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PREFACE 
The aim of this thesis is to analyse the silence principle (i.e. the right to silence and the 
privilege against self-incrimination) and to determine its place within procedural and 
constitutional law. Should the silence principle be entirely abolished, sustained as a 
limited evidentiary rule or elevated to the status of a constitutional right? The central 
question to be argued is whether the silence principle has a rationally justifiable and valid 
procedural place within the accusatorial-adversarial Anglo-American system of criminal 
justice. 
The methodology employed in the main body of this thesis involves a critical and 
comparative examination of the silence principle and is founded on the following four legs : 
a) A historical analysis of the silence principle and its antecedents. Does the 
historical silence principle support the modern silence principle in description 
and scope? 
b) An analysis of the distinction between a "right" and a "privilege". Why is the 
accused's right to silence distinguished from the witness privilege? Is there a 
philosophical justification for the silence principle? 
c) A comparative study of the two major jurisdictions of the Anglo-American 
system of justice, namely : 
i) The American silence principle constituted as the fifth amendment 
privilege against self-incrimination and entrenched within the U.S. 
Constitution; 
ii) The English silence principle constituted until recently as a common law 
evidentiary rule contained within a body of ill-defined principles loosely 
referred to as the unwritten English Constitution. The common law rule 
has been statutorily formalized in the Criminal Justice and Public Order 
Act 1994 and will be greatly influenced by the new Human Rights Act 
1998. 
iii) The South African interpretation of a silence principle is caught between 
the two extremes of an American absolute right and an English 
evidentiary rule. Silence in South Africa is a relative right subject to a 
balance of interest and reasonable limitation. Which of these definitions 
is better suited as a template for an ideal silence principle? 
vi 
d) A comparative international study of the procedural differences between an 
inquisitorial and an accusatorial system. How does a principle of silence 
function outside the accusatorial system? 
The conclusion of the thesis is that the most suitable role of a silence principle within the 
accusatorial system is one of a flexible compromise. While it does not deserve abolition 
neither does it deserve elevation into a constitutional right. Silence is best suited to the 
role of a procedural evidentiary rule. A circumstantial item of evidence with its trial 
admissibility determined by the criteria of relevancy and prejudice. If the legal, political 
and cultural pressures upon a particular jurisdiction are such as to demand constitutional 
entrenchment then the second best alternative is to define the silence principle as a 
relative right susceptible to a properly applied balance of interest test. The worst 
alternative is to define the silence principle in absolute terms. Silence as an evidentiary 
rule or a relative right means that it will sometimes be necessary to emphasise the 
autonomous interests of the individual in remaining silent and at other times the societal 
interest in crime prevention. Which interest is to be preferred and to what extent will 
depend on the prevailing social pressures of the day. It shall be argued that the elevation 
of a silence principle into a constitutional right stifles a critical examination of the essentials 
of silence by disguising its inherent irrationality and lack of a philosophical raison de etre. 
The interpretation of a silence principle as an absolute constitutional right by the Supreme 
Court of the United States is confusing, contradictory and riddled with innumerable 
exceptions. By contrast the English approach to silence is pragmatic and highly 
successful. The Criminal Justice and Public Order Act of 1994 gives a meaningful 
interpretation of silence which takes into account its logical flaws. The English statute is a 
successful compromise between the need to protect the individual during the criminal 
process and the need to combating crime in the most efficient manner possible. While the 
South African interpretation of silence is a workable compromise, South Africa may have 
been better served by defining its silence principle in terms of the pragmatic English 
statutory model which allows for the efficient but carefully controlled use of silence in the 
combating of crime. 
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CHAPTER 1 
A DELICATELY POISED ARTIFICIALITY 
"Silence" as an evidentiary principle is universally recognized as one of the defining 
characteristics of the Anglo-American legal system. The historical thread of the silence 
principle is caught up in the evolution of an adversarial and accusatorial type criminal justice 
system. In a broad sense it derives its meaning and clarity from a unique jurisprudence but it 
also serves to illustrate many of the absurdities and weaknesses prevalent in the 
accusatorial criminal system. It has become the catch-all phrase of a popular contemporary 
literature. The layperson mostly ignorant of the law is likely to be familiar with the endlessly 
repeated caution of the television police drama, "you have a right to remain silent and 
anything you say will be used in evidence against you". Of course the silence principle 
encompasses more than a mere rule of silence in the face of police questioning. It also 
includes the accused's "right" to silence at trial and the witness's "privilege" against self-
incrimination during criminal, civil and other quasi-legal proceedings. The silence principle is 
not only a right to silence, it is also a right not to co-operate, not to be questioned and not to 
answer questions unless the individual chooses to do so in the unfettered exercise of a free 
will. 
A wall of confusion surrounds the so-called "right" to silence and the "privilege" against self-
incrimination. Apart from the obvious contradiction as to whether the silence principle is a 
"right", a "privilege" or merely an evidentiary "rule", the principle is not a uniform one but a 
bundle of disparate and sometimes overlapping immunities which arise at different stages of 
the legal process. The silence principle may generally be defined as a protective sphere 
which attaches to the individual during the criminal process. The traditional principle 
developed as a reaction to a number of historical pressures. Its primary historical justification 
is as a protection for the individual against state oppression, abuse of procedure and the 
compulsion of self-incriminatory evidence of guilt. Its secondary historical justification is as a 
guarantee against the unreliability of a confession coerced from the individual's mind by 
compulsion. Proponents of the silence principle have advanced it as the backbone of the 
accusational system. A principle which buttresses the central notion of a fair trial process by 
bringing about a proper balance between the individual-accused and the state-accuser. It is 
said to be a curb on government overreach, preventing abuse during custodial interrogation 
and maintaining a non-coercive relationship between interrogator and interrogee. It is also 
claimed to re-enforce the presumption of innocence so essential to the integrity of the Anglo-
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American criminal system. In theory it has been equated by the American courts with "our 
high regard for human dignity",1 "the inviolability of the human personality",2 "a right to a 
private enclave where the [individual] may lead a private life",3 and is said to protect "the 
conscience and dignity of man".4 The silence principle is supposedly "one of the great 
landmarks in man's struggle to make himself civilized".5 An expression of the fundamental 
decency in the relationship developed between government and man. Intended for ages to 
come and designed "to approach immortality as nearly as human institutions can approach 
it".6 Silence is regarded as a hallmark of democrac/ and a principle of natural justice which 
has become permanently fixed in the jurisprudence of the American State.8 The English and 
Australian courts have similarly characterized the silence principle as a general rule 
commensurate with "great justice and tenderness".9 "A maxim of our law as settled and as 
wise as almost any other in it" .10 An essential ingredient in the common law of human 
rights, 11 "a most important"12 and "sacred right". 13 The European Court of Human Rights has 
characterized the silence principle as a generally recognized international standard which 
lies at the heart of the notion of a fair trial.14 In theory the silence principle appears to be a 
substantial human and procedural right but in practice it has been subject to deep erosion 
and severe limitation. An intimate examination reveals a principle of great emotional and raw 
rhetorical power but one with a thoroughly inadequate jurisprudential foundation. The 
unpalatable truth is that the so-called "right" to silence and its corollary the "privilege" against 
self-incrimination finds its support more on sentiment than it does on philosophical reasoning. 
It is perhaps worth remembering Lord Templeman's qualified warning in A. T and T /ste/ Ltd v 
Tully, silence is an "archaic and unjustifiable survival from the past" .15 
Two clear and fundamental principles of the common law establish the proper and purposeful 
relationship between the state and the ordinary citizen within the state. First, there is the 
1 Cohen v Hurley 378 U.S 1 (1964). 
2 Murphy v Waterfront Commission 378 U.S 62 (1964). 
3 Miranda v Arizona 384 U.S 436, 460 (1966). 
4 Ullmann v United States 350 U.S 422, 446 (1950). 
5 Ullmann v United States ibid at 426. 
6 Cohen v Virginia 19 U.S 264, 387 (1821). 
7 Miranda v Arizona ibid at 460. 
8 Brown v Walker 161 U.S 591, 600 (1896). 
9 Harris v Southcote and Moreland (1751) 2 Ves Sen 389, 394. 
10 R v Scott (1856) Dears 28 47, 61. Livingstone v Murray (1830) 9 Shaw 161 (Scotland). 
11 Pyneboard (Pty) Ltd v Trade Practices Commission (1983) 152 CLR 328, 346. Sorby v 
Commonwealth (1983) A.L.J.R. 248, 261. 
12 Orme v Crockford (1824) 13 Price 376, 388. 
13 Re Worrel, ex parte Cossans (1820) 1 Buck 531,540. 
14 Saunders v U.K (1997) 23 E.H.R.R. 313 para 68. 
15 A T and T /stet Ltd v Tully (1993) A.C 45, 53. Although Lord Templeman refers to the witness's 
privilege against self-incrimination in civil proceedings, his warning may equally apply to the 
defendant's privilege at trial. 
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right of every individual not to be subjected to physical or psychological abuse at the hands 
of the state. The infringement of this principle during the pre-judicial and judicial process 
does immense damage to the integrity and legitimacy of the entire legal system. It goes 
without saying that in the Anglo-American criminal system, a coercively induced confession 
or admission is inadmissible. Not so much for reasons of unreliability or an infringement of 
the accused's "right" to silence but because its admissibility would corrupt the trial and violate 
the moral underpinning of the criminal process. Second and to some extent derived from the 
first principle, is the right of the innocent individual to be protected against irregular 
conviction. Punishing a citizen by mistake undermines public confidence in the validity and 
efficiency of the criminal process. On the other hand a criminal system which allows a large 
number of the guilty to escape (usually on excessively technical grounds) risks undermining 
public confidence in its social legitimacy. A fair trial in a civilized legal system is therefore 
recognizably predicated upon these two primary principles. Each legal system must within 
its own cultural nuances achieve a fair balance between the protection of the individual 
citizen-rights and the societal-state interest in public order and the cost effective punishment 
of the wrongdoer. These two primary principles have evolved to assist in the maintenance of 
a fair but finely poised balance of interests. 
To these two clear principles the common law has added a third, but unfortunately not so 
clear, principle, namely the principle of silence. The silence principle grants the suspect the 
legal power to remain silent during the police interview, the accused the right to refrain from 
testifying at trial and the witness the privilege to refuse the answering of incriminatory 
questions. It shall be argued in the course of this thesis that the silence principle, unlike the 
other two common law principles, actively creates an inevitable and totally unnecessary 
conflict with the societal interest in public order. Because of the artificial restraints it places 
on the ability of society to achieve a fair balance, genuine support for the silence principle 
has largely been conditioned by high sounding rhetorical flourishes and a sentimentality 
without clear reasoned jurisprudential foundations. A legal principle if it is to exist in harmony 
with other legal principles, must be susceptible to logical analysis, otherwise it simply serves 
to confuse and distort the legal process. A thorough examination of the Anglo-American 
legal literature will reveal a somewhat hypocritical lack of practical support for the silence 
principle. Both the English and the American courts, all too often, come to the pragmatic 
realization that the reality of fighting crime demands certain limitations on the individual's 
procedural and human rights. The United States Supreme Court has thought it unwise to 
pursue the ideal of a silence principle to its logical conclusion. Rather than develop a 
genuine constitutional right to silence, the Supreme Court has sought expedient refuge in a 
technical interpretation of the fifth amendment which confuses rather than clarifies the nature 
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and scope of the idea. The same is true of the English courts. The principle of silence is 
acclaimed as an important unwritten constitutional right of the English citizen.16 Yet the 
English courts give it even less practical support than do their American cousins. The 
unavoidable truth is that a silence principle hinders rather than aids in the establishment of a 
proper balance between the legal interests of the individual and the legal interests of society. 
Since the effect of a silence principle is to efficiently bar the admission of relevant evidence 
thereby suppressing the truth, silence should only be afforded legal recognition if the 
relationship it protects is of outstanding social importance and would be irredeemably 
harmed by the denial of recognition. 
The accused's right to silence is sometimes misleadingly confused with the witness's 
privilege against self-incrimination.17 The term privilege against self-incrimination is used in 
the United States to describe collectively and somewhat confusingly the various fifth 
amendment immunities which attach to the suspect, the accused and the witness. Fifth 
amendment silence within the paradigm of the United State Constitution is explained as a 
right "not to be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself', which means 
that American definitions of a right to silence and a privilege against self-incrimination will 
always be analysed within the framework of a state compelled self-incrimination. However, 
within the English and Commonwealth jurisprudential paradigm both the idea of silence and 
self-incrimination remain analytically distinct variations on a common denomination. The 
common denomination is the legally derived ability of not speaking out. In other words, the 
ability to refrain from a positive act. Primarily, the right to silence is the right not to be 
questioned. The privilege against self-incrimination is the privilege to refuse to answer 
damaging questions.18 Secondarily, a person may not speak at all and yet his silence may 
serve to incriminate him. The non-physical act (of not speaking) leads to the legal 
consequence (self-incrimination).19 Analytically there is a difference between silence and 
self-incrimination. 
16 The European Convention on Human Rights has been incorporated into domestic English law. The 
English court now has a specific written standard framework against which to compare all legal issues, 
law and precedent touching on human rights. (Human Rights Act 1998 incorporated August 2000). 
17 In R v Brophy (1982) A.C 476, 481, the House of Lords analysed the right against self-incrimination 
in the language of the right to silence. 
18 Williams The Proof of Guilt 3rd Ed London (1963) 37-38, suggests that only the right of a witness not 
to answer incriminating questions is properly to be regarded as a right against self-incrimination, 
whereas the right of an accused is a right not to be questioned. This distinction is declarative of the 
common law. In contrast Sec 35(3)0) of the South African Constitution gives the accused a right 
against self-incrimination. 
19 For example, the accused may exercise the right to silence in court, but if the judge comments on 
the silence, the accused's silence may incriminate him in the eyes of the jury. Similarly, if adverse 
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Silence : the right to silence is the legal power not to speak out or more precisely, a 
prohibition on the compulsion to speak. This wide legal power is an absolute immunity 
awarded to the suspect during the police interview (the suspect may remain silent in the face 
of interrogation) and to the accused at trial (the accused may refuse to take the witness 
stand and testify).20 A silence immunity in this sense also means that the state may not, 
during the course of the trial, draw any adverse inferences from the accused's conscious 
choice of pre-trial or trial silence. 
Self-incrimination : the privilege against self-incrimination is also an immunity not to speak 
but couched in the form of a protection against the compulsory production of self-
incriminatory testimonial evidence. This legal power is a selective and relative immunity 
awarded to the individual (either the suspect, the accused, or more commonly the witness) 
who may refuse to answer only those selected prosecutorial questions which pose the 
possible risk of a future criminal prosecution. 
Waiver : the final analytical component of a right to silence and a privilege against self-
incrimination is that both may be waived. Waiver is a common feature of all rights and more 
so of the silence principle. When silence is waived, it is by the exercise of the individual 
accused's or witness's reasonably informed and reasonably exercised voluntary free will. It 
is a waiver by a free moral agent knowing the facts and consequences of the different 
courses of action open to him and freely choosing the one over the other. A waiver choice 
may be either express or implied but is always intentional. 
Immunity : silence and self-incrimination are concerned with the protection (immunity) of the 
citizen against abuse of state power by those state organs charged with an investigatory or 
adjudicatory function. The pre-trial stage : silence and self incrimination at the pre-trial stage 
are usually weighed together because the effect of these protections only really manifests 
itself at the trial stage. The trial stage: silence at the trial stage is usually examined against 
the procedural framework of the accused's failure to testify. The witness: possesses only a 
privilege against self-incrimination and is immunized against a future risk of criminal 
prosecution. Immunity in this sense usually takes a statutory form and offers varying 
degrees of protection. The American immunity instrument provides a wide use and 
derivative use immunity which compels the witness to disclose all relevant information but 
prevents the derivative use of that testimony by the state. The English immunity instrument 
inferences were allowed to be drawn in court from the accused's exercise of the pre-trial right to 
silence, this may amount to a denial of the privilege against self-incrimination. 
20 The blanket protection applies equally to the suspect at pre-trial and the accused at trial. The 
difference being that the suspect does not possess the right to refuse to be questioned. He may 
remain silent during the interrogation, but the accused has the right not to take the witness stand and 
may not be questioned at all. 
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is more haphazard offering various degrees of protection, depending on the constructive 
interpretation of each statute (although this is now likely to change with the incorporation of 
the European Convention of Human Rights into domestic English law). The South African 
witness privilege is effectively defined as a limited use immunity which operates only at the 
specific proceeding where the incrimination might occur.21 
Competence and Compellability : a significant difference between the right to silence and 
the privilege against self-incrimination is characterized by the evidentiary rules of 
competence and compellability. The witness is competent, compellable and cannot refuse to 
take the witness stand.22 The witness need not answer incriminatory questions. The 
damaging questions may however, be properly put to the witness who must claim the 
privilege on a question to question basis. On the other side of the stand is the accused who 
is a competent witness for the defence, but an incompetent witness for the prosecution. He 
cannot be compelled to testify at his own trial. 23 On the one hand, the procedural rule which 
makes the accused a competent witness only for the defence is a re-enforcement of the 
accused's right to silence at trial. On the other hand, the rule which makes the accused an 
incompetent witness for the prosecution is a re-enforcement of the accused's privilege 
against self-incrimination .. The accused cannot be compelled by the prosecution to give 
evidence against another co-accused. 24 The reason being that the accused may 
inadvertently during examination-in-chief give self-incriminatory evidence in an attempt to 
minimize his own role in the crime. This prosecutorial incompetency applies only for the 
period during which the co-accused are jointly tried. The accused becomes a competent 
witness for the prosecution the moment he pleads guilty, is acquitted of the crime or when a 
separation of trials is ordered. When the accused voluntarily gives evidence against a co-
accused, he loses his protective shield and the prosecution may make use of the accused's 
evidence in cross-examination. The accused is said to have waived his protection and loses 
his privilege against self-incrimination. 
Adverse Inferences : the consequence of exercising a right to silence is determined by 
assessing the commentary of the judge or prosecution and deciding whether or not a 
21 Ferreira v Levin NO 1996 (1) SA 984 (CC), 1996 (1) BCLR (1) (CC), the constitutional right against 
self-incrimination is a use-immunity which guarantees the right to a fair criminal trial. If the right to a 
fair trial is not threatened, the self-incrimination rule has no application (at para 159). The link 
between a witness pre-trial self-incrimination immunity and the trial itself was forged on the 
unconstitutional nature of liquidation inquiries into company insolvencies (sec 417(2)(b) of the 
Companies Act 63 of 1973, which demanded self-incrimination). 
22 Sec 14 of the English Civil Evidence Act 1968. Sec 203, 217 and 219A of the South African 
Criminal Procedure Act 1977 as qualified by sec 14 of the Civil Proceedings Evidence Act 1965 . 
.23 Sec 1 (f) of the English Criminal Evidence Act 1898. Sec 196 of the South African Criminal 
Procedure Act 1977. 
24 The rule is necessary to prevent the prosecution from calling one accused to testify against another. 
The opportunity would then be created for the accused to be denied the privilege against self-
incrimination by inadvertently giving evidence in chief which is self-incriminating. 
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reasonably adverse inference has been drawn. Three common sense inferences may be 
drawn from the exercise of the silence principle; (i) Silence in the face of an accusation may 
be taken as an implied admission of what is said against the accused. (An implied 
agreement). (ii) Silence, alone or coupled to other evidence, may infer a consciousness of 
guilt. This kind of inference may amount to an implied agreement but it also consists of an 
unintended display of consciousness of the correctness of the case against the accused. (iii) 
Silence may be used to evaluate other evidence or inferences drawn from other evidence, 
allowing the other evidence to be more readily accepted. Silence may aid in the 
establishment of a prima facie case against the accused. These are logical inferences which 
may, but not necessarily must be drawn from silence, either in the face of a question asked 
or of evidence presented against the accused and to which the accused has an opportunity 
to reply. None of these logical inferences may be drawn unless a denial, explanation or 
answer would be reasonably expected, having regard to all the circumstances. 
Categories : Lord Musti/1 in R v Director of the Serious Fraud Squad : ex parte Smith 25 
succinctly describes a bundle of six rules of silence which differ in nature, origin and 
incidence: 
(a) A general immunity from being compelled on pain of punishment to answer 
questions. 
(b) A general immunity from being compelled on pain of punishment to answer 
questions which may incriminate. 
(c) A specific immunity of the suspect undergoing interrogation from being compelled 
on pain of punishment to answer questions of any kind. 
(d) A specific immunity possessed by an accused person at trial from being 
compelled to answer questions put to him in the dock. 
(e) A specific immunity possessed by a person charged with an offence from being 
interrogated. 
(f) A specific immunity possessed by an accused in certain circumstances from 
having adverse comment made on a failure to answer questions before trial or at 
the trial. 
The modern conception of silence as it is presently understood in the Anglo-American legal 
system is not any single one of the above-mentioned immunities but a combination of 
immunity (c), (d) and (f). Immunity (c) and (d) are the traditional and historical justifications 
for silence. Immunity (f) is a more recent protection without a historical justification. 
25 (1992) 3 W.L.R 66 (1993) A.C (HL) 30-1. 
8 
For the sake of clarity and brevity, the right to silence and the privilege against self-
incrimination shall be labeled, where so appropriate in the course of this thesis, by the catch-
all term "the silence principle". 
The meaning of a silence principle may also be illustrated by examining its relationship within 
the triad of procedural rights which make up the overarching principle of a right to a fair trial. 
The presumption of innocence has always enjoyed universal recognition as a fundamental 
tenet of procedural law. A golden thread designed to safeguard the rights of the individual at 
trial. 26 The conceptual relationship between a right to silence, a privilege against self-
incrimination and the presumption of innocence has been something of a jurisprudential 
enigma. The view that a right against self-incrimination is the primary factor in the 
relationship has been expressed by the South African Cape Provincial Division, 27 the 
Australian High Court,28 and the Canadian Supreme Court.29 The position that a right to 
silence is the governing principle is held by the House of Lords.30 However, in the seamless 
web of rights as recognized by S v Zuma and others,31 the most acceptable and coherent 
view holds that the dominant partner in the relationship should be the presumption of 
innocence.32 It is said that the character of a right to silence and a right against self-
incrimination is best understood when flowing as a natural consequence of the presumption 
26 The presumption of innocence is a fundamental tenet of the common law. It is enshrined in sec 
35(3)(h) of the South African Constitution and is the governing principle behind the silence and self-
incrimination rights of the suspect and the accused. The presumption means that at trial the state 
bears the full burden of proof and the final evidential burden of persuasion. It is a golden thread 
running through the criminal law (Woolmington v D.P.P. (1935) AC 462, Lord Sankey at 481) and 
pervades the whole of the criminal justice administration (Stephens, General View of the Criminal Law 
of England 2 Ed (1890) 183. 
27 Park-Ross v Director: Office for Serious Economic Offences 1995 (2) SA 148 (C) 162. 1995 (2) 
BCLR 198 (C). 
28 Pyneboard (Pfy) Ltd v Trade Practices Commission ibid note 11 at 346. 
29 R v Jones (1994) 2 SCR 229. R v Herbert {1990) 2 SCR 151, 57 CCC (3d) 1, 34. Thomson 
Newspapers Ltd v Canada: Director Restrictive Trade Practices Commission {1990) 1 SCR 425, 480. 
R v P (MB) (1994) 113 DLR 461, 477-8 referring to the right to remain silent and the presumption of 
innocence, "All of these protections, which emanate from the broad principle against self-incrimination, 
recognize that it is up to the state, with its greater resources, to investigate and prove its own case, 
and the individual should not be conscripted into helping the state fulfil this task". 
30 R v Brophy ibid note 17 at 481. 
31 1995 (2) SA 642 (CC) 1995 (4) BCLR 401 (CC). It is for the prosecution to prove the guilt of the 
accused beyond a reasonable doubt. Reverse the burden of proof and the right to remain silent after 
arrest, the right not to be compelled to make a confession and the right not to be a compellable 
witness against oneself, would be seriously undermined (para 33). 
32 See also S v Mbatha; S v Prinsloo 1996 (2) SA 464 (CC). 1996 (3) BCLR 293 (C.C). S v Meaker 
1998 (8) BCLR 1038 (W), 1998 (2) SACR 73 (W), a reverse onus provision violates the right to remain 
silent (at 850). Osman and Another v Attorney-General, Transvaal1998 (4) SA 1224 (CC), 1998 (11) 
BCLR 1362 (CC), the Constitution enshrines both the presumption of innocence and the right to 
remain silent during plea proceedings and at trial. These rights reinforce each other and are integral 
to a right to a fair trial (at para 12). Sopinka J in R v Noble (1997) 146 DLR 385 (Canada), states "the 
use of silence to establish a prima facie case infringes the presumption of innocence by relieving the 
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of innocence. The seamless web of rights dominated by the presumption of innocence is 
concerned with justifying the criminal justice system's limitation of liberty rights.33 Disturbing 
the right to silence causes a damaging ripple effect throughout the fabric of the criminal 
justice system. By limiting or eroding the individual's right to silence the pivotal presumption 
of innocence is unbalanced and the resultant damage to the fair trial principle undermines 
the credibility of the entire criminal justice system. 
Within the woof and sweep of the complex fabric making up a typical Anglo-American 
criminal justice system, the silence principle has the following procedural applications : 
First, it is one of the rules which defines the parameters of the citizen's legal duty to co-
operate with the state. The state's criminal investigatory organs rely heavily on the individual 
citizen's co-operation. The state may require the individual to answer questions and hand 
over documents. It may request the individual to subject himself to a forensic examination, 
intimate body sampling, identity parades and searches of person or property. In essence, 
the silence principle straddles the border between the compulsion of personal communicative 
testimonial evidence and physical external real evidence. Second, the silence principle 
provides an evidential immunity from judicial and prosecutorial comment. The prosecution 
(and sometimes the judicial officer) is usually prohibited from commenting to the jury on the 
accused's refusal to answer questions, both at pre-trial and at trial. In a non-jury system like 
South Africa, the judge must warn himself against being influenced by the accused's failure 
to testify.34 Ideally, no adverse inferences, particularly of guilt, may be drawn from silence 
during the pre-trial or trial stage.35 The United States Supreme Court has held in Griffin v 
prosecution of its duty to establish its case unassisted by the accused". See also R v Dubois (1985) 
23 DLR (41h) 503, 521-2. 
33 A balanced assessment of the jurisprudential relationship between a presumption of innocence, the 
right to silence and the privilege against self-incrimination can only be made once it is understood that 
criminal justice rights are based not only on the rationale of protecting human dignity but also as a 
justification for interference with the individual citizen's liberty. The foundational status of the 
presumption of innocence, its connection to the right to silence and its nexus with the fair trial concept 
can only be understood as a basket of protections which justify the criminal administrative system's 
interference with individual liberty. This is the essential American Constitutional reasoning and has 
been adopted by a South African court in Uneeda Taxi Service Association v Maninjwa and Others 
1998 (3) SA 417 (E) 1998 (6) BCLR 683 (E). 
34 It is suggested that judicial comment and permission to the jury to make use of adverse inferences 
from silence should not apply outside the context of the jury trial : S v Brown en 'n Ander 1996 (11} 
BCLR 1480 (NC) 1490 1996 (2) SACR 49 (NC). However, even a judge (sitting without a jury) 
hardened by the constant exposure to a never-ending procession of guilty accused may find it difficult 
to appreciate the presumption of innocence. For the jaded judicial trier-of-fact, it may be even more 
important to be continually reminded of the necessity of a strict compliance with the rules of evidence. 
Seigel "Rethinking Adversariness In Non-jury Criminal Trials" (23) Am. J. Crim. L (1995) 1. 
35 Ideally, no inference should be drawn from the exercise of silence. Realistically however, human 
nature being what it is, the likelihood of adverse inferences being drawn by a layman jury is strong. 
What should be guarded against is the drawing of inferences which amount to guilt or damaging 
inferences which make the use of silence unreasonably costly for the accused. Griffin v California 380 
U.S 609 (1965). 
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California 36 that neither the judge nor the prosecution may comment to the jury on the 
accused's failure to testify. Miranda v Arizona 37 prevents the state from making use of the 
suspect's silence during custodial interrogation and Jenkins v Anderson 38 allows pre-trial 
silence to be used only for the limited purpose of impeaching the accused's credibility at trial. 
In England the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act (1994) expressly allows for the drawing 
of adverse inferences in specific instances. The Canadian Supreme Court has re-affirmed 
the common law rule in R v Noble,39 by barring adverse inferences of guilt from the 
accused's failure to testify. South Africa unambiguously follows the English common law. 
Adverse inferences may only be drawn from the accused's failure to rebut the state's prima 
facie case. These inferences may not amount to inferences of guilt. The extent to which the 
common law position will be altered by the constitutionalisation of the silence principle was 
left open by the Constitutional Court in Osman and Another v Attorney-General Transvaa/. 40 
Third, the silence principle is designed to provide the suspect with a cautionary warning 
during the police interrogation. The warning should also include an instruction on access to 
legal advice. Fourth, the silence principle within the law of evidence gives direct substantial 
and procedural support to two other evidentiary exclusionary rules. The rule against an 
involuntary confession, and the rule against the admission of evidence obtained by police 
deceit and trickery find a measure of jurisprudential support in the suspect's legally 
recognized ability to remain silent.41 
The arguments for and against the silence principle are summarized here for convenience 
but will be analysed in greater detail in the succeeding chapters. The arguments in favour of 
a silence principle are as follows : 
(a) Silence is a fundamental component of a fair accusatorial trial process linking the 
presumption of innocence to the key procedural duty within the adversarial trial 
process, namely the state's burden of proving guilt unaided by the accused. 
(b) There are a number of reasons for silence which are consistent with innocence. 
36 ibid. 
The suspect may be embarrassed or shocked into silence by the accusation. He 
may have an antipathy towards the police which precludes co-operation. The 
37 384 U.S 436 (1966). 
38 447 U.S 231 (1980). 
39 (1997) 146 DLR (41h) 385 43 CRR (2d) 233. Sec 4(6) of the Canadian Evidence Act prevents 
judicial or prosecutorial comment on adverse inference use to the jury. But the judge may also not 
warn the jury against drawing inferences from silence. 
40 Ibid note 32 para 24. The Botswana Court of Appeal has held in Attorney-General v Moagi (1982) II 
BLR (CA) 131, 175 that an adverse inferences is permissible and does not offend the constitutional 
right of the accused once a prima facie case has been established. See infra chapter 11 note 50. 
41 See in particular the clear definitions set out in the English Police and Criminal Evidence Act (1984) 
amended (1991), Sec 76 and Sec 78, hereinafter referred to as PACE. 
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accused may elect to remain silent at trial because of a poor demeanour, inability 
to express himself properly or a simple ignorance of the issues. Silence is a good 
protective shield for the immature, inadequate, weak or vulnerable 
suspect/accused most liable to manipulation under police questioning or 
prosecutorial cross-examination. 
(c) Silence protects against the cultural compulsion to speak and reduces the 
temptation to lie. Consequently, a silence principle reduces the risk of a false 
confession, perjury or misleading testimony. Silence enhances the truth-finding 
function of the adversarial process. 
(d) Silence is a strong shield against most state induced forms of physical and 
psychological abuse, including the inducements of trickery and deception. 
(e) Silence guards against unjustifiable infringements of the individual's liberty (a 
primary justification of the American fifth amendment), human dignity and privacy 
(a primary justification of the South African bill of rights). In this sense, it protects 
against the ultimate degradation of forcing the accused to convict himself from out 
his own mouth. 
(f) No logical or evidentiary relevant adverse inferences may be drawn from silence. 
A relevant and positive inference cannot be logically drawn from the negative 
"nothingness" of silence. 
(g) The witness privilege against self-incrimination encourages testimony and allows 
for an optimum functioning of the adversarial system. lmmunising the witness 
strikes a good balance between the court's need for reliable and trustworthy 
information and the witness instinctive need for protection against prosecution.42 
The arguments against a silence principle may be summarized as : 
(a) The silence principle has no rational jurisprudential foundation and its historical 
antecedents do not support the generous interpretation and scope awarded to the 
modern principle. A legal principle which has no logical foundation serves only to 
distort rather than enhance the criminal process. 
(b) Following from the above, the silence principle serves only to inhibit a criminal 
process which should be better designed to expose rather than suppress legal 
facts in the pursuit of legal truth. 
(c) Other evidentiary testimonial privileges are able to socially, culturally and legally 
justify the exclusion of relevant evidence. Professional privilege excludes relevant 
evidence because it enhances the professional relationship between attorney and 
42 The privilege encourages the witness to come forward and give evidence (encouraging testimony) 
and it re-enforces public opinion (self-incrimination is abhorrent to public opinion). 
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client. Marital privilege is a social necessity and supports the intimate 
relationship between the spouses. Public privilege excludes relevant evidence 
because its disclosure would be detrimental to the state interest. Only the 
privilege against self-incrimination is unable to supply a pressing social or legal 
rationale for its exclusion of relevant evidence. 
(d) The abolition of a silence principle would rationalize procedural law, make the 
criminal process practically more efficient and excuse the court from drawing 
absurdly fine distinctions on silence. 
(e) The abolition or limitation of the silence principle would not harm the individual, as 
adverse inferences would not be automatic, but dependent on the circumstance 
and reasonably evaluated in the light of all the evidence. 
(f) Silence is an effective shield for the knowledgeable and guilty accused but not for 
the innocent accused. When faced by an accusation the natural instinct of the 
guilty person is to remain silent and to obfuscate the facts whereas the innocent 
person is more likely to speak up in an attempt to explain the facts. The guilty 
accused, but not the innocent accused, is presented with a dilemma between 
disclosing evidence of guilt or suffering an adverse inference through saying 
nothing. The silence principle calls upon the law to dispense with the dilemma 
and allows the accused to conceal knowledge of guilt. Undoubtedly the choice 
forced upon the guilty accused is psychologically unenviable, but why should it be 
a function of the law to shield the guilty accused from making it? 
(g) When the accused fails to testify or to rebut a prima facie case (absent an 
innocent explanation), the logical and rational inference must be that the accused 
is guilty. 
(h) Statistically the silence protection is hardly ever exercised in the station house or 
at trial. Where it is exercised it results in high acquittal and low conviction rates. 
It is therefore futile to support a principle which is so under-utilized but which 
when efficiently utilized, has the dangerous potential to severely undermine law 
enforcement. 
(i) Silence is a weak protection against physical torture and psychological coercion. 
There are better alternatives which give a wider practical protection against 
sophisticated modern investigatory techniques (ie. The automatic right to have 
legal counsel present during all interrogations. The use of tape-recordings and 
video as a necessary part of the interrogation). 
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(j) Use and derivative use immunity has become an effective modern substitute for 
the witness privilege against self-incrimination in most Anglo-American 
jurisdictions. The witness privilege is rapidly becoming a vestigial protection. 
There are a number of strong psychological motivations built into the adversarial-accusatorial 
criminal system which makes a perfect right to silence unrealistic in practice. The average 
suspect, unlike the hardened professional criminal, feels a strong social pressure to co-
operate with the police. The suspect's natural anxiety to explain his innocence coupled with 
the intimidating atmosphere of the interview room and the well-honed interrogation skills of 
the police, rapidly erode the suspect's resistance and will to claim the right to silence. The 
right to silence in such a hostile environment is a weak and ineffective protection more likely 
to be manipulated by the professional criminal than the average suspect. There are better 
practical safeguards available which are not susceptible to the corrosive environment of the 
police station. Once out of the station house and in the courtroom, the accused's right to 
silence is at best a two-edged sword. It may serve to keep the accused out of the witness 
stand, but it cannot prevent the layman jury from drawing a natural psychological inference of 
guilt. Despite judicial instruction to the contrary, damaging inferences may always be drawn 
once the jurors become aware not only of the accused's refusal to testify, but also of his 
previous refusal to answer police questions. There is simply no legal manner in which the 
natural jury inclination can be prevented. Statistical studies in England indicate that in 
response to the inherent psychological pressures built into the Anglo-American criminal 
process the majority of suspects choose to waive the right to silence. 
Why is there such an implacable hostility towards the right to silence on the part of the law 
enforcement establishment? After all, the right to silence is an impractical and weak 
protection easily broken down in the interview room and exercised by a very small number of 
informed suspects. The underlying reason may well be that if the right to silence is ever 
taken seriously, its potential impact on the criminal investigation process would be extremely 
damaging. The criminal justice system is specifically organized around the interrogation, the 
confession and the guilty plea. An effective right to silence would seriously disrupt this 
process. A secondary reason may be the complicated moral dilemma presented to the 
ordinary police officer by the right to silence. On the one hand it is the training and instinct of 
a good policeman to break down the unco-operative suspect in order to obtain relevant 
evidence. On the other hand, the police officer is also charged with the duty of informing the 
suspect of his right to silence, the contrary aim of which is to inhibit the release of relevant 
evidence. The officer is placed in a moral quandary, caught between his professional 
responsibilities and the artificial duty imposed upon him by the right to silence. The result is 
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that the police officer often stretches or breaks the law in order to carry out his duty 
efficiently. The courts collude in this process by ignoring police trickery and deception or by 
imposing weak sanctions against obvious breaches of the law. 
The general principle of silence is the progeny of the adversarial trial and to a large extent 
finds its justification in the unique nature of the Anglo-American criminal justice system. A 
process in which counsel for the state and the accused square up against each other and 
fight over the body of the accused before a neutral judicial "umpire". Libertarian protagonists 
have seized upon the unique nature of the common law criminal system as a primary 
justification for the silence principle. In the adversarial context, the state maintains a 
disproportionate power which necessitates a formidable array of procedural rules to level the 
"playing field" and to protect the accused's interest. The procedural rules of the adversarial 
system have been developed to ensure a fair trial contest. An arena is provided in which the 
primary goal of the state is to artificially establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt and in 
which the aim of establishing truth is usually a secondary consideration. Within the artificial 
arena, removed as it is from practical reality, the silence principle finds a comfortable abode. 
One of the major purposes of a silence principle in this artificial process is said to do "with 
the finding of truth".43 According to this muddled view, the silence principle enhances the 
reliability of the truth-seeking process by eliminating the abuses characteristic of an 
inquisitorial style criminal investigation.44 It achieves factual accuracy by excluding unreliable 
confessions and by forcing the state to build its case through an independent investigation. 
In Miranda v Arizona,45 the court defines the adversarial system as a demand "that the 
government seeking to punish an individual, produce the evidence against him by its own 
independent labours rather than the cruel expedient of compelling it from his own mouth". 
Yet in contradiction, the same court via Justice Stewart in Tehan v United States,46 claimed 
that "the fifth amendment ...... is not an adjunct to the ascertainment of truth" and Justice 
Cardozo in Palkov v Connecticut,47 said "justice ...... would not perish if the accused were 
subject to a duty to respond to orderly inquiry". Why is the automatic assumption made that 
crime is capable of being solved by the independent labours of the state unassisted by the 
accused? The nature of crime is such that often only the perpetrator has relevant knowledge 
of the crime. More importantly why should the trial be an artificially level playing field? 
Criminal justice is not a game and it is absurdly inappropriate to define the accused as a 
43 Michigan v Tucker417 U.S 433, 448-9 {1974). Oregon v Elstad 470 U.S 298 {1985). 
44 Murphy v Waterfront Commission 378 U.S 52 {1964}, "our preference for an accusatorial rather 
than an inquisitorial system of criminal justice". 
45 384 U.S 436,460 {1966). See also Malloy v Hogan 378 U.S 1, 8 {1964). 
46 382 u.s 406,415-18 {1966). 
47 302 u.s 319, 325-26 {1937). 
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sportsman deserving of a sporting chance to escape justice. The notion smacks of 
antiquated etonian idealism. Another widespread assumption is the idea that the silence 
principle somehow protects the adversarial system against the pernicious influences of the 
inquisitorial system. Abolish the right to silence and the superior adversarial system would 
quickly degenerate into an inferior, unfair and oppressive inquisitorial type system. The 
silence principle is justified as a delicately poised protection standing between a fair "cricket 
match" type adversarial system and a harsh "Roman-gladiatorial" type inquisitorial system. 
Surely these unverifiable and bellicose libertarian assumptions are merely another example 
of the irrational and emotional use of language by proponents of a silence principle who are 
forced to base their arguments on sentimentality rather than on well reasoned facts? 
Once removed from the artificial environment of the trial process, the flawed pretences of a 
silence principle reveal themselves. In the real world personal accountability is the usual 
societal moral norm. The wrongdoer is expected to personally account for his transgression 
of social rules. The young child caught with his hand in the cookie jar is not instructed on his 
right to remain silent, but requested to make an honest and revealing disclosure. Yet, in the 
artificial world of the courtroom, the silence principle entrenches non co-operation and 
expressly denies the necessity for personal responsibility and a moral duty to account for 
wrong actions. Indeed, in the United States and now ,in South Africa, the ideal of non co-
operation is raised to the status of a constitutional right. The artificial nature of the 
adversarial system means that innocence or guilt is not predicated on the true facts but is 
conditioned solely by the prosecution's ability to prove guilt in accordance with a number of 
highly technical evidentiary rules and procedures. The slightest distortion of this delicately 
poised artificiality has wide-ranging and damaging ramifications for the entire criminal 
process. In South Africa the distortion is triggered by a first world standard in procedural 
laws but a third world's lack of economic resources and a consequent inability to practically 
enforce the high theoretical standards. The result is a gradual breakdown of the criminal 
justice system and an increasing inability to cope with spiraling levels of criminality. What 
South Africa requires is a less aggressive adversarial system in which excessively technical 
and artificial rules are systematically reformed or abolished. The silence principle is one of 
the artificial rules which needs to be reconsidered. 
In theory, the adversarial accusatorial court is expected to be a fair and disinterested trier-of-
fact nobly protecting the human interests of the accused. The state legislates high sounding 
rules to protect these seemingly noble sentiments. The reality is quite different. In practice, 
almost 95% of criminal convictions in the United States are obtained through a formal system 
of plea-bargaining. Although it is difficult to establish precise figures, in South Africa, the U.K 
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and Australia a significant minority of convictions occur through the use of informal plea-
bargaining arrangements. These convictions by-pass the trial process and take place in the 
back room via the negotiated guilty plea where none of the so-called noble protections apply. 
The accusatorial criminal system, despite its high sounding rhetoric, is only partially a system 
based on due process and a fair trial. In some measure the criminal process has been 
cynically reduced and redirected to the exploiting of cost-efficient guilty pleas without the 
need for recourse to time-consuming and expensive trials. The accusatorial system is 
unavoidably seared by the mark of hypocrisy. On the one hand it upholds the silence 
principle as a fundamental constitutional value, but on the other hand, the system relies 
extensively on inducing so-called voluntary confessions. The irony is that the accusatorial 
system elaborately protects the accused through his right to silence in an open public trial 
where the danger of abusing the accused's right is minimal. But behind the scenes police 
interrogators surreptitiously induce confessions and state prosecutors negotiate these 
confessions into guilty pleas. Why? Could it be that obtaining a conviction in the modern 
judicial trial in which the accused is shielded by a comprehensive presumption of innocence 
and an elaborate right to silence is now so difficult that the criminal system is forced to rely 
on extra-judicial devices for a significant number of its convictions. 
The accusatorial and adversarial criminal justice process is a finely poised system which 
requires a vigilant maintenance and a constant fine tuning. The South African criminal 
system is a perfect illustration of what can go wrong when this delicate system is mal-
administered. At the pre-trial stage there is an undermanned, overworked and ill-equipped 
police force whose investigatory processes are often incomplete and marred by insufficient 
or inadmissible evidence. At the trial stage, the inexperienced state prosecutor must build up 
a prima facie case from an incomplete police docket and then somehow match the trial 
standard of a proof beyond reasonable doubt. All this in the teeth of highly technical 
procedural safeguards for the accused. The result is an army of professional criminals well 
advised by expensive defence counsel who escape liability by hiding behind the right to 
silence. Na"ive, ignorant and incompetently represented petty criminals who waive their right 
to silence and having no other effective back-up procedural safeguards fill the prisons in their 
tens of thousands. The consequence is a desperate discussion on introducing a formal plea-
bargain procedure modeled on the American experience.48 The goal, to increase the pre-trial 
bargained conviction rate to the American level. The solution, libertarian proponents would 
48 Debate around the introduction of a formal plea-bargain procedure is still in its infancy. Although it 
is presently impossible to determine the number of convictions induced by informal plea-bargaining, 
once a formal system is in place bargained guilty pleas are likely to increase significantly to American 
levels. See further Discussion Paper 94. Jan 2001, project 73, Simplification of Criminal Procedure 
(Sentence Agreements). 
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say, is a better funded and comprehensively staffed criminal justice system. Agreed! But 
also a silence principle which is less than a fundamental human right and more like an 
evidentiary rule capable of rational and pragmatic judicial evaluation. A shield certainly! But 
not one behind which the guilty accused may find an absolute shelter. 
The main body of this thesis shall be made up of an analysis of the English and the American 
treatment of the silence principle. A valuable insight may be gained from a comparison 
between the English reduction of the silence principle into a mere evidentiary rule and the 
American elevation of the principle into an absolute constitutional right. In America the 
silence principle is based on a constitutional interpretation of the fifth amendment (1791 
Constitution), whereas the English principle is statutorily subsumed in the Criminal Justice 
and Public Order Act 1994. The structure of the English and the American debate over the 
silence principle is significantly different. 
The American principle is generally defined in absolute terms and is not subject to legislative 
curtailment. The American debate is a limited one about the scope of the constitutional right 
rather than an unlimited one over its inherent nature. By contrast, in a parliamentary 
sovereignty such as England, the debate is more radical and focuses on the very essence of 
silence as a fundamental common law principle. The trend in England has been towards 
erosion and formal legislative attrition of the silence principle. The English practice, because 
it does not have the ready benefit of a written constitution is to seek immediate relief of 
specific individual grievances rather than express rights in broad general terms as is the 
American way. Although there is no English inspired constitutional code which protects basic 
individual rights, England has recently incorporated the European Convention on Human 
Rights into domestic law (Human Rights Act 1998). The Human Rights Act's influence on 
the jurisprudence of the silence principle is likely to be considerable. By contrasting the 
American and the English experience a vibrant picture of the silence principle is created as it 
is presently practiced and understood in the Anglo-American criminal justice system. An 
intimate and comparative study is also relevant to the South African experience. South 
Africa is currently caught in a legal cultural divide. On the one hand the South African 
silence principle is squarely and unimaginatively based on English antecedents and 
precedents. In the past South African adjective law has always looked to England for its 
jurisprudential inspiration. On the other hand, the constitutionalisation of the silence principle 
will mean that Canadian and American precedent will become increasingly more persuasive 
as the English influence begins to wane. Canadian constitutional law will become generally 
influential over the entire spectrum of constitutional practice and American influences are 
likely to be specifically limited to certain key areas of the South African Bill of Rights, one of 
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which is likely to be the right to silence.49 The focus of the South African debate will 
undoubtedly shift from one in which the nature of the principle is questioned to one in which 
the scope of the principle is defined. Ironically, in the face of rising crime levels, the English 
have chosen to limit silence as an unjustifiable obstruction to the efficient investigation and 
prosecution of criminals. South Africa, despite its limited economic resources, has chosen 
instead the luxury of institutionalizing silence by raising it to the status of a procedural right. 
Once silence as a constitutional procedural right is annexed to the notion of a fair trial, it 
becomes impossible to negotiate. Essential reform becomes difficult and, in an attempt to 
solve the problem, more and more superficial and artificial layers are added to the criminal 
process which serves only to disguise rather than resolve the problem. By contrast, the 
Australians have elected not to entrench a silence principle within the federal constitution. 
Consequently, each of Australia's five states has the power to statutorily modify or even 
abrogate the silence principle. It can only be a healthy process for every jurisdiction, at 
intervals, to examine the tenets of its legal system in order to determine whether the rules 
remain relevant to the socio-legal demands of the day. By constitutionalising silence, the 
South African legal system has partially closed the door on this dynamic avenue of legal 
reform. In addition to an analysis of the Anglo-American jurisprudence, a secondary 
examination will also be made of the inquisitorial system's treatment of the silence principle. 
Although the silence principle is a unique creation of the accusatorial system, it does play an 
important role in the trial process of the inquisitorial system (a legacy of the French 
Revolution's absorption of English legal principles). In addition, the European Convention on 
Human Rights has recently been interpreted to include a right to silence (sec 6(1 )) which is 
closely linked to the notion of a fair trial and the presumption of innocence. A complete 
understanding of the silence principle requires a comparison between the two major Western 
I 
legal traditions. 
The erosion of the English silence principle is due in large measure to a renewed popularity 
of a modernized Benthamite-Utilitarian50 philosophy which conceives of silence as no more 
than an instrumental protection for certain procedural interests of the criminal defendant. 
Silence is negotiable on the basis that it is only one of a number of alternative protective 
devices, most of which are more effective as procedural shields. At the other end of the 
49 The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms does not contain an express right to silence at the 
pre-trial stage (at best sec 10(b) recognizes the right to be informed of counsel and a failure to warn a 
suspect of such a right may indirectly exclude statements made by the suspect). Sec 11(c) and sec 
13 only prevent self-incrimination at the trial but not the pre-trial stage. The backbone of the Canadian 
right to silence remains the common law and statutory law. Because of the incomplete and limited 
nature of the Canadian Constitutional silence principle, American fifth amendment jurisprudence is 
likely to remain far more persuasive in the jurisprudence of a South African right to silence. 
50 Bentham Rationale of Judicial Evidence Book II ch 3 Bowring Ed 1843. 
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spectrum the entrenchment of a constitutional silence principle is due to a libertarian ethos of 
human rights which emphasizes the needs of the individual over the interests of society. 
Unfortunately the libertarian reference does not allow for a rational justification of the silence 
principle and the inquiry around the evidentiary value of silence is sometimes obscured by 
the lavish use of rhetorical rather than substantive arguments. For example, one of the 
central libertarian arguments is that if the sovereign state seeks to prosecute, convict and 
punish the criminal accused, it must do so on the strength of evidence gathered through its 
own independent exertions rather than through the coerced assistance of the accused. 
However immutable this justification for silence may be in theory, it has been set aside in a 
host of cases in which the accused has been compelled to aid his accusers in the search for 
the evidence needed to secure his conviction. The accused is legally compelled to 
participate in an identity parade, to speak, write, spell, to provide superficial body evidence of 
fingerprints, shoeprints, height, colouring, shape, to walk in a certain way, to supply intimate 
blood, and DNA tissue sampling. South Africa has legislated a statutory obligation which 
compels rape suspects to furnish blood samples in order to determine HIV status. The 
significant difference between a libertarian definition of a largely theoretical silence principle 
and its practical irrelevancy is illustrative of the smoke and mirror libertarian approach to the 
silence debate. 
The thesis has been developed and framed in a manner which provides the answers to a 
number of critical questions. The intention is to provide an easily understood and 
comprehensive quantum of information about the nature of silence and the use made of 
silence in the various key stages of the legal process. The difference between silence as a 
constitutional right and as a mere evidentiary rule will be examined, as will the manner in 
which cultural nuances effect the application of the silence principle. The thesis will ask and 
attempt to answer the following questions : 
(a) How did the component elements (the right to silence and the privilege against 
self-incrimination) of a silence principle evolve? What is the difference between 
the historical principle and its modern counterpart? 
(b) Is the silence principle more appropriate to a right, a privilege or an evidentiary 
rule? Does the silence principle possess a logical foundation and are there 
rationales which justify it? 
(c) Should a constitutional right to silence be defined in absolute or relative terms and 
be subject to a balance of interest analysis? Which is the most appropriate, the 
American right defined in absolute terms which excludes a balance of interests, 
the English rule defined in evidentiary terms and open to statutory modification, .or 
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the South African right defined in relative terms and susceptible to a balance of 
interests analysis? 
(d) When, how and to whom does a right to silence and a privilege against self-
incrimination apply? Do they only apply to the suspect, accused or the witness? 
What about the pre-arrest suspect and the preliminary interviewee? Before or 
after caution and only in criminal proceedings? Is there a difference between 
testimonial and non-testimonial evidence, oral and documentary testimony, 
natural and juristic personae? 
(e) How is silence used and does it have any evidentiary value in itself? May silence 
infer guilt or does it merely add circumstantial evidence to an already established 
prima facie case? Is silence capable of acting as a prior inconsistent fact able to 
undermine the accused's credibility at trial? May the judge and the jury comment 
on silence? May the jury be directed to ignore the accused's silence? Under 
what circumstances and in terms of which requirement may a privilege of self-
incrimination be evoked? 
(f) What lessons are to be learnt from a comparative analysis of the major Anglo-
American jurisdictions? What valuable insights may be derived from a 
comparison between the accusatorial and inquisitorial legal systems? 
Many of the legal conclusions reached in answering these questions will depend on where 
the balance is struck between a utilitarian reasoning in which all relevant information is to be 
made available to the trial officer in the interests of truth and a libertarian reasoning in which 
certain kinds of relevant information are to be excluded because individual rights must be 
protected against infringement by state organs. The thesis is therefore written within the 
following paradigm. At best, it may be argued that a silence principle provides some 
measure of protection against state-sponsored physical and psychological procedural abuse 
of the accused at the hands of the police interrogator and later, at the hands of the state 
prosecutor. The idea of a silence principle as a procedural protection for the suspect during 
custodial interrogation was the sole consideration in persuading Wigmore to end his initial 
objection to silence and to accept a narrow pre-trial evidentiary based silence rule.51 At 
worst, a silence principle actively suppresses relevant evidence and subverts the basic 
purpose of the criminal justice system which is to arrive at the legal truth. The old adage that 
51 Wigmore A Treatise on the Anglo-American System of Evidence in Trials at Common Law 
McNaughton Ed, Little Brown & Co (1961). 
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the criminal trial is not about truth but about justice should be dismissed with contempt. Just 
as science is about the search for natural truth, so the law should be about the business of 
legal truth. 
During the course of this thesis a number of conclusions will become readily apparent : 
(a) The historical antecedents of the silence principle do not support the modern 
definition and the wide scope of the contemporary silence principle; 
(b) There are no rational justifications for the silence principle. A constitutionalised 
silence principle is built on weak philosophical foundations. The silence principle 
is truly a mansion built on sand; 
(c) The elevation of the silence principle above an ordinary evidentiary rule gives 
silence a ring of absoluteness. It then becomes difficult to apply a proper and 
necessary balance of interest test. 
(d) The constitutional entrenchment of the silence principle limits the legal 
establishment's ability to review and reform. The debate about silence within the 
court becomes a sterile and artificial one over the scope of the principle rather 
than a dynamic one about its nature and essence. 
(e) When a constitutional right to silence is limited (and only in the most exceptional 
circumstance), the various justifications for the limitation are usually awkward, 
unconvincing explanations based on an artificial logic. Many of the United States 
Supreme Court decisions which limit silence fall into this category. 
(f) Silence can only be meaningfully understood in terms of a compromise. Silence 
does have a place within the legal hierarchy, not as a constitutional right, but 
more as an evidentiary rule capable of rational judicial evaluation. It may have 
some value as a protection during custodial interrogation, but its protective value 
at trial is illusionary, especially in a jury-type trial system. 
(g) The silence principle's protective value in a jury-based trial process is illusionary 
as there is no method by which the court can control the thought processes of the 
jury. The juror may draw any kind of conscious or unconscious, reasonable or 
unreasonable adverse inference as he or she may think fit. The silence 
principle's protective value in a non-jury trial process is simply superfluous. The 
professional judge as the trier-of-fact is unlikely to draw an unreasonable adverse 




2.1 A Historiographic Perspective 
In order to formulate a comprehensive and critical framework within which to analyse the 
modern "right" to silence and its adjunct the "privilege" against self-incrimination, it is first 
necessary to understand the idea within its historical context. The strong passion which a 
silence principle evokes within its proponents, the contrary and equally strong antagonism 
expressed by its critics, begins to be better understood once the origin and evolution of the 
legal principle is examined at some length. In the words of Frankfurter J, "a page of history is 
worth a volume of logic".1 The silence concept encapsulated by the Latin maxim "Nemo 
Tenetur Prodere Seipsum"2 is said to be a unique and fundamental factor in the development 
of the Anglo-American criminal procedure and one of the key events in humankind's struggle 
to be civilized.3 The giants of English law, Blackstone and Gilbert regard the idea as 
illustrative of the best in English jurisprudential development.4 While Bentham responds to 
the idea of silence by characterizing it as a "pretence" and "nonsense on stilts".5 The origin 
of the initial privilege against self-incrimination is to obscure to be dated precisely. 
Nevertheless the philosophical idea is born in a time of extreme social ferment,6 roughly 
between the demise of the last Plantagenet kings7 and the rise of the sturdy Tudor dynasty.8 
It is a child of the religious, political and constitutional struggles which mark sixteenth and 
seventeenth century England. As a comprehensive but abstract legal principle it comes of 
1 Ullmann v United States 350 U.S 422, 438 (1956). 
2 The ancillary argument is made that the true source of the Latin maxim is to be found in the early 
Hebriac and Talmudic texts. Rosenberg and Rosenburg "In The Beginning, The Talmudic Rule 
Against Self-Incrimination" (63) New York U. L. Rev (1988) 955, Lamm "The Fifth Amendment and Its 
Equivalent in Jewish Law'' (17) Decaloque J {1967) 1, Horowitz The Privilege Against Self-
Incrimination- How Did It Originate" (31) Temp. L.Q. {1958) 121 suggests that the silence principle 
was incorporated into Roman and later English common law through the influence of early Hebriac 
religious writings. Puritan intellectuals well versed in biblical theology were influenced by authoritative 
rabbinical interpretations of the Talmud. But see Mazabow "The Origin Of The Privilege Against Self-
Incrimination Jewish Law'' (104) SALJ (1987) 710. 
3 Griswold The Fifth Amendment Today (1955) 7. 
4 Blackstone Commentaries On The Laws of England Oxford Clarendon (1765) 68, Gilbert The Law of 
Evidence By A Late Learned Judge (1756) 140. 
5 Bentham Rationale of Judicial Evidence Bowring Ed (1843). 
6 Quinn v United States 349 U.S 155, 161 (1955), ''the privilege was hard-earned by our forefathers. 
The reason for its inclusion in the constitution and the necessities for its preservation, .... are to be 
found in the lessons of history''. 
7 The Plantagenets; Henry Ill (1207-72) and Edward Ill (1312-77). 
8 The Tudors; Henry VIII (1509-47) the establishment of an Anglican state church, Mary (1553-58) 
the conflict between state-sponsored Catholicism and early Anglicanism, Elizabeth I (1558-1603) the 
reverse conflict between state-sponsored Anglicanism and minority Catholics and Puritans. 
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age after the Glorious Revolution and the eclipse of the weak-willed Stuarts.9 The historical 
development of the silence principle as a protective procedure is the consequence of two 
fundamental pressures. The principle evolves as a protection against state oppression and 
state abuse of process to compel evidence of guilt. It is also the result of a reaction to the 
unreliability of a confession forced from the individual's mind by compulsion, fear, torture, 
flattery or hope. The modern reformulation al"'d elevation of an accused's silence principle 
(as opposed to the privilege against self-incrimination) into a working procedural rule within 
the criminal trial structure does not begin until the late eighteenth century. The accused's 
right of silence is the result of essential structural reforms to English criminal procedure and 
the introduction of an organized state-controlled police force. The removal of restrictions on 
access to defence counsel and defence witnesses, the articulation of a coherent standard of 
proof, the removal of all bars on the accused as a competent witness culminated in the 
development of a strong trial and pre-trial "right" to silence. The criminal process has come 
full circle from its immature beginning which places all the affirmative burdens on the 
defendant to prove his own innocence, to a mature system where the state is required to 
prove guilt and the defendant need only passively challenge a prima facie case. The exact 
origins and development of the silence principle has triggered a confused debate amongst 
legal historians which serves to cloud rather than clarify the important issues. Ironically the 
confusion surrounding the origin of the historical silence principle is self-perpetuated in the 
confusion about the justification and purpose of the modern silence principle. 
The Orthodox view. The traditional school closely follows the approach initially scouted by 
Bentham. The privilege against self-incrimination develops as a defensive mechanism 
prompted by the religious and political state inspired persecutions of the sixteenth and 
seventeenth centuries. A principled resistance led by England's persecuted non-conformist 
minorities against the inquisitorial methods 10 of the prerogative and ecclesiastical courts.11 In 
Wigmore's classical account12 the notorious agitation of political "Levellers" and extreme 
Puritan sects between 1637 and 1641 contributed to the abolition of the controversial Star 
Chamber and High Commission courts and the sweeping away of the inquisitorial ex officio 
oath procedure. (An oath in God's name to answer truthfully, designed to elicit self-
incriminatory answers). "With all this stir and emotion a decided effect is produced and is 
9 The stuarts; James I (1603-25) the initial struggle between king and parliament, Charles I (1625-
1649) the triumph of parliament over monarchy, Cromwell and the Commonwealth (1651-1658), 
Charles II (1660-1685) the Restoration, James II (1685-1688} the Glorious Revolution of 1688, the 
replacement of the Stuart House by the present Hanoverian House of Windsor, the final subordination 
of monarchy and the lasting triumph of parliamentary rule. 
10 Randai"Sir Edward Coke And The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination" (8) S.C.L.Q (1956) 420-21. 
11 Wolfram "John Lilburne: Democracies Pillar of Fire" (3) Syracuse L. Rev (1952) 218. 
12 Wigmore A Treatise On Evidence McNaughton ed (1961) val VIII, sec 2250, 267-295. 
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immediately communicated naturally enough to the common law courts" .13 According to 
Wigmore, the privilege creeps into the procedure of the common law courts indirectly as a 
result of a confusion and association of ideas.14 He regards the privilege as a distinct 
creation of reformation and revolution. References to self-incrimination in the medieval 
common law record are explained away as clashes over jurisdiction between the common 
law and church courts.15 Indeed, until the sixteenth century the common law courts 
themselves often made use of self-incriminatory questioning and parliament continued to 
pass legislation allowing for such questioning.16 In the reign of Elizabeth I, Puritan and 
Catholic minorities, opponents of the newly established Anglican Church began to question 
the inquisitorial ex officio procedure of the High Commission and other principal state 
instruments for the suppression of heresy. In the 1630s the renewal of the attack against 
state sponsored oppression by Lilburne and the dissident "Levellers" eventually led to the 
abolition of both High Commission and Star Chamber. The collapse of the inquisitorial state 
and church courts, a statutory prohibition against self-accusation, created the idea of a self-
incrimination principle which percolated first through the common law procedure and then by 
example into civil proceedings. 17 
Levy18 generally follows Wigmore's chronology but with an important difference. He argues 
that the groundswell of antagonism against the ex officio oath has far deeper roots in the 
medieval common law courts. 19 What Wigmore explains away as disputes over vague and 
unformed jurisdictional boundaries, Levy sees as early evidence of a developing hostility 
against inquisitorial and self-incriminating oaths.20 The evolution of a privilege against self-
incrimination within common law procedure does not occur by a vague association of ideas, 
as Wigmore explains it, but as a definite response to an active and aggressive political 
13 Wigmore ibid at 289. 
14 Wigmore ibid at 291-92. Wigmore divides the process into two distinct periods. {1200 to 1600) 
individuals manipulated the vague idea of a conscience-driven principle against self-incrimination as a 
defence when forced by the ecclesiastical court to swear ex officio. {1600-1700) the defendant began 
to assert the privilege, by now well-established as a defence in the common law courts {at 269). 
15 Wigmore ibid at 276-280. 
16 Maquire "Attack Of The Common Lawyers On The Oath Ex Officio" in Essays in History in Honour 
of C M Howard Wittke Ed {1967) 202, 204. Wigmore ibid at 271 maintains that until the 16th Century 
the common courts made no objection to the imposition of the ex officio oath, provided it was 
administered on due presentation, namely on a charge per famam or per clamosam insinuationem. 
17 Wigmore ibid at 290. "By the time of the English Civil War [1642-48] it [the privilege] is but a bare 
rule of law. It begins to coalese only in the reactionary period of the restoration [1660-1685] and the 
revolution [1688] with the ascendancy of Whig [over Tory] principles and the rejection of absolutist 
Stuart practices". 
18 Levy Origins Of The Fifth Amendment New York {1968). 
19 Ibid at chapter II, 43-83. 
20 Gray "Prohibitions And The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination In Tudor Rule And Revolutions" in 
Essays for G R Elton Cambridge C.U.P {1982) has lent his support to Wigmore's rather than Levy's 
version. For example Gray identifies the prohibition cases of the 1 th Century as disputes over 
jurisdiction rather than as fundamental clashes between rival systems. 
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struggle. The privilege against self-incrimination is the positive result of a four hundred year 
conflict between two radically different systems of criminal procedure. 21 On the one hand 
there is the English common law which by stages through the centuries gradually upholds 
the basic liberties of the ordinary Englishman. Champions of the common law, men such as 
Beale,22 Fulle~3 and Coke24 use the inherent principles of the common law to fashion a 
strong legal privilege against self-incrimination. On the other hand there is the inquisitorial 
process of the ecclesiastical courts founded on Roman law and designed specifically to 
suppress religious deviance. A process vigorously exploited over the centuries in the interest 
of church and state by the likes of Bishop Grosseteste,25 Archbishops Whitgiff6 and Laud.27 
The privilege against self-incrimination is a common law invention intended to protect the 
indigenous accusatorial criminal procedure against erosion by a continental inquisitorial 
process. The battle line between these rival systems is drawn around the legality and reach 
of the ex officio oath. During the Tudor period the defendants most often entangled within 
the coils of inquisitorial process were Puritan28 and Catholic29 non-conformist minority 
groups. Conscientious objectors opposed to the practices of the newly established 
Elizabethan Anglican Church. The Puritans sought to purify the English Church by cutting 
away the last vestiges of popish rites and paraphernalia. In turn, the Catholics sought to 
draw the Anglican Church back to the roots of the one true faith. Both were bitter religious 
enemies, but ironically, united, in their legal objection to, and in the defences used against 
the ex officio procedure. These objections were primarily directed against the Court of the 
High Commission.30 Unlike other ecclesiastical courts, the High Commission was a roving 
inquisition with wide jurisdictional powers employed by the government to ferret out religious 
dissent. The main tool employed for this purpose was the cost effective ex officio oath and a 
process which centred around coerced testimony and a condemnation from out the 
accused's own mouth. The initial defences of its victims were unsophisticated appeals to 
biblical injunctions and vague referrals to rights of conscience. 
21 Levy ibid at 20-24, 29-35, 39-42. 
22 Beale, Clerk of the Privy Counsel (1580-1590} revived the argument that the ex officio oath was 
contrary to Magna Carta. Levy ibid at 170-172. 
23 Fuller (1604-1610} an active defence counsel for Puritan dissidents. Levy ibid at 232-242. 
24 Edward Coke, Chief Justice of Common Pleas under James I. Levy ibid at 229-265. 
25 Bishop Grosseteste (1235-1253} the first churchman to apply the new ex officio oath procedure in 
England even against the express opposition of Henry Ill. Levy ibid at 47. 
26 Whitgift, Archbishop of Canterbury under Elizabeth I used the High Commission as a weapon 
a.painst religious minorities. Levy at 109-135. 
2 Laud, Archbishop of Canterbury under Charles I also used the High Commission and the Star 
Chamber as aggressive weapons against the Puritan minority. 
28 Levy, ibid at 136-172. 
29 Levy, ibid at 83-108. 
30 Usher The Rise And Fall Of The High Commission Tyler Ed (1968} is the most complete work on 
the functioning of this court. 
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But when combined with the efforts of the professional common lawyer, the defences grew in 
sophistication and became a formidable legal weapon. Writs of prohibition and habeaus 
corpus prohibiting ecclesiastical courts from proceedings on the basis of the ex officio oath 
gained credence.31 These writs exemplified the fundamental common law notion that an 
English subject had the right not to be coerced into giving evidence against conscience and 
contained the first explanations by common law judges of a legal rule against self-
incrimination. 
In addition to the ecclesiastical and common law courts, there was a third judicature 
dispensing the monarch's direct justice through a Privy Council and associated royal 
prerogative courts. These state institutions had no peculiar jurisdiction of their own but dealt 
with a whole range of issues concerning the sovereign's interests. These prerogative courts 
unhesitantly intervened in matters equally within and beyond the traditional jurisdictional 
reach of the common and ecclesiastical courts. The prerogative courts were only 
distinguishable from the common law courts in the procedure followed and not by a defined 
substantial jurisdiction. The Court of the Star Chamber,32 for example, adopted an 
inquisitorial procedure based on the ex officio oath. The procedure was flexible and could be 
modified according to the matter being examined. With the merging of state and church in 
the person of the monarch during the sixteenth century, the jurisdictional distinction between 
the secular and the spiritual sphere became blurred.33 The Court of the High Commission 
began to be identified with the monarch's spiritual duty to stamp out religious heresy. The 
Court of the Star Chamber was identified with the monarch's secular duty to crush political 
deviance.34 By the beginning of the seventeenth century the defendant was faced by a 
bewildering array of different tribunals, all with confusing and sometimes interlinked 
jurisdictions. If brought before the Court of the Star Chamber, the defendant would be 
regarded as a primary source of testimony and coerced by oath, interrogation and by leading 
31 Coke used his position as Chief Justice of the Common Pleas (1606) and later Chief Justice of the 
King's Bench (1613) to oppose the power of the High Commission. Levy ibid at 330. Randal ibid note 
10 at 420-22. 
32 The Court of the Star Chamber had developed by the 16th century into a distinct court, its 
proceedings were secret, its methods within its own discretion and included inquisitorial techniques. 
Radcliffe and Cross The English Legal System Cross and Hand 5th Ed (1971) 107-8. 
33 Henry Tudor VIII broke away from Rome and formed the Anglican Church with himself as its 
spiritual head. (Act of Supremacy 1534 ). The new church was basically Catholic in theology but no 
longer acknowledged the pope. Ecclesiastical matters now became matters of state and religious 
heresies were considered treason against the state. 
34 Henry VIII employed inquisitorial processes to establish Anglican supremacy. His Catholic 
daughter Mary used the inquisitorial process of the Star Chamber to persecute Protestantism and to 
re-establish the Catholic Church. Elizabeth I simply reversed the process and used the prerogative 
courts to persecute Catholics and to solidify Anglicanism. Charles I used the prerogative courts for 
political purposes against a hostile parliament. His failed policies led to the abolition of both the Star 
Chamber and High Commission in 1641. The ecclesiastical courts were temporarily revived by 
Charles II but with the express exclusion of the ex officio oath. 
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questions into providing self-accusatory information. The Court of the Star Chamber 
gradually acquired a notoriety in matters of political conscience equal to that of the High 
Commission in matters of religious conscience. The political and social upheavals during the 
reign of Charles I redirected the attack against the ex officio oath by giving it a new and 
constitutional dimension. Central to the political agitations of the 1600s was John Lilburne 
who made civil disobedience a way of life.35 In his various trials, speeches and 
pamphleteering, he highlighted the moral and ethical illegality of the ex officio oath.36 
Spurred on by public opinion, parliament abolished the Star Chamber and High Commission 
in 1641 and prohibited the use of oaths in the remaining ecclesiastical courts.37 By 1700 all 
English courts had accepted the fundamental legal principle that compelling a self-
incriminatory answer in a criminal trial was improper.38 In terms of the traditional Wigmore-
Levy theory, the evolution of a legal principle against self-incrimination is explained as a 
struggle against the ex officio oath represented by the ecclesiastical and later by the 
prerogative courts. It begins as a simple inchoate resistance to an unjust procedure. With 
time the defence becomes increasingly more sophisticated as it is used in turn by the 
common law courts to protect their jurisdiction, the Catholics to escape heresy charges, the 
Puritans to secure religious freedom, and finally, by politically motivated activists in the 
struggle to limit monarchial absolutism and to implement parliamentary rule-based 
government. The High Commission and the Star Chamber serve as the focus for these 
variously motivated resistances to the ex officio oath. From the abolition of these courts and 
their procedures, the legal privilege against self-incrimination is forged. According to Levy, 
the privilege against self-incrimination is primarily the creation of a four hundred year long 
struggle for dominance between the domestic accusatorial criminal procedure and the 
continental inquisitorial process.39 Within this broad context it is also secondarily the 
culmination of the struggle against church and state for personal religious and constitutional 
liberty. The privilege against self-incrimination to some extent symbolizes the victory of 
individual rights over state interest. The evolution of the privilege as a protection of 
conscience, human dignity and personal liberty (first generation rights)40 has given it a 
35 Levy ibid at 266-300. Wolfram ibid at note 11 at 216-218, 241. 
36 Lilburne, a prominent member of the Puritan "leveler'' sect, suffered four prosecutions between 
1637 and 1649. These prosecutions were instituted initially by the court under Charles I but later by 
the court under Cromwell. He died in 1657. 
37 Abolition of the High Commission 1641 (Statute 16 Car. I ch 11) and later (Statute 13 Car II c 12 
~1661)). 
8 Levy ibid at 301-330. The privilege against self-incrimination was firmly entrenched when in 1688 
James II attempted to prosecute seven bishops for defying his edict abolishing all laws against 
Catholic non-conformists. 
39 Building on a common law tradition, after 1688, the English criminal justice system began slowly to 
move towards a modern style accusatorial-adversarial system. Levy ibid at 280-320, 321-323. 
4
° Flinterman "Three Generations Of Human Rights Rights" in Berting J et a/ Ed Human Rights in a 
Pluralist World Westport (1990) but in contrast see Donnelly "Human Rights, Individual Rights And 
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unique and distinctive nature which separates it from the general run of the mill legal rule. 
For this reason alone, proponents of a modern silence principle feel justified in elevating the 
principle into a constitutionally entrenched right. A special value, quite separate from its 
identity as an evidentiary rule of evidence, is attached to the idea of silence because of its 
seemingly important role in the historical struggle to develop a human rights culture. The 
pervasiveness of a so-called right to silence in all Western criminal systems (and some 
Oriental systems) is testimony to its unique appeal. It is understandable therefore why 
attempts to abolish or limit the "right" to silence have been met by a fanatical resistance more 
often based on inward emotional sentimentality than on objective reason. 
The Canon view : In strong contrast to the traditionalist school, a more recent theory 
advanced by Helmholz and Macnair41 suggests that the development of a privilege against 
self-incrimination arises not in common law, but in canon law.42 It was not the invention of 
the common law lawyer as proposed by Levy but a well-established defensive principle of 
medieval religious thought about controversial rules of canon law.43 According to Macnair, 
hostility against self-incrimination and the danger that oath-swearing and perjury represented 
for the Christian soul was always part of the religious debate and was never a common law 
principle until much later, at least after 1688.44 Helmholz also demonstrates that the roots of 
the privilege are to be found in the ius commune. A merger of Roman and Canon rules and 
a sophisticated legal system used extensively throughout the continent and in all the English 
prerogative and ecclesiastical courts.45 The privilege originated in debate between canon 
lawyers as early as the thirteenth century. By the late sixteenth century regular use was 
being made of a canonical rule against self-incrimination in ecclesiastical courts. When the 
seventeenth century common law courts began to interfere and intervene within the 
jurisdictional sphere of the High Commission, they did so simply to prevent abuse of the 
inquisitorial procedural rules by the state-manipulated Commission. In other words, the 
common law courts were simply requesting the Commission to abide by the canon law rules 
of inquisitorial procedure which the Commission and the Star Chamber were abusing in their 
Collective Rights" in Berting J et a/ Ed Human Rights In A Pluralist World Westport {1990) and 
Universal Human Rights In Theory and Practice lthica {1989). 
41 Helmholz "Origins Of The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, The Role Of The European Ius 
Commune" {65) New York U. L. Rev {1990) 1962-1990. Macnair "The Early Development Of The 
Privilege Against Self-Incrimination" {10) Oxford Journal Legal Studies {1990) 66-84. Writing 
independently of each other both authors arrive at the same conclusion. 
42 Helmholz ibid at 964. Macnair ibid at 67, suggests a unique approach in which the silence principle 
was first applied to witnesses and then to allegations of crime in civil proceedings before the criminal 
accused was given a right to remain silent at trial. 
43 Helmholz ibid at 963-964, "focusing exclusively on 1 th century common law judicial commentary 
has resulted in a narrow and misleading account of the origins". 
44 Macnair, ibid at 64. 
45 Helmholz, ibid at 967. 
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hunt for religious and political dissidents.46 The Wigmore-Levy claim that the privilege 
against self-incrimination is the result of the common law's resistance to encroachment by 
inquisitorial procedure is therefore historically incorrect.47 The evolution of a rule against self-
incrimination is based firmly in Roman-canon law and the common law simply incorporated 
the well-documented rule at a much later date. The general theory outlined by Wigmore-
Levy is correct in its broad perspective. The modern principle does owe its existence to the 
central role played by the common lawyer who took up its cause and expanded it. Much of 
the traditional argument about the struggle against the ex officio oath remains valid. As 
Wigmore and Levy clearly note, one of the reasons for the rapid expansion of the principle is 
the Tudor-Stuart constitutional struggles of-the mid-sixteenth to the mid-seventeenth century. 
However, the traditional argument needs modification in certain essential respects. First, 
according to Helmholz, the maxim nemo tenetur is to be found in many of the medieval 
canon law references,48 and also in continental manuals on civil and criminal procedure.49 
The principle appears in European precedent as a sub-rule of inquisitorial procedure 
centuries before the rule appeared in the common law.50 Macnair suggests that the earliest 
examples of the application of a privilege against self-incrimination in an English forum are to 
be found in the equity courts which applied canon law and not in the common law courts. 51 
Second, an examination of the common law sources reveals that the common law contained 
no actual privilege against self-incrimination.52 The common law courts continued to use 
self-incriminatory type questions well after the Stuart Restoration in 1660, especially in cases 
of contempt and abuse of process. Most of the objections to the ex officio oath cited by Levy 
are in fact, based on claims that the oath infringed inquisitorial procedure and not a common 
law privilege. 53 Grey argues that the common law judges issued writs of prohibition against 
the oath only after other substantive reasons, apart from the privilege, were shown to exist. 54 
Third, arguments in manuscript treatises and case precedent of the English ecclesiastical 
courts are based almost exclusively on a jurisprudence derived directly from the ius 
commune. Evidence indicates that objections to the ex officio oath are largely taken from the 
46 Grey, ibid note 20 at 348. Helmholz, ibid at 973. Macnair, ibid at 68. 
47 Levy's treatment of the origins of the maxim nemo tenetur is inconsistent. He accepts its canonical 
origin (at 70, 285}. He denies its canonical origin (at 95, 329). He refers to the origin as nebulous 
(1 07) and mysterious (329). Wigmore is more correct in assuming it to be of canonical origin (at 275-
276). Macnair, ibid at 67, 68. 
48 Helmholz, ibid at 967. the maxim appears in the most basic guides to canon law, the Glossa 
Ordinaria to the Decreta/s (1243) of Pope Gregory IX, and are endorsed by Innocent IV (Quinque 
Decretalium ad X 1.6.54 dudum no 11 (1570)) and the canonist Panormitanus (Decretalium ad X 
2.18.2 Cum super no 16 (1555)). 
49 Helmholz, ibid at 967, note 28, 29. 
50 Macnair, ibid at 70-72. 
51 Macnair, ibid at 69. 
52 Wigmore (McNaughton Ed 1961) note 12 at 353-54. 
53 Helmholz, ibid at 987-989. 
54 Grey, ibid note 20 at 353-54. 
30 
Roman-canonical law of the time and not from the common law. 55 None of these objections 
are sourced, as Levy suggests, from a supposed right of conscience, Magna Carta or are a 
pure invention of the common law. 
The Adversarial view: A third theory proposed by Langbein56 argues that the emergence of 
a common law trial based silence principle is more accurately placed at the end of the 
eighteenth century.57 As a practical and workable principle, it coincides with the rise of an 
adversarial model of criminal justice based on an increasingly central role assigned to the 
defence counsel. Contrary to the traditionalist view, the procedural mechanisms of the 
sixteenth and seventeenth century trial did not allow for the evolution of a silence principle. 
The Stuart trial system, in particular, was structured in such a way as to give the accused 
every incentive to speak out defensively against the charge. The trial was centred around 
the accused. The accused who deliberately chose to remain silent in the face of judicial and 
prosecutorial questioning could not reasonably hope to prove his innocence. Langbein is 
skeptical of Wigmore's rather vague claim that the privilege creeps into the common law trial 
process indirectly and as an association of ideas.58 In this regard Wigmore can only be 
referring to the association of two ideas. On one hand, a privilege against the inquisitorial ex 
officio oath which coerces the suspect into answering questions about conscience and 
religious or political beliefs. On the other hand, the expectation that the accused should 
respond in person to the charges and evidence levelled against him in a criminal trial. It is 
difficult to understand how these widely separate ideas can be susceptible to confusion or 
association even during the "stir and emotion" caused by the collapse of the High 
Commission and Star Chamber.59 Viewed in this light the traditional emphasis on the 
privilege as a narrow defensive rule which leads to the abolition of the ex officio oath 
procedure and then is somehow translated into a general criminal rule is somewhat 
misleading. While the privilege is an effective remedy against misuse of ecclesiastical 
procedure, its highly abstract nature would have had no discernable practical influence on 
55 Helmholz, ibid at 969. 
56 Langbein "The Historical Origins Of The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination At Common Law'' (92) 
Mich. L. Rev. (1994} 1047-1085. 
57 Langbein, ibid at 1047. 
58 Langbein is critical of Wigmore's historical sources (at 1077-1081). Wigmore quotes seventeen 
cases as authority for his view (at 290 note 1 05). Langbein suggests that Wigmore has incorrectly 
analysed these cases. 
59 Wigmore (at 289} "a decided effect is produced and is communicated naturally enough to the 
common law courts". Holdsworth A History Of English Law 7 Ed London and Boston 61h (1966) 199 
indirectly supports Wigmore, "[the privilege] is the somewhat illogical outcome of the disputes between 
the common law and the ecclesiastical courts". Langbein (at 1075) replies that it is muddled thinking 
to expect "the common law courts which had never employed the ex officio oath, to re-cast their 
criminal procedure for the purpose of implementing a notion that the common law courts had until then 
asserted only as a corrective against the incompatible procedure of detested non-common law courts". 
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the criminal trial with its differing procedural rules.6° Certain specific procedural techniques 
militated against the successful development of a privilege against self-incrimination within 
the Tudor-Stuart criminal trial system. The primary inhibitory factor was the denial of access 
by the accused to defence counsel. 61 Only once defence counsel was allowed to take the 
accused's place and test the state's case could the pressure on the accused to testify be 
relieved. Absent defence counsel the accused had to conduct his own defence and in this 
environment a silence principle could not develop. Other secondary inhibiting ,factors 
included restrictions on defence witnesses,62 the undefined nature of the prosecutorial 
standard of proof,63 the inability of the accused to properly prepare for trial,64 the harsh pre-
trial procedure which often forced the accused to incriminate himself and made these 
incriminating statements available at trial,65 the accused as the best source of evidence and 
a jury influenced sentencing process.66 These processes taken together exerted a strong 
pressure on the accused to speak up in his own defence. Without defence counsel as a 
shield and guide the accused's refusal to respond to the evidence against him would have 
amounted to a forfeiture of all defences. 57 In stages throughout the eighteenth century, these 
inhibiting factors gradually began to disappear as the jurisprudential understanding of the trial 
process changed. In particular, the role of defence counsel gradually began to assume 
greater importance. 58 With defence counsel as a shield, the trial became an opportunity to 
test the prosecution case. By casting doubt on the state's presentation of evidence, the 
defence counsel began to shift the focus of the trial away from the accused. The state 
acquired an increasing burden of proof.69 It was these profound eighteenth century changes 
in trial structure which contributed to the development of a silence principle. 
60 The Latin slogan nemo tenetur did gain popular appeal during the Tudor-Stuart period but "the 
slogan did not make the privilege, it was the privilege which developed much later, that absorbed and 
~erpetuated the slogan" (Langbein at 1 083). 
1 Langbein, ibid at 1054. 
62 Ibid at 1055. 
63 Ibid at 1056. 
64 Ibid at 1057. 
65 Ibid at 1059. 
66 Ibid at 1062-1063. 
67 Langbein , ibid at 1084, "Indeed in a system which emphasized capital punishment, the right to 
remain silent was the right to commit suicide. Only when defence counsel succeeded in restructuring 
the criminal trial did it become possible to fashion a true privilege against self-incrimination at common 
law''. 
68 Common law prohibitions against defence counsel changed slowly from 1696 to 1836, but defence 
counsel only became a significant part of the trial process in the 1780s (Langbein at 1 048). 
69 Beattie "Scales Of Justice, Defence Counsel And The English Criminal Trial in the 18th and 19th 
Centuries" (9) Law and Hist. Rev ( 1991) 233-35, 238, 244. 
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2.2 The Wigmore-Levy Orthodox Theory 
The "stir and emotion", as Wigmore puts it, which was eventually to give rise to a privilege 
against self-incrimination has its beginning in the eleventh century. Prior to the Norman 
conquest, Saxon England70 had no separate ecclesiastical court system. Churchmen and 
noblemen together presided over popular country courts (the courts of the hundred and of 
the shire), 71 with a general and indiscriminate jurisdiction to decide all civil, criminal and 
religious issues. William I, the Norman conqueror of England, in accordance with accepted 
continental practice established a separate and parallel ecclesiastical court system under 
church control. By the mid-twelfth century England had developed two rival and competing 
court systems. A common law system derived from the old secular Saxon-Germanic process 
practiced in the King's court and covering all non-church legal matters. A foreign influenced 
ecclesiastical court system deriving its substance and procedure from continental canon 
law72• The differences between these rival systems was significant and the privilege against 
self-incrimination owes its origin to the inevitable competition and jurisdictional conflict 
between these rival systems. The ecclesiastical court utilized an inquisitorial procedure in 
which the prosecutorial and judicial functions were fused in the person of the judge.73 This 
basic inquisitorial procedure was to remain unchanged for many centuries. By contrast, the 
common law courts utilized a developing accusatorial system which was eventually to be 
characterized by an adversarial division of functions. In its more sophisticated medieval form 
the common law court assigned responsibility to a grand jury for the presentation of the 
charge, a prosecutor organized the evidence for the king, a judge presided over the trial and 
what was to become a "petit" jury rendered the verdict. According to Wigmore-Levy it is in 
the clash between these rival systems that the privilege against self-incrimination was born. 
70 The Saxons, a Germanic tribe, conquered Roman Britain (430 AD). The last Saxon king, Harold I 
was defeated by William I of Normandy at the Battle of Hastings (1066). The subsequent history of 
England is of a Saxon underclass (English speaking) ruled b~ a Norman aristocracy (French speaking) 
until the emergence of a common English identity in the 141 century. In fact, the formal language of 
the courts was for many centuries a mixture of Latin and French. 
71 Levy ibid note 18 at 5. Wigmore ibid note 12 at 270. Saxon England was divided into 34 shires. 
Each shire court was presided over by either a Bishop, Earl or Sheriff. Shires were further divided into 
smaller courts or "hundreds". A sheriff presided over a hundred. The courts convened at monthly 
intervals and had a wide jurisdiction in all civil, criminal and religious matters. Thompson and Johnson 
An Introduction To Medieval Europe Allen and Udwin London (1985) 432-462. 
72 A system of law which still dominates modern Europe, and derived from the Corpus /uris Civilis of 
Justinian, Byzantine Emperor (527-565). 
73 Levy, ibid at 39-42. 
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The ancient Norman-Saxon trial procedure was based on one of the many variations of 
primitive Germanic oath practices. 74 The trial process consisted of an initial determination of 
which party had the right of proving either the claim or the defence and the form of proot_l5 
Proof and judgement in this primitive system was not a rational evaluation based on intrinsic 
merit. It was instead a direct appeal to God?6 Proof was one sided in the sense that only 
one of the parties, selected by the judge, could prove or disprove the dispute. Judgement lay 
in the selected party's success or failure. The actual adjudication would take the prescribed 
form of either a compurgational oath77 (purgatio canonica) or trial by ordeal78 (purgatio 
vulgaris) including fire, poison, water or ordeal by battle. The compurgational oath, trial by 
witness or trial by oath, was characterized by a ritual observation of form. The function of the 
oath was to provide a standard incantation for executing a spiritual ritual or intercession with 
God which was believed to produce a just result. Any variation in the oath, stammering, 
stumbling or word changes was said to burst the oath. "Bursting" meant that God had 
rejected the oath and judgement could be immediately granted against the losing party. · In 
trial by oath the defendant's oath depended for its validity on the support of a number of 
fellow compurgators (iusiurandum de credulitate) who were prepared to add their oaths to 
the defendant's oath. The reasoning behind this numbers game was that neither the 
defendant nor his fellow swearers would endanger their mortal souls by the sacrilege of false 
swearing. The compurgational oath fell into disuse early in the thirteenth century because it 
had become little more than a corrupt swearing contest. 79 As long as the defendant could 
round up the requisite number of fellow compurgators, he would win his judgement 
irrespective of whether or not his fellow oath swearers had knowledge of his truthfulness. 
Nevertheless the primitive adjudicatory method had one unique feature which was to be 
enshrined within future developments of the common law process. The early method was 
accusatory in nature and was to remain accusatory as the system evolved. The judge's role 
was simply to enforce the observance of the prescribed rules. The judge had no role in the 
74 Silving "The Oath Part I" (68) Yale L.J (1959) 1361-64, "The Germanic law was ritualistic, oath 
specific and infused with religious and magical notions. The proceeding was oral, personal and 
confrontational". 
75 Silving, ibid at 1362. "The court decided not on the merits but on the manner of proof'. Levy at 5, 
"Judgement proceeded trial because it was a decision on what form the trial would take". 
76 Thayer Preliminary Treatise On Evidence At The Common Law (1898) 9-16. Pollock and Maitland 
The History of English Law 2 Ed vol 2 (1898) 603. In the irrational trial mode the investigator 
surrenders his task to the forces of revelation and his reason plays no more role. This mode is based 
on the notion of a direct intervention of God in human affairs. Stone Evidence, Its History And Policies 
Butterworths (1991) 2-4. 
77 Holdsworth ibid note 59 at 302-12. Thayer ibid at 16-46. Stone ibid at 4-5. The oath invokes 
divine wrath and when the oath swearer remains unaffected it is a divine indication of his innocence. 
78 Stone, ibid at 6. In the ordeal, the person undergoing the test is condemned unless divine 
intervention directly negatives the condemnation. He is subject to a certain experience which 
produces a certain effect. If the effect is produced, the person is condemned. If it is not produced, 
then divine intervention has absolved the person. 
79 Levy, ibid at 5-6,9. Wigmore, ibid at 273. Randal, ibid note 10 at 420. 
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actual judgement, deciding only which party to put to the proof and the form which the proof 
was to take.80 In 1215 the Fourth Lateran Council abolished the compurgational oath and in 
its place introduced a new inquisitorial oath based on the reforming decretals of Pope 
Innocent 111.81 The new oath was no longer a self-determinative and irrational appeal to 
divine intervention but functioned as a means of providing the judge with evidence for a 
rational solution of factual issues. In England the old compurgational oath had never 
generated any opposition because it was a simple declaration of innocence based on an 
appeal to divine intervention. The new inquisitorial oath by its very nature was bound to 
evoke strong objections. It provided a perfect vehicle for the judge to probe the accused's 
mind. In the beginning the probing and questioning was limited to the specific charge 
(always against morals or religion) but the oath procedure was later to become the basis of a 
roving inquisition probing without specific reference. The new oath was to become an 
efficient state directed exploratory device in the future war against heresy and other non-
conformities. 82 It is in the opposition to the inquisitorial oath that the beginning of a privilege 
against self-incrimination may be identified. 
In the secular king's court, trial by ordeal was gradually replaced by an early form of trial by 
jury. Jury by "presentment" and "inquest" were early attempts by the Angevin monarchy to 
establish an organized and centralized legal administrative process.83 It became the practice 
to summon trustworthy men from the district in which the king's court sat, who were sworn to 
tell the truth based on their personal knowledge about the serious issues in the community. 
The main function of "presentment" was to decide whether there was sufficient evidence to 
put a suspect on trial. 84 This process was eventually to be guaranteed by the Magna Carta 
right not to be put on trial without first being charged by credible witnesses. 85 With the formal 
abolition of the ordeal, judges began to fill in the gap by asking presenting juries to take over 
the role of adjudicating guilt and entering a verdict. Consequently, two separate kinds of 
80 Plascowe "The Development Of The Present Day Criminal Procedure In Europe and America" (48) 
Harvard L. Rev (1935) 437-441, 445-46, 453-460. 
81 Levy, ibid at 25-29. Wigmore, ibid at 275. Innocent Ill's determination to destroy all heresy is the 
driving force behind the inquisitorial procedure. Davis A History Of Medieval Europe Longman Grp Ltd 
~1979) 341-353. 
2 Radcliffe and Cross The English Legal System Cross and Hands 5th Ed (1971) 107-108. Wigmore, 
ibid at 274-275. Levy, ibid at 29-39. 
83 For example, the Doomsday Book was compiled on the verdicts of jurors selected from each 
locality. Thayer ibid note 76 at 51. Holdsworth, ibid note 77 at 313. Levy, ibid at 8. 
84 The early jury was not an adjudicatory body but a source of proof, the juror was selected because 
of his ability based on a personal knowledge to give truthful answers. Thayer ibid at 53. Pollock and 
Maitland ibid at 658. Holdsworth ibid at 314. Levy ibid at 8-9. 
85 Chapter 26 of Magna Carta "no bailiff .... shall put any man to his open law, nor to an oath upon his 
own bare saying, without faithful! witnesses". Note Magna Carta was a charter of liberties extorted 
from John I (1215) by his barons, and amended 1216, 1217, 1225. The 1225 version was 
incorporated into English statutory law. 
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juries developed. A presenting jury in which the accusation was made and a trial jury in 
which guilt was decided. The jury system thus began its long evolution from a collection of 
knowledgeable witnesses basing judgements on personal experiences to an independent 
disinterested decision-maker basing judgements on the evidence presented to the court.86 
By the time the inquisitorial ex officio oath was introduced into England as a replacement for 
the abolished ordeal in the ecclesiastical courts, trial by jury was well established in the 
ordinary common law courts. The stranglehold which inquisitorial Roman-canon law took on 
the secular courts of Europe was not to be duplicated in the ordinary English common law 
courts which continued to use the older mechanism of proof by verdict of jury. 
Three new methods of adjudication based on variations of the inquisitorial oath were 
introduced by the Lateran Council. The three actions, imitations of Roman civil law, were the 
accusatio in which the accuser voluntarily accused the defendant, bore the risk of proving his 
accusation and the risk of punishment if he failed. The denunciate in which the private 
accuser secretly denounced the suspect to the court and the inquisitio, in which the court 
acted as accuser, prosecutor, judge and jury.87 The inquisitorial process allowed the court to 
act summarily, to disregard rules, forms and other legal impediments. The suspect could be 
detained and questioned on the mere suspicion of infamia.88 The absence of evidence 
against the accused at the initial inquiry was irrelevant as the inquisitorial process relied on 
the accused as its main source of testimony.89 
First, the accused was forced to take the oath de veritate dicenda. An oath in God's name to 
answer truthfully.90 In its popular form the oath became known in England as the oath ex 
officio. 91 The oath was the primary mechanism of the inquisitorial procedure and was 
specifically designed to elicit self-incriminatory answers. Second, the oath's effectiveness 
was enhanced by keeping the accused at all stages completely in ignorance of the 
accusation, accuser and evidence brought against him. Third, the accused had no choice 
but to take the oath. A refusal to swear or silence in the face of questioning would give rise 
to two adverse inferences. Either on inference of guilt pro confessio, as if he had confessed, 
86 Stone ibid at 16-23. Levy ibid at 16-22. See also O'Conner "The Transition From Inquisition To 
Accusation" (8) Crim. L. J. (1984) 351-372. 
87 Levy ibid at 23. Wigmore ibid at 275. 
88 Infamia could be established by common report (fama), suspicion (clamosa insinuatio) but the 
easiest and most popular method was by judicial suspicion (ex officio mero). Levy at 23. Wigmore at 
275. Maguire "Attack Of The Common Lawyers On The Oath Ex Officio" in Essays In History In 
Honour Of C M Howard Wittke Ed ( 1967) 203. / 
89 Levy ibid at 23-29. 
90 Silving ibid note 74 at 1366. Berger Taking The Fifth Lexington Books (1980) 6. Corwin "The 
Supreme Courts Construction of the Self-Incrimination Clause" (29} Mich. L. Rev. (1930) 1, 6, "The 
oath was foolproof in securing a conviction". 
91 Ex officio : by the authority of the judge and in two essential forms ex officio promoto (on an 
accusation made by an individual to the judge). Ex officio mero (purely on the authority of the judge). 
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or an inference of contempt.92 The ex officio oath was introduced into the English 
ecclesiastical courts by Cardinal Otho, papal-legate of Pope Gregory IX93 in 1236. It was first 
employed by Bishop Grosseteste of Lincoln (1235-1253) who instituted a roving inquisition 
into the morals of his diocese.94 Opposition to the new oath procedure developed almost 
immediately and was due largely to the uncomfortable differences between the rival 
procedures. The common law trial by jury presented the accused with a public accusation by 
an identified accuser to a specific charge before a sworn jury. On the other extreme, the ex 
officio inquisition proceeded against the accused, often by force, without showing probable 
cause or specifying the nature of the accusation and allowed the judge to question widely 
until some moral violation was uncovered. The ex officio procedure was without doubt a 
highly efficient device in exposing moral and religious infractions. But it could not be 
compared favourably with the procedural advantages enjoyed by the defendant in the 
common law court. 
In response to the increasingly widespread use of the ex officio procedure by the church, 
Henry Ill (1216-72) issued writs prohibiting his English subjects from answering questions 
under oath. 95 The common law courts also issued writs of prohibition against church 
proceedings which infringed common law jurisdiction. These prohibitory writs were statutorily 
formalized when parliament passed several laws, De Articuli Cleric and the Prohibitio 
Formata De Statuto Articuli Cieri, limiting church usage of the ex officio oaths to matrimonial 
and testimonial causes, nisi in causis matrimonialibus vel testamentariis.96 Nevertheless 
inquisitorial processes began to creep into secular practice largely as a result of its 
effectiveness in securing easy, informal and cost-effective convictions. By the fourteenth 
century most state organs, Privy Council, Chancery and Exchequer were making use of 
some kind of inquisitorial administrative process.97 The Privy Council in particular 
administered several prerogative courts whose procedures were highly discretionary, 
including the power to employ the ex officio oath.98 The Star Chamber, one of the judicial 
92 Levy ibid at 22-23. 
93 Weigmore ibid at 270. Levy ibid at 46. Burger ibid note 90 at 6. 
94 Levy ibid at 47. Maguire ibid note 88 at 205-206. 
95 Levy ibid at 47. Maguire ibid note 88 at 205-206. Burger ibid note 90 at 7. Morgan "The Privilege 
Against Self-Incrimination" (34) Minn. L. Rev. (1949) 2-3. 
96 De Articuli Cleric (9 Ed W2. 1315-1319). Articuli Cieri (1 STAT. at LG 403) "no layman may be tried 
for heresy, or other enormities, save causes matrimonial and testamentary, by the ex officio oath". By 
its nature ex officio was a satisfactory process when applied to matrimonial matters, but because of its 
design limitations subject to abuse when applied to heresy and other political proceedings. 
97 Edward I (1272-1307) was principally responsible for centralizing and unifying the various arms of 
~overnment. 
8 The Privy Council consisted of the most powerful clerics, nobles of the realm and developed into 
England's most formidable political body. Introduction To Select Cases Before The King's Council 
(1243-1482). Leadman and J Baldwin Ed, Seldon Society, vol 35 (1918). These prerogative courts 
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arms of the Privy Council was to play a pivotal role in arousing opposition to the ex officio 
oath. Early common law court and parliamentary opposition to the utilization by both church 
and state of the ex officio procedure symbolized the nature of the opposition which was 
gradually to give rise to a right against self-incrimination.99 Parliament attempted to combat 
state use of the ex officio oath by petitioning the crown and statutorily100 prohibiting Privy 
Council use of the oath on the authority of Magna Carla.101 In parallel the common law 
courts resisted the use of the oath by the ecclesiastical courts because of an increasing 
encroachment on their jurisdiction.102 Between 1250-1400, there was a burgeoning objection 
to the compulsory oath but as yet, no objection to the idea of compulsory self-incrimination. 
The rise of Lollardy 103 and other heretical sects around 1400 allowed the church to 
implement a brutal campaign in order to eliminate religious deviance. By emphasizing the 
social, political and spiritual dangers of heresy, the church was able to coerce both crown 
and parliament into a reluctant co-operation. Parliament passed the De Heretico 
Comburendo,104 giving the church temporal powers in the administration of the ex officio 
procedure. Crown support for the anti-heresy campaign legitimized the ex officio oath and 
opposition to inquisitorial procedure temporarily vanished. 105 The church gained a temporary 
statutory endorsement for its inquisitorial powers. By 1500 a renewed and revitalized 
resistance to inquisitorial procedure re-emerged. William Tyndale (1525) condemned the 
oath as a violation of individual conscience. 106 John Lambert (1537) was possibly the first to 
argue, "no man is bound to betray himself' to which he attached the Latin maxim "nemo 
tenetur prodere seipsum". Lambert's claim was narrow. He did not assert a privilege against 
were created by the king, parens patriae, in the exercise of his residuary power after the establishment 
of the common law courts. Legal matters for which there was no common law writ and which could 
not be heard in a common law court fell under the king's prerogative jurisdiction. The prerogative 
courts included Chancery, Admiralty, Star Chamber and the later High Commission. Levy ibid at 49. 
Maguire ibid note 88 at 207. 
99 Wigmore regards medieval opposition to the ex officio oath as a mere jurisdictional dispute. Levy, 
Maguire and Berger go beyond the jurisdiction issue and see a distinct pattern of an opposition based 
on a privilege against self-incrimination appearing in this period. 
100 Statute of Purveyors (24 Edw 3 ch 4 (Eng)) and (42 Edw 3 ch 4 (Eng)), "no man shall be put to 
answer without presentment by jury, by due process and writ original, according to the laws of the 
land". 
101 Parliament opposed the oath on the basis of Magna Carta, chapter 29 "every subject is entitled to 
an indictment, by jury, trial by jury, in a common law court". Morgan ibid note 95 at 4-5. 
102 Berger ibid note 90 at 8. Morgan ibid note 95 at 5. 
103 An English movement for ecclesiastical reform based on the teachings of John Wycliffe (1370-
1414) condemning transubstantiation, the sacraments, celibacy, and insisting upon the translation of 
the bible into English. Levy ibid at 54. 
104 A powerful lobby of prelates forced through parliament the ex officio statute (2 Hen IV c 15) (2 
STAT at LG (Eng) 415). 
105 Herman "The Unexplained Relationship Between The Privilege And The Confession Rule (Part I}" 
(53) Ohio. St. L. J. (1992) 112. Levy ibid at 56-61. Berger ibid note 90 at 8. Maguire ibid note 88 at 
308. 
106 Tyndale The Obedience Of A Christian Man, a work according to Levy which foreshadowed the 
idea of a privilege against self-incrimination by stating that it was wrong to compel individuals to testify 
against each other. Levy at 63-67. 
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self-incrimination. Instead, he refused to answer on oath until he had been formally accused 
and given notice of the charge. St German through his influential treatise, attacked the 
ecclesiastical courts in general and the ex officio oath in particular. He argued for the 
supremacy of the common law over canonical law.107 Reacting to these pressures, 
parliament with the cynical support of Henry VIII (1509-1547) approved the repeal of the 
Heretico Comburendo in 1534.108 The use of the ex officio oath was not abolished, but it was 
severely restricted by the requirement of a formal charge presentation before the oath was 
sworn. 
The Henrician reformation (1534-1547) was the watershed which shifted the struggle against 
the ex officio procedure from the purely religious stage on to the open political arena. Henry 
VIII excised the English church from the authority of Rome, denied Papal supremacy and 
installed himself as head of a new Anglican Church.109 With the merger of identity between 
church and state, the jurisdictional divide between ecclesiastical and secular courts became 
less distinct. The fusion of secular and spiritual powers within the person of the sovereign 
meant that ecclesiastical issues became matters of state and religious violations were turned 
into criminally treasonable acts.110 To ensure political and religious orthodoxy the state 
adopted inquisitorial procedures. The Henrician Star Chamber, and later the Elizabethan 
High Commission were the principal state tools in a struggle which became increasingly 
more politicized. The notion of a rule against self-incrimination takes on a new coherence 
which it had previously lacked. The idea of self-incrimination is born as a result of the 
creation, development and state manipulation of the High Commission and Star Chamber. It 
is no longer a mere objection against ex officio process in purely religious matters, but is now 
partially defined by the constitutional struggle between parliamentary rule of law and 
monarchial absolutism. Henry VIII cynically employed the oath and inquisition against all 
internal Catholic opposition in his efforts to solidify Anglican Church supremacy. His 
daughter Mary I (1553-58) in turn created an early version of the High Commission and used 
it to re-introduce Catholic supremacy at the expense of Anglican Protestantism.111 The first 
coherent and widespread attempts by accused heretics to claim a privilege against self-
incrimination arise as a consequence of the brutal Marian inquisition. These privilege claims, 
based on an appeal to conscience, consisted of a general refusal to take the ex officio oath 
107 St German, a well know common lawyer, popular for his biting commentaries against the ex officio 
oath. Levy at 64. 
108 Repealing statute 25 Hen 8 ch 14 (Eng) (4 STAT at LG (Eng) 279-79). 
109 Act of Supremacy (1534). Confirmation of the Anglican State Church. 
110 Secular rather than spiritual considerations now dictated government policy. Treason and sedition 
were the crimes for which religious non-conformists were prosecuted under the Anglican 
establishment. 
111 Levy ibid at 75-77. Herman ibid note 105 at 116. 
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or to answer incriminatory questions.112 The efficiency of the Marian Commission 
established a precedent which would assist Elizabeth I (1558-1603) in establishing a far 
stronger Court of the High Commission. When Elizabeth I took power, she simply reversed 
the roles of Anglican and Catholic by re-establishing Anglicism as the official state religion. 
She also began a concerted and repressive campaign to pacify her Catholic subjects. The 
Elizabethan High Commission became the primary weapon in the rooting out of Catholic 
heretics.113 The Elizabethan religious settlement of 1559 which re-established the Anglican 
State Church114 was a moderate policy calculated to appeal to the conservative majority by 
being Protestant in doctrine but traditionally Catholic in ceremony. It however served to 
alienate non-conformist minorities. It was an offence to Catholics because it was so 
Protestant in theology and repugnant to Puritans because it was not thorough going enough 
in its reformation. By 1580 Puritan dissidents had replaced Catholics as the main source of 
danger to the established Anglican Church. 115 John Whitgift, Archbishop of Canterbury, was 
appointed to head a reformed, reconstituted High Commission with a discretionary mandate 
to punish religious non-conformity.116 The suspect was summoned before the High 
Commission without being informed of the accusation or the identity of his accuser. The 
suspect was required to take the ex officio oath and to answer questions which attempted to 
establish guilt for a crime never disclosed. A refusal to swear would result in a referral to the 
Star Chamber and a possible criminal charge. A truthful answer would expose the suspect 
to a charge of heresy or treason. To lie under oath would risk perjury and constitute a sin 
against scripture. To defend against this dilemma Puritan intellectuals began to develop an 
argument based on the legal reasoning that the oath ex officio was an unconstitutional 
violation of Magna Carta. 117 
112 This period is well documented in John Foxe The Book Of Martyrs (1536) which describes the 
trials of famous heretics during the Marian inquisition. Each trial description contains an account of 
the abuse of common law rights by the inquisition and the ex officio oath. Levy ibid at 79-81. 
113 Usher The Rise And Fall Of The High Commission (1913) 16, 24-25. Levy at 83-96. Herman ibid 
note 105 at 116-117. By 1585 all English Catholic priests were by law guilty of treason. 
114 The Act of Supremacy (1 Eliz. c. 1 (Eng)) is important in establishing crown control over religious 
matters, restoring state authority over "all manner of errors, heresies, schisms, abusers, offences and 
enormities" (sec Ill). "To examine upon their corporal oath" (sec X). The ex officio oath in this regard 
is secured in letters patent 1583, 1590 and 1593. 
115 Catholicism represented a largely external threat, but Puritanism went to the very heart of the 
Protestant establishment. Levy ibid at 117, 120. 
116 The High Commission's powers included the ex officio oath, the right to impose immediate fines 
and other forms of punishment, the power to summon witnesses and to punish disobedience to its 
orders. It had no defined geographical jurisdiction and was a refined example of a roving inquisition. 
Pollard "Council, Star Chamber And Privy Council Under The Tudors" Eng, Hist. Rev. (1922). 
117 Beale, clerk of the Privy Council, and a leading critic of the High Commission, revived the 
argument that the ex officio oath was contrary to Magna Carta. Although historically inaccurate, his 
account did serve the purpose of turning the Magna Carta from a document guaranteeing aristocratic 
rights into a charter protecting the basic rights of all. Levy ibid at 139-150. 
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As yet, the opposition was focused on the ex officio oath procedure. Only in later 
generations would the same argument be made that involuntary self-incrimination violated 
the due process of the common law courts. The High Commission and the Star Chamber 
became the focal point of a sustained campaign based on a legally articulated right against 
self-incrimination. 118 These defensive arguments against inquisitorial processes rested on 
the well reasoned idea that both Magna Carta and the common law limited the crown's 
sovereignty. Parliament as a source of the common law could limit the power of the crown's 
prerogative courts. 119 By the beginning of the seventeenth century the opposition to the oath 
procedure was no longer a religious one, but had become a political-constitutional struggle 
between parliament and the common law courts against the crown and its prerogative courts. 
During the Stuart dynasty the common law courts began to play a pre-eminent role in the 
development of the right against self-incrimination.120 Edward Coke, Chief Justice of the 
Common Pleas, and Nicholas Fuller, lawyer and member of parliament, rose to prominence 
during the reign of James I (1603-1625). Fuller attacked the oath at every turn and spoke 
out against the High Commission and in support of Magna Carta.121 Coke asserted the 
superiority of the common law and set definite limits to inquisitorial procedure.122 He issued 
numerous prohibitory writs against the illegal use of the oath in ecclesiastical procedure. 
According to Coke, ecclesiastical courts acquired jurisdiction only on the authority of 
parliament and the common law court as the instrument of parliament. Common law courts 
could set limits on ecclesiastical jurisdiction. He reaffirmed parliament's ability to make law in 
this regard, defended the individual's right to the benefit of the common law procedure and 
118 For example, Thomas Cartwright (1535-1603) argued that the oath invaded privacy, violated 
conscience and was contrary to religious principles. Pearson Thomas Cartwright And Elizabethan 
Puritism Cambridge (1925). Levy states that Cartwright asserted a privilege similar to the modern 
one. John Udall was probably the first accused to assert a privilege against self-incrimination before a 
common law court (1590). His silence was construed as an inference of guilt and he was convicted of 
heresy (1 How St. tr 1275-1289 (1590)). 
119 James Morice, member of parliament, argued that the oath violated the common law by presuming 
the accused guilty and forcing the accused to prove the presumption true. The presumption violated 
Chapter 29 Magna Carta because criminal proceedings were governed by the law of the land as 
determined by parliament and not by the crown and its special courts. (Levy at 194-196). The oath 
also violated chapter 28 which required due and proper presentation of the charge by a jury (Levy at 
235-236). 
120 Wigmore's account differs slightly from that of Levy and Maguire. According to Wigmore there is 
no real indication of a privilege before the reign of James I. Prior to this, the conflict centred around 
jurisdiction and abuse of ex officio procedure. Unlike Wigmore, Levy regards the prohibition cases in 
the reign of Elizabeth (1558-1603) and James I (1603-1625) as positively hostile to compulsory self-
incrimination. Both however, agree that the privilege was well established by the restoration of 
Charles II (1660). 
121 Fuller, a prominent supporter of Puritanism, defended Cartwright (1590-1) before the High 
Commission and was himself imprisoned by the High Commission in 1607. Levy ibid at 229-241. 
122 Chief Justice Common Pleas (1606) Chief Justice King's Bench (1613). Dismissed from office 
(1616), continued as a member of parliament to argue for the common law courts and against the 
Crown's prerogative courts. Levy ibid at 229-257. Wigmore ibid at 280. 
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limited the ex officio oath to matters testimonial and matrimonial. But Coke also employed 
methods other than the writ of prohibition 123 to accomplish his goal. In both Boyer v High 
Commission 124 and Burrowes v High Commission 125 he argued, one of the first sitting 
English judges to do so, that laymen could not be examined under the ex officio procedure 
because of the legal rule nemo tenetur prodere seipsum.126 Although most of the case 
decisions during Coke's period of office are limited to overruling ex officio procedure on 
jurisdictional grounds, his legal reasoning supported the growing notion that it was immoral to 
compel self-incrimination.127 As a result of the well-orchestrated attacks on the prerogative 
and ecclesiastical courts, the use of the ex officio process gradually declined during the 
period 1616 to 1633.128 The theoretical basis of a privilege against self-incrimination had by 
now become well established. Resistance to the oath was no longer singularly based on the 
unfairness of the ex officio oath. It had by 1630 acquired a much broader meaning as a 
basic right against involuntary coercion and the violation of human dignity contrary to the 
instinct of self-preservation.129 Resistance to the ex officio oath became politicized when in 
1634 Charles I and Archbishop Laud revived the controversy. Under Laud the High 
Commission came to dominate the Star Chamber, both being used by the state as security 
agencies.130 A resurgent Star Chamber began to reach into areas where its influence had 
never gone before. 
123 A writ of prohibition was usually issued by the common law court preventing the ecclesiastical 
court from proceeding on the basis that the matter before it concerned temporal issues outside of the 
ecclesiastical court's competence. Randal "Sir Edward Coke And The Privilege Against Self-
Incrimination" (8) S. C. L. Q (1956) 437,446, 450. 
124 80 Eng Rep 1052 K.B (1615). 
125 81 Eng Dep 42, 43, K.B (1616). See also Collier v Collier. 72 Eng Rep 987 K.B (1589) and 
Edwards 13 Coke Dep 9-10 (1609). All these cases in Coke's reports at Co. Rep 26, 77 Eng Rep 
1308 {1607). 
126 There were by 1600 many instances of defendants making use of the Latin maxim. Lambert 
~1538), Tresham {1581). Beale (1584). Udall (1586) and (1590). 
27 Coke argued three points consistently throughout his legal career. (a) the ecclesiastical judge had 
to make known the charge before proceeding. (b) the judge could inquire into words or acts but never 
into thoughts. (c) no lay person could be examined under the ex officio oath except in matters 
matrimonial or testimonial. 
128 By contrast the nemo tenetur principle was never evoked by an accused in a criminal matter 
before a common law court. The trial process of the common law court continued to pressure the 
accused into making self-incriminating statements. 
129 Levy ibid at 263-264. 
130 Levy ibid at 271. Berger ibid note 90 at 15. Charles I in a letter to the High Commission (Feb 4 
1637) insisted upon a more vigorous enforcement against non-conformists. He complained about 
dissenters who had "grown to that obstinacy, that some refuse to take their oaths, and others, being 
sworn, refuse to answer". These should be forced "to answer upon their oaths in causes against 
themselves and to answer interrogators touching their own contempts objected against them". Letters 
to the High Commission (1637) Hazard State Papers voll 482 (Rymer 190). 
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The prerogative courts retained the practice of extracting incriminatory testimony through the 
efficient use of the confession pro confessio. 131 Both the High Commission and the 
increasingly notorious Star Chamber became the focal point of a revitalized opposition along 
the lines championed by past heroes, Beale, Cartwright, Morice, Fuller and Coke. The 
culmination of a four hundred year struggle against the ex officio procedure, according to 
Levy, is symbolized by the trial of John Lilburne, an anti-Stuart leveler and Puritan, popularly 
known as Freeborn John.132 Charged with distributing heretical books, his 1637 trial focused 
the entire nation's attention upon the proceedings in the Star Chamber. The refusal of 
Lilburne to swear the ex officio oath or to answer against himself is said by Levy and 
Wigmore to be the final link in the development of a privilege against self-incrimination.133 In 
the struggle for personal liberty and conscience Lilburne argued that "it was contrary to the 
law (Magna Carta) to force a man to answer questions concerning himself'. A free man has 
the right to silence and adversaries must state the charge against him and prove it by means 
of their own witnesses. 134 Lilburne's trial served as the catalyst for a renewed and final 
struggle fought along three separate battlefronts. The first was a political confrontation 
between the Crown (insistent upon a divine right to rule) and parliament (supporters of the 
rule of the land and Magna Carta). The second was a religious clash between the Crown 
(aligned with the Anglican Church) and parliament (dominated by Puritans). The third was a 
purely legal battle between the Crown (and its reliance on the prerogative courts) and 
parliament (supporter of the common law courts). In this aspect it was also a jurisdictional 
struggle between the Crown and its support of inquisitorial procedure and parliament loyal to 
the accusatorial system of justice. Lilburne's trial underlined a turning of the political tide 
against the Crown. It highlighted the first tremours of a social revolution which was to lead to 
civil war (1642-1649). In 1941 the long parliament135 dominated by Puritan factions and 
galvanized by public resentment over Lilburne's unfair treatment, finally abolished the High 
131 In terms of the pro confessio procedure, defendants who refused to give self-incriminatory 
testimony were treated as if they had confessed. The same was applied to the defendant who did 
answer but did so in an incomplete manner. Levy ibid at 269-271. 
132 Lilburne suffered a number of prosecutions between 1637 and 1653. The Star Chamber under 
Charles I (1637), a common law trial (1649) and a common law trial under Cromwell (1653). Although 
he won all his cases, he was forced into exile and then imprisoned. He died in 1657 aged 43. Levy at 
273. See also Levy "John Lilburne and the Rights of Englishmen" Constitutional Opinions Oxford Un. 
Press (1981) 14-39. 
133 Levy ibid at 272-278. Wigmore ibid at 282-283. Griswold The Fifth Amendment Today (1955) 1, 
2, 3. 
134 Lilburne's trial 3 Howell St. tr. 1315, 1318 (1637). Wolfram "John Lilburne's Democracies Pillar Of 
Fire" (3) Syracuse L. Rev (1952) 218. . 
135 The long parliament was called by Charles I, desperate for funds to finance a war against his 
rebellious Scots subjects. Phillips "The Last Years Of The Star Chamber (1630-1641))" Transactions 
Royal Historical Society 4th XXI (1939). Levy ibid at 278-279. 
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Commission, Star Chamber and swept away the inquisitorial oath procedure.136 Later at his 
second trial (1649), Lilburne placed the privilege against self-incrimination within its proper 
and familiar modern context. 137 For the first time a high English court expressly recognized a 
rule against self-incrimination within the constitutional context of a fair trial and due process 
of law. The abolition of inquisitorial procedures did not have an immediate effect on the 
common law courts. 138 The trials of the twelve bishops (1641), King Charles's regicide trial 
(1649) and the notorious Scroop's trial (1660),139 illustrate a slow but steady immersion of the 
privilege into English jurisprudence. However, by the Restoration (Charles II 1660-1680) the 
principle was fully acknowledged in all courts. 140 By the Glorious Revolution (1688) it was 
commonplace. 141 
The opposition to the ex officio oath ended in the common law right of the criminal accused 
to remain silent and not to furnish self-incriminatory evidence. The accused could now 
demand that the state prove its case against him by way of independent witnesses. The rule 
harmonized with a number of other procedural rules. The object of which was to ensure a 
fair trial, to protect the presumption of innocence and to place the burden of proof squarely 
on the shoulders of the state. The rule against self-incrimination also stood for the idea that 
it was inherently cruel to force the accused to expose his guilt. Its historical antecedents had 
forged it into a fundamental principle of the accusatorial due process of law. 
But the rule was more than a mere procedural rule. On a much higher level it had come to 
symbolize religious liberty, personal conscience, human dignity and the right to privacy, 
freedom of speech and of politics. 
136 16 Car I ch 10 (Star Chamber) 16 Car I ch 11 (High Commission (1641 ). The statute describes the 
Star Chamber as "an intolerable burden to the subjects and the means to introduce an arbitrary power 
and governmenf'. All matters formerly examinable before the Star Chamber would from the abolition 
be addressed by the common law courts. An argument has also been raised that the abolition of the 
prerogative courts was not the result of the popular opposition to the ex officio oath but was more the 
result of the abuse of prerogative powers by Charles I. 
137 Lilburne states, "by the laws of England, I am not to answer to questions against or concerning 
m1self'. To which Judge Keble replied, "You shall not be so compelled". 4 St. tr 1269, 1292-3 (1649). 
13 In 1647 the Levellers presented a petition to parliament demanding the constitutional changes 
advocated by Lilburne. In the humble petition of many thousands article 3 stated, "you permit no 
authority whatsoever to compel any person . . . . to answer to any question against themselves .... 
except in cases of private interesf'. 
139 Bishops case 4 Howell st. tr 3, 65 (1641 ). King Charles case 4 How St. tr 993, 1101 (1649). 
Scroop's case 5 How St. tr 1034, 1039 (1660). In Scroop the judge expressly conceded "you are not 
bound to answer me, but if you will not, we must prove if' (at 1034). 
140 Levy Constitutional Opinions Oxford Uni Press (1981) 200-202. Havinghurst "The Judiciary and 
Politics in the Reign of Charles II" (60) L.Q.R. (1950) 62-78. 
141 In Entick v Carrington 19 How St. tr (1765) 1073, Lord Camben says "It is very certain that the law 
obliges no man to accuse himself because the necessary means of compelling self-accusation, .calling 
upon the innocent and guilty would be both cruel and unjust". 
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The impetus for the creation of the privilege against self-incrimination according to the 
Wigmore-Levy theory was a four hundred year long common law inspired resistance to the 
ex officio oath. How was such a persistent hostility against the inquisitorial oath in England 
sustained? After all the ex officio oath was nothing more than an oath sworn by the 
defendant to tell the truth. The antagonism towards the oath appeared to have arisen partly 
from an objection against its nature but also from the context in which it was used. It was 
primarily a state device aimed at heretical opponents of the church establishment and thus 
by association opponents of the state itself. It was also a political weapon in the 
constitutional struggle between two radically different forms of political philosophy. On the 
European continent the same inquisitorial procedures were aimed at similar religious and 
political dissidents but without triggering comparable levels of hostility. The inquisitorial 
process to this day continues to dominate most European legal systems. Yet in England 
from its very inception, the Roman-canonical procedure was met by a hostile and consistent 
criticism. What precisely was wrong with the English form of the inquisitorial procedure and 
why did it give rise to a privilege against self-incrimination? One of the earliest arguments 
raised against the ex officio oath was that it violated biblical principles.142 Christian theology 
prohibits the swearing of an oath, the purpose of which was to produce self-incriminatory 
testimony. Self-accusation and the confessional ritual should always be a private matter 
between God and the individual. The strict biblical injunction was understood to work on two 
levels. On one level lying under oath was regarded as a blasphemy against God. Even an 
unthinking, unknowing falsehood under oath would place the swearer in peril of his soul.143 
On another level, the oath was viewed as an obvious violation of individual conscience, 
hence John Udall's sixteenth century appeal to freedom of conscience as a justification for 
refusing the oath.144 Second, a strong and uniquely English Puritan objection to the oath 
gradually emerged, based on the inflexible conviction that certain religious beliefs should be 
beyond the ability of a secular power to question or to punish. Resistance towards the oath 
may be regarded as a substitute symbol for a religious tolerance which was absent in Tudor 
and Stuart society. At the same time resistance to the oath was a rallying point in the 
struggle against monarchial absolutism and the privilege against self-incrimination was 
regarded as a justifiable defence in the face of state tyranny. One of the defences raised by 
Lilburne at his second trial in 1649 was that a right against self-incrimination was not only a 
protection of religious belief, but also an expression of political liberty and conscience. Third, 
142 The Bible is fairly consistent in its disapproval of oath taking in general. Matthew 5 : 33-7, Exodus 
20: 7, Deuteronomy 5: 11. But see infra note 182. 
143 Coke, Chief Justice of the Common Pleas characterizes the oath as the "invention of the devil to 
destroy miserable souls". Randal ibid note 123 at 445. 
144 Kemp "The Background Of The Fifth Amendment In English Law" (1) Wm and Mary L. Rev (1958) 
281. Wigmore ibid at 286. See also Udall's trial 1 How St. tr 1275, 1289 (1590). 
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the ex officio procedure was designed as an extremely effective operational medium for a 
"fishing expedition" type inquisition. 145 The ex officio oath procedure was simultaneously an 
effective state tool but also an extremely dangerous one because it placed every ordinary 
citizen at risk in their daily religious observances. Inquisitorial questioning could easily 
entrap innocent suspects who thereby unwittingly accused themselves. Furthermore, the 
oath was always administered prior to the presentation of the charge. Without being 
informed of the charge against them, unprepared suspects were easily tricked or surprised 
into providing self-incriminatory evidence. Fourth, suspects who swore the oath were often 
faced with the inherently cruel alternative of either exposing themselves to punishment in hell 
for lying in violation of the oath or exposing themselves to bodily punishment by admitting to 
the offence. 146 Tyndale described the dilemma succinctly "[It is] a cruel thing to break into a 
man's heart, and to compel him to put either soul or body in jeopardy, or to shame 
himself' .147 According to sound jurisprudential principles, a "good" law must always take into 
account human weakness whenever possible.148 A law or a legal rule inconsistent with 
human nature serves only to burden the conscience. The ex officio procedure was "bad" law 
because it concentrated exclusively on exploiting human frailties. Self-incriminatory 
testimony coerced from the defendant by inquisitorial process was certain to be intrinsically 
untrustworthy. All legal rules should be based on ideals compatible with human nature, an 
aspect of which is the purely human desire for protection against self-incrimination. The ex 
officio process unashamedly confronted the defendant with an inhumane choice between 
harmful disclosure, contempt or perjury. A legal process such as the ex officio oath could not 
expect to survive especially when it sought to compel the individual into making unnatural 
choices. Fifth, the oath procedure was an unacceptable violation of individual human dignity 
and privacy. 149 According to Coke, "no man should be compelled to answer for his secret 
thoughts and opinions".150 However, in this regard the state was left with no other 
alternative. The struggle against religious non-conformity could only be fought with 
procedures which unacceptably intruded upon individual privacy. Heresy by its very nature 
was a crime of psychology, of secrecy and intimate conscience. 151 The suppression of 
heresy presented the state with certain unique enforcement problems. There were only 
three practical methods by which the state could effectively prosecute the offence. The 
145 See the modern argument infra chapter 4 p. 147-149. 
146 The modern version of the dilemma and trilemma defence is to be found in Murphy v Waterfront 
Commission, infra chapter 4 p. 112 and p. 115-116. 
147 Tyndale The Obedience Of A Christian Man (1528). Levy ibid at 63. 
148 Connery 'The Right To Silence" (39) Marq. L. Rev (1956) 180, 183. 
149 See the modern argument for privacy infra chapter 4 p. 118-129. 
150 Coke's judgement in Jenners case : Stowe MS 424, Fols 159 b, 160 a (1611 ). 
151 Wolfram "John Lilburne: Democracies Pillar Of Fire" (3) Syracuse L. Rev (1952) 218, 219, "heresy 
was likely to be committed in the mind rather than by deed or word. Witnesses to a man's non-
conformist thoughts are difficult to procure". 
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perpetrator himself had to be forced into a confession or an accomplice had to be persuaded 
to turn state's witness. Both these methods were difficult to apply. After all, the perpetrator 
would not always confess, nor were there many obliging accomplices. Both perpetrator and 
accomplice were essentially engaged in religious activities which neither believed to be 
wrong. The third method or the ex officio oath was precisely designed to take these practical 
difficulties of combating heresy into account. Without a procedure which placed the 
perpetrator under oath to speak truthfully and then probed his inner thoughts, heresy could 
never be proved. Thomas More (1478-1535), English Chancellor under Henry VIII, warned 
"the streets were likely to swarm with heretics" .152 Archbishop Whitgift, head of the High 
Commission under Elizabeth I, was coldly analytical in his reasoning, "heretics spread their 
poison in secret and make it impossible to produce witnesses against them". 153 Hence the 
state's willingness to apply inquisitorial procedures in its continuous attempts to enforce 
political, religious and social orthodoxy. The more vigorous the state attempt to enforce 
conformity, the stronger grew the opposition and with it a burgeoning privilege against self-
incrimination. 
The Wigmore-Levy traditional theory154 may be criticized in a number of important respects. 
The difficulty with Wigmore's and Levy's accounts are that they refer ambiguously to the 
catch-all word "privilege" without precisely defining the meaning of the word. Are they 
referring to a rule against silence, a rule against self-incrimination, or a rule against self-
accusation. In all probability, they are referring to a "witness" type privilege against self-
incrimination. In this sense the abolition of inquisitorial procedures during the seventeenth 
century does contribute to the establishment of an immunity from the obligation to provide 
self-incriminatory testimony. It may well be reasoned that a narrow privilege is established 
by the Restoration or no later than the Glorious Revolution of 1688 in cases of heresy, 
sedition and treason. 155 The seventeenth century privilege was based on an objection to the 
152 Levy ibid at 65. 
153 Levy ibid at 139. 
154 Despite the obvious flaws in the Wigmore-Levy orthodox account, judicial precedent continues to 
endorse the view. Hammand v The Commonwealth of Australia and others (1982) 152 C.L.R. 188, 
201, 203. Bishopgate Investment Management Ltd v Maxwell and Others (1993} CH 1 (CA) 17-18. 
Environmental Protection Authority v Caltex Refining Co Ply Ltd (1993}. 118 A.L.R. 392, 404, 426, 
440. Petty and Maiden v The Queen (1991) 65 A.L.J.R 634. S v Zuma 1995 (2} SA 642 (CC) para 30. 
In contrast see Ackermann J's reference to the Langbein theory in Ferreira v Levin NO and Others 
1996 (1) SA 984 (CC), para 92n 124. 
155 If the privilege is limited to this narrow instance, then it serves not only as a protection of 
conscience and human dignity but also as a protection against torture. While torture was never 
commonplace in the English criminal system, it was applied with reasonable frequency in cases of 
state sedition and treason. It was also to some extent indirectly a part of the criminal pleading 
process, especially paine fort et dure. Langbein regards Levy's argument that the privilege is well 
established by 1688 as a safeguard of liberty and dignity as incorrect. Langbein contends that no 
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taking of the ex officio oath, a curb on the intrustive powers of state officials and a practical 
preventative against fishing expeditions. It was a privilege inconsistent with the usual 
seventeenth century criminal trial and was never, other than peripherally, a part of the 
common law criminal procedure. The Wigmore-Levy account cannot therefore be referring 
to the accused's right to silence within the criminal trial process, an altogether different 
conceptual idea. Langbein has conclusively demonstrated that a trial right to silence is the 
product of a lawyer-driven adversarial system developed in the late eighteenth century. 156 
Both Wigmore and Levy locate the origin of the privilege in the common law tradition, but 
offer no real verifiable proof in this regard. Levy, in particular, explains the development of 
the privilege as a consequence of the clash between rival inquisitorial and common law 
procedures. Yet Helmholz and Macnair157 have unquestioningly documented the source of 
the privilege in early canon law and not in common law. The privilege is clearly a rule of 
early canon law and was only later incorporated into the common law. Wigmore neatly 
sidesteps and Levy completely ignores the fact that compulsory self-incrimination had been 
an integral part of due process in the common law courts for many centuries. The ordinary 
courts, King's Bench, Common Pleas and even the Exchequer, had regularly used 
compulsion on defendants and witnesses and continued to do so long after the abolition of 
the prerogative courts in 1641. Holdsworth writes that beginning in the early Middle Ages, 
the accused had no privilege against self-incrimination.158 The focus of the criminal trial 
centred around the examination of the accused and remained so until the eighteenth century. 
In practice, the accused was regularly forced to plead at the criminal arraignment by way of 
paine fort et dure.159 The accused was subject to a preliminary hearing and the refusal to 
answer the committing magistrate's question was admissible as evidence against the 
accused at the subsequent trial. The nemo tenetur seipsum principle held no advantage for 
the criminal accused but the suspect or witness brought before a prerogative court could 
claim the privilege with a reasonable chance of success. Both Wigmore and Levy are vague 
on the transmission method by which a supposedly common law principle is re-incorporated 
into the seventeenth century criminal trial procedure. Wigmore refers to a natural association 
mention was made of the privilege in the Bill of Rights 1689, nor did the Whig reformers mention it 
when drafting the procedural safeguards for the Treason Act of 1696 (at 1053). 
156 See infra p. 56. 
157 See infra p. 49. 
158 Holdsworth ibid note 59 at 199. 
159 In terms of the Statute of Westminister (1275), during the plea process the reluctant accused 
would have weights piled upon him until he consented to plead. As the criminal proceeding was 
stayed until the accused pleaded, torture was often employed to speed up the process and to coerce 
the accused into pleading. Stephen History Of The Criminal Law of England (1883) 297-301. The 
practice of physically forcing the accused to plead continued until 17 41. After its abolition, a refusal to 
plead was admissible as an inference of guilt. By 1827 a refusal to plead was treated as a plea of not 
guilty. Baker An Introduction To English Legal History 3rd Ed (1990) 580-81. 
48 
and confusion of ideas which magically results in the emergence of a fully fledged privilege in 
the criminal trial at some imprecise time during the 1600s. Levy finds the nexus in the 
privilege's direct response to an aggressive religious and political struggle of the middle 
1600s. Nevertheless, it is unclear how a privilege limited to and forged on the ideals of 
religious conscience and political liberty could have crept into and reconciled itself to the 
ordinary criminal court procedure, with its mundane day-to-day concern over murderers, 
rapists and thieves. Levy argues that the various trials of John Lilburne, the popular figure of 
dissent in seventeenth century England, are a primary catalyst in the formation of the modern 
privilege. According to Levy, Lilburne's principled opposition to the ex officio oath and the 
inquisitorial rule of enforced self-incrimination generated the impetus for the development of 
a modern privilege. A number of commentators disagree on the extent of Lilburne's historical 
importance. April160 explains Lilburne's trial defence not as an opposition to the ex officio 
oath per se, but as an opposition to all questioning based on unspecified charges. In his 
view, an exclusive opposition to the ex officio oath would have been absurd. At the time 
similar oaths were being administered as standard practice in the common law courts. 
Lilburne's opposition was that while the oath could be administered at trial, there was no 
precedent or authority to administer it in a proceeding which was entirely exploratory and 
inquisitorial. Lilburne's objection is a narrow one, limited to the exploratory use of the oath in 
the High Commission and Star Chamber. In this sense it is unrelated to a defence based on 
the privilege against self-incrimination. Silving 161 regards Lilburne's refusal to swear to the 
oath as an indignant protest against his inability to choose the compurgational oath instead. 
Not being given the choice, he refused to swear to an inquisitorial oath which was not part of 
the law of the land nor part of his English birthright. Langbein 162 the harshest critic of the 
orthodox school, rejects the idea that Lilburne played any pivotal role in the development of 
the privilege. Langbein regards Lilburne as a rather peripheral figure. If any slight 
importance is to be attached to Lilburne, it is in his pointed comments on the inadequacies of 
the trial procedure. Lilburne's refusal to answer interrogatory questions was not based on a 
privilege against self-incrimination, but on the trial procedural rule that the prosecution must 
be put to the proof of its accusation.163 Lilburne's defensive strategy is therefore inconsistent 
with a privilege. Indeed, taking into account the structure of the seventeenth century trial and 
its formal pressures to testify, Lilburne would have had no other alternative but to conduct an 
aggressive and spirited defence if he wished to be found not guilty. There is a significant 
160 Aprii"A Re-Appraisal Of The Immunity From Self-Incrimination" (39) Min. L. Rev (1954) 83-84. 
161 Silving "The Oath Part I" (68) Yale L.J (1959) 1366. 
162 See infra note 199. 
163 Lilburne's defence is filled with examples of his request for the prosecution to prove its case. "Sir, I 
deny nothing, but prove it first". Lilburne's trial 4 St. tr 1269 (1649}. Lilburne used his refusal to 
answer questions as part of a greater strategy which was to place the onus of proof upon the 
prosecution, at 1340, 1341, 1382, 1388 and 1389. 
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conceptual difference between the older Wig more-Levy theory and the more recent Langbein 
theory. If the Wig more-Levy theory is to be believed, then the Lilburne trials are an exception 
and a historical oddity. It would be absurd to reason that at the time when the English 
common law judges were supposedly upholding the political accused's immunity from 
inquisitorial self-incriminatory practices, they were also vigorously and hypocritically 
compelling the accused in a criminal trial to all sorts of self-incriminatory questioning. 
2.3 The Helmholz-Macnair Roman-Canon Theory 
Research into a broad spectrum of source material has led to a re-evaluation of the origins of 
a privilege against self-incrimination. Helmholz and Macnair164 place the privilege's earliest 
roots in the Roman and canon laws of the ius commune. Far from being a developing rule of 
the common law as Levy suggests, 165 the privilege sprang from a continental source. The 
maxim nemo tenetur originated within the ius commune as a defensive sub-principle of 
inquisitorial procedure centuries before its appearance within the common law.166 By the 
thirteenth century it was part of the glossa ordinaria to the decreta Is ( 1234) of Pope Gregory 
IX.167 Resistance against abuse of the ex officio procedure arose from within the ius 
commune, initially articulated by the civilian lawyer and later by the common lawyer. 168 
Macnair states "that up until the revolution of 1688, the common lawyers shared the same 
'mental universe' of the canonists on the question of self-incrimination".169 During the 
sixteenth century arguments based on a canonical privilege against self-incrimination were 
regularly being raised against procedural abuse of the ex officio oath in the English 
ecclesiastical courts. 170 A canonical rule of privilege was a standard litigation process in the 
164 Helmholz "Origins of the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination : The Role Of The European Ius 
Commune" (65) Nw. Y. Un. L. Rev (1990) 962, criticizes Levy for relying exclusively on the opinions of 
seventeenth century common law judges thereby giving a misleading account of the privilege's origin 
(at 964). Macnair "The Early Development Of The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination" (10) Oxford J. 
Legal. Studies (1990) 66, who suggests that, "the privilege came into the English law from the 
common family of European law, particularly the canon law (at 67). 
165 Levy ibid at 329-330, incorrectly states "the nemo tenetur maxim has come a long way from its 
mysterious origins. Reputedly, a canon law maxim, it had never existed in any canon law text". See 
also Wigmore ibid at 296-301, Macnair ibid at 70, Helmholz ibid at 967. 
166 Helmholz ibid at 967. Macnair ibid at 69 "the earliest applications of the privilege are in equity 
courts not at common law''. Neither Wigmore nor Levy dealt adequately with the equity authorities. 
Levy simply did not distinguish them from the common law authorities. Wigmore cites equity and 
common law cases promiscuously to prove that a privilege was well established in the Restoration. 
167 Helmholz ibid at 967, "It was also endorsed by Innocent IV and Panormitanus probably the most 
influential writers on medieval canon law. 
168 Gray "Prohibitions And The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination In Tudor Rule And Revolutions", in 
Essays for G R Elton Cambridge C.U.P. (1982) 345, "medieval common law did not contain a 
straightforward privilege ... it had little place for one because trial was normally by jury, and the jury 
was conceived as the source of truth from its own knowledge". 
169 Macnair ibid at 67. 
170 Helmholz ibid at 969-973. 
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ecclesiastical court. "When the defendant in an ecclesiastical court wished to evoke a 
common law rule, he did so by introducing a royal writ of prohibition preventing the church 
judge from taking any action at all. However, such an action was usually a last resort for the 
defendant. His first step was to take an objection under the law of the church itself'.171 
English lawyers and the common law courts were therefore reliant on a well established 
canonical principle in their later struggle against the procedural abuses of the state's 
prerogative courts. 172 Nevertheless, much of the Wigmore-Levy theory remains valid, 
particularly the argument that the constitutional struggles of the mid-seventeenth century 
popularized and expanded the witness privilege, contributing to its establishment as a valid 
legal common law principle. 173 The conclusion which emerges from an analysis of reports, 
treatises and research on the ecclesiastical courts does not suggest, as Levy claims, that 
the privilege is wholly forged in the bitter struggle between rival common law and inquisitorial 
systems. Neither was the seventeenth century privilege an absolute one in the modern 
sense but a relative one 174 subject to exception and raising complex issues of canon law. 
The privilege of the ius commune was the defendant's qualified right to refuse to answer 
questions. It was a protection only against intrusion into private affairs by officious 
magistrates who had little more than innuendo to proceed on. The canon privilege was 
qualified by a balancing test in which the interests of the church, the quality of the evidence 
and the intrusiveness of the questions were weighed against the moral interests of the 
individual under investigation. The defendant in the ecclesiastical court could defend against 
procedural irregularities by raising certain exceptional objections. These canon rule 
objections to the ex officio oath were generally founded on the principle nemo tenetur and 
incorporated two highly specific variational forms. A refusal to take the oath at all on the 
basis that the whole procedure was invalid because it lacked an identified accuser, nemo 
punitur sine accusatore, 175 or a refusal to answer incriminating questions after having taken 
the oath on the moral basis that no one is bound to reveal his own shame, nemo tenetur 
detergere turpitudinem suam.176 Only as a last resort once the canon rule objections had 
failed, would the civilian litigant seek a common law writ of prohibition staying the 
ecclesiastical judge from proceeding. The records indicate that whenever common law 
171 Helmholz ibid at 973. 
172 Helmholz ibid at 968. 
173 Helmholz ibid at 990. 
174 For an interpretation of the absolute nature of the American 51h amendment, see infra chapter 5 p. 
159. For the English relative statutory right see infra chapter 9 and for the South African relative 
constitutional right see infra chapter 11. 
175 Helmholz ibid at 975. 
176 Helmholz ibid at 981 . 
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judges intervened to prevent procedural abuse of the ex officio oath, they were merely 
enforcing a canon law rule upon the ecclesiastical courts. 177 
The early church accepted the oath procedure reluctantly and placed narrow constraints on 
its use. The oath was only used as a substitute medium of proof.178 A necessary alternative 
in the absence of valid documentary evidence or reliable witnesses, indubiis et necessariis. 
During the medieval age and under church influence, the oath developed from a 
compurgational mode of irrational proof into an oath de veritate dicenda. 179 In his Summa 
Theo/ogica, Thomas Aquinas argued that the individual was not obliged to take the oath.180 
However, once the oath had been administered either fama publicus (on the basis of 
sufficient knowledge), or probatio semplena, the individual was then obliged to confess. The 
early privilege began its existence as a limitation upon this public duty to confess. The 
church demanded only private auricular confession. Far from reflecting the modern idea that 
a defendant has an absolute right to remain silent, the original privilege may simply have 
been a disqualification of public confession. Private confession was never protected by the 
canon privilege because a religious confession of sin was good for the Christian soul. The 
canon maxim from which the privilege was derived is set out as /icet nemo tenetur seipsum 
prodere, tamen proditis perfaman tenetur seipsum ostendere utrum possit suam innocentiam 
ostendere et seipsum purgare and translated as "no-one is bound to inform or produce 
(prodere) against himself, but when exposed by public repute (fama publicus), he is held 
(tenetur) and permitted (Licet) to show (ostendere) if he can, his innocence and purge 
himself (purgare). 181 The maxim, when read as a whole, does not establish a privilege 
177 Gray ibid note 167 at 348-350, "common law courts had the naked procedural power to stop what 
they did not like in non-common law courts. Most High Commission cases arose on Habeas Corpus 
rather than on a writ of prohibition. 
178 Silving "the Oath Part I" (68) Yale L. J. (1959) 1344. "It was conceded to be a medicine which 
though disagreeable was at times indispensable". 
179 De veritate dicenda "an oath to tell the truth". Oaths had obtained a special significance by the 
sixteenth century. In the ius commune there were at least 174 ways in which they could be applied. 
180 Summa Theo/ogica, part Ill, art 2 (at 257-58) Newton Press Ed (1988), "the individual once he has 
taken the oath is not obliged to tell the whole truth. He may remain silent, for there is a difference 
between silence and falsehood, but where there is infama, or express evidence of guilt, and he is 
asked to confess, he cannot conceal the truth". See St Augustine The City Of God New York Ed 
~ 1982) only oaths taken in falsehood or without necessity were prohibited (at 135). 
81 Wigmore "Nemo Tenetur Seipsum Prodere" (5) Harvard L J. (1892) 83-84, n2, translates the 
maxim as "though no one is bound to become his own accuser, yet when once a man has been 
accused by general report, he is bound to show whether he can prove his innocence and to vindicate 
himself'. According to Silving ibid note 177 at 1367, Wigmore's translation is erroneous because he 
ignores the decisive word Licet and ostendere is wrongly translated as to 'prove'. Silving (at 1367-68) 
concludes that the maxim refers instead to the compurgational oath. Macnair ibid at 70-71 suggests 
that the maxim refers to the oath de veritate dicenda. It is also argued that the use of the word 
prodere indicates that the maxim meant no more than that the individual had no positive obligation to 
'seek out' the proper authorities and to inform against himself. He could simply wait until summonsed 
by the proper court process. The differences in translation and meaning illustrate the obscurity of the 
Latin phrase. 
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against self-incrimination. On the contrary, it expressly declares that incriminating answers 
may be given in certain circumstances. When the first part of the maxim, nemo tenetur 
seipsum prodere, is separated from the remainder, a false translation is created, implying an 
unqualified privilege against self-incrimination. It was this misleading truncation, nemo 
tenetur prodere seipsum, taken out of its proper context that Edward Coke, Chief Justice of 
the Common Pleas, manipulated in his personal crusade against the ecclesiastical court 
system of James 1.182 By the middle of the seventeenth century, the privilege had grown into 
a right not to be interrogated under oath in the absence of a well founded suspicion. A 
magistrate was expected to have some kind of probable cause before asking the defendant 
to respond under oath to incriminating questions. 
An important initial criticism of the English ex officio procedure as applied by the prerogative 
High Commission and Star Chamber was that it violated biblical injunctions. Jesus said 
"Thou shalt not foreswear thyself, but shall perform unto the Lord thine oaths, but I say unto 
you, swear not at all",183 and again, "Woman where are thine accusers, hath no one 
condemned thee?"184 These biblical prescriptions served to justify non-conformist opposition 
to oath swearing in general and the ex officio oath in particular. According to seventeenth 
century jurisprudence, commencing a criminal proceeding by means of an oath process and 
without a verified accuser was contrary to both divine law and the law of the land. The 
defendant's refusal to swear in the absence of an accuser could be motivated by a claim to 
the canon rule nemo punitur sine accusatore. On a more pragmatic level, the argument was 
made that the ex officio procedure distorted natural justice by corrupting judicial 
impartiality.185 In the absence of an official accuser, the judge could no longer be a neutral 
communicator between the accused and the accuser (proditus perfaman). 
By making the judge into both accuser and adjudicator, ex officio mero, 186 the High 
Commission and the Star Chamber were abusing the ordinary canon law procedure. One of 
the more telling criticisms of the ex officio procedure as applied in these prerogative courts 
was that it deviated from the established canonical procedure. The established canon · 
182 See supra Edward Coke, at p. 40-41. Bentham Rationale Of Judicial Evidence Bowring Ed (1843) 
suggests that the nemo tenetur principle is an invention of Lord Coke. Certainly much of what he 
declared to be English law became so on his ipse dixit. 
183 Matthew 5 : 33-37. Christian theologians of the early church concluded that Christ's words should 
not be taken literally, as it is sometimes contradicted. St Paul was a foremost supporter of the oath at 
Romans 1 : 9: 2, Corinthians 1 : 23 : 11 : 31. As was Abraham of the Old Testament at Genesis 21 : 
23-24, Hebrews 6 : 13. 
184 John 8 : 10-11. Helmholz ibid at 975. 
185 Helmholz ibid at 975. 
186 Macnair ibid at 72 "the use of the ex officio mero procedure opened the way for fishing 
interrogatories on matters unconnected with the original accusation or presentment". 
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process allowed for inquisitorial questioning on oath subject to a trustworthy accusation 
made by an accuser with a reasonable interest in the outcome of the proceedings. An 
important requirement of this standardized system was that the accusation had to be made 
known to the defendant before the administration of the oath and the commencement of 
questioning. The canon procedure was designed to apply in the average ecclesiastical court 
acting against religious transgressions and imposing excommunication, public penance and 
other spiritual punishments.187 By contrast, the High Commission and Star Chamber 
targeted political transgressions, not religious ones, and abused the oath procedure in order 
to secure secular penal punishments. To make matters worse, the High Commission relied 
upon a rarely used exception to the standard canonical procedure. This exceptional oath 
process was initiated by fama publicus but only on reasonable suspicion and probable 
cause. To justify proceedings by way of fama publicus, certain strict requirements had to be 
met. The fama had to be the true source of the prosecution, proved by the testimony of a 
trustworthy witness and not a mere malicious rumour spread by an enemy of the 
defendant.188 The fama publicus variation on the standard canon process was developed in 
the thirteenth century to combat heresy, on the reasonable ground that exceptional crimes 
demanded exceptional remedies. It was never intended to target political crimes and was 
abolished by the Catholic Church in 1725.189 Critics of the High Commission and the Star 
Chamber charged the prerogative courts with abusing and manipulating the exceptional 
requirements of the fama publicus oath process in the secular interests of their political 
master. In order to be effective as a roving political inquisition, the judges of these 
prerogative courts proceeded ex officio mero190 and by fama publicus. Judicial investigations 
were initiated on purely personal suspicion, thereby creating an artificial and wholly 
unverifiable subjective source of fama publicus. In the unbalanced procedure as applied in 
the prerogative courts, there was no means of determining the reasonableness of the judicial 
187 The jurisdiction of ecclesiastical courts was limited to religious issues, such as heresy, blasphemy, 
witchcraft, profanity, schisms, atheism, etc. Also morality issues : fornication, adultery, incest and 
bigamy. Criminal jurisdiction was strictly limited to matters of usury, defamation, drunkenness, public 
misconduct and breaches of contract. Some kinds of ecclesiastical sanction, for example 
excommunication, could be turned into a penal punishment but only through a common law writ de ex 
communicato capiendo. At frequent intervals the jurisdiction of the church courts was statutorily 
limited to matters testimonial and matrimonial only. 
188 Helmholz ibid at 976-977. 
189 Silving ibid note 178 at 134 7. Macnair ibid at 71. Levy ibid at chapter 2. 
190 The High Commission justified its extraordinary procedure by relying on the Elizabethan Act of 
Supremacy 1 Eliz 1 ch 1 sec 8 (1558) for authority. The Act of Supremacy granted the High 
Commission special powers permitting it to ignore standard canon law and even common law rules. 
Critics of the High Commission argued that all statutes including the Act of Supremacy were subject to 
interpretation by the common law. The High Commission was therefore bound to follow the limitations 
on its procedure as set down by the common law judges. In Spend/ow v Smith 80 Eng Rep 234 K.B. 
(1615) it was asked "the question is whether the High Commission or the common law judges will 
have the exposition of the Elizabeth I statute, and we are of the opinion that the judges of the common 
law will". Gray ibid note 168 at 354-356. 
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accusation, nor was it possible to establish the accuracy of the charge before the swearing of 
the oath. The rise of a privilege against self-incrimination may be viewed against this 
background, as a defensive measure against prerogative courts which abused established 
canonical procedure for political purposes. 
Another defensive measure designed to combat the abuse of the oath procedure was based 
on the canon rule, nemo tenetur detegere turpitudinem suam, "no one is compelled to bear 
witness against himself, because no one is bound to reveal his own shame".191 In terms of 
this rule the defendant could swear the oath and still selectively refrain from answering self-
incriminatory questions. An important principle of religious faith was the expectation of a 
private and personal confessional relationship between individual and God. It was immoral 
to compel a public confession. The privilege against self-incrimination developed as a 
protection of private confession and as a prevention against unacceptable public confession. 
StJohn Chrysostomos, a fourth century Greek Church Father, said "I do not say that you 
should betray yourself in public, nor accuse yourself before others, but that you obey the 
prophet when he said, reveal your ways unto the Lord" .192 The ex officio procedure, 
especially the ex officio mero process, by its nature required public utterances of self-
incriminatory testimony, thereby infringing the theological distinction between private and 
public confession. The ex officio procedure not only infringed the private confessional 
relationship, but also violated the individual's personal autonomy193 and privacy.194 
Furthermore, forcing the defendant under oath to answer incriminating questions was a 
strong temptation for perjury and exposed the individual to the cruel trilemma of choosing 
between perjury, contempt or self-incrimination.195 These objections and the privilege which 
arose from them were not absolute but relative defences. Inquisitorial questioning under 
oath remained a valuable canonical tool only as long as the strict requirements were rigidly 
complied with. Civilian lawyers did not consider the privilege to be a fundamental or absolute 
right, but simply a protection against a narrow kind of abusive and intrusive judicial process. 
The canon principle nemo tenetur developed in response to the danger posed by the 
politically manipulated prerogative courts in their abuse of inquisitorial procedures and 
probable cause. In this sense, it was a narrow protection designed to shield the individual 
191 Helmholz ibid at 981. 
192 Silving ibid note 177 at 1344, Helmholz at 982. Haslehurst Some Account Of The Potential 
Discipline Of The Early Church In The First Four Centuries Haysmond 1st Ed (1921) 101. 
193 See infra chapter 4 p. 124-129 .. 
194 See infra chapter 4 p. 118-129 .. 
195 The argument that the ex officio oath encouraged perjury was first made before the King's Bench 
in Maunse/1 and Ladd (1607) (B. L. Add Ms 25206 in fols 55 and 59). The accused sought a habeaus 
corpus writ against the High Commission and defence counsel argued that perjury was the inevitable 
result of the ex officio oath especially if the High Commission proceeded by interrogatorii captiosi -
questions designed to entrap the unsophisticated defendant. Gray ibid note 168 at 360-363. 
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from roving and fishing expeditions. The nemo tenetur principle was therefore a perfect 
defensive tool against a High Commission and Star Chamber which routinely undertook 
these roving inquisitions. In summary, a number of important points about the operation of 
the nemo tenetur principle may be isolated. First, the silence principle developed out of an 
opposition to the High Commission and Star Chamber prerogative courts. It was essentially 
a limited defensive shield against religious and political prosecution. Second, the trial 
procedure in these prerogative courts lacked both a specific accuser or a specific chargeable 
allegation and was directed at thoughts as well as deeds (A typical fishing expedition). Third, 
the ex officio oath was intended to exploit strongly held religious beliefs. In the seventeenth 
century religion was much more powerful than it is today. The spiritual sanction of lying (a 
risk of eternal damnation) was a greater risk than mere perjury, compelling the accused to 
speak the truth even at the cost of self-accusation. The ex officio oath therefore imposed a 
form of spiritual torture. The silence principle was designed as a legitimate moral defense 
against the infliction of ex officio spiritual torture. Fourth, there were two notable exceptions 
to the nemo tenetur principle. When there was a specific accuser, someone with an interest 
in the accusation and the conviction, the defendant was morally and legally obliged to swear 
the oath. The privilege did not operate in the case of public fama, a well grounded suspicion 
that a specific person had committed a religious or political crime. Fifth, irregular trial 
proceedings could be defended against in a number of ways, either by argument within the 
prerogative court itself or by writ of prohibition or habeas corpus aminating from the common 
law courts. However, when the common law courts intervened they did so in a supervisory 
capacity, not by applying the common law but by requiring the prerogative courts to adhere 
to their proper procedures (a kind of notice of bar). 
If the Helmholz and Macnair analysis of the canon law sources is correct, then the privilege 
against self-incrimination is not a common law innovation nor is it entirely forged from the 
conflict between rival systems. Instead, it is a defensive sub-rule of canon law developed as 
a protection against abuse of established inquisitorial, de veritate dicenda, procedure. The 
idea is taken up by the seventeenth century common lawyer and expanded into its modern 
format. This transition from canon to common law occurs because the seventeenth century 
common and civilian lawyer shared much the same mental universe. The intellectual 
intercourse between the various legal fraternities resulted in a canon law rule being pressed 
into service within the common law courts. 196 The canon privilege focuses upon improper 
methods of coercing information from the defendant while allowing acceptable self-
incriminatory testimony within the properly applied and recognized canon law instances. 
196 Helmholz ibid at 989, "Lawyers have long chosen good ideas wherever they have found them. 
They press them into service in the short term interests of their clients". 
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Essentially it prevents a public confession but not a private confession. In this sense it can 
hardly be defined as a right to silence but only as a qualified witness-type right against self-
incrimination. The modern privilege is also much narrower, applying only to an actual or 
potential criminal proceeding. The traditional privilege is much wider and could be triggered 
not only in criminal proceedings, but on the risk of civil liability and injury to personality. In 
fact, it could be triggered whenever the seventeenth century witness or defendant faced a 
state forum requiring some manner of public confession. Helmholz and Macnair argue that 
the idea of a privilege against self-incrimination did not appear in the common law until well 
after the Glorious Revolution (1688) and is first noted in civil-inquisitorial cases197 and only 
later in criminal cases. By the turn of the eighteenth century, the privilege has become 
established as a common law legal principle. Gilbert, the leading eighteenth century 
authority on the law of evidence, writes "our law in this differs from the civil law, that it will not 
force a man to accuse himself, and in this we do certainly follow the law of nature, which 
commands every man to endeavour his own preservation" .198 The privilege is by the 
eighteenth century so well established that its canon law origin and heritage have become 
totally obscured. 
2.4 The Langbein Adversarial Theory 
Langbein 199 argues that the accused's right to silence could not have gained a widespread 
or practical acceptance during the seventeenth century. The right to silence was sometimes 
applied in the seventeenth century but only in exceptional and limited circumstances. The 
accused was sometimes allowed to exercise a right to silence when the presiding magistrate 
wrongly administered the oath to the accused or where a non-party witness, once sworn, 
refused to answer to an incriminating question. The procedural framework of the ordinary 
criminal trial of those times had no place for the tactical use of silence by the accused. Quite 
the converse, the seventeenth century trial exerted certain pressures which forced the 
accused to take an active part in the proceedings against him. 200 The mechanics of the trial 
197 Examples are Bracy's case (1696) H 1696-7, I Ld Raym 153" privilege applied to an examinee in 
brankruptcy proceedings". Cox v Copping (1698} P1698 5 Mod 395, 1 Ld Raym 337, "the court 
refused to admit certain documents on the ground that it would be unfair to expose the defendant's 
documentary evidence to the plaintiff'. R v Worsenham (1701) 1 Ld Raym 705, R v Mead(1704) 2 Ld 
Raym 927, "the courts in both cases refused the production of certain books on the ground that it 
would compel the defendant to produce evidence against himself in a criminal cause". For the 
privilege's modern application to documentary evidence see infra chapter 7. 
198 Gilbert The Law Of Evidence (1756) 139-140. 
199 Langbein "The Historical Origins Of The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination" (92) Mich L. Rev 
~1994) 1047. 
00 Beattie Crime And The Courts In England (1660-1800) 1986. See also the old authorities, 
Blackstone Commentaries On The Laws Of England Oxford Clarendon (1756-1769) 4 vols and 
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system did not allow for defence counsel. The accused was obliged to formulate his own 
defence without outside assistance. A right to remain silent at trial means absolutely nothing 
without a defence counsel. If the accused does not have a lawyer to speak for him, his 
silence is self-destructive as it simply leaves the prosecution's case unanswered. Langbein 
explains, "the right to remain silent when no one else can speak up for you is simply the right 
to slit your throat".201 It is the gradual rise of an adversarial system and the increasingly 
dominant role played by defence counsel which allows the accused to make use of his 
silence as a tactical advantage. The Wigmore-Levy contention that a privilege against self-
incrimination reigns supreme in the criminal trial by the late seventeenth century is 
apparently irreconcilable with the Langbein account. The only manner of resolving the 
inconsistency is to draw a distinction between the privilege against self-incrimination and the 
right to silence. Analytically, a principle of silence is quite different from a principle of self-
incrimination. Silence deals with the prohibition placed on a compulsion to speak and the 
inferences which may be drawn at trial from a failure to testify. Self-incrimination deals with 
the extent to which the individual may be compulsorily conscripted by a state process to give 
incriminatory testimony against himself. The Wigmore-Levy theory therefore, traces the 
development of a witness type privilege against self-incrimination as a protection against 
state coercion. Langbein traces the evolution of the accused's right to silence at trial as a 
protection against the compulsion to testify. The existence of a privilege against self-
incrimination during the seventeenth century should not be confused with the non-existence 
of a criminal right to silence. While the privilege is an effective remedy against the 
inquisitorial oath procedure, its highly abstract moral nature and its identification with political 
issues would have had no discernible influence over the mundane common law criminal trial. 
The right to silence develops along a different path to that of a privilege against self-
incrimination. Langbein argues that a right to silence is essentially the product of a lawyer 
driven adversarial trial structure and illustrative of a fundamental philosophical shift in the 
understanding of criminal prosecution.202 Under the influence of an adversarial tension 
between prosecution and defence counsel, the trial begins its evolution from the seventeenth 
century emphasis on the accused's guilt to the modern emphasis on the accused's 
innocence. 203 
Stephen A History Of The Criminal Law Of England London 1883, A General View Of The Criminal 
Law of England 2"d Ed (1890). 
201 Langbein ibid at 1054, defines this kind of criminal procedure as the "accused speaks" trial system. 
202 Langbein ibid at 1068-71. A radical re-evaluation of criminal procedure creates a new lawyer 
driven "testing the prosecution" trial system. 
203 Langbein "The Criminal Trial Before The Lawyers" (45) Un. Ch. L. Rev (1978) 45 and "Shaping 
The Eighteenth Century Criminal Trial, A View From The Ryder Sources" (50) Un Ch. L. Rev (1983) 1 
and Prosecuting Crime In The Renaissance (1974). Beattie "Scales Of Justice, Defence Counsel And 
The English Criminal Trial In The 18th And 19th Centuries" (9) Law and Hist. Rev (1991) 221. Phillips 
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In the ordinary common law court system of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the 
criminal trial process was divided into two stages. The first stage, in terms of the Marian 
committal statute (1555),204 was a preliminary pre-trial inquiry or investigation before a state 
appointed Justice of the Peace,205 the purpose of which was to collect and collate all the 
evidence for and against the accused.206 The object of the magisterial examination was to 
subject the accused to a careful and wide-ranging questioning on every detail of the alleged 
crime. One of the more important aspects of the preliminary inquiry was that the accused 
was never questioned under oath, nor was he legally obliged to answer the interrogatory type 
questions. However, a failure to provide answers would be noted in the magistrate's 
deposition and submitted as evidence in the subsequent trial. Silence during the pre-trial 
inquiry would often be construed as an adverse inference of guilt against the accused. 
Another aspect of the preliminary process was that the standard treatment of the defence 
witness varied from that of the prosecution witness. The prosecution witness could only be 
questioned under oath, while the defence witness was questioned unsworn.207 The 
underlying reasoning being that the prosecution witness was thought of as inherently more 
credible and reliable than the defence witness. The preliminary inquiry offered the state a 
cost-efficient opportunity to obtain self-incriminatory evidence from an uncounselled, 
unsworn and often confused accused. The pre-trial examination also allowed the magistrate 
to function as a kind of back-up prosecutor. Usually the private citizen-accuser conducted 
the prosecution's case, but where there was no private accuser available, it was the 
magistrate who investigated, bound witnesses to appear at trial and orchestrated the 
prosecution. At the second or trial stage,208 a jury was sworn, the accused's plea was taken 
and the magistrate's deposition was read out. The prosecution witness was called first and 
"Goodmen To Associate And Bad Men To Conspire (1780-1860)" in Policing and Prosecution in 
Britain Hay and Snyder Ed (1988). 
204 1 and 2 Phil and Mar C13, 2 and 3 Phil and Mar C10 (1554) and (1555). The origin and effect of 
these acts is discussed in Langbein Prosecuting Crime In The Renaissance (1974) 5-125. 
205 The main purpose was to question and collect evidence, particularly as no police force existed in 
those times. The inquiry was a necessary investigatory tool. 
206 It was standard procedure for the magistrate to focus on the prosecution witness and to under-
emphasise the accused's witness. This prejudice reflects the prevailing legal cultural notion of a 
presumption of guilt against the accused. The procedure designed to collect only prosecution 
evidence was based on the Marian Committal Statute of 1555. If the accused declined to testify at 
trial or attempted to deny his pre-trial statement, the statement would be evoked against him at trial. 
Even Levy recognized that the privilege against self-incrimination "scarcely existed in the pre-trial 
stages of a criminal proceeding" (at 325). 
207 Not until 1848 (11 and 12 Viet CH 42) were rules enacted which warned the accused of his ability 
to refuse to answer questions at pre-trial and cautioned him about the adverse inferences which could 
be drawn from his silence. Freestone and Richardson 'The Making Of English Criminal Law, John 
Jervis And His Acts" Grim. L. Rev (1980} 5. 
208 Stephen inbid note 200 at Vol. I 347-348. See also Smith De Republica Anglorum Mary Dewar Ed 
( 1982) book 2, ch 23 and his analysis of the structure of the 16th century trial. See Langbein ibid note 
199 at 1049. 
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again questioned under oath. The accused was obliged to challenge the prosecution 
evidence as it unfolded. The trial was carefully structured to allow for a confrontational 
dialogue209 between the prosecution witness and the accused, forcing the accused to 
respond immediately to each item of evidence as it was adduced against him. The trial 
process counted heavily against the accused. He was given no advance notice of the 
prosecution's case, no legal counsel to assist in challenging the factual issues and no means 
of securing the attendance of the defence witness at trial. Perhaps the greatest handicap for 
the defence was the inability of the accused and the defence witness to testify under oath. 
Both were only entitled to give unsworn testimony from the stand resulting in an often 
insurmountable credibility problem. 210 The operating presumption during the trial was one of 
guilt and the adverse procedures of the trial strongly inhibited the accused's ability to 
discharge the burden and establish proof of innocence. In this type of environment, silence 
offered the accused no tactical advantage at all. Instead, the benefit lay in responding 
immediately and positively to each item of prosecution evidence. The trial initiative was 
firmly in the hands of the prosecution and the accused invariably responded reactively rather 
than proactively. Seventeenth century statistics disclose that virtually all accused 
consciously chose to speak out either at the pre-trial or the trial stage.211 The trial process 
was often a mere formality, reduced to a straightforward analysis of the accused's pre-trial or 
trial self-incriminatory testimony.212 The seventeenth century notion of proof differed 
substantially from the modern concept. Proof was always constituted a priori at the pre-trial 
inquiry and not by a process of rational analysis. Admissibility of evidence was not linked to 
the more modern idea of relevancy, but dependent on the idea that some kinds of evidence 
were lawful and others unlawful. The idea that evidence should be subject to a critical 
evaluation determinative of its intrinsic value and weighed against conflicting evidence during 
209 Langbein ibid note 199 at 1049, the accused and the accuser in "altercation". 
210 The reason for not administering the oath to the accused were based largely on the logic that the 
accused was better protected by not being sworn. Allowing the accused to swear an oath would force 
the accused to incriminate himself, tempt the accused to commit perjury and could be construed as a 
forced confession. Stephen ibid note 200 at vol I 354, suggests that the real reason for prohibiting the 
accused from swearing was to increase the power of the prosecution. Gilbert ibid note 198 at 139, 
says that the accused was "utterly removed from being evidence for want of integrity''. Phillips A 
Treatise On The Law Of Evidence 2 Ed (1815) 34, "accused are excluded from the oath on the want of 
integrity and not as some supposed to save them from the temptation of perjury''. The primary 
purpose of this disqualification appeared to be the necessity of keeping untrustworthy evidence from 
the jury. 
211 Beattie ibid note 200 at 348-349, "there was no thought that the prisoner had a right to remain 
silent on the grounds that he would otherwise be liable to incriminate himself .... the assumption was 
clear that if the case against him was false, the prisoner ought to say so and suggest why, and that if 
he did not speak that could only be because he was unable to deny the truth of the evidence". 
212 Trials were speedy affairs, processed while the parties' memories were fresh. There was no voir 
dire, no opening or closing statements, no evidentiary or procedural motions, magistrates often 
obtained a standard pre-trial confession, cross-examination was a rudimentary process hesitantly 
conducted by the accused. 
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the trial process was as yet unformed. Once the preliminary investigation had built up a case 
of lawful proof against the accused, a presumption of guilt arose and the onus was on the 
accused to explain away the prosecution's lawful proof item by item. 
The procedural processes deliberately designed to coerce the accused into an active 
participation in the trial and which mitigated against the development of a right to silence may 
be described as follows : First and most importantly, the accused was denied outside 
independent legal representation. 213 The court was expected to take on the dual function of 
prosecutor and defence counsel. According to Beattie, "the common practice was for the 
judge to take the prosecution's witness through the testimony, line by line, acting as both 
examiner and cross-examiner until satisfied that the fullest possible case existed".214 On the 
other hand, judicial assistance for the accused was strictly limited to advise on questions of 
law and never on factual issues.215 The judge could shield the accused from illegal 
procedures, but could not assist the accused in organizing a defence.216 The accused was 
obliged to formulate his own factual defence and at the same time, to counter the 
prosecution's factual evidence as it unfolded.217 According to prevailing logic, the accused 
was denied legal counsel for the following reasons : The accused was regarded as the 
primary and best source of evidence.218 The assumption was made that an innocent 
accused could easily persuade the jury of his innocence. By contrast, the guilty accused 
through speech, gesture, demeanour and manner, would betray himself to the jury.219 
Allowing defence counsel to shield the accused would constitute an artificial defence thereby 
preventing access to the best form of evidence, namely the accused himself.220 
Second, the accused's ability to conduct his own defence was inhibited by a number of other 
procedural obstacles. The accused was unable to efficiently utilize his defence witnesses. 
213 Langbein ibid not 199 at 1049-1066. Beattie ibid note 200 at 339, 360. For both authors, the 
absence or presence of a defence counsel is the central reason for the absence or presence of a 
silence principle. 
214 Beattie ibid note 200 at 342. 
215 Coke The Third Part Of Institutes Of The Law Of England, Concerning High Treason And Other 
Pleas Of The Crown Cap 63 p137 (1637}. Langbein ibid note 199 at 1 050n9. 
216 Beattie ibid note 203 at 223, 233, 236-47, 254. 
217 Even when the accused was provided with defence counsel around the middle of the 181h century, 
the counsel's role was strictly limited to advice on legal issues, never on factual matters. Beattie ibid 
note 199 at 360 "Counsel knows his duty at trial and may speak for the accused on any matter of law, 
but cannot do so in matters of fact, the accused must manage his entire defence in the best manner 
he can", in Derby (Surrey Assize Proceedings} Lent 1752 at 2-11. 
218 Modern inquisitorial trial systems continued to regard the accused as a primary source of 
evidence. The trial system is structured around the accused. 
219 Langbein ibid note 199 at 1053, who quotes the authority of Hawkins A Treatise Of The Pleas Of 
The Crown London (1721} Sweet and Maxwell (1931 }. 
220 Langbein ibid note 199 at 1054. · 
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The accused had no legal power to subpoena witnesses.221 In addition, the usual practice 
was to detain the accused before trial, thereby preventing him from locating defence 
witnesses and properly developing his defensive argument.222 By contrast, the magistrate, 
during the pre-trial inquiry, was required to bind the prosecution witness to appear at trial. 
No such admonishment was given to the defence witness. The accused was also denied 
advance warning of the charge against him, making it difficult to develop a coherent defence. 
Significantly, the accused had to make do on unsworn testimony. Unlike the accused or 
defence witness, the prosecution witness gave testimony on oath and was entitled to decline 
to answer any question which could lead to a criminal punishment223 (a witness privilege 
against self-incrimination). The accused's protection on the other hand, was assumed to lie 
in not being sworn at all. The unbalanced difference being that the unsworn accused did not 
enjoy a corresponding protection or right of silence. Third, there was as yet no properly 
defined standard of proof. The beyond a reasonable doubt standard had not yet been 
developed. The seventeenth century standard was vague and shifting.224 The accused was 
hampered by his inability to determine just how and when the proper threshold level of proof 
had been reached. The vagueness of the standard is illustrated by the dictum of Scroogs J 
in the Popish Plot case, 225 who defined it as "the proof belongs to the Crown to make out 
those intrigues of yours, therefore you do not need counsel, because the proof must be plain 
upon you, and then it will be vain to deny the conclusion". This was made more difficult 
because the accused in practice bore a substantial burden of proof and rebuttal was often a 
hesitant process without clear cut guidelines. The consequence of the inchoate standard of 
proof was that the jury was allowed a wide latitude in reaching its verdict. Fourth, the jury 
played a crucial role in the allocation of the appropriate sentence. The seventeenth century 
jury had the power, especially in cases concerning the death penalty, to select a lesser 
sanction. By currying sympathy from the jury, the accused could hope to persuade the jury 
towards a more lenient verdict.226 Remaining silent during the sentencing stage of the trial 
221 Lilburne 3 How St. tr 1315 ( 1637) is forced to request the court for subpoenas for "certain 
~arliamentary men who will not come in save by compulsion". 
22 Stephen ibid note 200 at vol I 356-357. 
223 John Friend's case 13 How St. tr 1 , 17 ( 1696). Lord Treby on the nature of a sworn witness, "no 
man is bound to answer any question which will subject him to a penalty or to infamy'. Lord Treby is 
simply restating the rule against self-incrimination (see supra Wigmore-Levy theory). 
224 Shapiro Beyond Reasonable Doubt And Probable Cause, Historical Perspectives On The Anglo-
American Law of Evidence ( 1941 ) 1-41 . The most common directive to the jury was "if the evidence is 
sufficient to satisfX your conscience" (at 14). The vague formula was replaced by the modern doubt 
rule in the late 18 century (at 21-25). 
225 Popish Plot case 12 How St. tr 1.14 ( 1678) Scroggs J. 
226 Langbein ibid note 199 at 1062-1064. The distinction between the main trial and the sentencing 
stage of the early criminal trial was not as clear cut as it is today. 
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would therefore not be to the advantage of the accused.227 Fifth, the cumulative effect of a 
refusal of counsel, an identification of the accused as the best source of evidence, a pre-trial 
process which allowed the accused's silence to be adduced as evidence at trial, the 
credibility problem of giving only unsworn testimony on the stand, sundry other restrictions on 
defence preparation and the sentencing power of the jury successfully mitigated against the 
development of a trial right to silence. 
The turning point in the development of a trial right to silence began with a change in the 
philosophical understanding of the criminal prosecution.228 The axis of a new jurisprudential 
reasoning was based on a re-interpretation of the nemo tenetur prodere seipsum principle. 
The idea that a confession coerced by physical or spiritual torture was essentially unreliable 
was re-developed as a protection against self-incrimination. The well-established rule which 
permitted a non-party witness, once sworn, to refuse to answer all self-incriminating 
questions was extended into a protection for the accused against compulsory self-
incrimination. The Treason Act of 1696229 initiated the very first reforms and commenced the 
process of expanding the accused's defensive trial rights. To compensate for the fact that 
judges were appointed by and subservient to the state,230 the Treason Act eliminated a 
number of procedural disadvantages which had prevented defendants from providing "a just 
and equal means for defence of their innocences".231 The Treason Act swept away the 
prohibition on defence counsel, allowed the accused a copy of the charge sheet and 
permitted defence counsel to examine, cross-examine and address the jury on the merits of 
the accused's defence.232 More importantly, the Act also granted to the accused the power 
to have witnesses subpoenaed and sworn. 233 Although initially limited to treason trials, the 
227 In order to reduce his sentence, the accused needed to evoke a sympathetic response from the 
~ury by justifying the reason for the crime and by appealing to good character. 
28 In the 1 ih century, scientific philosophy began to take on a rational bias under the influence of 
Voltaire (1694-1788) Rousseau (1712-78) Montesqiueu (1699-1755) Hume (1711-76) and Locke 
(1632-1704). New standards of rational inquiry were developed including the idea of relevancy as a 
~re-requisite for admissibility and a rational/logical assessment of evidence. 
29 Treason Act (7 and 8 Will Ill Ch 3 (1696)). The Act was a reaction to the Popish Plot trials of the 
1670s, in which a number of politically prominent individuals were falsely accused of treason on the 
single perjured testimony of Titus Oates, a paid government informer. Hampered by a trial process 
which prevented an effective defence many innocent individuals. suffered a traitor's death. Kenyon 
The Popish Plot (1972) 225. Havighurst ,;The Judiciary And Politics In The Reign Of Charles II (part 
I~" (66) L.Q.R. (1950), 62. Stephen ibid note 200 at voll383-92. 
2 0 Judicial appointments were gifts of the Crown, either sebene gesserit or durante bene placit. 
Havighurst "James II And The Twelve Men In Scarlet" (69) L.Q.R. 522 (1953). The reforms of 1696 
and 1730 were partially based on the evening-up principle. Judges favoured the Crown and to 
counter this tendency, defence counsel were admitted to evenly balance the trial. 
231 7 and 8 Will Ill CH 3 Sec 1 to sec 7. 
232 Shapiro "Political Theory And The Growth Of Defence Safeguards In Criminal Procedure, The 
Origins Of The Treason Trial Act" (11) Law and Hist Rev (1993) 215. 
233 The legal ability of the accused to testify under oath in a criminal trial was a statutory power 
conferred by 1 Anne STAT 2C9 (1703). 
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use of defence counsel began to sneak into the routine procedures of the ordinary criminal 
trial. By the late eighteenth century, court practice and judicial discretion combined to widen 
counsel's window of opportunity.234 Judges used their discretion more frequently to allow 
defence counsel and by the nineteenth century, there was an accelerated change in 
courtroom procedure as the utilization of defence counsel took hold and became 
commonplace. The increasing use of defence counsel began to sway and shift the focus of 
the criminal trial in the most fundamental manner. The idea that the accused was to be 
regarded as innocent until sufficient evidence proved otherwise gained momentum. By 
casting doubt upon the validity of the factual evidence presented by the prosecution, the 
defence counsel managed to bring increasing pressure to bear on the prosecution to prove 
its case. 235 The onus of proof gradually swung away from the accused towards the state, 
placing the burden on the prosecution to rebut what was then considered to be an innovative 
and developing presumption of innocence.236 The intimate jurisprudential relationship 
between a presumption of innocence and the right to silence as a "seamless web" of rights 
recognized by the South African Constitutional Court inS v Zuma .and Others,237 may be said 
to have its origin in the development of an adversarial lawyer driven system of criminal 
justice. It is in the nineteenth century changes which sculptured a new adversarial trial 
system that the true beginning of the accused's trial right to silence is to be found (as 
opposed to the witness or defendant's privilege against self-incrimination which has its 
beginning in the political trials of the seventeenth century). What had previously been a 
disadvantage now became an advantage. The accused's new-found ability to shelter behind 
defence counsel allowed him to use his silence as a tactical offensive trial weapon. The 
accused had only to take care not to contribute evidence (in the form of an admission or 
confession}, in order to make it increasingly more difficult for the prosecution to prove its 
case. 
The factors which contributed to the rise of an adversarial system thereby establishing a 
fertile environment for the development of a right to silence may be summarized as follows : 
First, the influence of defence counsel was crucial in the development of a modern 
adversarial trial system. Defence counsel played an essential role in separating the · 
defensive and testimonial functions of the accused who had been previously obliged to both 
defend himself and testify at his own trial. By taking over the defensive function, the defence 
234 Langbein "The Criminal Trial Before The Lawyers" (45) Un Ch. L. Rev (1978) 307, 311-312. 
Beattie ibid note 200 at 352-62. 
235 Beattie ibid note 200 at 361-362 and ibid note 203 at 233-35, 244. Langbein note 199 at 1069 and 
ibid note 203 at 84-114. 
236 Beattie ibid note 200 at 375 and ibid note 203 at 238. 
237 1995 (2) SA 642 (CC). 1995 (4) BCLR 401 (CC). 
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counsel freed the accused from testifying, rendering the accused's testimonial function 
somewhat unnecessary. Hence a burgeoning defensive right to silence. Second, the 
necessity to counter every item of evidence as it was adduced in a kind of spontaneous 
reactive confrontational dialogue between the accused and the prosecution witness was 
replaced by organized and distinct party burdens. The prosecution bore the burden to 
commence proceedings by adducing evidence and the accused bore a proactive burden to 
rebut such evidence.238 Third, the development of an adversarial party-party relationship 
resulted in a rationalization of a coherent standard of proof. The rather vague and shifting 
standard was replaced by a new beyond a reasonable doubt standard of proof. 239 The 
prosecution was put to the proof of its case without the assistance of the accused. Silence 
by the accused made it more difficult for the prosecution to meet the necessary threshold 
level of proof. Fourth, by a vigorous cross-examination of the prosecution witnesses, 
defence counsel limited the number of factual issues which needed to be answered, thereby 
reducing the necessity for the accused to testify and indirectly encouraging the use of silence 
as a tactical advantage.24° Fifth, the increasing effectiveness of defence counsel in turn 
forced the state to employ a distinct and professional body of prosecuting counsel. To shield 
their clients against examination by these professional prosecutors, defence counsel began 
to make increasingly more use of the silence principle by keeping the accused out of the 
stand. The defence tactic of refusing to allow the accused to testify was so effective that the 
common law accused was eventually declared an incompetent witness at his own trial. A 
disability which was only legislatively removed in 1898. Sixth, the central and dual role 
previously played by the judge as both prosecutor and defender declined in importance as a 
distinct professional class of prosecutor and defence counsel usurped the functions of 
examining and cross-examining the witness. The judge, reduced to the role of an impartial 
referee, could now devote his time to ensuring a fair trial and a proper protection for the 
accused's trial rights, including the right to silence. This process also reduced judicial 
influence over the jury which increasingly became a neutral trier-of-fact. With the exception 
of the accused's testimonial disqualification as a trial witness, the familiar modern trial format 
was well established by the middle of the nineteenth century. (Until the end of the nineteenth 
century the development of the American silence principle followed a similar pattern to that in 
England). 
238 Langbein ibid note 199 at 1070. 
239 Langbein ibid note 199 at 1070. 
240 Beattie ibid note 203 at 235. 
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The removal of the accused's testimonial disqualification by the Criminal Evidence Act 
1898241 (in South Africa by the Administration of Justice Act 1886 (Cape)) was not without 
controversy.242 Those in favour of the Act argued that the accused should have exactly the 
same procedural rights as other witnesses, including the ability to testify under oath. The 
disqualification was unfair as it substituted a presumption of perjury for a presumption of 
innocence.243 Opponents, on the other hand, argued that the accused would be exposed to 
the rigours of cross-examination. The jury could draw adverse inferences from the accused's 
silence, regardless of specific judicial cautionary instructions and the accused would be 
faced with an undeniable temptation to commit perjury. For example, Stephen, the leading 
English commentator on evidence, noted "it is not in human nature to speak the truth under 
such pressure as would be brought to bear on the prisoner, and it is not a light thing to 
institute a system which would almost enforce perjury on every occasion".244 Nonetheless, 
the only restriction on both the English and South African Acts was to bar the prosecution245 
from commenting on the accused's failure to give evidence.246 It was thought that the bar on 
commentary coupled with the accused's right to silence was a sufficient qualitative substitute 
for the testimonial disqualification.247 
At the beginning of the twentieth century the silence principle emerged as a specific immunity 
against police custodial interrogation (an immunity from being compelled on the pain of 
241 Parker "The Prisoner In The Box, The Making Of The Criminal Evidence Act 1898" in Law and 
Social Change in British History. Guy and Beale Ed. {1984) 160. 
242 The removal of the testimonial disqualification came much earlier in America. Maine {1864), by 
the end of the 19th century all American states with the exception of Georgia {1962) had done so. {Act 
of March 16 {1878) 20 STAT 30 at 18 U.S.C. sec 348, 1994). Bodansky "The Abolition of the Party-
Witness Disqualification, An Historical Survey'' {70) KY. L. J {1982) 91. 
243 In the many English parliamentary debates of the 19th century over this question, the primary relief 
sought by reformers was not a right to silence, but greater powers for the defence counsel. The 
increasingly more important role of defence counsel, recognized in the mid 19th century {6 and 7 Will 
IV C114 1836), contributed to a changing philosophical thinking on criminal procedure. Modern legal 
ideas began to be reflected in case law, R v Arnold 173 Eng Rep 645, 645-46 K.B {1838) and also in 
statute. The Jervis Act 11 and 12 Viet CH 42 sec 18 {1848). 
244 Stephen ibid note 200 at vol I 202. 
245 Curiously the 1886 Cape statute contained no provision restricting prosecutorial comment on the 
accused's silence, this only came later. In America only a few state statutes restricted prosecutorial 
comment, others did not. In 1966 the U.S. Supreme Court in Griffin v California banned all 
~rosecutional and judicial commentary on silence. 
46 All the competency statutes, the English 1898 Act, the South African 1886 Act, the Australian 1893 
Act and the American Federal 1878 Act, expressly preserve the accused's ability to make an unsworn 
statement from the stand without exposure to cross-examination. This ability was removed in South 
Africa in 1977, England 1982 {Criminal Justice Act sec 72), America in the 1920s (Commonwealth v 
Stewart 151 N.E 74 {Mass 1926). 
247 For a historical development of the American right against self-incrimination see Moglen "Taking 
The Fifth, Reconsidering The Origins Of The Constitutional Privilege Against Self-Incrimination" (92) 
Mich. L. Rev (1994) 1086-1130. Urick "The Right Against Compulsory Self-Incrimination In Early 
American Law'' {20} Columbia Human R. L. Rev {1988) 107. Mayers "The Federal Witness Privilege 
Against Self-Incrimination" {4) Am. J. legal. Hist {1960} 107. Morgan 'The Privilege Against Self-
Incrimination" {34} Minn. L. Rev {1949) 1. 
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punishment to answer interrogatories of any kind) and a specific immunity against taking the 
witness stand at trial (an immunity against being compelled to give evidence or to answer 
questions ·under examination or cross-examination). There was as yet no immunity against 
the drawing of adverse inferences from the failure to answer questions or give evidence at 
the pre-trial and trial stages. The early twentieth century silence principle was a simple 
evidentiary procedural rule underscored by utilitarian logic and sustained by the same 
rationales as those of its direct ancestor, namely an abhorrence of compulsion and a concern 
that evidence obtained by state coercive practices was inherently unreliable. It was not until 
the middle of the twentieth century that a resurgent human rights culture adopted the 
reasoning that no adverse inferences could be drawn from the defendant's silence. At first, a 
no-inference rule was strictly limited to the pre-trial stage after the administration of a 
cautionary warning. This limited prohibition had its genesis in the Judges Rules (1912), the 
repeal of the John Jervis Act (1848) by the Criminal Justice Act (1925) and the provision for 
an obligatory caution once a defendant was charged with an indictable offence. The re-
interpretation of the caution in R v Nay/o~48 and R v Leakey,249 as an "invitation to say 
nothing" gave rise to the unwarranted impression that it was wrong to draw any adverse 
inference from silence in response to the caution. An interpretation which was adopted by 
Hall v The Queen250 as a principle of the common law and affirmed as such by the Privy 
• 
Council and the Court of Appeal in Parkes v The Queen.251 It was not until the last quarter of 
the twentieth century that adverse inferences from the accused's silence in court began to be 
prohibited. None of these quite modern prohibitions on adverse inferences has a sustainable 
underlying rationale nor are they based on historical precedent. The practical reason for 
limiting adverse inferences from silence appears to be judicial distrust of the intellectual 
capacity of layperson juries to draw common sense inferences from the accused's failure to 
give evidence.252 The twenty-::first century silence principle within the Anglo-American 
system consists of a right to silence at pre-trial and trial, a prohibition against adverse 
inferences and a displacement of the historical utilitarian foundations of the principle by a 
human rights culture based primarily on moral sentimentality rather than on sound 
jurisprudentia/logic. 
248 (1933} 1 KB 685 at 687. 
249 (1944} 1 KB 80 at 86. 
250 (1971} 1 WLR 298. This decision was criticized by R v Chandler (1976} 1 WLR. 585. See also R v 
Christie (1914} AC 545 and R v Bathurst (1968} 2 QB 99. For a full exposition of the English position 
see infra chapter 8. 
251 64 Cr App R25. See also R v Sparrow (1973} 1 WLR 488. R v Martinez-Tobon (1994) 1 WLR 388. 
252 A reasoning which has absolutely no relevance within the South African trial context, yet South 
African courts have blindly followed English precedents by imposing the very same limitations. 
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A review of the origins of both the privilege against self-incrimination and the right to silence 
illustrate a number of fundamental ideas necessary for a proper understanding of the modern 
principle. 
The witness privilege against self-incrimination is a creation of the 11h Century, the 
accused's trial silence is the creation of the 18th Century : 
The origin of the privilege against self-incrimination is to be found in the seventeenth century. 
The product of a religious and later a political struggle against the inquisitorial ex officio oath 
procedure. Its roots lie in the early Roman-canonical law as a defensive sub-principle 
against abuse of oath procedure. The English common law courts take up the cause and the 
privilege becomes a symbol of the jurisdictional struggle between the ecclesiastical and the 
common law courts. Later the privilege develops into a defensive tool against religious and 
political oppression. It assumes a dual function. On the one hand, a symbol of the struggle 
between parliament (the rule of law) and monarchy (the divine right of kings). On the other, a 
symbol of the struggle between the individual interest (in search of first generation rights) and 
the state interest (in search of stability and orthodoxy). Analytically, the principle of self-
incrimination deals with the extent to which the individual (the witness or the accused) may 
be compulsorily conscripted by a state procedure to give incriminatory testimony against 
himself. It is an effective defence against state organized roving fishing expeditions. 
The accused's right to silence within the common law courts follows a completely different 
evolutionary path and should not be confused with the witness privilege. A right to silence is 
the end result of a unique lawyer driven adversarial system and the rise of defence counsel 
in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. The eighteenth century "Age of Reason" prompts 
a radical philosophical rethinking of the criminal process. The result is a separation of the 
defensive and testimonial functions previously merged in the accused's person and a 
developing adversarial tension between prosecution and defence. Analytically the principle 
of trial silence deals with the prohibition on a compulsion to speak. At pre-trial, a failure to 
reply to an interrogatory question and at trial, a failure to testify. As a twentieth century 
innovation the silence principle also deals with the prohibition on the drawing of adverse 
inferences. 
The orthodox school of history strongly suggests that the primary rationale in the 
development of a principle against self-incrimination is the natural human abhorrence of 
using coercive methods in the extraction of incriminating testimony. The rationale is 
essentially a human rights argument based on the fundamental necessity of protecting 
liberty, privacy and human dignity against the cruelty of both physical and psychological 
compulsion. Secondarily, the principle against self-incrimination is said to promote the truth 
seeking function of the legal process. By excluding coerced confessions and admissions, 
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the accuracy and reliability of the adjudicatory procedure is enhanced. The more recent 
adversarial school of though suggests that the rationale behind a right to silence is to be 
found in the procedural protections enjoyed by the individual at both the pre-trial and trial 
stages. The trial silence principle is best understood as an instrumental protection and part 
of the jurisprudential triad between a right to a fair trial and the presumption of innocence. 
The historical privilege is both more narrow and at once broader than the modern 
privilege: 
The modern privilege against self-incrimination is a wide protective shield against all kinds of 
personal incriminatory testimony. By contrast the historical privilege was a more narrow rule 
focused only on a limited number of self-incriminatory statements. It must be remembered 
that self-incrimination was an established and culturally acceptable practice in both the early 
common law and ecclesiastical courts. The medieval canon privilege was a protection only 
against public confession but not against private confession. The seventeenth century 
privilege was essentially a limited defensive legal device against the misuse of inquisitorial 
oath procedure by the prerogative courts of the High Commission and Star Chamber. The 
privilege was a prohibition against certain kinds of interrogations under oath, including a 
protection against torture253 and the extraction of involuntary confessions. 254 A sworn 
witness could decline to answer questions on the ground of possible self-incrimination but 
the unsworn witness was expected to answer. Similarly, until the nineteenth century, 
magistrates continued to encourage the accused to speak during the pre-trial interrogation 
253 The development of the privilege against self-incrimination was in some measure a reaction 
against the use of torture, particularly within the prerogative courts. The rationale behind the use of 
torture was not to obtain evidentiary facts but solely to extract a confession of guilt. The use of torture 
in the English courts was never as widespread as on the continent and was generally confined to 
treason and other "state" crimes. The use of torture was an extraordinary procedure which only the 
power of the crown could justify, it could only be applied by command of the king or the king's Council. 
Levy ibid at 326 quite correctly reasons that where there is a right against self-incrimination there is 
necessarily a right against torture. Stephen ibid note 200 at 440 noted, "the maxim nemo tenetur .... 
was all the more popular because it condemned the practice of torture for the purpose of evidence, 
then in full use on the continent and in Scotland". See further Levy ibid at 326-328. Wigmore ibid at 
315-317. Herman ibid note 105 at 178-179. Interestingly, judicial torture was not abolished in France 
until 1789, Russia, 1801 and in some German states 1831. Sherman "Informal Immunity, Don't You 
Let The Deal Go Down" (21) Loyola L. Angeles. L.R. (1987) 1, 9-14. 
254 At the time of the abandonment of torture an admissibility rule against involuntary confessions 
developed. The original voluntariness rule was merely another method of restating the old rule that 
torture for the purpose of obtaining confessions was illegal. Herman ibid note 105 at 176-180. 
Wigmore ibid at 401 sec 2266. Initial confessional law was based on the rule that involuntary 
confessions were admissible because of an inherent unreliability (R v Waricksha/1 (1783) 1 Leach 263) 
but in R v Sang (1980) A.C 402, 436, the view was expressed that the underlying rationale was really 
the nemo tenetur seipsum maxim. Statutory law (PACE 1984) has now abolished the old common law 
principles and introduced a rule based on "oppression" (sec 76(2))- anything done or said which is 
likely to render a confession unreliable. The statutory rule includes elements of reliability as well as 
the discipline and protective principles. In South Africa it is still good law, R v Camane 1925 AD 570, 
that a necessary corollary of the right to remain silent is the right not be compelled to make a 
confession. 
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stage and again at trial. The accused's silence could and often did drawn an adverse 
inference of guilt. The historical privilege was in some respects much wider than the modern 
privilege. The modern privilege may only be invoked by a witness who is at risk of a possible 
criminal charge. The older privilege could be successfully triggered when there was both a 
risk of criminal punishment and a risk of civil liability, including defamation. Furthermore, the 
older privilege operated not only within the domestic jurisdiction, but also against the risk of a 
foreign prosecution. The modern privilege does not extend immunity to the witness who 
fears the possible risk of prosecution within a foreign forum. 
The historical privilege was always a relative principle, the modern privilege is 
sometimes relative and sometimes absolute : 
The historical privilege was a limited and relative shield of the ius commune, subject to a 
balancing test in which the individual interest was always weighed against the church or state 
interest. In the same way the accused's original right to silence also reflected a balancing of 
interests pragmatism. Adverse inferences, sometimes of guilt, were drawn in the appropriate 
circumstance at pre-trial and at trial. By contrast the modern American privilege against self-
incrimination (including the corollary right to silence) is deemed an absolute constitutional 
safeguard which no amount of evidence can overcome. In its core area, the privilege is 
absolute and only on the periphery is it subject to influence by a balance of interest principle. 
The European Court of Human Rights has recently reinterpreted sec 6(1) of the European 
Convention of Human Rights and has introduced a right to silence couched in language with 
absolute overtones. In the same vein the South African right to silence (Sec 35 F.C. 1996) is 
defined as a relative right subject to limitation by sec 36, although in time, it might prove to 
have certain absolute features. On the other hand, the present English statutory right to 
silence, the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994, sensibly permits the state to draw 
adverse inferences in the appropriate circumstance from both the accused's pre-trial (sec 34) 
and trial (sec 35) silence. 
A confusion of ideas and a reification of slogans : 
The privilege against self-incrimination and the right to silence have always been subject to a 
certain confusion of ideas and language. This confusion is compounded by the 
interchangeable and promiscuous use of the word "right" and the word "privilege". A right is 
a philosophical concept quite distinct from a privilege. A right to silence has an origin and 
nature different from the origin and nature of a privilege against self-incrimination, even 
though both are based on the same fundamental principle of self-protective "silence". This 
confusion of ideas allows the advocates of a "silence" principle to justify it by an appeal to 
emotion, through the medium of a human rights-based language, without being held to a 
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rational proof of its merits. Bentham, the utilitarian philosopher, criticizes adherents of the 
"silence" principle who adopt the principle merely because it is born in the struggle against 
state compulsion or coercion. What could be more natural, he says, "than that a people, 
infants as yet in reason, giants in passion, should reject every feature of tyranny and 
unquestionably accept every feature against it?".255 The fact that tyrants have historically 
abused the witness and the accused in the course of compelling them to answer does not 
prove that it is always logical or rational to excuse them from responding to lawful inquiry. 
The development of the modern "silence" principle is a perfect example of how old ideas can 
be adapted to new functions. Wigmore notes, "If one instance better than another serves to 
exemplify the manner in which history may cover up the origin of a legal principle, destroy all 
traces of its real significance, change and recast its purpose and its use, while preserving an 
identity of form .... It is the rule that no man shall be compelled to criminate himself'.256 The 
old maxims are dressed in new shorthand slogans and old doctrines acquire new meanings 
which take on a self perpetuating life of their own. The original canon law maxim, licet nemo 
tenetur seipsum prodere, tamen proditis per famen tenetur seipsum ostendere utrum possit 
suam innocentiam ostendere et seipsum purgare (no-one is bound to inform against himself, 
but when exposed by public repute, he is held and permitted to show if he can, his innocence 
and purge himself) which does not establish a so-called privilege against self-incrimination, 
has been truncated and paraphrased to the popular "nemo tenetur seipsum prodere or "no 
one is bound to betray himself' which in turn has been converted into the declaration "no one 
shall be compelled in a criminal case to be a witness against himself'. The slogan, a 
privilege against self-incrimination begins to sound like the slogan a right to silence. Much of 
the history of the silence principle has been a confusion of ideas and a slippage from one 
doctrine and slogan to another without a true appreciation of the conceptual differences 
between them. The development of a silence principle is governed by a gradual but 
progressive slippage in the various historical purposes of the privilege, from the original rule 
of limiting the burden of religious confession to a rule of condemning abuse of interrogation 
under oath. Both rules are then fused into a wide condemnation of all incriminatory 
interrogation. In the course of the centuries these old doctrines are moulded into a single 
modern principle that it is unfair to expect the accused to participate actively in the criminal 
process against him. History does not support the definition or constitutional status awarded 
to the modern right to silence and its modern corollary the privilege against self-incrimination. 
Proponents of the silence principle who seek a historical justification for their opinion are 
perhaps unknowingly adding to the confusion. 
255 Bentham Rationale Of Judicial Evidence Vol Ill Chapter 7 at 456, 460, Bowring Ed 1843. 
256 Wigmore "Nemo Tenetur Seipsum Prodere" (5) HaN. L. Rev (1891) 71. 
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2.5 CHRONOLOGY 
A.D. EVENT LEGAL CONSEQUENCE 








(1066-87) of Normandy procedure 
Reign of Stephen (1135-54) 
Henry II (1154-89) 
Reign of John I (1194-1216) 
Fourth Lateran Council 
Otho Papal-legate for Gregory IX 




Stephen attempts to proscribe the teaching of 
Roman law in England. Two distinct and rival 
legal systems exist side by side. An 
ecclesiastical court system based on inquisitorial 
procedure and a secular King's court based on 
an indigenous Germanic-Saxon process. The 
result is a double judicial system and a struggle 
over jurisdictional limits. 
The development of a jury based procedure 
despite the influence of substantive Roman law. 
The jury system represents a centralizing 
instrument of royal power within the common 
courts. Trial by jury effectively bars the 
introduction of a canon law procedure in the 
secular courts. 
John is forced to sign the Magna Carta (June 
1215) as a redress of baronial grievances. The 
Charter binds the crown not to outlaw or imprison 
except by the law of the land or a judgement by 
jury. The Charter is incorporated into statutory 
law in 1225 and becomes a symbol of freedom. 
It forms one of the legal justifications (albeit 
incorrectly) for a claim of privilege against self-
incrimination by Puritan non-conformists of the 
171h century. 
Pope Innocent Ill abolishes the ancient Germanic 
based compurgational oath and replaces it with a 
Roman-canonical oath de veritate dicenda or as 
it is popularly known in England, the oath ex 
officio. 
The compurgational oath had never aroused any 
opposition in England as it was a simple 
declaration of innocence based on an appeal to 
God. The new ex officio oath did arouse hostility 
because it allowed the judge to probe and 
explore the mind of the witness. 
Henry attempts by means of prohibitory writs to 
prevent Bishop Grosseteste from abuse of the ex 
officio oath procedure. 
The statute De Articu/is Cieri resolves the 
A.D. EVENT 
1368 Edward Ill 







The Court of the Star Chamber 
William Tyndale 
Henry VIII 




jurisdictional dispute between the rival systems 
by limiting ecclesiastical jurisdiction to matters 
matrimonial and testimonial and this limitation 
prevails until the end of church courts in England. 
Confirms the rights and freedoms of his subjects 
as set out in the Magna Carta, "no man shall be 
put to answer without presentment, before 
justices, or matter of record, or by due process 
and writ original, according to the old law of the 
land". 
Statutory formalisation of the ex officio oath 
procedure De Heretico Comburendo as a 
reaction to the Lollard heresy. First use of the ex 
officio procedure outside of matrimonial and 
testimonial matters. The massive opposition to 
the ex officio oath in the 16th and 17th centuries 
would never have occurred if the ex officio 
procedure had been confined to testimonial 
matters in the ecclesiastical courts. The 
precedent set here allowed the later use of the ex 
officio oath in the state struggle against heresy 
and political non-conformity. 
First appearance of the Star Chamber Court 
evolving from the King's Council as a prerogative 
administrative instrument. The ex officio oath 
becomes the usual fact-finding procedure of the 
prerogative courts. 
An influential English intellectual who criticizes 
the ex officio oath in his widely read Obedience 
Of A Christian Man. 
Mounting opposition to the ex officio oath initiated 
by Tyndale results in the repeal of the De 
Heretico act and the restriction of the ex officio 
procedure by the requirement of a formal charge 
and due process before the taking of the oath. 
The Act of Supremacy severs the union between 
the English Church and the Catholic Church. 
Fusion of state and church in the person of the 
monarch. The Star Chamber is assigned the 
task of securing conformity to the new 












The procedure of the common law 
criminal court 
The procedure of the ecclesiastical 
and prerogative courts 
Mary I 
Elizabeth I 




Is the first person to make use of the Latin maxim 
Nemo Tenetur Seipsum in defending himself 
against a heresy prosecution. His objection was 
not against the process of compulsory self-
incrimination but only against the use of the oath 
as a tool to reveal crimes which were unknown or 
unproved. 
From the medieval period to the middle of the 
16th century the accused before a criminal court 
could not refuse to answer incriminating 
questions. The older method of proof forced the 
accused to a direct denial of the charge under 
oath. In the 16th century the legislature had no 
hesitation in sanctioning modes of proof which 
directly involved the examination of the accused. 
Until the middle of the 18th century the 
examination of the accused is a central feature of 
the criminal court. 
The resistance to the inquisitorial process of the 
prerogative courts begins to take on a political 
dimension. This political resistance results in the 
abolition of inquisitorial procedure. In the ruin of 
inquisitorial processes a privilege against self-
incrimination is born. 
The accession of Mary leads to the re-
establishment of the Catholic Church and a 
bloody purge of Anglicanism. Mary establishes 
the first High Commission court to suppress 
Protestant heresy. The Marian committal statute 
(1555). 
Elizabeth's new Act of Supremacy results in a 
politico-religious compromise. The establishment 
of a sophisticated High Commission under 
Archbishop Whitgift to supress political and 
religious deviance. The High Commission and its 
specialized ex officio oath procedure is used as a 
fishing expedition against Catholic and Puritan 
dissident minorities. 
As an ordinary attorney and Attorney-General, 
Coke becomes an active opponent of the ex 
officio oath procedure in the church courts. In 
Collier v Collier he first uses the defence nemo 
tenetur seipsum. 
The trial of Cartwright illustrates the emergence 
of a highly politicized Puritanism as a major 
A.D. EVENT 
1606 James I 
1616 Lord Edward Coke 
1634 Charles I 
1637 John Lilburne 
1641 The long Parliament 
1642- English Civil War 
1648 
1645- Cromwell and the Commonwealth 
1658 
1660 The restoration of Charles II 
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LEGAL CONSEQUENCE 
irritation to the Crown. Morice, Beale and Fuller 
are prominent members of this burgeoning 
opposition movement. 
Coke becomes Chief Justice of the Common 
Plea. His fixed determination is to set the 
common law supreme above bishops, 
ecclesiastical courts and even above the king. 
As Chief Justice of the King's Bench, he uses the 
slogan nemo tenetur seipsum as a means of 
interfering with ecclesiastical oath procedures, 
especially in cases of a criminal nature. In 
Burrowes v High Commission, Coke limits the 
High Commission's oath procedure to testimonial 
causes and declares that the High Commission 
has no jurisdiction to examine on oath in criminal 
(political crime) cases. 
Charles re-organizes the Star Chamber and High 
Commission. Under Archbishop Laud a new 
campaign is launched against the King's political 
opponents (diverse Puritan sects). 
The Wigmore-Levy theory contends that the 
mounting tension within the popular courts to the 
ex officio procedure comes to a head in John 
Lilburne's first trial. It is in "Freeborn" John's 
struggle for what he regards as the basic 
constitutional liberties of an Englishman that the 
origin of a well reasoned privilege against self-
incrimination is to be found. 
Parliament abolishes the unpopular Star 
Chamber and High Commission together with the 
inquisitorial oath procedure. The privilege 
against self-incrimination, at least in theory, 
becomes a legally accepted principle. 
Political struggle between parliament (the 
supporter of the common law courts) and the 
Crown (the supporter of the prerogative-
inquisitorial type courts). 
During the dictatorial rule of Cromwell, a narrow 
privilege against self-incrimination becomes 
entrenched as a custom of English law. 
The privilege against self-incrimination begins to 
be incorporated into the criminal common law 
court system as an effective and practical 







Popish Plot trials 
Trial of the Twelve Bishops 
The Glorious Revolution 
The conceptual clash between the 
Orthodox common law theory and 







Highlights the inequity and unfairness of the 
criminal trial in which the accused enjoys very 
few procedural advantages. The trial judge acts 
as the accused's defence counsel in matters of 
law only. The accused is left on his own as to 
matters of fact. The accused and his defence 
witnesses give unsworn testimony while the state 
witnesses give· sworn testimony, a massive 
credibility problem. 
Archbishop Sancroft utilizes the privilege against 
self-incrimination as part of his legal defence. 
The defence is accepted by the court. By the 
end of the 11h century there is a narrow but well-
established privilege against self-incrimination for 
political and religious crimes. 
The last Stuart, King James II is removed from 
the English throne. Parliament is now supreme 
and the Crown is relegated to a subsidiary role. 
The common law courts are dominant and the 
ecclesiastical courts, although revived in 1662, 
have fallen into practical disuse except for the 
discipline of the clergy. 
According to the Wigmore-Levy theory, the 
privilege against self-incrimination is a well-
established procedural tool of the common law 
criminal trial by the end of the 1 th century. 
Wigmore sees the absorption of the privilege into 
the criminal trial as a gradual process of 
assimilation. Levy sees it as an active and 
dynamic incorporation, the result of the traumatic 
social upheavals of the time. 
According to Helmholz and Macnair the privilege 
was a part of the English ecclesiastical law and 
not the common law. 
The privilege was a limited defensive procedural 
device of the ius commune. against the 
compulsive confessional pressure of the ex 
officio oath. It was not regarded as a 
fundamental personal right but as a curb on the 
intrusive powers of the inquisitorial court. 
According to Langbein, there is no evidence of 
the existence of a privilege in the 1 th century 
criminal trial which continues to be dominated by 
institutional pressures for the compelling of 












Judicial appointments reformed 
Legislative reforms 
A gradual change in the trial 
process begins 
American constitutional entrench-
ment of the privilege against self-
incrimination 
First session of the U.S. Congress 
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accused speaks trial). For example, the Marian 
Committal Statute (1555) was designed to 
pressure the accused into incriminating himself 
and to collect evidence on behalf of the State 
against the accused. The accused's pre-trial 
statements were used in evidence against him at 
trial. 
In all probability Wigmore and Levy are correct in 
identifying a narrow witness privilege against 
self-incrimination in the common law courts. A 
witness privilege is conceptually different from 
the accused's right to silence. The structure of a 
1 ih century criminal trial precludes the 
development of a right to silence but allows for a 
narrow non-party witness privilege against self-
incrimination once the State witness is sworn. 
Until 1701 judges held office at the pleasure of 
the Crown. Reform of the appointment process 
now allows the judiciary a measure of objective 
impartiality and an immunity from interference by 
the Crown. 
Legislation is enacted to allow the defence 
witness to give sworn testimony in the ordinary 
felony trial and makes other minor procedural 
changes. This legislation is the consequence of 
the Treason Trial Act (1696) which allows the 
accused pre-trial access to the preliminary 
charge sheet and a grace period in which to 
prepare a defence. 
According to Langbein, a process of testing the 
prosecution's case beings to develop. The 
exercise of judicial discretion permits the 
accused to make use of defence counsel in the 
ordinary criminal court. The beginning of the 
modern adversarial trial process. Nevertheless 
the court continues to emphasise the advantages 
of treating the accused as the central testimonial 
resource. 
Incorporation of a privilege in the provincial state 
constitutions. Maryland (1776), North Carolina. 
(1780) Massachusetts (1784) New Hampshire 
(1784). 
First draft of a Federal United States Constitution 
Second session of the 
Congress 
U.S. Ratification of the U.S. Constitution and the 
incorporation of a fifth amendment privilege 
A.D. EVENT 
1792 Fox's liberal Act 
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against self-incrimination as the protection for the 
liberty of the citizens. The authors of the fifth 
amendment regarded it as a safeguard against 
the introduction of an English style Star Chamber 
procedure. It was not as yet defined as a 
fundamental and absolute personal right. 
Faced by an increasing use of professional 
defence counsel in the criminal trial, the English 
prosecution service re-organises itself. Private 
associations for the prosecution of felonies are 
established (1770-1790). The decline of judicial 
influence over the jury trial beings. 




criminal trials shield the accused, to conduct the defence and 
to cross-examine state witnesses. 
The adversarial fair trial concept 
Judicial impartiality 
John Jervis Act 
Incompetent witness 
The old inchoate standard of proof is redefined 
into a crisp easily applied formula. The initial 
development of a presumption of innocence as 
part of a fair trial concept. The systemization of 
the legal literature in the form of organized law 
reports (nisi prius reports). 
The adversarial trial process is now the accepted 
norm. The judge becomes an impartial controller 
as professional counsel usurp the functions of 
defence and prosecution. The defence counsel 
is now by statute also allowed to address the 
jury. 
The introduction of a legal cautionary rule 
warning the accused that he may decline to 
answer questions in the pre-trial interrogation 
and that his answers could be used as evidence 
against him at trial. The final legislative abolition 
of the Marian Committal Statute 1555. 
The accused is an incompetent witness for the 
defence and is legally prohibited from taking the 
witness stand on oath. 
1878- Competent witness for the defence The removal of all testimonial bars on the 
1898 accused. The American Federal Act (1878), the 
South African Administration of Justice Act 
(Cape) (1886), the English Criminal Evidence Act 
(1898). 
1900 The right to silence The early 20th century silence principle is a 
limited specific utilitarian immunity against pre-








The Judges Rule (Introduced into 
South Africa only in 1931) 
The Seminal cases 
The fifth amendment 
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There is as yet no specific prohibition against the 
drawing of adverse inferences. 
The refinement of the old cautionary warning. 
The repeal of the John Jervis Act by the Criminal 
Justice Act (1925) and the reform of criminal 
procedure rules. The Judges Rules represent 
the first tentative steps towards the evolution of a 
no adverse inference rule. 
R v Naylor (1933) 1 K.B 685 and R v Leckey 
(1944) 1 KB 80. The interpretation of the caution 
to mean an "invitation to say nothing" and a 
second step towards the prohibition against the 
drawing of adverse inferences from silence. 
In the first quarter of the twentieth century the 
American fifth amendment belongs to a distinctly 
second class group of constitutional rights. 
Palkov v Connecticut 302 U.S 319 (1937). 
1960 - The American Warren Court 
1969 
The Warren Supreme Court elevates the fifth 
amendment into the first rank of constitutional 
protections. 
1965 The American no-inference, no- Griffin v California 380 U.S 609 (1965). Neither 
comment rule the prosecution nor the judge may draw an 
adverse inference from the accused's failure to 
testify at trial. The prohibition is an absolute one 
and is not susceptible to a balance of interests. 
1966 The Miranda warning Miranda v Arizona 384 U.S 436 (1966). A set of 
custodial procedural safeguards designed to 
shield the suspect from the coercive influences of 
police interrogation. The fifth amendment is 
extended outside of its pure contextual meaning. 
The silence principle becomes part of an 
obligatory police caution and is linked to a 
coerced confession rule. 
1966 The United Nations The International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights. Article 14(g) expressly provides for a 
privilege against self-incrimination. 
1968 The English Civil Evidence Act The statutory codification of the witness privilege 
against self-incrimination (Sec. 14). The South 
African equivalent, Sec. 14 of the Civil 
Proceedings Evidence Act is introduced in 1965. 
1970 The English no-inference rule The adoption of the no-inference rule as a 
to principle of the common law, Hall v The Queen 




inference rule in Parkes v The Queen (1977) 64 
Crim. App. R. 25. 








Procedure Act silence principle directly or indirectly in Sec. 203, 
Sec.217,Sec.219A. 
The Canadian Constitution Act 
(Part I) 
The Police And Criminal Evidence 
Act (PACE) 
The Singapore Criminal Procedure 
Act (Chapter 68) 1985 
New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 
(Note the Australian Constitution 
makes no mention of a silence 
principle). 
Funke v France 16 EHRR 297 
The English Criminal Justice And 
Public Order Act (no South African 
equivalent) 
The South African Constitution 
The Charter of Rights and Freedoms. The 
common law definition of a witness privilege 
against self-incrimination is directly defined in 
Sec. 11(c) and indirectly in Sec. 13. The Charter 
makes no mention of a right to silence which is 
only residually incorporated by virtue of Sec. 7 
Statutory safeguard against the admission of 
involuntary confessions. A judicial discretion to 
· exclude involuntary confessions. The attachment 
of a specific police code of conduct regulating 
arrest and interrogation procedures. A 
mandatory police administered right to silence 
caution. 
The Criminal Procedure Code of Singapore is 
amended to provide for adverse inferences 
against the accused who fails to mention relevant 
facts either during pre-trial interrogation or trial 
examination. 
In Sec. 23(4) everyone who is arrested or 
detained shall have the right to refrain from 
making a statement and to be informed of that 
right. The silence principle is also indirectly 
recognized in Sec. 366(1) of the Crimes Act 
(1961). There is no codification of the witness 
privilege against self-incrimination. 
Funke re-interprets Sec. 6(1) of the European 
Convention on Human Rights by making the 
silence principle an integral element of the right 
to a fair trial. 
The introduction of clearly defined statutory rules 
on the nature and kind of adverse inference to be 
drawn from an invocation of silence at pre-trial 
(Sec. 34) and at trial (Sec. 35). 
The elevation of the silence principle from a 
utilitarian common law rule into a fundamental 
constitutional human right (Sec. 35(1 )(a)(b), 
(3)(h)O). 
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A.D. EVENT LEGAL CONSEQUENCE 
1998 - The Human Rights Act The incorporation of the European Convention of 
2000 Human Rights into English domestic law. The 
beginning of a steady erosion of the utilitarian 
basis of the present English statutory definitions 
of the silence principle. 
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CHAPTER3 
RIGHTS, PRIVILEGES, MORALITY AND RATIONALITY 
3.1 The Logic of Rights and Privileges 
The silence principle in constitutional and evidence law has long been subject to an alarming 
degree of confusion. The interchangeable use of a "right" and a "privilege" for what are 
arguably two different concepts is misleading. A "right" to silence usually attaches to the 
accused during the criminal process. A "privilege" against self-incrimination is invoked by a 
witness called to offer testimony in either a criminal or a civil proceeding. In English and 
Commonwealth jurisdictions there is a tendency to label both generally as a "right to silence", 
whereas the Americans tend to use the catch-all sentence a "privilege" against incrimination. 
The confusion is compounded by the fact that the "right" and the "privilege" have different 
historical antecedents. Furthermore, a "right" denotes a strict human interest. It is an 
expression of a fundamental human value which demands legal protection by its very nature. 
A "privilege" on the other hand, is considerably less valuable than a "right". It is a type of 
special treatment accorded, usually by the State, as a favour or concession. While an 
intrinsic "right" is unalienable, a concessional privilege may be revoked or withdrawn at any 
time. A "right" imposes a limitation on the exercise of government powers by strictly defining 
the relationship between the citizen and the state. The state cannot arbitrarily create a "right" 
in the way it creates a "privilege". The state merely interprets and validates claims to an 
already existing right in a contested circumstance. A "privilege" entitles the citizen to 
withhold relevant information from a court with the legal power to demand disclosure. 
"Privilege'" may on one level be defined as a rule against disclosure and on another level as a 
rule of admissibility. Nevertheless, if the "privilege" is waived or if the privileged information 
escapes into the public domain, the court is legally obliged to act on it. A "privilege" is 
intrinsically of a lesser value than a "right". 
To add to the confusion, the silence principle is sometimes explained as an immunity and 
defined either as an immunized "right" or an immunized "privilege". The words immunity, 
right and privilege are often applied interchangeably although the philosophical differences 
between them are quite significant. The accused's "right" is sometimes said to be more 
valuable than the witness "privilege" because the accused is faced with an immediate and 
urgent threat to his liberty. The accused is confronted by the immediate weight of the state's 
resources, whereas the witness risks only the possibility of a future criminal charge. The 
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accused's need is more immediate and therefore his "right" is more valuable. The witness's 
need is less immediate and therefore his "privilege" is less valuable. 
Despite the inherent philosophical difference between a "right" and a "privilege", common law 
jurisdictions tend to be arbitrary in the way they label and make use of these differing 
concepts. In America both the "right" and the "privilege" are constitutionally entrenched. 
There is also a certain sense of absoluteness attached to the constitutional guarantee. In 
England and Australia the "right" and the "privilege" are not constitutionally guaranteed. 
They are ordinary principles of the common law which sometimes enjoy statutory support 
and are sometimes vulnerable to statutory abrogation. In South Africa the accused's "right" 
to silence (Sec 35(1 )(a)) and "right" against self-incrimination (Sec 35(3)0)) is constitutionally 
guaranteed but only as a relative and not an absolute "right". In the Canadian Charter of 
Rights and Freedoms only the accused's and the witness's "privilege" against self-
incrimination is constitutionally entrenched. No mention is made of a "right" to silence which 
is only indirectly incorporated into the Canadian Constitution through sec 7 and then only as 
a residual supplement to the self-incrimination clause. · 
The confusion between a right and a privilege stems largely from the increasingly dominant 
role that rights-based moral theories play in the modern world. Since the Second World War 
(Europe) and the Vietnam War (America), there has been an overwhelming tendency to 
advance legal arguments in terms of a rights-based terminology. 1 In the modern Western 
world the various human right doctrines have overshadowed alternative moral philosophies 
as the primary mechanism for social and legal reform.2 Utilitarianism as a persuasive 
alternative moral theory has been rendered unfashionable not for want of rationality but for 
want of publicity. In the continuing debate between natural and positive law, the advantage 
lies with a rights-based theory because it prioritises individual interests over and above the 
more abstract utilitarian conception of a communal worth and nett happiness. Within the 
present Western cultural experience the good of the part is preferred to the good of the 
1 This tendency stands in sharp contrast to the meaning of the opening sentence of the 1789 version 
of the American Constitution. "To establish justice, ensure domestic tranquility, provide for common 
defence and promote the general welfare", expresses the utilitarian ideal of promoting the well-being 
of the nation as a whole rather than as a protection of individual human rights. By contrast, Davidson 
Human Rights Buckingham {1993) 167 speaks of a resurgence of natura/law principles in the 201h 
century as exemplified in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights {1948) and the U.N Charter. 
Bassiouni The Protection Of Human Rights In The Administration Of Criminal Justice Etc New York 
(1994) XXIV, referring to the provisions of the U.N. Charter states, "These provisions unequivocally 
assert the existence, primacy . . . of internationally protected human rights . . . . [in all] national legal 
systems that have ratified the charter irrespective of [sovereign claims]". 
2 The last 50 years has seen the introduction of various human rights instruments. For example, the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948), the International Covenant of Economic, Social and 
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whole. Utilitarianism is a maximizing collective principle requiring the state to maximize the 
total nett sum or balance of happiness of all the citizenry.3 It is an abstract ideal into which 
an individualizing principle of silence cannot fit comfortably. On the other hand, a natural 
rights-based theory is a distributive and individualizing ideal giving priority to specific basic 
interests of each individual citizen and in which a silence principle finds a comfortable albeit 
superficial niche. There is an intellectually unbridgeable gap between utilitarianism (for 
which maximizing nett happiness is the ultimate criterion of value) and a theory of basic 
human rights (which insists upon protecting values of individual welfare). By recognizing and 
organizing these individualizing welfare values, the human rights-theory conflicts with and 
pulls against the maximizing aggregate principle espoused by utilitarianism. Yet a human 
rights-based moral theory of law exhibits a serious flaw which is often ignored. According to 
Hart,4 "It cannot be said that we have had .... a sufficiently detailed or adequately articulated 
theory showing the foundations for such rights and how they relate to other values. Indeed, 
the revived doctrines of basic rights are .... still unconvincing". A recurring theme of this 
thesis shall be that a human rights-based principle of silence does not possess a sufficiently 
rational justification. No legal principle should be entrenched within constitutional law simply 
because it is emotionally appealing and fashionably acceptable. There must be a logical 
foundation on which to articulate a coherent and cogent rationale. The so-called "right" to 
silence possesses neither logic, morality or reason. 
In the light of South Africa's apartheid legacy the constitutional entrenchment of a right to 
silence comes as no surprise. Human rights theory dominates every intellectual and legal 
debate. It is hardly surprising therefore that South African constitutional experts have been 
seduced by siren appeals to the heart instead of by sound juridical reasoning. In the words 
of one such expert, "the infringement of human dignity by the compelled or enforced self-
incriminating production of testimony is obvious. The cruelty of compelling testimony is plain 
to every thinking person and a remnant of apartheid criminal procedure". The use of the 
words "obvious" and "plain" is the usual refuge of those libertarians who cannot articulate 
satisfactory reasons for their ideas. A basic question frequently lost sight of in the post-
apartheid euphoria is whether "silence" is indeed a normative right. Are there sufficient moral 
and rational criteria justifying the fundamental character of "silence" which entreat 
constitutional entrenchment? Is "silence" the safeguard of conscience, human dignity and 
Cultural Rights (1966), the European Convention on Human Rights (1953). Surprisingly enough, even 
an English Human Rights Act (1998). 
3 See Hart's Essays in Jurisprudence and Philosophy Essay 8, Clarendon Press (1983) 182. 
4 Ibid at 195 "Right-based theories cannot compare to the clarity and detailed certainty of 
utilitarianism". 
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personal autonomy which libertarians so readily assume, or are these merely pretty words 
without rational substance? 
A utilitarian construction of the silence principle would define it as no more than an 
instrumental evidentiary rule. A libertarian construction would elevate silence into a 
constitutional right. The difference between a "rule" and a "right" is profound. A rule is 
objective, susceptible to logic and governed by accepted norms of substantial law. A right, 
however, may not be susceptible to logic. The assertion "a right to silence" immediately 
presents a number of ambiguities. These ambiguities arise from the uncertainty as to the 
precise nature of the relationship which exists between the right bearer and the 
corresponding duty which arises from the exercise of the right. When X states "I have a right 
to silence" does that mean that everybody else owes a duty to do something for X, or that X 
himself has no duty not to do something, or that X by asserting his right, causes others to 
acquire a new or to loose an existing duty. A right therefore is susceptible to a number of 
different philosophical explanations and a host of various definitions. These meanings and 
definitions are distinguishable according to the nature of the relationship between the right 
bearer and the duty being asserted. A right may be fu~her divided into two specific 
categories. It is either an objective right (expressing a logically determinable value of 
substantive law) or it is a subjective right (expressing a subjective value which is not usually 
susceptible to logic). An objective legal right expresses an end goal value which it promotes 
by empirical evidence and which is capable of definitive resolution. A subjective right on the 
other hand, expresses a basic attitude for which no reason can be given. It is in a sense an 
irrational right because it is subject to emotion and incapable of definitive resolution. A right 
to silence possesses only a bare subjective value. One either agrees with the assertion of 
the right or one disagrees. Silence is not capable of objective resolution. The primary 
problem with the right to silence is that libertarians attempt to disguise its bare subjective 
value by using the language of normative objectivity and by carefully exploiting the ambiguity 
inherent in the meaning of the word "right". 
Legal Right Definitions : In order to understand the rationales, laid out in Chapter Four, 
which are said to justify the right to silence, it must first be determined whether it is possible 
to characterize "silence" as an affirmative legal right. A number of everyday definitions of a 
legal right may be established. First, a right may be defined as the absence of a prohibition. 
In this sense the right is framed negatively. There is no legal norm which imposes a duty not 
to perform the conduct forming the object of the right. _ The individual has a right to act 
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because there is no prohibition to abstain from it. Hohfeld5 characterizes this type of right as 
a liberty right. Second and by contrast, the opposite definition recognizes a right as a 
positive authorization. Unlike the absence of a prohibition, this kind of legal right is 
predicated on the existence of a positive legal norm. A positive norm which permits the 
conduct forming the object of the right as a permissive right. Third, a legal right may also be 
viewed as a reflection of an obligation or as a correlative to the obligations of others. Within 
this reference, a liberty right has no substance without a defining perimeter of obligation and 
a permissive right is dependent for its validity on a positive obligation emanating from a 
granting authority. Fourth, a right may also be defined as a power. A power right is the right 
which imposes a duty on the citizen to perform certain acts as prescribed by a higher, more 
powerful authority. Silence, because of its loose unspecific and rather negative nature, is 
equally susceptible to definition as a liberty, obligatory, permissive or power right. However, 
the majority of theorists, Bentham included, conceive of a right of silence as a benefit flowing 
from a defined legal obligation. The silence principle is properly understood as a benefit right 
because this definition corresponds best with the normative consequence expected of a 
silence principle. An individual acquires a benefit (right) when one of his interests is the 
reason for imposing a duty (obligation) on another (usually the state). Finally, there is the 
fashionable and more modern characterization of a right as an immunity. Hohfeld defines 
this type of right as a liability in respect to the power of another, of which the correlative is a 
disability or a lack of power. Immunity rights are important because most constitutional rights 
are conceived and spoken of in terms of the language of use-immunity. The post Second 
World War right to silence is best explained as a human right immunity consisting of a 
combination of two basic components. Primarily, silence is an immunity against the state's 
coercive power to compel the disclosure of self-incriminating evidence. A prohibition against 
the state's abusive infringement of the individual's mind. This immunity operates as a 
protection against pre-trial police interrogation and trial prosecutorial examination. It is also 
indirectly a protection, for both the individual and the court, against the unreliability of a 
coerced admission or confession. Secondarily, it is a direct immunity, except in a number of 
limited circumstances, against the drawing of adverse inferences from the· individual's 
conscious choice to remain silent. No adverse inferences may be drawn from the choice to 
remain silent during the pre-trial interview or the failure to testify during the trial. The main 
obstacle in the path of a coherent analysis of the silence principle is that proponents of the 
privilege against self-incrimination and the right to silence have incorporated the language of 
all of the abovementioned right definitions in their arguments without keeping to the proper 
distinctions. Scrambling together the separate categories of rights results in confusion about 
5 Hohfeld in Rights And Jural Relationships In The Philosophy Of Law 3rd Ed (1986). 
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the core nature of the silence principle. The use of a rights-based terminology merely adds 
rather than detracts from the confusion surrounding the silence principle. Libertarian 
theorists in particular, often blur the conceptual differences between a right and a privilege by 
using both terms indiscriminately to refer to the same idea. In the words of California v 
Byers, "only rivers of confusion can flow from a lake of generalities". 
Philosophical Meaning : Most legal theorists assume that a legal relationship may be 
reduced to a right and a corresponding legal duty or obligation. A duty or legal obligation is 
said to be that which one ought or ought not to do. Duty and right therefore appear to be 
correlative terms. Every first year law student is taught that when a right is infringed a duty is 
violated. For example, the accused has a right to silence and the state has a corresponding 
duty not to violate that right. However, the simple relationship "right-duty" is philosophically 
inadequate and leads to ambiguity. It is the ambiguity around the "right-duty" legal dualism 
which allows the word "right" to be used indiscriminately to mean a privilege, an immunity or 
a power all at the same time. According to Hohfeld,6 the usual explanations of a right are 
much too vague and its popularly accepted relationship to duty much too simplistic. Hohfeld 
would draw a much more precise relationship by highlighting and contrasting the nature of 
the connection between a right and a privilege. A right and its jural correlative, a duty, are 
similarly reflected in the relationship between a privilege which is the opposite of a duty and 
its correlative, a no-right, which is the opposite of a right? For example, X (the landowner) 
has a right to prevent Y (the trespasser) access to his land. X has a privilege of entering his 
own land (X does not have a duty to stay off). The privilege of entering the land is a negation 
of the duty to stay off. A duty in this sense has a meaning precisely the opposite to that of a 
privilege. Consequently, the correlative of a privilege is the negation of a duty or a no-right. 
X's right that Y shall not enter on to the land is Y's correlative duty not to enter. X's privilege 
of entering his own land is the correlative of Y's no-right that X shall not enter. Therefore a 
privilege is defined as a negation of a legal duty (i.e. the opposite of a legal duty) and the 
correlative of a "no-right".8 The accused's privilege against self-incrimination means the 
mere negation of a legal duty to testify. It is therefore logically mistaken to use the word right 
to refer indiscriminately to a privilege. The two concepts are not mutually interchangeable. X 
(the landowner) also has the power to change Y's legal relationship by personally 
transferring the land toY, which correlates withY's liability to have the relationship changed. 
X has an immunity against Y, preventing Y from unilaterally transferring the land to himself, 
6 Hohfeld ibid at 308-312. See also Lyons "Correlative Of Rights And Duties" in Philosophy Of Law 
3rd Ed (1986) 324-329; Radin "A Re-statement of Hohfeld" (51) Harv. L. Rev (1938) 1141. 
7 Hohfeld ibid at 309. 
8 Hohfeld ibid at 309. 
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which correlates with Y's disability to do so. X and Y's relationship to each other and the 
land turns on an interrelated nexus of correlative and opposite denominators. A legal 
relationship cannot be defined simplistically as a right, but consists of a complicated bundle 
of rights, privileges, powers and immunities. The advantage of a Hohfeldian type of analysis 
is that it enables real normative choices to be disentangled from verbal confusions. There is 
a temptation to move from the proposition "I have a right to silence" to "so you have a duty 
not to infringe my right to silence". This kind of false logic may be avoided once it is realized 
that the word right stands for four quite dissimilar relationships, each defined by a common 
denominator, "Right-duty, privilege-no-right, power-liability and immunity-disability. 
The Hohfeldian explanation of a right as a jural correlative relationship implies that a right is 
relative. It is at the bare minimum susceptible to a balancing of interest between the right (or 
privilege) possessed by one against the duty (or no right) possessed by another. Galligan for 
example, defines a right as a protective interest, "to have a right is to have a justified claim 
that an interest should be protected by the imposition of correlative duties. To warrant 
protection an interest must evoke a value which is important enough to outweigh conflicting 
values and goals and important enough to justify the imposition on others".9 It is in this 
relative sense that most Anglo-American rights may be understood. Relative rights 
underscore the unwritten English constitution and the written Canadian, South African and 
Australian constitutions. (Relative rights also underscore all European civil law 
constitutions). On the other hand, a right may also be defined as absolute in the sense that it 
does not allow for a balancing of independent interests. An absolute right implies a near total 
prohibition against infringement. Dworkin 10 would argue that this is the proper nature of a 
right. Taking rights seriously is to regard the right as a "trump". The right will always prevail 
over mere utilitarian goals. The nature of the American fifth amendment right in its core 
essence may well be defined as a Dworkinian absolute right which must always prevail 
except in exceptional circumstances. A right based on a deontological view of morality does 
not allow for limitation except in the rare circumstance in which it is necessary to protect a 
more important right or to ward off some great threat to society. McCloskey would define a 
right as a positive entitlement, "rights are things that a person has, possessed independently 
of other persons and independently of what else ought to be". 11 To Kleinig a right is a 
"minimum condition in which a human being may flourish as a moral agent and which ought 
9 Galligan "The Right To Silence Reconsidered" Cu"ent Legal Problems (1998) 69, 88. 
10 Dworkin "Taking Rights Seriously" in Oxford Essays In Jurisprudence Simpson Ed (1973). 
11 McCloskey "Rights: Some Conceptual Issues" (54) Aus. J. of Phil. (1976) 99, at 99 and 102, 'The 
account of rights in terms of powers, claims, expectations, liberties are to be rejected in favour of this 
positive view". 
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to be secured for him if necessary by force". 12 Traditionally a right has always been 
considered as a "liberty each man has, to use his power, as he will himself for the 
preservation of his own nature" .13 The logical flaw in these distinct definitions of a right as a 
liberty, power, expectation, entitlement, moral enhancer or protective interest is that theory is 
invariably out of step with reality. For example, a person trapped in a cave may have a right 
to liberty in theory but is unable to exercise that right in practice. A person may possess the 
right to write a novel but lacks the creative power to do so. A labourer may have a right to 
employment but no reasonable expectation of ever obtaining one. Why then is it so readily 
assumed that a theoretical right to silence places practical restraints on the state? 
Despite the significant variations in the many explanations for the definition of a right, a 
common thread may be identified. A right and its jural corollary a privilege, however defined, 
possess at a bare minimum some kind of positive attribute or quality. What is relevant, 
irrespective of the definition, is that each conceptualization of a right provides for an 
advantage. For example, the right to life positively protects against human created dangers. 
The right to a fair trial imposes a positive procedural burden on the state. In this vein, the 
silence principle prevents adverse inferences being drawn against the accused by reason of 
a failure to testify or to provide information. Accordingly, the positive attribute identified in 
both the right and the privilege must prefer a moral and a rational advantage. A right 
however defined, must be foundationally morally and rationally coherent. An affirmative legal 
right derived from a normative and autonomous system must possess an internal and 
transparent rationality. A right becomes internally rational (as a first step) when it generates 
a consistent set of reasons which are sufficient by themselves to justify the standard 
articulated and the obligation created by the right. The right becomes transparently rational 
(as a second step) when these consistent reasons are a sufficient moral justification of the 
standard and the obligation. A legal right must necessarily and contingently possess the 
elements of rationality and morality. The purpose of the next two chapters is to determine 
whether or not these elements are indeed possessed by the so-called "right to silence".14 In 
this chapter the moral basis of a silence principle will be reviewed. In the fourth chapter the 
rational justifications for silence will be subjected to a critical examination. 
12 Kleinig "Human Rights, Legal Rights And Social Change" in Human Rights Kamenska and Tay Ed 
(1978) 44-45. For the contrary view see Marshai"Rights, Options And Entitlements" in Oxford Essays 
in Jurisprudence, Simpson Ed (1973) 228, 241. "A right is a claim or entitlement to a benefit from the 
~erformance of a certain obligation". 
3 Hobbes Leviathan Penguin Ed (1996) 129-30. 
14 See Bickenbach "Law And Morality'' in Law And Philosophyvol29 (1989) 300. 
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3.2 The Moral Fulcrum 
There is a close historical relationship between law and morality. Many important criminal 
rules may be traced to a pre-existing moral precedent. The proper relationship between law, 
morality and the silence principle may be reduced to the following five paradigms : 
Natura/law 15 : Law reflects morality, for without morality law is but naked power. The law is 
a natural exhortatory system founded on a superhuman source. A supernatural authoritative 
source of law which imposes conditions on human existence which no human lawmaker can 
remove. Natural law carries the moral authority of divine law and the law of nature. Natural 
law is connected to divine law through the human soul (which links the person to the divine), 
through human conscience (which enables the individual to distinguish between right and 
wrong) and through the human mind (the mental ability to understand right from wrong). 
Blackstone states it succinctly, "Law commands that which is morally right and prohibits that 
which is morally wrong". The natural law paradigm is presently the most popular method of 
explaining silence as a fundamental right. The right to silence is a divinely inspired human 
right, the aim of which is partly to protect the human personality and partly to prohibit 
wrongdoing. 
Utilitarian-positivist law: Law is separable and different to morality.16 Law is a command 
from a determinate and accountable sovereign and is used as a sanction to achieve a 
necessary human purpose. The morality of law depends (not on a divine source as in 
natural law), but upon the morality of its purpose and its effectiveness in achieving that 
purpose. Law does not exist for its own sake but in the rational use to which it is put and the 
results it helps bring about in the real world. Jeremy Bentham regards law as a social 
sanction with the moral purpose of creating a society in which the greatest number of 
persons enjoy the greatest happiness, "should not the purpose of law be to enrich the quality 
of life of those who live under it? And is not its true relationship with morality to be found in 
the goodness or badness of the results it produces?". Utilitarianism is the great opponent of 
15 A modern right is naturally associated with a deontological approach to morality. Rawls "A Theory 
Of Justice" Chadwick Ed (1971) 22-4, 27 describes an ordered society but one in which a subject is 
not bound to obey laws when basic interests are not protected as having priority over mere utilitarian 
increases in net happiness. Dworkin 'Taking Rights Seriously'' in Oxford Essays in Jurisprudence 
Simpson Ed (1973) 202, 213 denies that the prospect of utilitarian gains can justify preventing a 
human being from doing what he has a right to do. The general good is never an adequate excuse for 
limiting rights. Nozick "Philosophical Explanations" in Oxford Essays In Jurisprudence Simpson Ed 
(1981) 490-495 speaks of a set of near absolute individual rights which form the foundations of 
morality. Each subject as long as he does not violate the same rights of others has the right to be free 
of all forms of coercion. 
16 It has been persuasively argued by Hart that some criminal laws are not necessarily dependent on 
moral foundations. Hart The Concept Of Law (1961) chapter 6. See also Woodard 'Thoughts On The 
Interplay Between Morality And The Law'' (64) Notre Dame L. Rev (1989) 784-804. 
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Natural law and would either abolish or reduce the silence principle to a mere evidentiary 
rule. A silence principle is only morally and rationally justifiable if it promotes the greater 
well-being of society. When it inhibits the law enforcement interests of society (works against 
the greater happiness of society), it becomes morally and rationally unjustifiable. 
Neutral law : Law is morally neutral because it is founded on the impartiality of the legal 
process itself. Law is the creation of an institutional process, framed by a legislature, 
implemented by an administration, applied by a judiciary and enforced by the police service. 
All of these constituent elements are parts of the legal mechanism which by a ceaseless fine-
tuning, work harmoniously together. The morality of law is not to be found in substantive 
rules or procedures but in the countless incremental changes made within the legal process 
in a response to practical social needs. The silence principle is a cog in an enormously 
delicate, complicated, but neutral legal machine. Within this mechanism silence as an 
evidentiary rule works harmoniously with other evidentiary rules. But silence as an elevated 
constitutional rule causes disharmony as other rules are forced to readjust and re-
accommodate to a higher right to silence. A constitutional right to silence unbalances the 
legal machinery and makes a radical retinkering necessary. 
Custom law : Law is a stage in the development of society's value system as certain social 
habits become social values requiring special protection by the legal process. In all social 
organizations there is a dynamic interplay between custom, morality and law. Of the 
customs, habits and ideas that govern the everyday lives of persons, some are followed 
through unthinking inertia, some are endowed with moral authority and some are enforced as 
law by legal sanction. This process is a constant dynamism as ideas· and ideals change 
through time. As old and new issues disappear and reappear in new guises. Law is not the 
result of morally or rationally agreed-upon decisions. It is the result of tradition and of each 
society's unique cultural evaluation of the issues that exist at a particular time. The silence 
principle in this sense h~s no rational basis and exists as a matter of custom, public 
tolerance and timing. It has intrinsic worth only because society at that particular time is 
ready and willing to accept it as an appropriate response to a specific culturally perceived 
wrongness. A South ·African right to silence may be partially explained in terms of this 
paradigm. The elevation of silence to a constitutional right is society's cultural reaction and 
revulsion against apartheid. 
Marxist law: Law is the opposite of morality and is a form of institutionalized immorality. 
Morality can only exist in a classless society in which each individual takes from the society's 
resources only as much as is required for his immediate needs. Law in an organized 
hierarchical society is an instrument of oppression created by the ruling elite to protect their 
own interests. The law which preserves these elitist interests is immoral because it acts to 
the detriment of the unpropertied masses. In a classless society in which all property is 
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collectively owned a silence principle becomes redundant. The state is identified with the 
people and the state always acts in the interests of the people. An individualized and 
protectionist human right of silence is therefore irrelevant as the collective state entity can 
never exploit or abuse the interests of the citizenry. 
The international trend in modern jurisprudence is a selective one which, since the Second 
World War, has increasingly favoured a natural and human rights-based theory of law and 
morality. Within this global culture of fundamental human rights all modern constitutions to 
some degree or another contain a chapter or declaration of rights. The American and 
Japanese constitutions contain a complex of fundamental norms which negatively and 
positively bind the state. The right to silence is conceived of as a protection limiting the 
manner in which the state may act against the citizenry. The German, Canadian and South 
African culture of human rights is based on value orientated constitutional norms. The core 
of the German Grundgesetz is article 1 (1 ), "human dignity is inviolable. To respect and 
protect it is the duty of all state authority". The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms 
guarantees the free and democratic rights of the individual and a respect for the inherent 
dignity of the human personality. Central to the South African Bill of Rights is the safeguard 
of human personality vouched for in sec 10 (inherent human dignity) and sec 1 (a) "human 
dignity, the achievement of equality and the advancement of human rights and freedoms". In 
these constitutions the silence principle is one of the qualifications of a fundamental human 
personality. Recently the European Court of Human Rights has read into sec 6(1) of the 
European Convention on Human Rights a right to silence which it had apparently overlooked 
for some 30 years.17 The Australian High Court has re-interpreted the privilege against self-
incrimination by using human rights rhetoric.18 England with its proud heritage of an 
unwritten constitution has legislated a Human Rights Act (1998) which incorporates the 
principles of the European Convention into domestic English law. What all these human 
rights instruments share is the common but vaguely articulated notion that somehow state 
compelled self-incrimination is morally harsh. (The kind of compulsion outlined here is not 
defined as physical or mental torture, unacceptable to all, but as the psychological pressures 
which arise as a natural consequence of the criminal process). Opposite to this 
constitutionalised culture of human rights lies a utilitarian theory which argues that a criminal 
17 No practical conclusion about the inherent limitations on the European right can be drawn as no 
specific provision is made in Sec 6(1). Funke v France (1993) 16 EHRR 297, 326, which conjured a 
right to silence from Sec 6(1) makes no mention of its parameters. Saunders v U.K. (1997) 23 EHRR 
313 holds that a right to silence does not allow for a balancing of interests as it is an integral feature of 
a right to a fair trial which by its very nature cannot be subject to a limitation. Murray v U.K (1996) 22 
EHRR, 45, speaks of the right as a generally recognized international standard which lies at the heart 
of the notion of a fair procedure under Sec 6. 
18 Environment Protection Authority v Caltex Refining Co Pfy Ltd (1993) 178 CLR 477. 
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system which labels silence as the right moral choice in the face of a reasonable accusation 
is unbalanced and morally skewed. 
The influential libertarian Greenawalt19 suggests that the basic core of the silence principle is 
morally justified and deserves constitutional protection. Greenawalt centers his argument on 
the idea that compelled self-incrimination is morally cruel. The state must observe moral 
restraints which resemble those which private citizens respect between themselves. The 
respect which individuals owe each other (and which depends on the intimacy of the 
personal relationship) may be extended to the respect which government owes to its citizens. 
The extent of the respect depends on the degree of the relationship between state and 
individual.20 In a relationship between private individuals there is no general moral obligation 
for the individual to explain his conduct. A refusal to do so does not always justify an 
adverse inference. A failure to answer the accuser who possesses at best only a slender 
basis for his suspicions can never be morally improper. In these circumstances an angry 
"mind your own business" is more appropriate. The moral obligation to respond exists only 
when the basis for suspicion is strong and where the relationship between accused and 
accuser is a relatively personal one.21 In Greenawalt's view of ordinary morality a person 
interrogated on slender suspicion may appropriately remain silent, but a person questioned 
on well-founded suspicion may not. Greenawalt's argument contains a number of obvious 
flaws. It is doubtful whether the moral relationship between private individuals can be 
logically extrapolated to the relationship which exists between the state and the individual. 22 
State authorities usually arrest a suspect on more substantial grounds than mere suspicion. 
Certainly once the suspect has been formally charged and compelled to stand trial the state 
should possess a prima facie case against him. The accused's relationship to the state in 
this circumstance bears little resemblance to the moral relationship between private 
individuals.23 It is illogical to characterize the relationship between the accused and the 
state-accuser as a close personal one which renders accusatory questioning morally 
impermissible. Greenawalt fails to persuade that silence in the criminal investigatory process 
is in line with ordinary moral behaviour. Greenawalt's idea flies in the face of common 
sense. All other recognized privileges, marital, professional-legal and state privilege, protect 
19 Greenawalt "Silence As A Moral And Constitutional Righf' (23) William and Mary L. Rev (1981) 15-
71. "Perspectives On The Right To Silence" in Crime, Criminology and Public Policy Hood Ed 235-
268. 
20 Ibid William and Mary L. Rev, 19, 20-33, 34-43. 
21 Ibid, 27-31. 
22 Ibid, 34, but see Moskovitz 'The O.J Inquisition; A United States Encounter With Continental 
Criminal Justice" (28) Van. J. Transnat. Law (1995) 1140. 
23 Greenawalt recognizes that his moral theory applies only to the pre-trial stage and does not support 
a right to silence at trial, ibid 59. 
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relationships having real social value. 24 By contrast, the morality of a silence principle 
applies only to the "arrested" and "accused" person who has either broken the law or is 
suspected of doing so. The moral value of a silence principle in the criminal process seems 
to defy ordinary common sense notions of decent conduct.25 United States Justice Friendly 
expresses the criticism most succinctly,26 "No parent would teach such a doctrine to his 
children. The lesson parents teach is that while a misdeed will generally be forgiven, a 
failure to make a clean breast of it will not be. Every hour of the day, people are being asked 
to explain their conduct to parents, teachers and employers. Those who are questioned 
consider themselves morally bound to respond and the questioners believe it proper to take 
action if they do not". How may a silence principle be justified on moral grounds when it 
stands in the way of a conviction, impedes the state in providing fully for the security of 
society and sometimes prevents satisfaction and restitution to the victims of crime. It is the 
inability to develop a sustainable moral basis for the silence principle which robs it of its 
authority and renders it opaque and irrational rather than transparently rational. There are no 
consistent reasons which provide a sufficiently moral justification for silence. A rights-based 
theory of the kind outlined by Greenawalt finds it difficult to explain the silence principle in 
coherent terms which takes into account the basic common sense observation "truth not 
silence is the right moral choice in the face of a reasonable accusation". In the words of 
McCormick,27 "[The courts] as they become conversant with the history of the privilege will 
see that it is a survival that has outlived the context that gave it meaning and that its 
application today is not to be extended under the influence of a vague sentimentality but is to 
be kept within the limits of realism and common sense". 
Libertarian proponents of a silence principle unable to confront the moral dilemma directly, 
are forced to resort to enigmatic orations. Lord Salmon,28 "[The silence principle] is a sense 
of instinct for what is just which is innate in our people". Lord Devlin,29 "It is a natural thought 
of England". Lord Gillies,30 "It is a sacred and inviolable principle". 
24 The effect of an evidentiary privilege is to prohibit the admission of relevant evidence and thereby 
suppress the truth. Privileges are recognized only because the protected relationship is of outstanding 
social importance and would be harmed by denying recognition to the privilege. 
25 Schaefer The Suspect And Society Hamilton Press Ed (1960) 59-60 "the chief difficulty with a 
tsilence principle] is that it runs counter to our ordinary standards of morality''. 
6 Friendly "The Fifth Amendment Tomorrow: The Case For Constitutional Change" (37) Uni. Cinn. L. 
Rev (1968) 671, 680. By contrast Greenawalt suggests that Friendly has got it wrong. Silence in the 
face of accusation is an ordinary standard of morality. 
27 McCormick "Some Problems And Developments In The Admissibility Of Confessions" (24) Texas. 
L. Rev (1946) 239, 277. Louisell "Criminal Discovery and Self-Incrimination" (89) Cal. L. Rev (1965) 
94, a strong advocate of silence nevertheless says, "the rule is psychologically and morally 
unacceptable as a general principle in human relationships". 
28 House of Lords debate on the Criminal Law Revision Committee, 11th Report, Cmnd, 4991 (1972). 
29 R v Bodkin Adams, unreported (1957) but referred to in the House of Lords debate. 
30 Livingstone v Murray (1830) 9 Shaw 161. 
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A similar vague sentimentality is echoed by fraternal brothers in America. Justice Brennan,31 
"[The fifth amendment] is an expression of our common conscience, a symbol of America 
which stirs our hearts". Justice Bradley,32 "[Compelled self-incrimination] may suit the 
purposes of despotic power but it cannot abide the pure atmosphere of political liberty and 
personal freedom". The deliberate use of the words instinct, innate, sacred, inviolable and 
conscience is designed to obfuscate reason by appealing directly to the heart. Here there is 
no appeal to logic or reason. Emotional sentimentality is the final resort of the human rights 
theorist. The reliance on opaque notions of morality explained in terms of high sounding 
rhetoric and driven by calls to a national culture is also ludicrously unpersuasive. Why is it 
automatically assumed that in the pure atmosphere of political liberty there is a morally 
driven demand for a personal right to silence? Where is the moral nexus? Why would 
political liberty be morally infringed by a state demand for information from a properly 
arrested suspect? The protagonist of a silence principle concedes not only the moral high 
ground but also the realm of logic. A silence principle is simply not internally rational. Lord 
Salmon, on the logic of silence, "our law has never been built on logic alone, still less on 
abstract theory".33 Justice Frankfurter, "a page of history is worth a volume of logic". 
Horowitz blandly claims, "the privilege is not good legal logic, but is a religious principle of 
humaneness and mercy engrafted upon the common law".34 Schaefer, one of the United 
States's most distinguished jurists, has characterized the silence principle as a doctrine in 
search of a reason. The modern silence principle, whether disguised as a right or a privilege, 
is invoked in circumstances which create the immoral impression that it is no longer a 
protection for the innocent, but rather a safe sanctuary for those who break society's rules. 
In the present South African debate over the unbalanced procedural advantage enjoyed by 
criminal rights as opposed to victims' rights, a constitutional right to silence is clearly 
perceived by the majority of the citizenry to be a shelter for the guilty rather than an aid to the 
innocent. Wherein lies the morality of silence? Why do we allow the so-called right to 
silence to contribute towards the undermining of the legitimacy of our criminal justice 
system? 
31 Malloy v Hogan 378 U.S 19 n7 (1964). 
32 Boyd v United States 116 U.S 616, 631-32 (1886). 
33 Ibid note 28, House of Lords debate, 1608. 
34 Frankfurter J in Ullman v United states.350 U.S 422, 438 (1956). Horowitz "The Privilege Against 
Self-Incrimination- How did it Originate", (31) Temp. L. Q (1958) 121, 143 Miranda v Arizona 384 U.S 
436, 480 (1966) referred with approval to the quote, "the quality of a nation's civilization can be largely 
measured by the methods it uses in the enforcement of its criminal law''. These kinds of 
generalizations offer little to justify the existence of the privilege and only add to the confusion. 
California v Byers 402 U.S 424, 469 (1971) notes "only rivers of confusion can flow from a lake of 
generalities". 
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Is there a proper place for a silence principle within the accusatorial system of criminal 
justice? Should it be abolished entirely or allowed a severely circumscribed role? In the 
Anglo-American system the testimonial value of silence may be reduced to the following 
three basic models : 
1. An evidentiary rule : silence is merely a circumstantial item of evidence. Its probative 
value is an inferential question determined by relevancy and prejudice. As a 
common law rule it is subject to statutory abrogation. The extent of its scope and 
influence is circumscribed by the legal-cultural pressures of the day. This 
construction of silence is the English, Australian and majority Commonwealth 
preference. 
2. A relative constitutional right : as a result of cultural pressures within the society 
some Commonwealth jurisdictions have opted for a constitutional entrenchment of 
the silence principle but one subject to a reasonable and justifiable balance of 
interest test. Through the use of internal and external modifiers, the legitimate 
interest of the state is weighed against the protective interest of the citizen. This 
construction of silence is the South African and Canadian preference. To some 
extent it is also the preference of other legal systems such as the German and the 
Japanese. 
3. An absolute constitutional guarantee : silence within the core criminal process is an 
absolute guarantee which precludes a balance of interest analysis. Within the trial 
context the accused has an absolute right to silence. A balance of interest test is 
only permissible on the periphery, in the context of the non-party witness privilege 
and state regulation of non-criminal practices. This construction is the American 
preference. 
It is suggested that the proper place for a silence principle lies somewhere between the 
extremes of abolition and absolute constitutional entrenchment. The suggestion is advanced 
that a silence principle should be properly construed as a mere evidentiary rule, limited in 
scope, taking its place within the body and rules making up the unique common law system 
of evidence. The law of evidence is primarily comprised of artificial exclusionary rules, 
utilitarian in design and concerned with aiding the court in the discovery of truth by excluding 
probative material which may lead the court into error. As has been briefly demonstrated 
above and will be further demonstrated in the following chapters, no moral or rational 
considerations have been advanced which mitigate against the use of silence as an ordinary 
item of circumstantial evidence possessing the same probative weight as all other 
circumstantial evidence and subject to the same test of relevancy. No sufficiently moral 
justification has been advanced as to why silence deserves a special kind of protection not 
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afforded other procedural or evidentiary rules : Moody J in Twining v New Jersey 35 reaches 
into the heart of the matter when he concludes, "the wisdom of the [right to silence] has 
never been universally asserted to since the days of Bentham . . . . [It] is best defended not as 
an unchangeable principle of universal justice but as a law proved by experience to be 
expedient". 
3.3 Utilitarian Rationality 
The primary moral arguments for and against the silence principle span the entire spectrum 
between a human rights and a utilitarian based philosophy. On the one hand natural law 
proponents view the silence principle as a fundamental principle of the Anglo-American 
criminal system. The dominance of this view in South Africa is illustrated by the upliftment of 
an ordinary evidentiary rule of silence into a constitutionally entrenched right to silence.36 On 
the other hand, positivist opponents are skeptical about the elevation of silence into a 
constitutional right. Ideally the criminal justice system should be a system designed 
specifically to search for legal truth.37 In the utilitarian construction of truth considerable 
moral concern is shown for individual and personal interests.38 However, the criminal 
process should not provide the individual with extra safeguards other than those required by 
a rectitude of decision or greater safeguards than are consistent with the principle of utility. 
To define the silence principle in the language of constitutional human rights is to appeal 
directly to emotion and never to reason. Silence as an evidentiary rule of the criminal 
process aids in the search for legal truth. Silence as a constitutional right merely inhibits that 
search.39 
35 211 U.S 78, 113 (1908). Similar reasoning is to be found in Adamson v California 322 U.S 40 
U947). 
Sec 25 of the 1993 and Sec 35 of the 1996 Constitution. 
37 McConville "Silence In Court'' N.L.J (1987) 1169, argues that criminal'procedure is not an inquiry 
into truth but a process in which different versions of legal reality compete. Legal truth does not have 
an independent or discoverable existence outside of the court, instead it is dependent on the 
adversarial ''winner takes all" structure. Legal truth is based on perceptions. Human beings construct 
legal truth based on changing perceptions of reality. In this sense legal truth is neither fixed nor 
permanent. By contrast, utilitarians argue that defining procedural rules in terms of human rights 
simply adds to the confusion, impermanence, vagueness and inability to define legal truths. Defining 
legal rules in terms of utility cuts through the confusion. A utilitarian definition of truth is practical and 
the best that can be hoped for. 
38 See Harts' incisive defence against the criticism that utilitarianism is a maximizing philosophy in 
which the individual has no intrinsic worth except as a point or fragment within the total aggregate of 
community happiness, Essays In Jurisprudence And Philosophy, Oxford, Clarendon Press (1983) 201, 
205-209. 
39 Zuckerman The Principles Of Criminal Evidence Oxford Clarendon Press (1989) attributes the 
English courts lackluster support of a right to silence not only to the awareness of the practical 
problems which would result from a strong enforcement of the right but also to its weak rational 
foundation. 
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Central to the rationalist tradition is Bentham's famous commentary on the silence principle 
in the polemical work "A Rationale of Judicial Evidence" (particularly Book IX).40 Under the 
persuasive influence of his forceful arguments, many of the technical exclusionary rules 
which once bedeviled English criminal procedure have been discarded. Despite his antiquity 
a contemporary and persuasive reasoning may be deduced from Bentham's eclectic theory 
of law which serves as the foundation for many of the critical modern arguments against the 
silence principle. There are a number of problems with a strict Benthamite approach. 
Bentham ignores the pre-trial stage of the criminal process and concentrates exclusively on 
the trial stage. Nevertheless utilitarian reasoning applies with equal validity to both the pre-
trial and the trial stages of the criminal process. His theory shows its antiquity by failing to 
account for the fact that a significant number of guilty pleas are determined before trial during 
a pre-trial negotiatory process (formal or informal plea-bargaining processes). Bentham's 
theory gives no precise guidelines on how to deal with the wrongful conviction of the 
innocent. If the essence of the trial is an accuracy of outcome, then guilt and innocence 
must be correctly determined. Unfortunately the trial process is often imperfect and 
sometimes the innocent are wrongly convicted. Bentham's theory offers no reasonable 
explanation on how utility may overcome the problem of mistaken convictions. Bentham's 
"free proof' natural system does not acknowledge the existence of values which place 
legitimate limitations on the admissibility of relevant evidence and exist independently of 
rectitude. Bentham speaks only of "actions". He is unaware of the distinction drawn by later 
philosophers between act-utilitarianism and rule-utilitarianism.41 For Bentham an act is right 
if it results in the best consequence. But it may also be reasoned that an act is right if it is 
required by a rule where the following of the rule has the best consequence. Rule-
utilitarianism is better suited to explaining the consequences of a silence principle. While 
Bentham's contribution is acknowledged, a more up-to-date open indirect rule-utilitarian 
theory is developed to explain the silence principle in the following pages. 
Rectitude of decision within a natural system of free proof is the basic principle of a utilitarian 
dialecticism. The essential model may be reduced to "the desired end of adjudication is 
rectitude of decision which must be consistent with utility and an accurate determination of 
true past facts, proved by a specific standard of probability on the basis of rational analysis of 
relevant evidence presented to an impartial decision maker. The desired end may be 
40 Rationale Of Judicial Evidence, book IV, IX (parts IV, VI and VII), Bowring Ed, William Tait, 
Edinburgh 1843 (hereinafter cited as R.J.E.). 
41 Austin The Province Of Jurisprudence Determined Lectures 2-4, Oxford Press, Clarendon (1955). 
Mill "Utilitarianism" Penguin Ed (1999}, philoso~hy series. Hare "Ethical Theory And Utilitarianism" in 
Lewis (Ed} Contemporary British Philosophy (41 series) 1976. 
98 
modified where utility requires it, on the collateral grounds of delay, vexation and expense".42 
From this model the primary values of a utilitarian theory of evidence within a utilitarian 
criminal process may be unraveled. First, the direct object of adjudication is rectitude or 
accuracy of decision and the correct application of the law to the proven facts.43 Second, 
rectitude of decision may be influenced or modified by collateral delay, vexation or expense 
(the inevitable costs of enforcing the law). The collateral costs of achieving rectitude should 
be kept to a minimum in the fashioning of evidentiary guidelines.44 A natural system of free 
proof is the most convenient means of minimizing these collateral costs. Third, all 
procedural law is logically valid only insofar as it lends itself to the reasonable 
implementation of the substantive law. The proper functioning of the law of evidence is to 
provide an accuracy of outcome. Accuracy demands that all probative evidence concerning 
the facts-in-issue must be admitted subject only to the possible collateral costs of delay, 
vexation and expense.45 Fourth, the most rational method of achieving evidentiary "accuracy 
of outcome" is by allowing the trier-of-fact access to all the probative evidence unhindered by 
technical exclusionary rules. A process of "free proof' within a natural system is preferable to 
a process of exclusionary rules within a technical system.46 Fifth, mandatory artificial rules 
which exclude reliable probative evidence have no place within utilitarian reasoning. 
However, there is a place for other rules, guidelines, instructions and judicial discretions 
which are consistent with utility and which advance the accuracy of outcome. Sixth, when 
applying utilitarian reasoning to a silence principle the key issue to be determined is whether 
or not the protection of silence consistently excludes the admission of relevant evidence 
thereby hindering rectitude of decision and preventing accuracy of outcome. 
42 Twinning Theories Of Evidence: Bentham And Wigmore Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London (1985). 
Postema 'The Principles Of Utility And The Law Of Procedure, Bentham's Theory Of Adjudication" 
(11) Georgia L. Rev (1977) 1393, Bentham And The Common Law Tradition, Clarendon Press, Oxford 
(1986). Menlowe "Bentham, Self-Incrimination And The Law Of Evidence", Law. Q. Rev (1988) 286. 
Lewis "Bentham's View Of The Right To Silence" (43) Current. L. Problems (1990) 135, 145, 146. 
43 By rectitude Bentham means "conformity with the law''. The law forms public expectations and 
regulates hopes and fears. If judicial decision making is conformable to the expectation the public is 
satisfied. Let the expectation be disappointed and insecurity and alarm commences. "Let in the light 
of evidence. The end it leads to is the direct end of justice, rectitude of decision", R. J. E VIII at 37. 
44 Relevant evidence may only be excluded where its admission would be attended by predominant 
collateral inconvenience, R.J.E VII at 336-7. This kind of utilitarian balance is reflected in the U.S 
federal rules of evidence (rules 401, 402, 403) and the English Police and Criminal Evidence Act 
iPACE) 1984. 
5 Vexation : a witness's reluctance to attend court or to disclose evidence. The sheer volume of 
evidence presented may sometimes be vexatious to the judge. Expense : witnesses and evidence 
excluded because neither party can bear the monetary and legal costs involved. Delay: a balance 
between the need to include all relevant evidence and the need to ensure a speedy trial. 
46 A technical system subordinates the production of evidence to a system of detailed exclusionary 
rules, "a Byzantine collection of exclusions, privileges, presumptions and formulae for weighing 
evidence" R.J.E. VII at 99-100. 
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Bentham is the first jurist to make the crucial taxonomical distinction between substantive 
and objective law. The utilitarian function of substantive law requires the maximization of 
overall community happiness by limiting socially harmful behaviour. The adjective law in turn 
gives effect to substantive law by maximizing its execution in the most efficient manner 
possible. The specific function of the law of evidence within the adjective process is a 
rectitude of decision which identifies relevant facts and renders them admissible in a court so 
that substantive law can be correctly applied.47 The link between utility and substantive law 
means that the societal expectations of security and stability raised by the substantive law 
are not disappointed. The preservation of society's security is therefore a major concern of 
utility.48 The problem with Bentham's reasoning is that he ignores the wider nature of 
adjudication by concentrating exclusively on the trial process. Rectitude has a generic 
application. It should apply equally to the pre-trial process and other administrative or 
tribunal processes. It applies wherever the law is systematically and regularly employed and 
there is a need for a high degree of factual accuracy. The primary purpose of Bentham's 
natural system is the need to maximize execution/implementation of substantive law by 
minimizing the inevitable collateral costs involved. There are two recognizable costs, those 
involving inevitable vexation, expense or delay and those involving the possible danger of 
misdecision. A balance must be found between the primary and the collateral ends of 
adjective procedure in order to enhance utility. When the execution of the law demands 
preponderant vexation or risk of misdecision, the principle of utility supplies a solution by 
preferring rectitude of decision. The principles of utility and rectitude of decision within the 
natural system serve to establish a sufficiently high standard of proof (the standard ought to 
be as high as is required by truth and utility) and guarantees the presumption of innocence 
so essential to the adversarial system.49 Three important evidentiary notions may be derived 
from Bentham's theory. First, a natural free proof system is proposed which contains no 
mandatory or artificial exclusionary rules - the very antithesis of our modern law of evidence. 
Second, questions about the admissibility of evidence are primarily questions of relevancy 
and empirical fact and never simply questions of law. Third, it follows logically that all 
47 Postema ibid note 42 of 1395-97. 
48 Substantive law raises certain societal expectations which can never be satisfied. One of the 
reasons for this is the excessive technicality of the protective rules which surround the accused in the 
accusatorial criminal process. Substantive law can never be successfully applied because it is 
hindered by these technical rules and the result is the insecurity and alarm of the ordinary citizen. 
South Africa is a typical case study. 
49 Bentham refers to the principle of rectitude as "innocence protecting". The primary protection of 
innocence flows from a utilitarian structured trial process. A number of trial structures consistent with 
utility, such as a high standard of proof serve to protect innocence. A utilitarian concern for the 
innocent does not depend on vague notions of rights, due process or fairness but on practical trial 
processes. R.J.E. VII at 345. 
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relevant evidence is prima facie admissible unless its production involves preponderant 
vexation or risk of misdecision. 
A modern utilitarian theory of evidence is not rigid and allows for the exclusion of some types 
of evidence and the inclusion of some kinds of rules in the interests of utility. Whenever the 
costs of admitting evidence outweigh the benefit of executing substantive law, the evidence 
ought to be excluded. Modern utilitarianism does not suggest that all rules must be 
abolished, merely the costly mandatory ones. Experience shows that some rules do have 
intrinsic value in avoiding inaccuracy and are therefore consistent with utility. Modern 
utilitarianism goes one step beyond Bentham's rather undifferentiated concept of rectitude. 5° 
The modern utilitarian concept of a trial no longer implies a simple blanket notion of rectitude. 
Exclusionary rules consistent with rectitude and utility are possible. Modern notions of 
rectitude are best served by "free" proof coupled with a framework of guidelines, judicial 
discretions and a limited number of advisory rules. Some categories of evidence the 
probative value of which are difficult to assess, high risk evidence, potentially prejudicial 
evidence (i.e. involuntary confessions, accomplice and children's evidence, similar fact 
evidence, improperly obtained evidence, etc) may justify strict rules and still be consistent 
with utility. Indeed, the modern tendency in the law of evidence is towards the shedding of 
excessively technical rules and the redefining of others along utilitarian guidelines. For 
example, cautionary rules concerning accomplice, children and rape victim testimony are no 
longer mandatory rules but advisory guidelines giving the trier-of-fact a discretion in the 
evaluation and weight to be attached to such evidence. In England the rules governing 
confession admissibility have also moved away from a rigid highly technical common law test 
of involuntariness to a statutory (Sec 76 PACE) and more realistic assessment based on 
reliability. 51 The South African Hearsay rule has also been statutorily and substantially 
redefined. A reconstruction which applies a flexible and ultimately utilitarian approach to the 
question of hearsay admissibility.52 Similar fact evidence has also been flexibly· re-
interpreted and this type of evidence is admissible once a logical nexus has been established 
between the evidentiary fact and a fact-in-issue. The English Criminal Justice and Public 
Order Act 1994 which allows adverse inferences from silence in certain circumstances is also 
unashamedly utilitarian in purpose and design. 53 The modern intention is to remake the law 
50 Ibid R.J.E. at 335. 
51 See infra chapter 8. 
52 Sec 3, Law of Evidence Amendment Act 1988. The English hearsay rule has also been largely 
discarded in civil cases in favour of a flexibly structured approach. Civil Evidence Act 1968, see also 
the Criminal Justice Act 1987, part II. 
53 See infra chapter 9. 
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of evidence by abolishing, where possible, excessively technical rules and to redraft other 
necessary rules. It is within this reforming context that the silence principle should be subject 
to a process of re-evaluation. Within a modern utilitarian framework of evidence, a silence 
principle should be regarded as merely another rule subject to the same relevancy test as all 
other evidentiary rules. Inferences flowing from silence are then no more than items of 
circumstantial evidence. 
Bentham's antagonism towards exclusionary rules allowed him to devote considerable space 
in his work to the disposing of specific justifications (pretences as he called them) supporting 
the so-called right to silence.54 Today only the argument from harm (the old woman's 
reasoning) and the argument from equity (the fox hunter's reasoning) carry the most 
persuasive force. According to the old woman's reasoning, the accused should be protected 
like an old woman from the effect of psychologically damaging self-incrimination. The 
argument that the state should be prevented from questioning the accused because a 
special kind of immoral and psychological harm is done to the individual through the 
compelled use of his self-incriminatory evidence is dismissed by Bentham. Punishment by 
detention is equally harmful to the accused, but does not attract the same weight of 
protection.55 If the accused deserves protection from the cruelty of compelled self-
incriminatory testimony, why then is he obliged to suffer the severe cruelty of incarceration?56 
It is also mistaken to assume that it is more cruel to be condemned by one's own admissions 
than by the evidence of an intimate third party. Zuckerman gives the following example: "Is 
it more cruel to force a woman to testify against herself and less cruel to force her to testify 
against her child?".57 Surely it is illogical to provide a legal right of silence to the woman in 
the first situation, but to refuse it to her in the second? Furthermore, the right to silence 
protects only against oral communicative self-incriminatory testimony, it does not protect 
against physical self-incriminatory evidence (fingerprints, blood samples, etc). It is absurd to 
suggest that it is more cruel to admit self-incriminatory oral testimony but less cruel to allow 
equally incriminatory physical evidence. 58 "Tis hard upon a man to be obliged to incriminate 
54 Bentham's criticism of the silence principle is not an isolated argument. Bentham's reforming vision 
is meant to apply to the entire criminal justice system. 
55 The accused is faced with the dilemma of telling the truth (and being convicted) or committing 
perjury (in order to escape conviction). Why should this present a dilemma, after all, it logically only 
aJ>plies to the guilty accused and not to the innocent accused. 
5 Thomas "The So-Called Right To Silence" (14) New Zealand Uni. L. Rev (1991) 308-309. Menlowe 
ibid note 42 at 296-299. 
57 Zuckerman "The Right Against Self-Incrimination, An Obstacle To The Supervision Of Interrogation" 
~102) L.Q.R. (1986) 63. 
8 In England R v Apicella (1986) 82 Cr App R 295 (CA) rejected the defence that a sample of body 
fluid used in evidence against a rape accused amounted to an oral confession. Adverse inferences 
may be drawn from the failure to give consent to the taking of an intimate sample Sec 62 (10) PACE 
(1984). 
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himself',59 is therefore illogical sentimentality. Giving such sentimentality any credibility 
would deprive the court of relevant evidence, undermine truth/utility and benefit the guilty at 
the expense of the innocent. 5° 
Once relevant and reliable evidence is withheld from the trier-of-fact the search for truth in a 
fair trial is made more difficult. Bentham is therefore critical of any rationale based on the 
idea of defensive trial fairness - the fox hunter's reasonir:g. It is unfair, so the reasoning 
goes, to compel the accused, hindered by a lack of resources, to testify against himself. 
Confronted by the full power and resources of the state the accused is perceived to be at an 
unfair disadvantage. The right to silence redresses the balance, making the trial more fair in 
the sense that the state and the accused are now evenly matched. Bentham would argue 
that fairness in this naive sense is only appropriate in a sporting event. This kind of naivete 
is based on a gentleman's agreement that the fox should be given a fair chance to run before 
being hunted down and therefore the accused should also be given a sporting chance during 
his trial before being convicted. Fairness in a sporting event cannot be logically compared to 
fairness in a criminal trial.61 Why should an artificial balance be manufactured between the 
defence and the prosecution? Apart from human rights rhetoric, there is no logical 
justification for not directing the full resources of the state against the prevention of crime and 
the conviction of criminals.62 Utilitarian fairness is totally different from sporting fairness. A 
fair trial in the utilitarian sense ensures that the end result of the trial is an accurate and 
truthful one. Fairness means that the accused should only be convicted if the evidence 
proves his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. One of the modern and popular justifications for 
a right to silence indirectly echoes the foxhunter's reasoning. A fair trial requires a strong 
presumption of innocence which in turn, is supported by a strong right to silence. By 
weakening or abolishing silence, the presumption of innocence is undermined and the trial 
59 
'The suffering .... is that which is inflicted by the punishment itself. In that alone consists the real 
affliction. As to the supposed addition - a mere metaphorical quantity - except in the mind of the 
rhetorician, it has no existence", Bentham R.J.E. Vll422, 452, 469. 
60 There are two possible exceptions to this reasoning : (a) the innocent accused who wishes to 
protect a third party - although why the accused should be protected from embarrassing disclosures, 
when the ordinary witness is not, appears to be somewhat illogical; (b) where the accused is a bad 
witness against himself - but here it matters very little even of a right to silence is awarded, once the 
prosecution has made out a prima facie case, the bad witness is in no worse a position if he defends 
himself badly than he would be if he had a right to silence and could refuse to defend himself at all. 
Menlowe ibid note 42 at 298-299. 
61 Another argument against the link between silence and a fair trial is that it does not compare apples 
to apples. Logically the accused should be compensated by giving him the same resources as those 
available to the state. An advantage for the state should be compensated by a like advantage to the 
accused. Like should balance like. Since a right to silence is not available to the state, it cannot be a 
fair like compensation for the accused. 
62 The inquisitorial-civil system of Europe which concentrates the full state resource against the 
accused has a totally different concept of fairness. See Infra chapter 11. 
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becomes much less fair. 63 To the utilitarian this kind of reasoning confuses the real meaning 
of a fair trial. The utilitarian conception of fairness is a far stronger guarantee for a 
presumption of innocence. The presumption of innocence once given a utilitarian justification 
does not require the support of a right to silence. The presumption of innocence is 
strengthened because once rectitude of decision is properly applied, the outcome should be 
the fair conviction of the guilty and the release of the innocent. 
Bentham does not write directly about the adjunct to the right to silence, namely, the witness 
privilege against self-incrimination. Nevertheless, allowing for such an exclusionary rule 
would be inconsistent with this general theory which requires all evidence to be admitted 
except when collateral ends predominate. Accordingly, a witness who refuses to give self-
incriminatory evidence may be charged with contempt. Suppose the witness is forced to give 
incriminating evidence and is duly convicted on the sole basis of his self-incrimination, would 
this not serve to undermine the presumption of innocence? Rule-utilitarianism argues that a 
"privilege" is the wrong solution.64 The better approach is to abolish the "privilege" and to 
substitute a rule of immunity. Immunity prevents the witness's self-incriminatory testimony 
from being used against him in a subsequent trial, but at least the evidence is receivable 
against the accused.65 In practice an immunity rule (which allows the use of evidence in 
some situations) is less costly than the more technical privilege (which denies the use of 
evidence in all situations) and is more consistent with utility. 
The crucial importance of utilitarian theory is that it offers a practical and rational 
methodology by which the influence of a silence principle may be ameliorated or removed 
entirely without distorting key elements of the accusatorial procedure. Within utilitarian 
parameters the prosecution is obliged to establish a prima facie66 case on the 
commencement of the trial. This process is recognized in all the Anglo-American 
jurisdictions by allowing for discharge of the accused at the close of the State's case if the 
burden is not met.67 The evidence led by the state must be such that a reasonable person 
63 For example in Sec 35(3)(h) of the South African Constitution a fair trial is defined in terms of a 
£resumption of innocence and a right to silence. See also S v Zuma 1995 (2) SA 642 (C.C). 
4 Zuckerman ibid note 57 "concludes that the privilege is not an effective protection as it creates a 
harmful conflict with the more important procedural protections and with society's need for crime 
control. 
65 See infra chapter 10 (English view) and chapter 7 (American view). 
66 Murray v D.P.P (1994) 1 WLR (H.L): Lord Murray (at 3) gives the meaning of a prima facie case as 
"consisting of evidence [direct or circumstantial] which [combined with legitimate inferences based 
upon it] could lead a properly directed jury [or judge] to be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that 
each of the essential elements of the offence has been proved". 
67 The South African Criminal Procedure Act, sec 174, S v Shuping and others 1983 (2) SA 119 (B) 
120H, 121A. S v Mpetha and others 1983 (4) SA 262 (C). Similar provisions apply in English, USA, 
Australian, Scottish, Canadian and New Zealand law. 
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would find in favour of the state before the defence is called upon to assume the evidentiary 
burden in rebuttal. According to utilitarian procedural theory, a weak circumstantial case 
intentionally built up by rigorous cross-examination will not suffice to establish the prima facie 
standard required of the prosecution. Something more is required by way of sufficient 
evidence.68 The absence of a right to silence therefore does not serve to advantage the 
prosecution by taking away from its burden or by adding to the accused's burden. 
Alternatively in a trial system which does possess a right to silence, utilitarian theory 
ameliorates the influence of such a right by allowing an adverse inference to be drawn from 
the accused's silence. The inference to be drawn depends largely on the strength of the 
prosecutorial case and amounts only to additional circumstantial evidence against the 
accused. It is unnecessary to accept Bentham's view that an adverse inference from silence 
must always amount to an inference of guilt. What inferences are properly to be drawn from 
the accused's silence depends upon the circumstances and is a question of logic. If there is 
no prima facie case to answer then no proper or logical inferences can be reasonably drawn 
from the accused's silence. On the other hand, if the evidence taken as a whole calls for an 
explanation and no such explanation is forthcoming, an inference of guilt may be drawn as a 
matter of common sense.69 The utilitarian process inspires confidence in the criminal justice 
system because it allows suspects to be convicted on the basis of sufficient evidence. A 
system which lacks artificial exclusionary rules and allows adverse inferences to be drawn 
from the accused's silence inevitably strengthens the public belief in its efficiency and 
legitimacy. The presumption of innocence, a safeguard of truth within the adversarial 
system, is also strengthened by utilitarian application. The presumption of innocence in the 
utilitarian sense amounts to a claim that the prosecution must establish a prima facie case in 
order to initiate the criminal process. The obligation to produce sufficient evidence renders it 
highly probably that the court is getting to the truth. A utilitarian process which removes all 
obstacles barring the path to legal truth can only serve to strengthen the presumption of 
innocence. 
68 According to utilitarian theory, the best reason for confidence in a criminal system is the societal 
belief that the accused is being convicted on the basis of sufficient evidence. Sufficient evidence 
~ives a better probability of accuracy of outcome and leads directly to verifiable legal truth. 
9 In the common law tradition an adverse inference may be drawn from a failure to testify but cannot 
by itself prove guilt. See infra chapter 8 (Commonwealth position) and chapter 11 (S.A. position). 
England statutorily allows adverse inferences from silence in certain circumstances. South Africa with 
its constitutional entrenchment of silence, is moving away from the English and Commonwealth 
tradition towards the American position as illustrated by Miranda v Arizona and Griffin v California infra 
chapter 11. 
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3.4 Philosophical Dispositions 
Two mainstream philosophical explanations of the silence principle within the criminal 
process and the evidentiary rules which regulate it may now be deduced. A general 
utilitarian theory which emphasizes rectitude and subjects the criminal process to a strict 
analysis based on accuracy of outcome. The Benthamite direct act - utilitarian theory of the 
nineteenth century has been superseded by a modern open and indirect rule-utilitarianism 
centred on the principle of rectitude but one also acknowledging that some kinds of 
evidentiary rules are necessary to safeguard against wrongful convictions. Modern 
utilitarianism recognizes that some collateral costs are inevitable in order to protect the 
innocent. Certain types of evidentiary rules are necessary even at the cost of increasing the 
risk of guilty acquittals. Nonetheless, the security of society, the confidence society has in 
the criminal process and the aggregate nett increase in society's welfare should never be 
compromised. Utilitarian theory is perhaps best suited to explaining the silence principle (its 
relevancy or irrelevancy) because utilitarianism is an analytic model based on interpreting 
consequences. The criminal process and the procedural rules which drive that process is 
also entirely about consequences. Utilitarianism has the ability to analyse these 
consequences and to provide rational explanations from which practical and workable 
propositions about the criminal process may be derived. On the other hand, a human rights 
theory proposes certain protective legal rights which are unalienably attached to the human 
being70 (the silence principle is a primary example of such a right). Although there are 
numerous variations of the human rights doctrine, the common thread is as follows. The 
idea that a natural higher law exists which should be elevated above positive law and that 
respect for human rights is a prerequisite for justice. The view of the state authority as the 
greatest potential danger to human rights. A human rights doctrine disregards 
rectitude/accuracy of outcome and concentrates exclusively on the criminal procedural 
relationship between the individual and the state. The human interest is absolute and the 
state interest is subordinate to the exclusivity of human needs. Probative evidence may be 
excluded from the trial process in order to serve more valuable social and human needs 
independent of rectitude. The right to silence is therefore a higher human interest which 
takes precedence over mere evidentiary and other procedural rules of the criminal process. 
Silence as a human interest deserves elevation to a constitutional right despite the inhibitory 
70 Henkin The Age Of Rights New York (1990) 4-5; "In sum, the idea of human rights is that the 
individual counts, dependent on his or her part in the common good. Autonomy and liberty must be 
respected and the individual's basic economic-social needs realized as a matter of entitlement, not of 
grace or discretion". See also Donnelly "Human Rights, Individual Rights and Collective Rights" in J 
Berting et al, Human Rights In A Pluralistic World, Wesport (1990). Howard Human Rights In Search 
For Community Boulder (1995). 
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consequential effect it has on the criminal process. The definition of silence in the language 
of human rights is certainly stirring and sentimental. The main problem with a human rights 
doctrine is that apart from its high sounding terminology, there is no rational basis on which 
to build a logical conceptual picture or a justification of silence. 71 The idea that human rights 
is somehow the minimum condition for human existence may also lead to a moral distortion. 
According to Gordon72 a right-based theory may be dangerous because it invokes ethical 
principles that it claims are universal and absolute. "At the same time because it implicitly 
asserts the most extreme moral claim possible, it is not concerned merely with wrong acts 
but rather with the distinction between absolute righteousness and absolute wrongness". It 
may distort morality by providing a "justification for inflicting suffering in much the same way 
that claims of righteousness have justified the bloodiest acts of holy wars".73 The so-called 
right to silence also invokes a similar sentiment. It triggers an emotional defence and draws 
an absolute battle line but provides no moral or rational justification for its elevated status. 
In the continuing debate about the silence principle four specific schools of thought may be 
identified. On the one extreme, act-utilitarian abolitionists would banish the silence principle 
entirely without replacing it with other safeguards except those procedural rules already 
inherent within the criminal process. The older pure form of utilitarianism would deny to the 
suspect or the accused any form of a silent right at all. The modern and diluted rule-
utilitarian reductionist version would sweep away all excessively technical, artificial and 
exclusionary rules but allow certain protective evidentiary guidelines consistent with utility 
and the accuracy of outcome. Perhaps allowing for a limited pre-trial rule as a safeguard 
during the police custodial interrogation. The erosion and limitation of the silence principle in 
many Anglo-American jurisdictions is a response to, and a systematic accommodation with, 
this diluted utilitarian vision. One of the flexible views adopted by modern utilitarians is that a 
silence principle may have a limited place in evidentiary law. It does not deserve abolition 
but neither does it deserve elevation into a constitutional right. A middle ground is preferable 
in which silence counts as a mere item of circumstantial evidence subject to rectitude of 
decision. The same probative value should be attached to an inference from silence as 
would be attached to any other circumstantial item of evidence. 
71 Howard ibid at 12-13 defines human rights as "nothing more than what human beings proclaim they 
ought to be. They are universal in the sense that they ought to be universal". This definition typically 
illustrates the empty rhetoric of a right-based theory especially in respect to the silence principle. 
What is meant by the idea "ought to be" and "ought to be universal". These high sounding words say 
nothing about the rational justification for a right to silence. 
72 Gordon "The Concept Of Human Rights : The History And Meaning Of Its Politicization" Brooklyn. J. 
oflnt. L. {1998) 691. 
73 Gordon ibid at 699, 790. 
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Substitution abolitionists straddle the centre and argue for the abolition of silence in 
exchange for the substitution of other procedural safeguards. Other procedural methods of 
protection are available which do not carry the cost associated with the silence principle and 
the potential loss of reliable evidence. A good illustration is in the context of commercial 
fraud where the silence principle constitutes an expensive obstacle to the tracing of 
misappropriated assets. 74 Provided that all the defendant's legitimate interests are protected 
only the guilty would seek to profit from a pre-trial and trial right to silence. Legitimate 
substitute protections include tape and video recordings of police interrogations, limited pre-
trial detention periods, access to compulsory competent legal advice during interrogation and 
at trial. Zuckerman75 suggests a criminal trial process regulated by the direct search for truth, 
(a utilitarian concept), including safeguards against wrongful conviction, false confessions 
and a minimum standard of procedural fairness covering both the suspect and the accused.76 
On the other extreme lie the two libertarian schools. The symbolic libertarian 77 would retain 
the right to silence not so much for its intrinsic value, but more for its symbolic significance. 
The right to silence is a keystone protection, a cultural mindset entrenched within the 
accusatorial system which prevents the state from loosening the constraints imposed upon 
police investigations. It is the symbolic banner behind which libertarians may rally in order to 
prevent the state from unleashing its full power. The right to silence is the symbolic 
expression of the presumption of innocence motivating adequate protections for the accused 
at trial. Personality18 and Instrumental retentionists'79 view the right to silence as an integral 
component of the accusatorial trial system. An effective right to silence coupled with a strong 
presumption of innocence guarantees procedural and substantive fairness at trial.80 Human 
right advocates regard the right to silence as a critical protection of personal autonomy, 
privacy and dignity which liberates the individual from the imposition of improper physical and 
psychological cruel choices. Instrumental protectionism suggests that the abolition of the 
74 Lord Templeman's commentary in A. T and T. lstel v Tully (1993) AC 45, 53. 
75 Zuckerman The Principles Of Criminal Procedure Clarendon Press, Oxford (1989), chapter 4. 
76 The introduction of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 has greatly increased the English 
suspect's safeguards rendering the right to silence unnecessary. Prior to PACE, the protection offered 
to the suspect was limited. The voluntary test for confession admissibility was subject to a wide range 
of highly technical exceptions and distinctions. Breaches of the weak judges rules rarely resulted in 
the exclusion of testimony, hence the need for a silence principle. However, post PACE courts have 
interpreted the statutory requirements of confession admissibility strictly and the code of practice rules 
have strengthened the suspects safeguards making the silence principle redundant. 
77 Galligan "The Right To Silence Reconsidered" C.L.P. (1988) "The [silence principle] is simply part 
of the [Ango-American] culture, it provides important symbols about how the individual person stands 
within the culture and about how authority is constitutred". 
78 See infra chapter 4 p. 112-129. 
79 See infra chapter 4 p. 134-151 . 
80 The wording of sec 35(3)h of the South African Constitution (1996) is a fair example of the 
libertarian philosophy which links the idea of a fair trial with the principle of silence and the 
presumption of innocence. 
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right to silence would shift the burden of proof incrementally towards the criminal defendant. 
Excising the right to silence undermines the presumption of innocence and alters the basic 
fabric of the accusatorial system by introducing new inquisitorial elements. 81 Remove silence 
and a catastrophic domino effect results which jeopardizes the protection of the innocent 
from unjust convictions, encourages fishing expeditions by the state and heightens the 
coercive interrogatory pressure on the suspect thereby increasing the risk of false 
confessions. It would also precipitate a decline in policing standards as the police begin to 
concentrate resources on the suspect rather than searching for independent sources of 
evidence. 
The silence principle is treated as self-obvious and rarely in need of justification. Advocates 
of the right to silence regard it as sacrosanct. Criticism of the right arouses a barrage of 
emotional defences often approaching near religious adulation.82 Yet in terms of utility, a 
protection against self-incrimination excludes the best kind of evidence increasing the risk of 
vexation, delay, expense and misdecision. Such an exclusion needs to be justified. It is not 
self-evident. At the end of the day an exclusionary rule, if it is to be elevated to the ranks of a 
constitutional right, must contain the inherent and essential criteria of transparent morality 
and rationality. It is insufficient to qualify a constitutional right with generous praise which 
cannot be translated into logically consistent applications of a clearly understood purpose. 
When a legal rule fails to satisfy the test of rationality, it must be revised or abandoned in 
favour of other principles which better suit legal needs. The silence principle whether in the 
guise of a normative procedural or substantive right possesses none of these essential 
criteria. A mandatory exclusionary rule which cannot be substantiated by reason or morality 
serves only to obfuscate the process by which legal truth is derived without offering any 
tangible benefit in return. In the following chapters the confusion surrounding the so-called 
81 Easton The Case For The Right To Silence Avebury (1996) 109, states, 'The privilege is built into 
the edifice of the adversarial system. If the right to silence were lost, this would shift the trial system 
from an adversarial one to an inquisitorial one". "If drawing adverse inferences from silence were 
simply grafted on to the existing adversarial system, we would be left with the worst aspects of each 
system". The problem with Easton's reasoning (a) is that she assumes an automatic shift in burdens-
which is not necessarily true; (b) she also assumes a shift towards the inquisitorial system -she is 
perhaps unaware that the adversarial system already contains a number of inquisitorial elements, just 
as the inquisitorial process contains a number of accusatorial elements - See Goldstein "Reflections 
On Two Models" (26) Standford L.J. (1974) 1018. 
82 Howard ibid note 70, at 13, refers to human rights as being religiously justified. A number of 
authors have sought to find a justification for the silence principle in religious history. Horowitz ibid 
note 34 at 142, speaks of the silence principle as grounded on cardinal principles of Judea-Christian 
religious law. Lamm "The Fifth Amendment And Its Equivalent In Jewish Law'' (17) Deca/oque. J. 
( 1967) 1, 12. Rosenberg and Rosenberg "In The Beginning : The Talmudic Rules Against Self-
Incrimination", (63) New York Un. L. Rev (1988) 955. See also Douglas J's reference to Jewish 
religious law in Garrity v New Jersey 385 U.S 493, n5, (1967) and Warren C.J's similar reference in 
Miranda v Arizona 384 U.S 436, 458, n27 (1966). By contrast, see Mazabow "The Origin Of The 
Privilege Against Self-Incrimination: Jewish Law?" S.A.L.J. (1987) 710. 
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right to silence in all the major Anglo-American jurisdictions will be highlighted. The inability 
of the Anglo-American legal establishment to provide a consistent rational and logical basis 
for the silence principle has led to much distortion and confusion. A bewildering web of 
conflicting legal opinions, procedural confusions, and incoherent court decisions at all 
hierarchical levels have been created over the past 200 years which appear to dangle in the 
air without proper jurisprudential support. It is important that all legal rules are anchored on 
rational criteria. Especially those rules which have achieved constitutional status. A 
constitutional right has the power to intrude across the broad spectrum of the law. It must be 
susceptible to logical analysis otherwise it becomes inflexible and difficult to negotiate. A 
constitutional rule which lacks a rational justification has the potential to distort the criminal 
process because it is subject only to sentimentality and not to reason. The association of 
legal rules with a deontological conceptualization of morality and legality simply leads to 
confusion. It is a recurring theme of this thesis that only utilitarianism can coherently explain 
the existence and source of rights, and provide a rational system for prioritizing rights when 
they are in conflict. The fundamental difference between a deontological silence principle 
and a utilitarian silence principle is that a deontological silence rule elevated into a 
constitutional right becomes inflexible and applies with a high degree of absoluteness,83 
whereas a utilitarian silence rule is derivative, relative and subject to a purposeful balancing 
of interests. A utilitarian rule is easier to negotiate into a stable, balanced relationship 
between the state and the individual interest. 
83 The inflexibility of a constitutional right is illustrated by Black J's opinion in Grunewald v United 
States 353 U.S 391, 425-426 (1975), "I can think of no special circumstances that would justify use of 
a constitutional privilege to discredit or convict a person who asserts it. The value of constitutional 
privileges is largely destroyed if persons can be penalized for relying on them". 
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CHAPTER4 
JUSTIFYING THE SILENCE PRINCIPLE 
4.1 MODELS OF SILENCE 
Herbert Packer describes the Anglo-American justice system as a tension between procedure 
and substance in the enforcement of criminal law.1 The crime control and due process models 
are defining normative models of criminal procedure which describe the dynamism of the 
criminal process from arrest to conviction.2 The crime control model emphasizes the interests of 
society in suppressing criminal conduct. Demanding that the criminal process be efficient and 
productive in the screening of the innocent from the guilty.3 Managerial efficiency and a smooth 
administrative processing is preferred over judicial fact-finding.4 The crime control model is best 
described in utilitarian terminology as an efficiency in the criminal process which maximizes the 
nett society welfare. Crime control requires the abolition or limitation of all unnecessary 
exclusionary and protective rules (including an artificial silence principle) which impede the 
conviction of the guilty. It views the silence principle as an unjustified obstruction to the efficient 
investigation and prosecution of criminals. The due process model is opposite. Although it 
stresses reliable fact finding, due process favours the reduction of possible error by a properly 
constituted judicial processing.5 The due process model is prepared to sacrifice a degree of 
efficiency in the interest of minimizing error. Drawing its inspiration from a human rights 
doctrine, it emphasizes human value over and above official managerial power. Procedural 
exclusionary rules and protective devices such as the silence principle are essential in 
minimizing the possibility of wrongful convictions. Due process is an appeal to the principle of 
legality and human value. In essence the crime control model resembles an assembly line 
process while its polar opposite, due process, requires that the criminal proceeding be structured 
1 Packer "Two Models Of The Criminal Process" (113) Un. Penn. L. Rev. (1964) 1-68. 
2 Goldstein "Reflections On Two Models, Inquisitorial Themes In American Criminal Procedure" (26) 
Stanford L. Rev. (1974) 1015-1016. Damaska "Evidentiary Barriers To Convictions" (121) Un Penn. L. 
Rev. (1973) 574-577. By contrast see Griffiths "Ideology And Criminal Procedure" (79) Yale L. J. (1970) 
359, who suggests that Packer's models are two manifestations of the same ideological view of a narrow 
accusatorial type criminal justice system. Griffith would consolidate the Crime Control and Due Process 
models into a single "Battle" model contrasted by an alternative "Family'' model. The "Family'' model is 
founded on a highly individualized approach to criminal punishment based equally upon the needs of the 
convicted criminal and society. Although an interesting intellectual argument, Griffith's "Family'' model 
bears no resemblance to any accusatorial system in the world. It may bear a general approximation to 
some foreign non-accusatorial systems. 
3 Packer ibid at 10-12, 24-25, 31-38, 35-40. 
4 Packer ibid at 10-12. 
5 Packer ibid at 13-20. 
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as an obstacle course.6 The crime control model is fundamentally an affirmative model.7 Its 
justification is utilitarian and its validating authority is usually a legislative process. In terms of 
the control model restrictions placed on the silence principle are usually statutory ones. For 
example, sec 35-38 of the English Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1944.8 The due 
process model is negative because it places limitations on official power by emphasizing human 
rights.9 Its validation requires an appeal to supra-legislative law, usually constitutional law. For 
example, the right to silence is constitutionally entrenched in sec 35 of the South African 
Constitution {1996) and the fifth amendment in the American Constitution. The modern root of 
the controversy over the silence principle may therefore be seen as a dynamic tension between 
the societal interest in convicting the greatest number of criminals in the most efficient manner 
possible and the need to protect human value within a humanized criminal process. 
Two strands of human rights arguments may be discerned within the due process model. 
Personality rationales seek to justify and explain the privacy and personal autonomy aspects of 
a right to silence.1° Compelled self-incrimination is an unacceptable infringement of personality 
because it imposes psychologically cruel choices.11 It invades privacy12 and infringes human 
dignity by inhibiting respect for the inviolability of the human personality.13 Instrumental 
rationales purport to justify the right to silence as a procedural device which furthers the 
essential humanizing goals of the accusatorial system.14 Silence prevents the compulsion of 
involuntary testimony, removes the temptation to employ investigatory short cuts and 
encourages witnesses to appear and testify. Silence strengthens the presumption of innocence, 
and guarantees the burden of proof placed on the accused, thereby ensuring a fair trial process. 
Abolish the foundational right to silence and the entire edifice of the accusatorial system begins 
6 Packer ibid at 13. 
7 Packer ibid at 22. 
8 See infra chapter 9. See also the Singapore Act chapter 11. 
9 Packer ibid at 22. 
10 The English perspective is in Galligan "The Right To Silence Reconsidered" C.L.P. (1988) 69, but see 
the refutation in Robertson "The Right To Silence Ill-considered" Viet. Un. Wellington. L. Rev(1991) 139. 
11 The American perspective : Bonaventre "An Alternative To The Constitutional Privilege" (49) Brooklyn. 
L. Rev. (1982) 31, 53-56. Greenawalt "Silence As A Moral And Constitutional Righr (23) Wm and Mary. 
L. Rev (1981) 15, Sunderland "Self-Incrimination And The Constitutional Privilege" Wake Forest L. Rev 
(1979) 171, 179-80. Louisell "Criminal Discovery And Self-Incrimination : Roger Tranter Confronts The 
Dilemma" (53) Cal. L. Rev (1965) 89, 95. Meltzer "Required Records, The McCarran Act And The 
Privilege" (18) Un. Ch. L. R (1951) 687, 692-93. Also Wigmore Evidence, Sec 2251, McNaughton Ed 
~1961). 
2 Aranella "Schmerber And The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination" (20) Am. Crim. L. Rev (1982) 31, 41-
42. Gerstein, Privacy And Self-Incrimination" (80) Ethics (1970) 87 and "Punishment And Self-
Incrimination" 16 Am. J. Juris (1971) 84. Menza ''Witness Privilege, Unconstitutional, Unfair, 
Unconscionable" (9) Seton. Hall. Cons. L. J. (1999) 505, 524-29. McKay "Self-Incrimination And The New 
Privacy" Sup. Crt. Rev (1967) 193, 230. Ratner "Consequences Of Exercising The Privilege Against Self-
Incrimination" (24) Un. Ch. L. Rev (1957) 472, 488-89. 
13 Murphy v Waterfront Commission 378 U.S 52, 55 (1964). 
14 McKay ibid note 12 at 209. 
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to crumble.15 The libertarian English common law justification is expressed by Murphy J in 
Pyneboard (Pty) Ltd v Trade Practice Commission 16 : 
"The privilege against compulsory self-incrimination is part of the common law of human 
rights. It is based on the desire to protect personal freedom and human dignity. These 
social values justify the impediment the privilege presents to judicial or other 
investigation. It protects the innocent as well as the guilty from the indignity and invasion 
of privacy which occurs in compulsory self-incrimination; it is society's acceptance of the 
inviolability of human personality". 
The libertarian American justification is encapsulated by Goldberg J in Murphy v Waterfront 
Commission.17 The privilege against self-incrimination reflects many of our fundamental values 
and most noble aspirations. Its principal justifications rest on the following : 
"a) Our unwillingness to subject those suspected of crime to the cruel trilemma of self-
accusation, perjury or contempt (a personality argument- but see Bentham's old woman 
reasoning); 
b) Our preference for an accusatorial rather than an inquisitorial system of criminal justice 
(an instrumental argument- but also a conclusionary statement which offers no reason 
on how the conclusion is reached); 
c) Our fear that self-incriminating statements will be elicited by inhumane treatment and 
abuses (a personality argument- in need of empirical verification); 
d) Our sense of fair play which dictates a "fair state- individual balance" (an instrumental 
argument closely related to (b)- but see Bentham's foxhunting reasoning); 
e) Our respect for the inviolability of the human personality and of the right of each 
individuaf to a private enclave where he may lead a private life (a personality argument-
based on the idea of individual moral autonomy); 
f) Our distrust of self-deprecatory statements (a personality argument closely related to (c)); 
g) Our realization that the privilege while sometimes a shelter for the guilty, is often a 
protection for the innocent (an instrumental argument- empirically unverifiable)". 
15 For the English perspective, Dennis "Instrumental Protection, Human Rights Or Fundamental 
Necessity'' (54) Cam. L.J. (1995) 342-76. Easton The Right To Silence Avesbury (1991) ch 6. Greer "The 
Right To Silence: A Review Of The Current Debate" (53) M.L.R. (1990) 709. Zuckerman ''Trial By Unfair 
Means" Crim. L. Rev (1989) 855-856 and "The Right Against Self-Incrimination, An Obstacle To The 
Supervision Of Interrogation" (102) LQ.R. (1986) 43, 63. McConville "Silence In Court'' N.L.J. (1987) 
1169. Dennis "Reconstructing The Law Of Criminal Evidence" C.L.P. (1989) 21. Williams ''The Tactics Of 
Silence" (137) N.L.J. (1987) 1107. 
16 (1983) 152 C.LR. 328, 346. 
17 378 u.s 52, 55 (1964). 
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4.2 PERSONALITY RATIONALES 
The difficulty in developing a moral foundation for the silence principle is compounded by an 
inability to formulate logical and coherent rationales. A number of endeavours have been made. 
Proponents of the personality rationales seek to justify the silence principle by clothing it in the 
rhetorical cloak of human dignity and individuality. Sec 10 and sec 14 of the South African 
Constitution ( 1996) entrench the right to human dignity and privacy respectively. Could the 
protection of these facets of personality serve as a sufficient rational justification for the 
existence of a fundamental right to silence. 18 Personality based theories operate on the 
assumption that the individual much like the state has sovereign existence. A personality 
doctrine draws its rationalization from John Locke's theory of government as a contractual 
relationship between the individual and the state. The sovereign individual must not yield to the 
state the power to compel evidence. The state and the citizen are equals, neither may exert 
undue influence over the other. The state in particular has no right to compel the sovereign 
individual to surrender or impair the right to self-defence. From these constitutional guarantees, 
two defensive arguments may be deduced. The concept of cruelty justifies the silence principle 
by holding compelled self-incrimination to be inherently cruel. 19 The concepts of privacy and 
autonomy give validity to the silence principle because state compulsion improperly infringes the 
personal space surrounding each individual.20 Opposite to these two standard theories is the 
notion based on self-protective perjury. An alternative normative theory· which explains and 
validates the silence principle in terms of the criminal law concept of situational excuse.21 The 
fundamental objection to compelled self-incrimination underlying the personality theories is that 
state compulsion treats the individual as a mere "thing" for the impersonal extraction of evidence. 
Silence is the exercise of an affirmative right which, according to Kantian principles, justifies 
excluding the state from the mind and the soul. 
18 The right to dignity occupies a central place in the South African Constitution and is mentioned in sec 4, 
sec 7(1) and sec 10. S v Makwanyane 1995 (6) BCLR 665 (C.C) 1995 (3) SA 391 (C.C) para 144 
describes the right to dignity and the right to life as the most important human rights. Dignity is at the 
heart of the right not to be tortured or to be punished in a cruel, inhuman or degrading way (at para 111 ). 
It is the central human right from which all other rights flow. See the seminal work Dolinko "Is There A 
Rationale For The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination" (33) U.C.L.A. L. Rev (1986) 1063-1148, many of 
the distinctions drawn in this chapter are based on Dolinko's seminal work. Griswold The Fifth 
Amendment Today (1955) 7, "we do not make even the hardened criminal sign his own death warrant, or 
dig his own grave ... We have through history developed a considerable feeling for the dignity and 
intrinsic importance of the individual. Even the evil man is a human being". See also Environmental 
Protection Authority v Ca/tex Refining Co Pfy Ltd (1993} 118 ALR 392,404-405 per Mason C.J. 
19 Goldberg J in Murphy v Waterfront Commission, ibid note 17, see argument (a). Brown v Walker 161 
U.S 591 (1896}. Note, cruelty is of a psychological and not of a physical nature. While the development 
of a silence principle is the result of a reaction against torture, no western theorist today would suggest the 
~revention of physical torture as a sufficient reason for the modern principle. 
0 Goldberg J in Murphy v Waterfront Commission per argument (e). 
21 Stuntz "Self-Incrimination And Excuse" (86) Columbia. L. Rev (1988) 1227. 
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4.2.1 The Cruelty Defence 
The cruelty defence rests on the notion that it is inhumanely cruel to compel a suspect to give 
evidence out of his own mouth thereby subjecting himself to a criminal sanction. The cruelty 
argument can be traced back in time to the medieval Thomist criticism of the popular but 
theologically flimsy morality of oath swearing22 which infringed the natural God-given duty of 
preserving the soul. It also served as an important jurisprudential defence to ecclesiastical 
inquisition during the 1th century,23 only to be dismissed by Bentham in the 191h century as the 
old woman's reasoning.24 Louisell restates the modern doctrine as "it is essentially and 
inherently cruel to make a man an instrument of his own condemnation".25 Greenawalt argues 
that the moral restraints which prevent self-accusation between private individuals should also 
apply to the relationship between the state and the citizen. He invokes the cruelty argument as a 
justification that the state should honour the individual's moral entitlement to remain silent. 26 The 
cruelty defence has some direct emotional appeal but sentimentality by itself is an insufficient 
justification. The argument loses much of its moral persuasiveness because its underlying 
premise presumes a guilty accused. The innocent accused would have nothing to lose by 
answering questions truthfully. No cruelty is involved in requiring the innocent per'Son to speak 
out. Only the guilty accused would be faced by the cruel choice. It is also difficult to argue that 
the interests of the guilty in evading criminal punishment is worthy of protection or of a priority 
greater than that of the victim.27 No rational explanation is advanced as to why compelled ,self-
incrimination is unacceptably cruel. Proponents appeal to intuition rather than reason. According 
to Ellis, "We cannot demonstrate why it is cruel. We feel that it is cruel, beyond this we cannot 
go".28 Is it possible to see beyond this kind of human rights emotional language and to isolate a 
logical basis for a right to silence? 
221n a medieval culture saturated by strongly held religious beliefs, compelled self-incrimination presented 
the accused with a genuine moral dilemma, the choice between earthly punishment or divine retribution. 
St Thomas Aquinas in his Summa Theologica argued that silence in the face of an oath was justified in the 
absence of accusation or express evidence of guilt. See Silving "The Oath Part I" (68) Yale L.J (1951) 
1329, 1343-50, 1382. 
23Cartwright, Lilbume and other Puritan leaders attacked the ex officio procedure on the basis of the 
cruelty implicit in an oath swearing. 
24See supra Bentham chapter 3 p.1 01. 
25Louisell "Criminal Discovery And Self-Incrimination" (53) Cal. L. Rev (1965) 89, 95. 
26Greenawalt "Silence And Moral And Constitutional Righf' (23) Wm and Mary L. Rev (1981) 34-38. See 
supra chapter 3 p.92. The contrary view suggests that Greenawalt's reasoning leads to a moral paradox. 
On the one hand the silence principle is justified on the basis of its moral dignity. On the other hand, 
Greenawalt's idea of morality is contrary to normal social practice. In family relationships an individual's 
non-disclosure is morally unacceptable. 
27 Dennis "Instrumental Protection, Human Rights Or Functional Necessity" (54) Cam. L. J. (1995) 359. 
28 Ellis "A Comment On The Testimonial Privilege Of The Fifth Amendmenf' (55) Iowa L. Rev (1970) 838-
39, "Are we then to reject the cruel trilemma argument [because] we cannot rationally explain it .... 
irrational feelings play a valid role in justifying the privilege". 
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Perhaps compelled self-incrimination is cruel because it imposes an unacceptably cruel 
trilemma. The accused is faced with an impossibly difficult psychological choice. The accused 
must either produce evidence of a crime (and thereby subject himself to a criminal penalty) or 
remain silent (and expose himself to contempt) or lie (and subject himself to perjury).29 The 
trilemma argument has garnered support from the United States Supreme Court as well as 
American academics.30 Unfortunately the trilemma argument cannot be logically substantiated. 
The question well worth asking is how much weight should be attached to the accused's 
possible experience of cruelty given the more substantial degradation wrought upon the accused 
and society by the commission of the offence in the first place. Given that worse consequences 
in the form of prison sentences and incarceration are regularly inflicted upon those who commit 
crimes, the idea of a trilemma as disproportionately cruel is logically absurd. There is no other 
kind of cruelty inherent in self-incrimination except the possibility of punishment. Unless the 
argument is made that all criminal penalties (punishment) are inherently cruel (and therefore 
socially unacceptable), there can logically be no cruelty unique to self-incrimination.31 
Furthermore as Bentham remarked some 150 years ago, "it is mistaken to think it more cruel to 
be condemned by one's own admission than by the evidence of some third party".32 The cruelty 
imposed upon the accused when condemned, say by a loved one, cannot be less cruel than if 
he were to condemn himself. Persons are often compelled to give testimony in any number of 
trial situations which force upon them so-called cruel choices. Mayers states, "requiring a 
mother to testify against her own son on trial for his life is surely a greater cruelty than requiring 
an ordinary witness to disclose some minor penal infraction".33 Ellis criticizes this type of 
example, "are we really to be persuaded to abandon the privilege on the ground that in some 
[exceptional] cases, its absence might be less cruel".34 Nonetheless, it is possible to foresee a 
situation in which the witness may well be forced to disclose incriminatory evidence against a 
29 Although the trilemma argument traditionally applies in the trial proceeding, a variation applies at the 
pre-trial stage. The suspect must choose between lying (and risk being caught in an incriminating 
contradiction), remaining silent and facing (the possibility of continued detention) and (a possible adverse 
inference of guilt). Dennis ibid note 27 at 358-359. 
30 See in particular Murphy v Waterfront Commission ibid note 17 and Pennsylvania v Muniz 110 SCt, 
2638, 2648 (1990). Western and Mandell "To Talk, To Balk, To Lie, The Emerging Fifth Amendment 
Doctrine Of The Preferred Response" (19) Am. Grim. L. Rev (1983) 521. Greenawalt ibid note 26 at 259. 
O'Brien ''The Fifth Amendmenr (54) Notre Dame Lawyer (1978) 26, 43. McNaughton ''The Privilege 
Against Self-Incrimination" (51) J. Crim. L.C and P.S (1960) 154, who refers to the choice as one amongst 
the three horns of the triceratops, harmful disclosure- contempt- pe~ury. 
31 Bentham supra chapter 3, R.J.E. book IX, ch Ill (Bowring Ed 1843) sec 3, 231 'Whatever hardship 
there is in a man being punished, that, and no more, is there in his being made to criminate himself'. 
Although punishment entails a degree of cruelty, society considers it justifiable. Why should a line be 
drawn between impermissible and permissible cruelty in such a way that makes it dependent on the 
existence of a silence principle? 
32 Bentham ibid at 236. 
33 Mayers Shall We Amend The Fifth Amendment (1959) 168-169. 
34 Ellis ibid note 28 at 837, "It is questionable whether the mother faces a real trilemma. How many 
judges would place a mother in such a position?". 
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parent, sibling, spouse, child, even an employee or employer. After all compulsory appearance 
at trial and compulsory disclosure on the witness stand is an everyday occurrence. A lack of 
careful analysis and a ready willingness to adopt emotional rights-based ideas is the reason why 
South African courts unhesitantly impose harsh choices upon the innocent witness but (absurdly) 
find it unacceptably cruel to impose a similar trilemma choice upon the accused.35 
An alternative hypothesis to the cruelty argument is the hypocrisy argument which holds self-
incrimination to be cruel because it is contrary to the basic human instinct of self-preservation. 
To compel incriminatory evidence is to establish an impossible ethical standard which almost all 
human beings are incapable of meeting. To cite Sunderland, "a [legal] philosophy must be 
based on the passion most common to human beings, the desire for self-preservation".36 
Evidence gained in violation of this fundamental characteristic of human nature is intrinsically 
untrustworthy.37 It cannot be hypocritical to punish the accused for his failure to render self-
incriminatory evidence when every other human being would do the same if placed in a similar 
situation. Unfortunately the conclusion to be drawn from the hypocrisy argument is one of moral 
dilution rather than moral reinforcement. Why should it be moral to conceal or deny the truth, 
even in the face of self-preservation?38 It is not a sufficient excuse to hold that society has no 
moral right to punish the accused for doing what every other member of society would do in the 
place of the accused. 
Notwithstanding the charge of hypocrisy and self-preservation, South African law does 
sometimes punish the wrongdoer for behaving in a way that all other persons would behave. 
For example, the law will punish the accused who destroys relevance evidence, who suborns 
perjury or who uses bribery/threats to cover up his criminality. In particular, South African 
criminal law does not exonerate the accused who culpably brings about the conditions of his own 
35 For example, the rape victim faces the cruel choice of testifying and having her sexual history cross-
examined or remaining silent and allowing the rapist to go free. The South African witness in organized 
crime trials faces an inherently cruel choice in deciding to testify or not. Refuse to testify and face the 
sanction of the state. Testify and face the real danger of being murdered. 
36 Sunderland "Self-Incrimination And Constitutional Principle" (15) Wake Forest. L. Rev (1979) 179-80. 
Meltzer "Required Records, The McCarran Act And The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination" (18) Un. Ch. 
L. Rev (1951) 687, 701. 
37 Kenealy"Fifth Amendment Morals" Cath. Law(1957) 340, 342. 
38 After all the wrongdoer possesses the ability to tell the truth, he simply does not want to exercise that 
ability because it is a difficult and unpleasant choice. While it is a difficult moral choice, it is not an 
impossible one. Why should the wrongdoer be held to a lower standard rather than a higher one? Lord 
Coleridge in R v Dudley and Stephens (1884) 114 Q.B.D. 273, ''We are often compelled to set up 
standards we cannot reach ourselves, and to lay down rules which we could not ourselves satisfy. But a 
man has no right to declare temptation [or self-preservation] to be an excuse, though he might himself 
have yielded to if' (at 288). Even if the choice is an impossible one, English law holds that the wrongdoer 
is not entitled to the defense of self-preservation. No person has the choice of taking the life of an 
innocent simply in order to preserve his own. South African law was the same (R v Werner 1947 (2) SA 
828 (A)) until the seminal case (R v Goliath 1972 (3) SA 1 (A)). 
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excuse and the need for his self-preservation. It is not contra bones mores for the law to punish 
a drug addict for the possession of illegal narcotics or an alcoholic for public drunkenness,39 
even though most persons would have broken the same laws were they similarly addicted. 
Necessity (a defence against the substantive element of unlawfulness) will not negate a 
criminally wrongful act on the part of the accused who has voluntarily joined a criminal gang and 
is subsequently coerced into committing a crime. Especially when he foresees that he may be 
placed in a situation of emergency which calls for his self-preservation.40 The addict, alcoholic 
and reluctant thief are punishable because of a freely willed wrongful act. By placing themselves 
voluntarily in the predicament, they have become culpable even though most human beings 
would have acted similarly. Therefore it cannot be cruelly hypocritical to punish the accused for 
withholding self-incriminatory evidence because the accused, by his own voluntary and 
blameworthy act, places himself in the circumstance requiring self-incrimination. 
The final submission favouring a cruelty defence brushes aside the idea of an unacceptably 
difficult choice inherent in the trilemma and hypocrisy arguments. According to the value 
argument the crucial factor in making compelled self-incrimination unnaturally cruel is that the 
accused is forced to inflict harm on some personal value most dearly cherished, namely honour, 
reputation, happiness or simply to himself. Compelled self-incrimination is a unique kind of 
cruelty, far more intensely degrading than the nominal cruelty suggested by the tri/emma and 
hypocrisy arguments. Dolinko illustrates the argument, "a sadist who forces a mother to choose 
which of her children will be killed, inflicts not only an extra quantum of suffering upon the 
mother, but also a unique form of cruelty. Would not this aggravated form of cruelty be present, 
although to a lesser degree, if an accused was forced to furnish evidence exposing himself to a 
criminal sanction. If it is cruel to inflict harm on a person, is it not aggravatingly cruel to compel a 
person to inflict harm on themselves?".41 As a consequence, enforced self-incrimination 
resulting in loss of honour or reputation would inflict an unnaturally intense suffering and 
unhappiness upon the accused. Compelling the individual to inflict harm upon himself 
aggravates the cruelty of simply inflicting it on him without his participation. Is it reasonable to 
39 It is not an infringement of the fifth amendment to punish the alcoholic for public intoxication or the 
heroin addict for possession, Powell v Texas 392 U.S 514 (1968), United States v Moore 486 F.2d 1139 
iD.C.Cir). 1964. 
0 S v Bradbury 1967 (1) SA 387 (A), "a man who voluntarily and deliberately becomes a member of a 
criminal gang with the knowledge of its disciplinary code of vengeance cannot rely on compulsion for a 
defence". (Holmes J.A at 404) and Burchell, Milton Principles Of Criminal Law (1997) 164-165. See the 
contrary view in R v Mohamed 1938 AD 30, S v Pretorius 1975 (2) SA 85 (SWA) and Snyman, Criminal 
Law (1995) 111-112 who considers Holmes J.A's decision in Bradbury to be an application of the 
discarded versari doctrine. American law (model Penal Code Sec 302 (2)) is the same as the English law. 
The duress (necessity) defence does not apply where the defendant places himself in a position in which 
he is likely to be subject to coercion. 
41 Dolinko ibid note 18 at 1102. 
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label compelled self-incrimination as uniquely and aggravatingly cruel? How is the word 
aggravating to be defined? A legal rule can only be termed aggravating when it exceeds the 
parameters imposed by the moral and legal convictions of society.42 The process of convicting 
and punishing the accused is in itself not inherently cruel. Forcing the accused to participate in 
this process by compelling self-incrimination is logically defensible.43 If punishment is a desired 
goal of our legal system despite the loss of honour or happiness which it inflicts, then compelled 
self-incrimination which promotes the desired end cannot be aggravatingly cruel. Moreover, the 
purpose of compelling self-incrimination is not to inflict harm upon the accused, but to arrive 
expeditiously at the truth. The innocent accused who is compelled to tell the truth cannot be said 
to have suffered an aggravating loss of honour. Likewise, any harm suffered by the guilty is 
justifiable because the determination of truth and the punishment of wrongdoing can never be 
considered aggravatingly cruel.44 
The cruelty argument in all three of its manifestations is logically flawed. The theory is unable to 
explain why self-incrimination in the way it is applied should be defined as uniquely or inherently 
cruel. The use of a human rights terminology may evoke sentimentality, but words by 
themselves are insufficient unless supported by well reasoned arguments. The protection 
against cruelty as a justification for the silence principle falls by the wayside. The cruelty 
argument is also fatally deficient in that it ignores the necessity for a truth-finding function. 
Cruelty arguments make no accommodation for the inclusion of a truth-finding mechanism which 
is at least as important as the presumed hardship of self-incrimination. 
4.2.1 The Privacy Defence 
Having noted the illogicality of a cruelty justification for the silence principle, advocates have 
instead turned to the various defences embraced by the concept of privacy. Superficially the 
privacy defence as the underpinning rationale for a silence principle appears ideally attractive. 
The nature of a silence principle is intimate and personal. It proscribes state intrusion by 
42 To define self-incriminatory behaviour as cruel implies that it is excessive, unjustified or unreasonable 
behaviour in the sense that the individual does not deserve to be treated in this manner as judged against 
the boni mores of society. 
43 In a well ordered society punishment is a desirable sanction. Although there is nothing intrinsically 
desirable about the imposition of suffering, the punishment of some wrongdoers, benefits and adds to the 
nett welfare of all society. In terms of utility, punishment is a desirable end goal and should not be 
regarded as inherently cruel when it benefits society as a whole. 
44 If the personal qualities of honour, reputation, etc., are inherently important to the wrongdoer, why 
expose them to risk in the first place? Within the South African organized and professional criminal 
community, punishment, incarceration and prison terms are viewed as a badge of honour rather than as a 
cruel degradation of personal values. 
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respecting a private inner sanctum of feeling and thought.45 According to Douglas J in Griswold 
v Connecticuf6 "the [fifth amendment] enables the citizen to create a zone of privacy which the 
government may not force him to surrender to his detriment". Privacy prevents personal 
debasement according to United States v Wade47 per Fortas J. The silence principle operates 
as a safeguard of the individual's substantive right to privacy, "a right to a private enclave where 
the individual may lead a private life".48 The law should secure for each individual a right to 
determine how and to what extent his thoughts, sentiments and emotions may be communicated 
to others. 49 American academics have generally endorsed privacy protection as the mainstay of 
the silence principle. Ratner0 refers to privacy as a constitutional facet of the silence principle. 
McKay,51 drawing upon the interrelationship between the fourth and the fifth amendments, 
suggests that a fifth amendment privacy right would offer indirect support to the fourth 
amendment (searches and seizures) and would be a logical corollary of the first amendment. In 
American law the right to privacy has acquired a much wider constitutional dimension than in the 
English common law. American privacy is described as the most comprehensive and the most 
valued by civilized men.52 On the other hand, English common law does not recognize a specific 
legal right to privacy. In Malone v Metropolitan Police Commissioner 53 and in R v Khan54 
(Sultan), the English courts refused to accept that evidence obtained by a breach of privacy was 
automatically inadmissible as a matter of law. According to the common law, it would be absurd 
45 In sec 14 of the South African Constitution, privacy consists of both a general right and a specific 
prohibition against unlawful searches and seizures. By contrast, the United States separates general 
privacy (14th amendment) from searches and seizures (4th amendment). The German constitution also 
separates personality protection (art 2(1)) from privacy of telecommunications (art 10). A right to privacy 
protects (i) the right to be left alone in respect to body, place and intimate relationship, (ii) to allow for the 
development of personality, self-realisation, (iii) to allow for control over private information about self. 
Fried "Privacy'' (89) Yale L.J. (1980) 435-36, privacy is "our control over the quantity and quality of 
information about us in the mind of others". Gravison "Privilege And The Limits Of The Law" (89) Yale L.J. 
(1980) 428-29 regards privacy as "a limitation of another's access to the individual" Dolinko ibid note 18 at 
1107-1112. 
46 381 U.S 479, 484 (1965). Tehan v United States 382 U.S 406, 416 (1966) per Stewart J ''the privilege 
stands as a protection for .... the right of each individual to be let alone". 
47 388 u.s 218,261 (1967). 
48 United States v Grunewald 351 U.S 391, 446 (1957) (Frank J). See also Goldberg J's argument ibid 
note 17 at (e). Couch v United States 409 U.S 327, 328 (1973) and Miranda v Arizona 384 U.S 460, 463 
i1966) refer to the right of each individual to a private enclave. 
9 Warner and Brandeis "The Right To Privacy'' (4) Harv. L. Rev (1890) 193, 198 "privacy is an inviolate 
aspect of personality''. A definition common to many American cases, see Goldberg J's argument (e) ibid 
note 17. 
50 
"The Consequence Of Exercising The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination" (24) Un. Ch. L. Rev (1957) 
488-489. 
51 
"Self-Incrimination And The New Privacy'' Sup. Crt. Rev (1967) 193. 
52 The American right to privacy is one of the integral parts of "liberty'' protected by a number of due 
process <Clauses. Privacy is defined and protected directly in the fourth amendment and indirectly in the 
first, third, eighth and ninth amendments. In all these amendments it is defined relatively and subject to a 
balance of interest test. Tribe American Constitutional Law tld Ed (1988) 1308-09. 
53 (1979) 2 W.L.R 700. 
54 (1996) 3 ALL E.R 289. Privacy as a justification for a silence principle has only been accepted judicially 
by Murphy J in Pyneboard Ply Ltd v Trade Practices Commission ibid note 16. 
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to advance privacy (which is not a recognized rule of law) as a justification for the silence 
principle (which is a recognized rule of law). The right to privacy has recently been incorporated 
into English Statutory law through the Human Rights Act (1998). Galligan suggests that privacy 
is important because it justifies personal identity and autonomy, "without a zone of privacy 
personality cannot exist". 55 A silence principle based on privacy is a necessary protection 
against government "big brother" monitoring of thoughts and desires. A silence principle 
safeguards the individual's mental and emotional state. Thoughts, knowledge, beliefs and ideas 
must be defended against outside intrusion, for the revelation of these intimacies would have 
devastating social consequences. 
The development of a traditional privacy argument is traceable throughout the 171h and 18th 
centuries. Although never specifically recognized as a legal rule, privacy did serve to frustrate 
"belief control" laws 56 and state sponsored "belief probes". Within the narrow historical context of 
a protection against inquisitorial religious and political belief probes the privacy rationale did 
serve as a reasonable justification for a silence principle. 57 Outside of this narrow instance it has 
no logical application. To justify a silence principle based on privacy as applied in the day-to-day 
criminal trial process, the privacy advocate must overcome four objections. First, the silence 
principle protects only against personal self-incrimination and not against third party disclosure. 
The wrongdoer is privileged from providing evidence but not from its production by others. Why 
should only one special type of privacy infringement be ruled out? Second, the silence principle 
offers no protection against compelled disclosure of non-incriminating evidence. Why does the 
silence principle rooted as it is in a concern for personal privacy prevent only an extremely 
narrow range of privacy intrusions? Third, the silence principle is much to rigid. It has the ring of 
absoluteness about it and makes no allowance for interest-balancing. Why should the 
compulsion of private testimony be regarded as improper especially when the state interest 
overrides the individual's privacy interest? Fourth, an act of immunity is logically inconsistent 
with a privacy centred silence principle. It is impossible to reconcile the privacy aspect of a 
silence principle against the idea of immunity which requires a surrender of privacy. The primary 
problem confronted by a privacy argument is similar to the problem which confronts and defeats 
55 Galligan, ''The Right To Silence Reconsidered" C.L.P. (1988} 69, 88. McKenna "Police Interrogation" 
(120} N.L.J. (1970} 666-7, "to oblige the suspect to disclose his secretthoughts and acts .... is to diminish 
his freedom". 
56 McNaughton, ''The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, Constitutional Affection, etc" (51} J. Crim. L. 
Criminology. Pol. Sci (1960} 145-146. 
57 Ellis ibid note 28 at 843, "the privacy argument loses force when not applied to religious and political 
belief probes, and is mere rhetoric in the context of the ordinary criminal trial". See also Amar and Lettow 
"Fifth Amendment Principles: The Self-Incrimination Clause" (93} Mich. L. Rev (1995} 891, "if the privacy 
rationale was logical, it would require equal application to civil proceedings". Stuntz "Self-Incrimination 
And Excuse" (88} Columb. L. Rev (1988} 1234 "If the privilege is designed to protect privacy .... its 
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the cruelty argument. The privacy theorist must explain why the privacy interest protected by a 
silence principle is uniquely and inherently important. In other words, why is the privacy 
infringement caused by compelled self-incrimination qualitatively different from the loss of 
privacy occasioned by a third party disclosure of the same information. 
Why only personal self-incrimination? : Privacy theorists appeal to the sacrosanct notion of 
mental privacy. The compulsion of self-incriminatory information inflicts a privacy loss greater 
and different from the loss inflicted by third party disclosure. The silence principle protects the 
central mental core of the individual's mind by shutting out compelled disclosure of personal 
thoughts, beliefs and feelings. Compelled self-incrimination is objectionable because it erodes 
the individual's capacity to control state access to private thoughts.58 The protection of mental 
and physical privacy interests is of course an essential priority in all civilized societies, but these 
rights are relative rather than absolute. In many circumstances, a state induced infringement of 
mental privacy is lawful. In criminal matters, the court is obliged to infringe the accused's mental 
privacy in order to establish the requisite mensrea necessary for liability.59 Criminal liability is 
established by a judicially controlled inquiry into the psychological aspects of the cognitive 
(intellectual intuition) and conative (control of will) mental elements. By observation, examination 
of physical evidence and a questioning of witnesses, the court builds up an indirect image of the 
accused's mind. The state must also prove intention either in the form of dolus directus, 
indirectus or eventualis by determining the accused's state of mind at the time of the commission 
of the unlawful act. The establishment of criminal guilt requires a justifiable intrusion into the 
individual's sphere of mental privacy. Why then should it be morally objectionable and irrational 
to obtain the same mental image directly through compelled self-incrimination.60 Privacy 
theorists attempt to neutralize the problem with the following sophism -questioning which forces 
direct self-incrimination causes intense pain and embarrassment, more so than information 
obtained indirectly from third party sources. The claim implies an empirical connection between 
application would turn on the nature of the disclosure and yet fifth amendment law focuses on the criminal 
consequences of disclosure". 
58 Arenella "Schmerber And The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination" 20 Am. Crim. L. Rev. (1982) 41 
views mental privacy as the most important value in the support of a "right to silence". 
59 The essential subjective elements of a crime are : criminal capacity (the mental ability to appreciate the 
wrongfulness of an act and the mental ability to act in accordance with that appreciation) : Intention (the 
ability to direct the will at a particular act and to appreciate the wrongfulness of such an act). 
60 It could be argued : questioning witnesses, examining physical evidence, yields only a second-hand 
kind of knowledge about a person's mental condition. Compelled self-incrimination is unacceptable 
because it is a direct first-hand intimate assault on mental privacy. Disclosure of second-hand knowledge 
being less intimate and indirect is thus more tolerable. This reasoning is based on a Cartesian conception 
of direct knowledge of one's own mind and indirect knowledge of another's mind. The conception contains 
an artificial distinction which has been shown to be empirically without value - Wittgenstein Philosophical 
Investigations (1987), Philosophy Series, chapter 3. The Cartesian mind-body duality is unable to 
rationally explain why first-hand direct disclosure of information is uniquely different from second-hand 
indirect disclosure of information acquired by observation and examination. 
122 
a privacy infringement and the experience of pain or embarrassment. There is, of course, no 
such causal nexus, because the individual's privacy may still be infringed without personal 
knowledge of the infringement, in which case no experience of shame would result. 51 
Why not non-incriminating information? The silence principle protects only against the 
disclosure of self-incriminatory information. The silence principle is inoperative when there is no 
risk of self-incrimination. The individual is obliged to disclose non-incriminating information. 
Why so narrow a construction? Privacy as a reason for a silence principle requires a much 
broader interpretation. The disclosure of non-incriminating information is after all as great an 
invasion of privacy as is the disclosure of incriminating information. Sometimes the disclosure of 
non-incriminating information may have great damaging consequences. Is compelling a mother 
to give evidence revealing her son's guilt in a criminal case less private than compelling a 
motorist to admit to a traffic infraction? If privacy is the bastion of a silence principle, why can a 
person not rely on it to deny information about sensitive financial affairs to the inland revenue or 
to withhold names and addresses from the police. The possibility of civil liability does not give 
the individual a right to silence. Nor does an attorney in disbarment proceedings possess a 
privilege merely because his answers may lead to disbarment. An illegal immigrant cannot 
refuse to answer questions about status. If the purpose is to protect privacy, why does the 
silence principle not protect against the taking of fingerprints, bodily samples and other physical 
non-testimonial kinds of evidence?62 How does a right to privacy justify the silence privilege for 
documents which have an existence independent of the accused's consciousness? State 
compulsion of inanimate papers can never be said to be an infringement of mental privacy. 
Privacy as a justification for a silence principle cannot be logically sustained on the narrow 
parameters currently defining the silence principle. 
Why no interest balancing? The individual right to privacy is not an absolute one. Quite often 
the privacy interest is balanced against the public interest. Privacy must give way when the state 
61 Criminal infringement of privacy is defined as crimen iniuria (dignitas} ''the unlawful and intentional 
violation of the privacy of another". The crime is committed regardless of whether or not the victim is 
aware of the intrusion, R v Holiday 1927 C.P.D. 395, R v Danie/1938 T.P.D 312. In other words, crimen 
inuiria is committed the moment mental privacy is infringed and does not depend on the victim's 
knowledge of the intrusion. 
62 Arenella ibid note 12 at 41 , "the Schmerber decision distinguishes between the state's open access to 
the accused's body and the accused's right to limit access to his mind. The attempt to limit state-inspired 
intrusions of mental privacy underlie the silence principle's historical developmenf'. See infra chapter 7 
and chapter 10. 
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interest is stronger.63 If the concept of privacy underlines the silence principle, then compelled 
self-incrimination would be forbidden only if it was unreasonable. 
Hence, self-incrimination should be allowed where the state can identify a strong specific enough 
interest in disclosure. Certainly, the American fourth amendment protection of individual privacy 
applies interest balancing by allowing reasonable searches and seizures. It reflects a balance of 
privacy and enforcement interests.64 The South African right to privacy (sec 14 of the 
Constitution 1996) has always been interpreted to include an interest balancing in both its 
common law and constitutional guises.65 By contrast, the silence principle is normally never 
interpreted to include interest balancing. The American fifth amendment privilege of silence 
does not bend under the weight of competing interests.66 The U.S Supreme Court has ruled 
"interest balancing is not only unnecessary, it is impossible".67 In the pure fifth amendment 
context of the criminal trial interest balancing has no place. The accused's right not to testify is 
rigid and absolute.68 Only in the context of pre-trial silence69 and in certain peripheral 
situations70 does the Supreme Court allow for a reasonable balance of interest analysis.71 By 
contrast, the English courts have often applied a flexible balance of interest analysis to the 
common law silence principle. Recent statutory amendments to the English silence principle 
reflect the growing importance of placing societal needs above the individual's privacy interest.72 
In jurisdictions which have elevated the silence principle into a constitutional right, the tendency 
is to treat the right as relative in theory, but absolute in practice. The accused's right not to 
63 Roe v Wade 410 U.S 113, 153 (1973) "some kind of state regulation of the right to silence is 
appropriate". Doyle v State Bar 32 Cal 3d P2d (1982) "a client's privacy interest is not absolute but must 
be balanced against the public interesf'. 
64 The U.S. Supreme Court has held "reasonableness" to require balancing the interest of intrusion into 
fourth amendment rights against government interests promoted by the intrusion. See United States v 
Villamonte-Marquez 462 U.S 588 (1983) and also Tennessee v Gamer 105 SCt 1699 (1985) at 1700 
which considers "the balancing of interests as the key principle of fourth amendment rights". 
65 Berstein v Bester NO 1996 (2) SA 751 (C.C). A legitimate expectation of privacy is an objectively 
reasonable one, "the contents of the right [to privacy] is crystallized by mutual limitation. Its scope is 
already delimited by the rights of the community as a whole" (at para 69, 79). A reasonable infringement 
of privacy involves a two step inquiry - Is there a factual infringement of privacy and may the factual 
infringement be justified in terms of the limitation clause. See also Mistry v Interim Medical and Dental 
Council of S.A. 1998 (4) SA 1127 (CC). 
66 
'Privacy' protected by the fourth amendment is a broad right, but individual privacy does not connote 
granite security against the well founded suspicions of the king's minions. By contrast, though narrow, the 
fifth amendment tolerates no penetration by judicial order on any ground - Uviller "Evidence from the Mind 
of the Criminal Suspecf' 87 Columbia L. Rev ( 1981) 1145. 
67 Fisher v United States 425 U.S. 400 (1976) at 403, "the fifth amendment strictures, unlike the fourth, 
are not removed by showing reasonableness". New Jersey v Portash 440 U.S. 450, 459 (1979). 
68 Griffin v California, chapter 6 p.217-226. 
69 Miranda v Arizona,chapter 5 p.163-193. Jenkins v Anderson chapter 6 p.212-213. 
7
° California v Byers, chapter 5 p.163-193 and chapter 7 p.253. 
71 As will be further illustrated in this thesis, the American courts frequently pay lip service to an absolute 
r~ht to silence, while tacitly acknowledging the need for a comprehensive balance of interest test. 
7 See infra chapter 9 p.320-321 in particular the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994. 
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testify will in practice always outweigh the state interest. The irrational presumption continues to 
persist that when a heinous crime is committed the accused is morally justified in withholding 
self-incriminatory evidence because he prefers to remain in a private enclave, an enclave from 
which the state is prima facie sure he departed to do violence to another. 
What about immunity? Despite recognition of personal privacy as one of the stated purposes 
of the fifth amendment, the U.S. Supreme Court has nevertheless held in Brown v Walker 73 and 
Ullmann v United States 74 that a grant of immunity renders the individual's privacy interest 
irrelevant. The silence principle does not prevent state compulsion of personal information as 
long as the compelled information is not used as evidence against the individual in a subsequent 
criminal prosecution. In Ferreira v Levin N0/5 the South African Constitutional Court has held 
that incriminatory evidence compelled from an examinee in terms of a statutory inquiry may not 
be used in a subsequent criminal proceeding. The South African right against self-incrimination 
is nothing more than a use immunity.76 A privacy based silence principle cannot be reconciled 
with an immunity doctrine which allows for the surrender of privacy.77 Privacy is a substantive 
interest of which the nature of the disclosure is important and not the consequence. Privacy is 
still infringed (substantively) by compelling testimony even though no evidentiary use 
(consequentially) is made of the immunized testimony.78 A silence principle which gives way in 
the face of immunity cannot be reconciled with a privacy principle which is logically incompatible 
with an immunity doctrine. 
4.2.2 Autonomy and Controlled Privacy 
Protagonists of the privacy rationale have failed to explain away the major objections to a silence 
principle justified on the ground of privacy. Few have really attempted to do so. The exception 
is Gerstein/9 a strong adherent of privacy whose work has been labeled the fullest philosophical 
defence of the privilege against self-incrimination.80 Gerstein bases his reasoning on the 
73 161 u.s 591, 598 (1896). 
74 350 u.s 422,439 (1956). 
75 1996 (1) SA 984 (C.C). 
76 De Waal et al The Bill Of Rights Handbook 2nd Ed Juta (1999) 581. See also Davis v Tip NO 1996 (6) 
BCLR 807 (W) and Sea Point Computer Bureau v McLoughlin NO 1996 (8) BCLR 1071 (W). 
77 For a detailed analysis of immunity doctrine, see chapter ?and chapter 10. 
76 Stuntz "Self-Incrimination and Excuse" (88) Columbia L. Rev (1988) 1234 "[Privacy] application would 
tum on the nature of the disclosure the government wished to acquire and yet settled fifth amendment law 
focuses on the criminal consequences of disclosure". 
79 Gerstein "The Demise of Boyd : Self-Incrimination and Private Papers in the Burger Courf' 27 UCLA. L. 
Rev (1979) 343 and "Punishment and Self-Incrimination" 16 Am. J. Juris (1971) 84. 
60 Greenawalt ibid note 26 at 21. 
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foundation of Fried's control theory of privacy.81 Privacy in this context means control over 
information about individual existence. Privacy has intrinsic value because it is integral to each 
individual human being. Self-incrimination is wrong because it forces an individual to divulge 
information of great personal significance. The weapon of self-incrimination weakens individual 
control and infringes individual autonomy in a morally reprehensible fashion. Gerstein says, "I 
am thinking about what is likely to be involved in a confession, .... the admission of wrongdoing, 
the self-incrimination, the revelation of remorse. I would argue that a man ought to have 
absolute control over the making of such revelations".82 Gerstein's argument thus revolves 
around two assumptions. First, compelled self-incrimination degrades those subjected to it by 
interfering with autonomous moral development. Second, compelled self-incrimination denies to 
the individual exclusive control of such a development. A forced public confession of self-
condemnation retards the individual's ability to take genuine responsibility for his wrongful action. 
Compelled confessions are thus axiomatically immoral. Gerstein's theory successfully refutes at 
least three of the four major objections leveled against the privacy defence. The silence 
privilege protects only self-incrimination and not third party disclosure because it entails the 
unique revelation of personal remorse. Similarly, only incriminatory evidence and not non-
incriminatory evidence is protected because self-incrimination is a human reaction and thus, by 
its very nature, a peculiarly immoral revelation of remorse and self-condemnation. Interest 
balancing in these core areas is absolutely prohibited even in beneficial situations, because a 
person is rightfully entitled to absolute control over all personal revelations. The concept of 
moral autonomy, in Gerstein's opinion, may be extended to form the template underpinning all 
the other major justifications of the silence principle. In particular, the cruelty of compelled self-
incrimination is thought of as founded on a concern for autonomy. Enforced incrimination is 
cruel because of the unique kind of moral degradation which it inflicts upon the autonomous 
individual.83 Moral autonomy may also be understood as assisting the silence privilege in 
maintaining a fair state-individual balance. Autonomy aids in securing an effective fact-finding 
procedure by forcing the state to establish guilt through its own independent labour. Moral 
autonomy, the right to defend oneself, and the presumption of innocence are interlinked and 
intrinsic elements of the adversarial-accusatorial system. These values taken as a coherent 
81 
"The privilege against self-incrimination is the affirmation by society of the extreme value of the 
individual control over personal information", Fried ibid note 45 at 437. 
82 Fisher v United States 425 U.S 400 (1976) at 406, "it is wrong to compel the act of self-condemnation 
because of what it forces us to reveal about ourselves". Bellis v United States 417 U.S. 91 (1974) at 96, 
"the privilege secures for the individual a private enclave where he may lead a private life". See also 
Andersen v Maryland 427 U.S 463 (1976). Confessions require painful self-incrimination of the innermost 
recesses of the conscience. Such a self-examination is so painful that it must remain under the 
individual's exclusive control and can never be compelled. Gerstein's notion of enforced self-incrimination 
is so painful that it must remain under the individual's sole control and can never justifiably be compelled, 
is curiously enough merely a restatement of Bentham's "old woman's reasoning", see supra chapter 3. 
83 See supra notes 22-44 and accompanying text. 
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whole, establish the framework within which the accused operates as a morally autonomous 
agent.84 
Why should the individual have absolute control over the making of a compelled self-
condemnation? Gerstein argues that certain revelations about moral character are uniquely 
private and the individual should have total control over these revelations in order to enhance 
moral development. In reasoning so, Gerstein is confronted by the same problem which 
confronts the cruelty theorist. Why is Gerstein's kind of self-knowledge uniquely private or 
qualitatively different from other kinds of privacy to which a silence principle does not apply. 
Gerstein merely states the proposition, self-incrimination is peculiarly private, beyond this bare 
assertion he does not go. 85 Self-knowledge may be private, but why it should be peculiarly 
private, is not susceptible to a rational analysis and this flaw is a major downfall of Gerstein's 
theory. A number of other problems present themselves. First, on what ground may the 
existence of an absolute right to autonomy be demonstrated? Gerstein is unable to provide 
evidence in substantiation of a subjective opinion at odds with objective reality. In practice, few 
individuals are able to consciously exercise exclusive or absolute control over their own moral 
development. Throughout his lifetime the human being is moulded and influenced by a barrage 
of "morality" inducing propaganda attributable to state, church and family. The ubiquitous effect 
of such brainwashing propaganda is usually far beyond the individual's ability to control. Neither 
is the individual rightfully entitled to an exclusive control over his moral development. As a social 
animal, the individual is subject to certain social mores. Society places a number of justified 
constraints on individual moral development. For example, a person may want to experiment 
with crime because the experience will teach him valuable moral lessons and in the process, 
enhance his moral development. Society will obviously not allow the personal freedom in which 
to undertake such socially damaging experimentation. Exclusive control over moral 
development is not a sacrosanct principle, especially when it causes damage to the community 
fabric or is exercised at the expense of community social values. 
Second, criminal punishment serves an important rehabilitative function apart from its usual 
retributive effect. Enforced prison rehabilitation which attempts to shape and strengthen moral 
character cannot be viewed as an improper infringement of the prisoner's freedom of 
conscience. If the use of punishment to reform criminals is not an impermissible interference in 
their moral autonomy, neither is the use of compelled self-incrimination. Third, undoubtedly, a 
majority of criminals will undertake the paihful process of autonomous self-examination in order 
84 Gerstein ibid note 79 at 350-1. Also Gerstein ''The Self-Incrimination Debate In G. Britain" (27) Am. J. 
Comp. L (1979) 98. 
85 Gerstein ibid note 79 at 91-93. 
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to personally acknowledge guilt and strengthen moral fibre. In South Africa however, there is a 
significant minority of hardened insensitive career criminals who do not consider themselves 
bound by community moral codes and are therefore neither willing nor capable of such an 
autonomous self-examination. Compelling self-incriminatory evidence from these career 
criminals would not result in the revelation of remorse or the pain of self-condemnation. 
Furthermore, in the absence of a silence privilege, the state will not necessarily employ its power 
to deliberately expose the accused's criminal conscience. The evidence demanded from the 
accused by the prosecution is a confession of what he has done, not how he feels about it. 
There is thus no absolute connection between compelled self-incrimination and the expression 
of remorse. No good reason exists to accept Gerstein's unrealistic premise - enforced self-
incrimination always compels self-condemnation and remorse.86 
Fourth, the central right not to confess, as Gerstein defines the prohibition against self-
incrimination, is secured only by his insistence on a broad and general right to silence. Police 
interrogation would become redundant under so wide a definition. It would be impossible for the 
interrogator to determine beforehand what kind of questions might result in impermissible 
confessions. In order to protect the core right not to confess, Gerstein's insistence on a blanket 
right to silence would have the effect of unrealistically hampering police inquiries.87 Finally, 
Gerstein's hypothesis presumes a false dichotomy. Either the criminal is allowed absolute 
privacy to determine his own moral development, or he is degraded by compelling a confession. 
Gerstein fails to take cognizance of a third alternative recently advocated by the English Criminal 
Justice and Public Order Act 1994 which allows reasonable but limited inferences to be drawn 
from the accused's silence. If compelling self-incrimination is truly painful, then allowing a 
silence privilege but drawing an adverse inference from such silence would not constitute an 
impermissible infringement of moral autonomy nor raise questions of conscience.88 Gerstein's 
theory has a certain visceral appeal. Unfortunately, after careful scrutiny, the argument fails to 
satisfy the rational senses. 
The quintessential privacy rationale strives to establish an area of autonomy, "for each individual 
free from the government's malignant or benign influence".89 The silence privilege enhances 
86Gerstein fails to acknowledge a viable alternative use of the silence principle. One which interprets the 
accused's silence as a damaging item of circumstantial evidence and which does not expose the 
accused's conscience. Drawing adverse inferences from silence and applying the appropriate probative 
value to these inferences, depending on the circumstance, does not infringe autonomous moral develop-
ment. 
87 Menlowe "Bentham And The Law Of Evidence" LQ. Rev. (1988) 300. 
88 Hart "Bentham And The Demystification Of The Law" (36) M. L. Rev (1973) 13. Menlowe ibid 301. 
89 Babcock "Fair Play; Evidence Favourable to an Accused" (34) Stan. L. Rev (1982) 1138. 
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autonomy by protecting the individual's ability to take responsibility for his own deeds.90 The 
essential concept deduced herefrom is a kind of absolute personal autonomy. The South 
African legal system recognizes personal autonomy by punishing conduct only after the 
individual has freely chosen to commit a wrongful act.91 However, the individual-in-society is 
willing to sacrifice some degree of personal autonomy in order to advance essential community 
values. In certain circumstances the citizenry is obliged to co-operate with the state. In all social 
relationships some degree of conformity is required. A summons cannot be ignored nor may a 
suspect flee the country or suborn perjury. Official documentation must be truthfully filled in on 
pain of sanctions. No privilege adheres to non-incriminatory information or in respect to civil 
proceedings. In the interest of communal existence, the individual surrenders a limited degree of 
personal autonomy, especially in circumstances where the cost outweighs the benefit. It is 
therefore illogical to insist that the benefit of enforced self-incrimination is always outweighed by 
the harm the practice inflicts upon personal autonomy. South African statutory provisions 
directly acknowledge the individual-society balance and the need to compel self-incrimination by 
carving out pragmatic exceptions to the silence privilege. In Ferreira v Levin NO, the 
Constitutional Court held sec 417 of the Company Act to be an infringement of sec 35 and the 
right to a fair trial. The court compromised by allow•ng the compulsion of incriminating evidence 
during the formal inquiry stage, but immunizing the defendant and preventing the use of such 
compelled evidence at a subsequent criminal proceeding.92 Clearly, efforts to combat 
corruption, sophisticated white collar crime and complex corporate fraud may be irremediably 
damaged by the prosecution's inability to obtain direct evidence from the accused, sometimes 
the only available source of evidence.93 In the United States similar state and federal provisions 
are to be found. Additionally, corporations are unable to assert the privilege on their own behalf 
and corporate officers incriminated by company records are likewise denied the privilege.94 
Boyd v United States. 95 which prevents compulsory process against business records based on 
fourth and fifth amendment protection has been largely undermined by a spate of judgements 
which remove the privilege from a wide category of required records.96 In England, a large 
90 Schrock, Welsh and Collins, "Interrogation Rights; Reflections on Miranda v Arizona" Cal. L. Rev 
~1978) 49. 
1 All Western systems are based on after the fact criminal liability as opposed to the alternative before 
the fact liability which would require unacceptable brainwashing and conditioning. 
92 1996 (1) SA 984 (C.C) See supra note 75. 
93 Since 1990, government statistics have shown a 150% increase in white collar crime. 
94 United States v White 322 U.S 361 (1911) at 364, "the privilege is a personal one applying only to 
natural persons". See chapter 7 p.229-230. 
95 116U.S616(1886). Seeinfrachapter 7p.241. 
96 Warden v Hayden 387 U.S. 294 (1967); Fisher v United States 425 U.S. 399 (1976); Couch v United 
States 409 U.S. 327 (1973). See also Saltzburg "The Required Records Doctrine, Its Lessons" (53) U. 
Chi. L. Rev (1986) 7 and Gerstein "Demise of Boyd" ibid note 79. See infra chapter 7 p.247-254. 
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number of statutory provisions abrogate the privilege. Notably, sec 3(1) of the Theft Act 1968, 
Sec 9 of the Criminal Damage Act 1971, as well as sec 290, 291 of the Insolvency Act 1984 and 
sec 434, 436 of the Companies Act 1948.97 Unlike the case in North America, the English 
privilege can be claimed by an entity possessing legal personality.98 The wide range of 
exceptions to the silence privilege suggests that it may not be so fundamental a principle after 
all.99 The human rights rationale in the form of cruelty, privacy or personal autonomy cannot in 
the final analysis present a sufficiently credible basis for a rational justification of the silence 
principle. Indeed, all three of these arguments exhibits a common flaw. In the words of 
Dolinko,100 "each of these arguments suffers from the central problem of 'overbreath'. Each 
rests on principles that, if taken seriously, would rule out not merely compelled self-incrimination, 
but a host of other practices which are not regarded as unacceptable". There is nothing morally 
intrinsic enough in the personality rationales which would logically justify allowing them to trump 
the retributive and deterrence functions of a well-balanced criminal justice system. To allow 
these individualistic rationales to do so would be extremely dangerous. For example, police 
could no longer detain or question suspects if privacy was the overriding concern. The court 
could no longer hold criminal trials if individual protections trumped the duty to testify. 
Nevertheless, despite the illogicality of the various individualistic personality rationales, this kind 
of reasoning presently underlines the European Court of Human Rights' understanding of a 
silence principle (Saunders v United Kingdom). 
4.3 SITUATIONAL EXCUSE THEORY 
Human rights advocates of the silence principle are unable to confront the basic moral notion 
that truth not silence is the right choice in the face of an accusation. Instead both Greenawalt 
and Gerstein, the leading normative advocates of a silence principle, adopt the opposing idea 
that silence in the face of accusation is the proper moral choice.101 Stuntz recognizing the 
subjective and ultimately irreconcilable nature of the traditional arguments, has proposed an 
alternative normative solution based on the substantive criminal law concept of situational 
excuse. 102 Stuntz argues that the silence principle may be justified by the application of a 
criminal law excuse principle. Silence may be explained by examining the manner in which self-
97 Heydon "The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination" L.Q. Rev. (1977) 214. See Re Paget (1927) 2 CH 85 
for an elaboration of the Insolvency Act. See R v Sel/ig (1991) 4 ALL ER 429 for the Companies Act. 
Further, also Andrews and Hurst Criminal Evidence (1998} 351. 
98 Triplex Safety Glass Co Ltd v Lanceqaye Safety Glass Co Ltd (1937) 2 ALLER 613. 
99 Tapper Cross on Evidence (1995) 454. 
100 Dolinko ibid note 18. For the European perspective on the silence principle, see Saunders v United 
Kingdom, infra chapter 10 p.92-93. 
101 See supra chapter 3 p.92-93, andsupra p.88-101. 
102 Stuntz "Self-Incrimination And Excuse" (86) Columbia L. Rev (1988) 1227-1296. 
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exculpatory perjury develops in a criminal procedural system in which the silence principle is 
absent. Excuse theory in such a system is a proper alternative, as it accommodates the idea 
that while adjudicative truth is paramount, promoting truth is sometimes too much to ask of the 
average person.103 The term excuse covers a number of theoretically distinct ideas.104 In the 
sense used by Stuntz, it excuses a provisionally wrongful act by the accused because, in certain 
circumstances, a person should not be punished for making the wrong choice. 105 The standard 
rights-based justifications, cruelty, privacy and autonomy suggest that a silence principle is 
imperative in protecting basic human rights. Excuse theory justifies the silence principle in a 
completely novel way. In excuse theory silence protects a category of wrongful conduct. 
Excuse focuses on temptation. Stuntz's notion is to explain a silence principle in circumstances 
which create a serious temptation to lie and in which excusing perjury is systematically 
affordable.106 Absent a silence privilege, the law would have to recognize an excusatory 
defence based either on duress or necessity. The resulting "privilege to lie" would make 
innocent defendants worse off. If the jury recognizes that perjury would not be punished, it 
would then places less faith on the defendant's testimony, including the testimony of innocent 
defendants. Hence, the justifiable necessity of a silence principle. In particular, those who 
violate a criminal norm when the law abiding citizen might well have done the same thing are 
often excused from criminal liability, especially in situations of necessity or duress. Similarly, a 
witness who chooses perjury when confronted by the unfortunate dilemma between self-
incrimination and perjury should not be condemned for making the wrong choice. The defence 
of necessity thus excuses the wrongfulness of the perjurious act and excludes criminal liability. 
Excusing perjury directly however, leads to two undesirable consequences.107 First, routine 
court excusal of perjury would strip away the potential cost attached to lying and thus undermine 
witness credibility. Second, immunizing perjury would significantly increase the amount of false 
testimony in a trial and erode public confidence in the legitimacy of the criminal justice system. 
The solution therefore lies in the indirect approach of immunizing silence rather than perjury 
itself. A privilege which immunizes silence and reduces the pressure to lie is an elegant solution 
103 Stuntz ibid at 1242 "by grounding the silence principle in substantive criminal law values, excuse 
theory affirms the silence principle's importance but does so in a way that it incorporates society's moral 
~reference for truth". 
04 Stuntz defines his concept within the terms of American criminal law which is reasonably similar to 
South African criminal concepts. Three kinds of excuse exist in criminal law (a) insanity excuses mental-
criminal capacity, (b) mistake of fact or sometimes of law excuses intention, (c) duress (necessity) 
excuses a wrongful act made in a difficult pressurized situation. 
105 The problem faced by situational excuse is whether or not to punish the accused for committing a 
wrongful act under pressure in certain well-defined emergency circumstances. 
106 Stuntz's theory shifts the focus from a standard emphasis on the methods used by the state to obtain 
self-incriminating evidence to a novel emphasis on temptation as an explanation for the existence of a 
silence principle 
107 Stuntz ibid at 1229. 
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to the pervasive problem of self-protective perjury. According to Stuntz, the essential 
philosophical reasoning is, "Anglo-American law has a tradition of acquitting certain categories of 
offenders, even while acknowledging that their conduct is criminal. The tradition helps explain 
why as a society we wish people would confess to their crimes but are unwilling to force them to 
do so" .108 Situation excuse theory is thus an attractive medium through which to view the silence 
privilege. The excuse argument depends upon the key notion of balancing and cost. Excuse 
hinges on the balance between the threat to the individual interest and the importance of 
obeying the law notwithstanding the threat. Necessity excuses a wrongful act because in certain 
situations, the choice to obey the law is terribly costly.109 The more costly it is to comply with the 
law, the more excusable it is to commit a crime. It could be said that the harm inflicted by self-
incrimination far outweighs the potential harm which may result from perjury and the accused's 
decision to lie is excusable. A silence privilege which protects the accused who wishes to avoid 
self-incrimination and which simultaneously prevents self-protective perjury is thus rationally and 
morally justifiable.110 The relative cost factor explains why the privilege protects only self-
incrimination and not non-incriminating testimonial evidence.111 Situational excuse theory would 
appear to be a perfectly rational justification for a silence privilege and is sufficiently broad 
enough to apply not only in the courtroom situation, but also during police interrogation.112 
According to Stuntz, the advantages of an excuse based privilege are essentially twofold. One 
of the greatest problems with a general silence privilege is that it bars relevant evidence and 
therefore obstructs the legal path of truth, making it so much harder to reach an accurate 
decision. An excuse based privilege which immunizes silence in a situation where the accused 
would be tempted to lie should make the trial process function smoothly by ensuring the 
reliability of admissible testimony. The manageable cost of an excuse based privilege helps 
explain why the privilege is so widespread in all Western legal systems. The most significant 
108 ibid at 1242. 
109 The criminal law concept of duress (necessity) suggests a two step inquiry : (a) the cost to the 
accused of obeying the law (a degree of pressure), (b) the importance to society of resisting that pressure 
(a degree of deterrence). Stuntz ibid at 1246-51. In some circumstances the cost of obeying the law for 
the average person (his self-interest) may be outweighed by the benefit of committing the crime. Excuse 
as a deterrent device is justifiable because sometimes the individual cannot be deterred by law, at an 
acceptable cost to society, from acting wrongfully. 
110 The two step inquiry is measured against an objective reasonable standard. 
111 Situational excuse theory proposes that the formal elements of a silence principle, namely compulsion 
of incriminatory testimonial evidence should be viewed as the mirror image of an excuse doctrine which 
would exist in a criminal system absent a silence principle. Stuntz ibid at 1262-1280. 
112 Stuntz ibid at 1295. Although it can be argued that the application of a silence privilege in the arena of 
interrogation is based more on deterrence than on excuse, ibid at 1264-1272. 
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advantage of an excuse theory113 is that it reduces the importance of the so-called "right" to 
silence. The excuse based privilege is a fairly inexpensive one, a useful tool in avoiding petty 
injustice. In other words, excusing wrongful conduct by removing the temptation to lie is no more 
fundamental to a criminal justice system than are other excuses which negate unlawfulness, i.e. 
private defence, consent, etc. It is therefore inaccurate to suggest, as do the mainstream 
theories, that silence is a fundamental protection for basic human liberties and dignities. 
Reducing the silence privilege to a mere substantive Jaw principle helps to explain why society 
so readily encroaches upon and restricts the scope of the privilege. 
A number of criticisms may be leveled against situational excuse theory. First, situational 
excuse as a normative theory suffers from a major conceptual error. Stuntz argues that a legal 
process which includes a silence principle is much more cost-effective than a legal process 
which compels testimony and where the accused is likely to regularly perjure himself. In a legal 
system which compels testimony, the court would be obliged to regularly excuse perjury, thereby 
undermining witness credibility and increasing the amount of false testimony at trial. Public 
confidence in such a criminal system would be severely shaken, hence the legitimate need for a 
silence privilege. Stuntz makes the assumption that absent a silence principle, the court would 
be forced to recognize and develop a practical excuse methodology based on self-protective 
perjury. On the contrary, an examination of the substantive criminal law fails to reveal any 
excuse based methodologies for other forms of criminal self-preservation.114 For example, the 
criminal law does not condone self-protective bribery, self-protective destruction of evidence or 
obstruction of justice. There is no reason to assume that absent a silence privilege, the court is 
likely to develop an excuse based on self-protective perjury. Stuntz also argues that a perjury 
penalty, by imposing a cost on false testimony, enhances the credibility of the innocent accused 
who testifies in his own defence. The problem with this argument is that perjury is inherently a 
rather weak kind of deterrent. The potential penalty of punishment and incarceration far 
outweighs the perjury penalty. The accused's desire to avoid a possible conviction is a far 
stronger inducement for giving false exculpatory evidence than the mere possibility of a perjury 
sanction. Furthermore, a credible excuse argument is dependent on the actual existence of a 
punishment for perjury. If there is no actual threat of perjury punishment, there is proportionally 
no need for excuse. In South Africa perjury prosecutions are few and far between. In effect no 
real threat exists and the value of an excuse rationale is correspondingly reduced. Would the 
public confidence in a criminal process, absent the silence principle, be diminished by the 
regular excuse of self-protecting perjury? The ordinary system of civil trials does not suggest 
such a danger. The civil trial system contains neither a silence principle nor a sanction for 
113 Stuntz ibid at 1295. 
114 Snyman Criminal Law (1995). Burchill and Milton Principles Of Criminal Law (1997). 
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perjury. There are often strong inducements for civil litigants to give false exculpatory testimony, 
yet public confidence in the civil trial system has not been eroded. 
Second, a moral distinction exists between necessity (duress) as a justification and necessity 
(duress) as an excuse. Necessity is sometimes viewed as justifying the accused's voluntary act 
by changing a potentially wrongful act into an actual rightful act. The accused is not criminally 
liable because the potentially wrongful act is justified by the boni mores of society. Necessity as 
an excuse is conceptually different. The excused act remains wrongful. The accused fulfils all 
the elements of criminal liability but is excused from the consequence of punishment.115 
Necessity in the form of a justification is far more moral than necessity in the form of excuse. 
Stuntz's theory relies on necessity as an excuse of a wrongful act (self-protecting perjury) by a 
guilty accused. The idea that a guilty accused's wrongful act is excusable undermines the moral 
foundation of situational excuse theory. It is morally indefensible to excuse lying during trial, 
especially when the lie serves to compound the lying accused's crime. Ironically, the bringing 
out into the open of the accused's lies is sometimes useful to the prosecution. False alibis, 
denials, false explanations can be checked and cross-examined. The experienced prosecutor 
may manipulate the accused's lies into strong evidence against the accused. 
Third, and more importantly, the parameters of the traditional necessity plea is strictly limited and 
applicable only to situations of extreme immediate peril. Simple self-protective perjury cannot be 
construed as the kind of grave immediate peril which need give rise to a plea of necessity. The 
idea of a broad based situational excuse defence encompassing the circumstance of imminent 
perjury as advocated by Stuntz is arguably an implausible and unrealistic extension of 
necessity.116 Fourth, a number of American jurists have analyzed the excuse argument in some 
detail and have found it to be contrary to conventional doctrine. American criminal law does not 
excuse the individual who voluntarily and culpably brings about the condition of his own excuse, 
a condition which specifically applies when a .person perjures himself in order to avoid criminal 
liability.117 The South African position in .this regard is somewhat ambiguous. South African 
115 The conceptual division between necessity (as a justified rightful act} and necessity (as an excusable 
wrongful act} is an international one. Fletcher Rethinking Criminal Law (1978} 511-14, 552-79. The 
German penal code, sec 34 and sec 35, makes a similar distinction. South African substantive criminal 
law defines necessity as a justification rather than as an excuse, Snyman Criminal Law (1995} 109-111, 
Burchell and Milton Principles Of Criminal Law (1997} 157-158. Although it has been argued that in the 
context of serious crime (the taking of life}, necessity as an excusable unlawful act may be more in line 
with the modern South African spirit of constitutionalism Paizes (1996} 113 SALJ 237ft. 
116 The necessity defence is strictly defined. The defence is applicable only when a legal interest is 
endangered in an emergency by an imminent or commencing threat, provided that the accused's 
protective act is not out of proportion to the interest infringed. These parameters are strictly applied and 
once the accused's act exceeds the parameters it becomes an unlawful act. The courts require a high 
quantum of evidence before the defence can succeed. 
117 See supra note 39-40 and accompanying text. 
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courts normally display an attitude of skepticism towards the defence of necessity. The trend is 
towards restricting the parameter and sphere of application rather than broadening it. A 
reluctant High Court of Appeal is therefore unlikely to allow the extension of a plea of necessity 
in this particular circumstance. Fifth, Stuntz views the modern fifth amendment doctrine as being 
based on a theory of choice and balancing. The plurality opinion in California v Byers 118 is cited 
as authority for this contention. A situational excuse theory which is also defined by interest-
balancing is therefore compatible with and serves to explain much of fifth amendment reasoning. 
Stuntz's understanding of present fifth amendment theory would appear to be incorrect. Interest 
balancing is impermissible, especially where core violations of the privilege are at issue.119 At 
best, interest balancing applies in peripheral issues involving government practices aimed at 
ensuring regulatory efficiency. When the government aim is to secure criminal convictions, 
interest balancing is absolutely forbidden. Sixth, situational excuse theory will ultimately serve to 
obscure the valuable distinction between adjective law and substantive law. The law of evidence 
is already sufficiently bedeviled by substantive law intrusions.120 Additional inroads are 
undesirable. The confusion which may result from the acceptance of an excuse based privilege 
far outweighs any practical benefit. Nevertheless situational excuse theory, despite its flaws, is 
illustrative of the idea that a silence principle need not always be explained in terms of a human 
rights or instrumental protection, nor need it be elevated to the status of a constitutional right. A 
silence principle is capable of objective definition through the application of ordinary substantive 
and procedural legal rules. Rationales for a silence principle which seek their meaning amongst 
legal rules are preferable to justifications which seek their reasoning in other philosophical 
arenas outside of the law. 
4.4 INSTRUMENTAL RATIONALE 
4.4.1 Legitimate Instrumental Value 
The legal order is designed to promote certain norms which ·society regards as intrinsic to a 
functional body politic. Criminal law in particular establishes and regulates the minimal conduct 
essential to an orderly society. The dual purpose of criminal law is the imposition of criminal 
penalties for violations of proper conduct and the maintenance of a buffer between state and 
individual. Consequently, the criminal justice system promotes a number of essential objectives. 
Primarily there is the need to maximize the probability of only convicting the guilty by minimizing 
118 402 u.s 424,499 (1971). 
119 See infra chapter 5 p.159-160 and chapter 7 p.253-254 and 279. 
120 Other substantive law concepts influencing adjective evidence law include irrebuttable presumptions of 
law, estoppel, parole evidence rule etc. 
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the chance of mistaken conviction. An additional procedural goal requires the establishment of 
mechanisms for individual and personal protection against state exploitation. The criminal 
process must be linked to controls which prevent it from operating at maximum efficiency 
because of its potency in subjecting the individual to exploitative and coercive state power.121 
Indeed, this has been an important concern amongst American authorities. In McNabb v United 
States, 122 Frankfurter J advances the consensual opinion, "the history of liberty has been the 
history of observance of procedural safeguards". Equally important is the need to ensure public 
respectability. Any erosion of the moral impact of a criminal sanction decreases the overall 
effectiveness of the criminal law. The widespread disrespect in certain South African quarters 
for a white dominated judiciary engenders cynicism, distrust and undermines the legitimacy of 
the entire law enforcement establishment. For these reasons the South African Constitution 
contains essential safeguards designed to bolster the moral legitimacy of the present state 
apparatus and to forestall abuse of the criminal process by governments with totalitarian 
sympathies.123 The goals served by a legitimate criminal system, it is argued, are sustained and 
promoted by an effective instrumental silence principle. 
One of the normative effects of a silence principle is the instrumental value it has on the 
maintenance of a proper and fair state-individual balance. As some American commentators 
have called it, "our preference for an accusatorial rather than an inquisitorial system".124 Viewed 
in this light the silence principle derives its philosophical reasoning from a Hobbes-Lockean 
concept of interlocking sovereign social and contractual relationships. Silence is not an end in 
itself, but represents a factor in the basic balance of power and rights which exists between the 
state and the individual. But if the silence principle is to be explained and justified exclusively in 
terms of a narrow instrumental value, then it cannot logically be categorized as a constitutional 
right. An exclusively instrumental explanation reduces the silence principle to a mere procedural 
rule amongst many other procedural rules. If silence has only instrumental worth, it can at best 
only be defined as a protection against self-incrimination and never as a "right" against self-
121 Hall "Objectives Of Federal Criminal Procedural Revision" 51 Yale L. J. (1942) 728 and Schaefer 
"Federalism And State Criminal Procedure" 70 Harv. L. Rev. (1956) 5. 
122 318 u.s 332, 347 {1943). 
123 This argument is particularly relevant to Southern Africa. Unstable regimes tend to abuse the criminal 
process in order to strengthen their weak authority. Stable governments in power for a considerable 
period tend to confuse the distinction between state and government by misusing the criminal process and 
its organs for narrow party political ends. It is argued that a silence principle is one of a bundle of 
instrumental devices which inhibit the tendency towards abuse of power. To prevent potential state 
coercion, the South African Constitution (1996) therefore guarantees certain procedural rights, sec 7 and 8 
(rights and applications), sec 12 (freedom and security), sec 19 (political rights), sec 32 (access to 
information), sec 33 Gust administrative action), sec 34 (access to the courts) and sec 35 (a right to 
silence). 
124 Murphy v Waterfront Commission, ibid note 16 per Goldberg J's argument (b) and (d). Miranda v 
Arizona 384 U.S. 436, 480 {1966). 
136 
accusation.125 A narrow instrumental interpretation of the silence principle implies a limitation in 
scope and applicability. Silence as a mere instrumental value exists in harmony and does not 
come into conflict with other procedural rules. Silence as a constitutional value means that all 
other legal rules must be adapted to accommodate the elevated status of the silence principle. 
A claim to silence in its instrumental form is never triggered where the personal disclosure is not 
incriminatory or the individual has been immunized. (For example, immunity grants which do not 
disturb a state-individual balance are compatible with silence as an instrumental protection. By 
contrast an immunity grant is incompatible with a silence principle predicated in human rights 
terminology as a protection of personal privacy/autonomy).126 Silence as a mere procedural rule 
exhibits fewer contradictions than silence as a constitutional right. The value of an instrumental 
legal rule is usually analysed by examining both its intrinsic and coherent worth. Intrinsic worth 
is judged by the unique benefit which the rule confers on the legal system as a whole. The rule 
must properly protect the interests it was designed for and must also help decide issues in the 
grey area between the designed rule and other rules. Coherent worth is measured by the overall 
benefit which the rule brings to all the other rules within the legal system. The rule should at a 
minimum enhance the functioning of other rules and cogently fill in the gaps which other rules 
are unable to do. The overall legal merit of a silence principle must therefore be determined by 
evaluating its intrinsic merit and the coherent benefit it offers to other rules within the 
accusatorial criminal process. Intrinsic and coherent worth is also indicative of a secondary 
value. A high degree of intrinsic and coherent worth contributes to the legitimacy of the legal 
rule in the eyes of society. The following analysis will reveal that the silence principle has very 
little intrinsic worth because it is a relatively weak shield for those interests it is designed to 
protect. Neither does it coherently add to, or for that matter, detract from other procedural rules 
within the accusatorial system. As a protection for the accused, it is perceived to be a criminal 
right rather than a victim's right and an obstacle to crime enforcement. It therefore has a low 
legitimacy value in the eyes of society. 
4.4.2 Protecting the Innocent 
"The privilege while sometimes a shelter for the guilty, is more often a protection to the innocent" 
is a widely cited dictum of Goldberg J. in Murphy v Waterfront Commission. 127 The wrongful 
125 Friendly Benchmarks (1967) 271, "What is important is that on any view the fifth amendment does not 
forbid the taking of statements from a suspect, it forbids compelling them .... rather than being a 'right to 
silence', the right, or better the privilege, is against being compelled to speak. This distinction is not mere 
semantics, it goes to the very core of the problem". 
126 See supra notes 45-100. 
127 378 U.S. 52, 55 (1964) per Goldberg J's argument (g). The problem with the innocence argument is 
that it amounts to an empirical statement, yet no evidence is advanced to support it. This kind of high 
sounding rhetoric is extremely common. The silence principle is often described in pretty words devoid of 
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conviction of the innocent is considered a severe moral harm warranting special measures to 
prevent its occurrence. 128 The silence principle is one of the special measures designed to 
protect the innocent. Not all would agree. Pound condemns the privilege "as a device which 
serves not the innocent, but rather the evil purposes of criminals and malefactors who are well 
advised" .129 McKay states, "it does not add to the clarity of thought to pretend that any 
substantial portion of those who assert the privilege are innocent of all wrongdoing" .130 
According to Bentham the privilege deprives a court of evidence and reduces the probability for 
a truthful verdict. In this sense the privilege provides a shelter for the guilty by derogating rather 
than improving the chance for an accurate decision. In Bentham's precise words, "If all the 
criminals of every class had assembled and framed a system after their own wishes, is not this 
rule the very first which they would have established for security? Innocence never takes 
advantage of it, innocence claims the right of speaking, as guilt invokes the privilege of 
silence" .131 Nevertheless, proponents argue that a silence privilege protects the innocent but 
nervous accused who by a poor demeanour on the witness stand, creates an unfavourable 
impression upon the court. It is said to be particularly valuable to those individuals who suffer 
from social or intellectual disadvantages (inarticulate, uneducated, suspicious, frightened and 
suggestible individuals). Yet these kind of persons are the least likely to make use of a silence 
protection. They almost invariably respond to police questioning. The privilege may also benefit 
the accused by limiting the prosecutorial ability to adduce evidence of previous convictions. 132 
The former argument is contrary to commonsense and human nature. In the words of Ayers, 
"without denying the extraordinary case of a man whose record is so bad, and whose honest 
exculpatory story so implausible that he elects to remain silence, in the majority of cases, even a 
hardened criminal when wrongly accused, would want to have his say''.133 Menlowe, arguing 
substance and reason. See also Wilson v United States 149 U.S. 60, 66 (1893), it is not everyone who 
can safely venture on to the witness stand though entirely innocent of the charge against him. Dolinko ibid 
note 18 at 1075-76. 
128 On the moral harm caused by a wrongful conviction, see Dworkin "Principles, Policies, Procedures" in 
Crime, Proof and Punishment Tapper Ed (1981) 193. 
129 Pound "Legal Interrogation Of Persons Accused Or Suspected Of Crime" (24) J. Grim. L. C and P. S. 
~1934) 1014, 1015. 
30 McKay "Self Incrimination And The New Privacy" Sup. Crt. Rev (1967) 193, 208. Griswold "The Right 
To Be Left Alone" (55) Nw. U. L. Rev (1960) 216, 223 says, "the privilege protects the guilty more often 
than it does the innocent". In Tehan v Shott 382 U.S 406, 414 (1966) the Supreme Court held, "the basic 
eurposes that lie behind the privilege .... do not relate to protecting the innocent from conviction". 
31 Book IV, R.J.E., 240-245 (Bowring Ed 1843). 
132 Prosecutorial comment on the accused's failure to testify is absolutely forbidden in American law. This 
appears to be motivated by a concern for the accused with a poor demeanour or a prior record, Griffin v 
California 380 U.S. 609 (1965). 
133 Ayers, "The Fifth Amendment And The Inference Of Guilt From Silence" (78) Michigan L. Rev. (1980) 
869 levels a well argued criticism against the decision in Griffin v California 380 U.S. 609 (1965) which 
bars any comment on a failure to testify. Berger Taking The Fifth (1984) 27. The justification for a silence 
principle based on prior conviction depends upon the prosecution's ability to impeach the accused with his 
prior conviction. There is no room for such a justification in a system which disallows prior conviction 
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along Benthamite utilitarian lines, has convincingly shown that once the prosec~tor has 
established a damaging prima facie case, the accused is in no worse a position whether he 
defends himself badly or refuses to defend himself at all.134 A poor demeanour may always be 
counteracted by defence counsel through further explanation and evidence.135 The latter 
argument based on prior convictions, is also unconvincing. In the Anglo-American system of 
law, prior convictions are always inadmissible unless exceptionally received, either as similar 
fact evidence of high probative value or under statutory exceptions. Exclusions of prior 
convictions is thus amply provided for and renders redundant the protection offered by a silence 
privilege.136 Finally, the protagonists fail to comprehend that all witnesses are faced with the 
same circumstance. No convincing reason is advanced as to why poor demeanour or previous 
convictions do not unfairly compromise the accused who voluntarily takes the stand. Why 
should poor demeanour or previous convictions become prejudicial only in the circumstance 
where the potential witness is a reluctant defendant who voluntarily refuses to take the stand in 
his own defence. In the opinion of Williams,137 the real reason for a claim of silence is invariably 
the fear of cross-examination and the piecemeal destruction of a light-weight defence. Indeed, 
Goldberg J's dictum in Murphy v Waterfront Commission has now been repudiated by a majority 
of American scholars. The contemporary American and British juror is more likely to regard the 
accused's failure to testify as evidence of guilt rather than of innocence. The accused is usually 
better advised by counsel to take the stand. In the South African courtroom, the experienced 
judge sitting without an easily persuadable layman jury, would be expected to reach a truthful 
verdict without being influenced either by poor demeanour or prior convictions. 
evidence and effectively instructs jurors to ignore poor performance on the stand. Stein ''The Refoundation 
Of Evidence Law" (9) Can. J. L. and Jurisprudence (1996) 279, 332, n218. 
134 If the accused testifies he may give the impression of lying. If he does not, he may leave damaging 
evidence uncontroverted. Proponents therefore assume that the accused is worse off without a right to 
silence. This assumption is incorrect if a utilitarian vision is allowed for. In terms of Benthamite utility, 
silence is only circumstantial evidence. In a court which allows adverse inferences, the accused risks no 
more than an ordinary witness who claims silence. He is not worse off by reason of his poor demeanour. 
Being a poor witness need not add circumstantial evidence to the state's case because poor demeanour 
goes to credibility and not to substance. Menlowe "Bentham, Self-Incrimination And The Law Of 
Evidence" L.Q.R. (1988) 298. 
135 A failure to testify on the basis of poor demeanour is never communicated to the jury. The jury, 
unaware of the accused's reason for not testifying, may well on its own initiative draw an adverse 
inference. It is preferable to allow the accused to testify and then to explain away poor demeanour. Both 
judge and jury should be capable of making allowances for poor demeanour. In contrast, see Bradley 
"Silence At Sentencing" Trial (1999) 88-89, Shulhofer "Some Kind Words For The Privilege Against Self-
Incrimination" (26) Val. V. L. Rev (1991) 330-31. 
136 Similar fact evidence of prior convictions is exceptionally admissible only if a relevant nexus is 
established. It is usually inadmissible because its prejudicial effect outweighs its probative value. To be 
admissible a logically relevant nexus must be established between the prior conviction and the present 
fact in issue. D.P.P. v Boardman (1975) 3 ALL. ER 887. Makin v Attorney-General New South Wales 
1897 AC 57 (P.C) 65. Statutory South African provisions excluding prior convictions, are sec 197 and sec 
211 of the C.P.A. (1977). On the other hand, statutory provisions which allow prior convictions are sec 
240 and sec 241 of the C.P.A. (1977) (possession of stolen property), but these provisions are not in any 
event covered by a silence principle. 
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4.4.3 State Exploitation 
The silence principle is also understood to assist in avoiding mistaken convictions by making the 
trial process a fair contest between equals.138 The "silence privilege" ensures a fair fight in which 
both sides have an equal chance of success by preventing the outcome from merely reflecting 
the state's superior power. The status of the accused as an "equal" adversary is a fundamental 
element of the adversarial process.139 Any significant weakening of the right to freely determine 
whether to speak or remain silent can only be seen as a grave injury to the process. A fair play 
argument adjusted to fit Lockean social theory is also advanced.140 A social contract exists 
between the sovereign state and the sovereign individual whereby no one may be deprived of 
liberty or life except by consent. The state cannot compel a sovereign individual to surrender his 
right of self-defence. Sovereignty embodies the idea of equality between the individual and the 
criminal justice system. The infringement of individual sovereignty by the criminal process is thus 
illegitimate and morally reprehensible. 141 The notion of an unassailable individual sovereignty is 
reminiscent of the previously discussed moral autonomy argument and is similarly flawed. 142 
The proper relationship between state and citizen is not one of equal sovereignty. The individual 
cannot enact laws, print money, or declare war. The state may in certain circumstances infringe 
the individual's nominal sovereignty. Citizens who tamper with evidence, threaten witnesses or 
attempt to flee jurisdiction may be punished without impermissibly infringing citizen rights or 
harming the integrity of the criminal system. The "fair trial" contest argument is circular in 
reasoning and conceptually misleading. The argument fails to determine the factors needed for 
137 Williams "The Tactics Of Silence" (27) N.L.J. (1987) 1107. 
138 Gerstein "The Self-Incrimination Debate In Gt. Britain" (27) Am. J. Comp. L. (1979) 98. The different 
conceptual approaches to adversarial procedure are reflected in the continuing debate between the 
'Utilitarian' and 'Libertarian' schools of thought. 
139 Equal means that the strategic advantages held by the prosecution must be evened out so that the 
accused is not simply convicted by virtue of the state's superior resources. 
McNaughton's "The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination" (51) J. Crim. L. Criminology P.S. (1960) 138. 
Arenella "Rethinking The Functions Of Criminal Procedure" (72) Geo. L. J. (1983) 185, 201. Green ''The 
Privileges Last Stand : The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination" (65) Brook. L. Rev ( 1999) 627. 
140 Locke An Essay Concerning The True Original Extent And End Of Civil Government, In Two Treatises 
on Government (Penguin 1986) 196. 
141 Fortas "The Fifth Amendmenf' 25 Clev. B. Ass'n. J. (1954) 91, 98, "the privilege reflects the limits of the 
individual's attornment to the state and in a philosophical sense insists upon the equality of the individual 
and the state". 
142 See supra p.124-129 .. 
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deciding what kind of individual-state balance is fair and equal. It also fails to decide whether the 
balance may be achieved in other ways without over-extending the silence principle. The 
answers to these questions is dependent on other kinds of silence justifications and on the value 
judgements of independent decision-makers and cannot be solely derived from the present 
argument itself. 
The view of the adversarial system as a serious form of combat in which the rules are designed 
to ensure equality and fair play is also contrary to utilitarian pragmatism.143 Turning the trial into 
a cricket match serves only to obfuscate the purpose which is to arrive at the equitable truth. 
The analogy between a criminal trial and a sporting event is illustrated by Bentham in his "fox 
hunter's reasoning". 144 The idea of fairness in the sense used by sportsmen is introduced into 
the trial to prevent compelled self-incrimination. The fox [accused] is to have a fair chance to 
save his life. He must have leave to run a certain course for the express purpose of giving him 
an opportunity to escape. In the sporting code a fair play rule is rational. However, a trial is not 
a recreation sport, so that fairness in the sporting sense should not reasonably apply. 145 The 
determination of truth, however it is defined,146 requires the full deployment of all the relevant 
facts. To bar relevant self-incriminatory evidence is simply to impede the search for truth. Truth 
is naturally the best safeguard against mistaken conviction and the best protection for the 
· innocent. 
There are a number of evidential rules which insulate the individual against superior state 
resources and prevent unjust convictions. Obvious examples are the "beyond a reasonable 
doubt standard" and the state obligation to disclose exculpatory evidence. Judge Learned Hand, 
in United States v Garson,147 gives the following opinion, "Under our criminal law the accused 
has every advantage. While the prosecution is held rigidly to the charge, he need not disclose 
the barest outline of his defence. He cannot be convicted when there is the least bit of doubt ... 
What we need to fear is the archaic formalism and the watery sentiment that obstructs, delays, 
and defeats the prosecution of crime". Judge Hand is being overzealous. The accused does not 
possess every advantage, although he has a good many. According to the fair play argument, 
143 Fortas ibid note 141 at 131-132, refers to the ancient compact which depicts the criminal trial as a case 
of equals meeting in battle, in which the sovereign state has no right to compel the sovereign individual to 
surrender or impair his right of self-defence. 
144 See supra chapter 3 p.102-103. 
145 Book VII, R.J.E. (Bowring Ed 1843). Also cited in Wigmore Evidence para 2251, 297, n2 
~McNaughton Ed 1961). 
46 The Utilitarian viewpoint is that legal truth is discoverable by empirical means. The Libertarian view 
expressed by McConville "Silence In Court'' (11) N.L.J. (1987) 1169, holds that a trial is not a search for 
empirical truth. It is an arena in which different versions of reality compete. Legal truth is not a 
discoverable entity existing outside the trial process. It is a product of the trial process itself. 
147 291 F. 646 649 (S.D.N. Y. 1923). 
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these rules require further reinforcement by a silence "privilege". It is difficult to see why this 
should be so. After all, compelled self-incriminatory testimony is not inherently unfair in terms of 
the values served by the adversarial system. Particularly since self-incriminatory testimony is 
routinely admissible in civil proceedings. The fair play argument is thus in substance no more 
than a belief based on spurious reasoning. The fair play argument may be reduced to a bare 
question to which there is no logical answer. Why should the state be prevented from adducing 
relevant evidence simply because it enjoys a so-called "unfair'' advantage? Proponents are 
forced to resort to vaguely articulated feelings. "We are once again dealing with value 
judgements, with an issue of conscience, with a "feeling" of justice which is [not] rationally 
explicable" .148 However, "feeling" is not a valid criterion for explaining a legal principle. 
The presumption of innocence149 is said in Woo/mington v D.P.P. to run, "like a golden thread 
through the fabric of the criminal law.150 The presumption of innocence is now a fundamental 
right in Britain. Article 6(2) of the European Convention on Human Rights is now incorporated 
into English domestic law through the Human Rights Act (1998). Presumption of innocence and 
silence "privilege" taken together require the prosecution to prove its case unaided by the 
accused. 151 The accused is given the right to silence as a shield which he may use against the 
dangers of cross-examination. To allow the prosecution to take up this silence and use it as a 
sword against the accused would be a violation of a basic principle of adversary justice.152 The 
onus of proof which rests upon the prosecution is not simply a burden to adduce evidence and to 
establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. It is also a burden to do so unassisted by the 
accused.153 To compel speech or to allow an adverse inference from silence would represent a 
significant shift within the prosecutorial burden, "effectively legitimizing the conversion of the 
lowest threshold in evidence, a bare prima facie case, into the highest proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt".154 In essence the silence privilege reinforces the presumption of 
148 Ellis ibid note 28 at 843, "it is not an issue which is amenable to empirical investigation nor can 
answers be derived by reasoning". 
149 What the slogan presumption of innocence actually means is quite elusive. Logically a presumed 
innocent person should never be charged in the first place. It is said by some commentators that the 
presumption simply means that the prosecution must go first. Yet in the civil world, the prosecution does 
not go first and the central feature of these trials is the interrogation of the accused by the judge. 
150 Woolmington v D.P.P. (1935) AC 462 at 481 (HL) and S v Zuma 1995 (2) SA 652 (CC), 1995 (4) 
BCLR 401 (CC) at para 36, S v Bhu/wana, S v Gwadiso 1996 (1) SA 388 (CC) 1995 (12) BCLR (CC) at 
~ara 24. 
51 Miranda v Arizona 384 U.S. 436 (1966) 415, Murphy v Waterfront Commission 378 U.S. 55 (1964). 
Also Wigmore para 2251 at 317 (McNaughton Ed 1961). 
152 Gerstein supra note 79 at 110. 
153 Tehan v Shott 382 U.S. 406, 415 (1966), "the basic purposes that lie behind the privilege against self-
incrimination do not relate to protecting the innocent but rather to preserving the integrity of the judicial 
system in which the guilty are not to be convicted unless the prosecution shoulder the entire load. It must 
do so unassisted by the accused.". 
154 McConville ibid note 146 at 1169. 
142 
innocence 155 and preserves the integrity of adversarial procedure by forcing the prosecution to 
shoulder the entire load.156 To adduce relevant evidence and establish guilt by its own 
independent labours. Lord Devlin in R v Bodkins Adams 157 describes the accused's silence as 
an affirmation of his autonomy and equality within the criminal procedure. His silence must be 
taken to mean, "Ask me no questions, I shall answer none. Prove your case". Abolish or 
weaken the silence principle and the burden of proof begins, by increments, to shift towards the 
accused. 
Reasoning of this kind exposes a general ignorance about the working of the evidentiary onus 
rules. During the trial both the state and the defence are faced with two distinct burdens. First, 
there is the primary onus of proof which in a criminal trial is initially fixed upon the state and 
remains so throughout the course of the proceedings. The state is expected to establish an 
essentially uncontroverted case in respect of all the criminal elements and must meet the 
expected threshold quantum of proof. 156 Second, there is an evidentiary burden which shifts 
between the state and the accused, depending on which party has established a prima facie 
case.159 Tactically the accused will at times during the trial bear an evidentiary burden of 
rebuttal. Technically it is incorrect to argue that the accused should never bear a burden or that 
the state should always shoulder the entire burden. Does an evidentiary burden in terms of 
which the accused must lead evidence in rebuttal constitute a limitation on the presumption of 
innocence? To speak of a shift in the burden of proof once the silence principle is limited is 
~nconvincing. How can a silence principle designed to exclude self-incriminatory evidence (a 
source of evidence) have any influence over the fixed primary burden of proof which does not 
concern itself with evidentiary sources? According to the law of evidence a primary onus of 
proof cannot be influenced by the way in which evidence is gathered. What it does concern itself 
with is the total sufficiency of evidence. The state's primary burden is discharged once the 
quantum and cogency of the evidence is sufficiently persuasive to overcome the threshold level 
155 McConville ibid at 1170, "removing the silence privilege or allowing an adverse inference to be drawn 
from silence has the effect of destroying the presumption of innocence and replacing it with a presumption 
of guilf'. 
156 R v Noble (1997) D.L.R. (4th) 385, 43 CRR (2d) 233 (Canada) at D.L.R. 418, "In order for the burden of 
proof to remain with the crown . . . the silence of the accused should not be used against him or her in 
building the case for guilf'. See also R v S (RJ) (1995) 1 SCR 451 26 CRR (2d) 1, 76 and Thomson 
Newspapers Ltd v Canada (Director Restrictive Trade Practices Commission) (1990) 1 SCR 425, 428. 
157 Unreported, cited in the House of Lords debate on the Criminal Law Revision Committee 11th Report. 
158 The burden of proof is a metaphorical expression for the duty which one or other of the parties has of 
finally satisfying the court that he is entitled to succeed. The incidence of the burden of proof (Wigmore's 
risk of non-persuasion) decides which party will fail on a given issue, if after hearing all the evidence, the 
court is left in doubt. It is fixed on one or other of the parties as a matter of substantive law. Tregea v 
Godart 1939 AD 16 at 23, Hoffmann, Zeffertt S.A. Law of Evidence 4 Ed Butterworth 1996. 
159 The evidentiary burden of combating a prima facie case made by one's opponent. South Cape Corp 
(Ply) Ltd v Engineering Management Services (Ply) Ltd 1977 (3) SA 534 (A) at 548. 
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and the establishment of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. This purpose has no logical 
connection to whether or not the state by its own independent labours or the accused by his own 
unwilling contribution has added to the quantum of evidence. In other words, how can a silence 
principle designed to protect against a particular kind of evidence, conceptually influence a 
burden/onus which is designed to account only for the quantum/cogency of all kinds of evidence 
and which is not designed to acknowledge the various sources of such evidence. Abolishing or 
weakening the silence principle cannot therefore within the meaning of evidentiary rules, shift the 
onus of proof towards the accused. 
The burden of proof argument also becomes speculative and unconvincing when it makes the 
unverifiable assumption that the integrity of the accusatorial system is impaired by the 
prosecution shouldering less than its due legal burden. An examination of the law of evidence 
reveals that the state does not always shoulder the entire burden nor is the silence principle an 
effective procedural device for ensuring a rigid maintenance of this threshold focus. 160 
Questioning the accused for his account of the facta propanda or drawing an unfavourable 
inference from his failure to do so does not necessarily breach the proper relationship between 
state and accused. After all, the routine acceptance of voluntarily made admissions or 
confessions 161 is an example of direct assistance rendered by the accused which allows the 
prosecution to prove its case. In many instances the accused is legally obliged to assist the 
prosecution even against his own will. The accused may be compelled to furnish non-
testimonial items such as evidence of body appearance, fingerprints, voice and handwriting 
samples.162 The state may compel the accused to appear in an identification parade. 163 
The U.S. Supreme Court in Schmerber v California164 has admitted blood samples taken without 
consent. The English Court of Appeal in R v Apicella 165 allowed a specimen of bodily fluid to· 
prove rape. The Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, sec 62(10) permits an adverse in-
160The state does not always shoulder the entire burden. There are important exceptions, apart from the 
evidentiary burden of rebuttal, in terms of which some of the burden falls upon the shoulders of the 
accused. Generally, the accused can be compelled to stand trial and to cooperate in the process which 
leads to his conviction. First, he can be compelled to provide non-testimonial physical forms of evidence 
even against his will. Second, the state is permitted to adduce voluntary admissions and confessions 
obtained directly from the accused. Third, the accused may be sanctioned for destroying evidence, 
bribing or intimidating witnesses. In terms of these three exceptions, the accused bears some of the 
burden of proof. 
161Sec 217 and 219A of the C.P.A. (1977). 
162Sec 228 C.P.A. (handwriting). See 212(4) and (6) C.P.A. (fingerprints). 
163 Rasso/ v R 1932 N.P.D. 112 and R v Gericke 1941 C.P.D. 211 (voice identification). 
164 384 U.S. 757 (1966). See also United States v Dionisio 410 U.S. 1 (1973) (voice exemplar), Gilbert v 
California 388 U.S. 263 (1967) (handwriting exemplar). See infra chapter 7 p.236-237. 
165 (1986) 82 Cr. App. R. 295 (CA). See infra chapter 10 note 123-130and accompanying text. 
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terence from failure to give consent to the taking of an intimate sample. 166 A Scottish court has 
admitted evidence of teeth impressions.167 New Zealand and Scotland allow evidence of a 
suspect's aroma.168 It has also been argued that the accused's decision to remain silent at trial 
is neither a testimonial nor a communicative act to which the silence principle should properly 
apply. Rather, it is a physical reality of the trial and should be treated in the same way as other 
evidence of physical description or behaviour. If the state does not breach its duty when 
adducing evidence of fingerprints, blood type or line-up description, then neither does it do so 
when it admits physical evidence of the accused's failure to testify. It is erroneous therefore to 
assume that the prosecution can never meet the burden of proof by relying on compelled 
testimony from the accused. The prosecution has presumably through its own unassisted efforts 
determined exactly what kind of questions need to be put to the accused. The prosecutorial goal 
in questioning the accused is to impeach credibility and to highlight inconsistencies in the 
exculpatory evidence. An experienced prosecutor should never put questions to the accused 
without a fairly good idea of what kind of answers to expect in return. 169 Relying on testimony 
compelled from the accused is logically defensible. The "entire load" or "full burden of proof' 
language used by adherents of a silence principle is thus a mere solecism. The state would still 
be obliged to bear the full burden of proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, whether the 
privilege existed or not. The silence principle in reality serves only to influence the kind of 
evidence which the state may adduce to meet the requisite burden and not the existence or the 
stringency of the burden itself. 
Proponents have sought to justify the silence privilege as a protective measure against 
oppressive and unnatural abuse of power by state organs. Indeed, the protection against torture 
is widely but erroneously believed to be a primary factor in the evolution of the English common 
law right to silence. Historical evidence suggests the contrary. According to Langbein, 170 the 
use of torture remained an exclusive prerogative of the highest central authority, exceptionally 
confined to political crimes and exerted no lasting influence over the common law courts. 
Torture reached a peak during the Tudor era but had disappeared entirely by 1640 without 
1661f consent is refused, the court may draw such inferences as appear proper, and the refusal may be 
treated, or amount to, corroboration of any evidence against the suspect - Easton. "Bodily Samples and 
the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination" Grim. Law Rev. (1991) 19. See also sec 37 and sec 225(1) of the 
C.P.A. (1977) in particularS v Binta 1993 2 SACR 553 (C). 
167 H ay v H.M.A. 1968 J.C. 40. 
168 R v Lindsay (1970) NZLR 1002 and Patterson v Nixon 1960 J.C. 42. The South African A.D. regards 
such evidence as inadmissible and untrustworthy on account of the danger of misunderstanding a tracker 
dog's behaviour. R v Trupedo 1920 AD 58 and S v Shabalala 1986 (4) SA 734 (A). 
169 Colman Cross-Examination: A Practical Handbook (1990) 169. 
170 Langbein "Shaping The Eighteenth Century Criminal Trial" U. Chicago L. Rev. (1983) 168. See supra 
chapter 2. 
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comment or controversy. 171 The prevention of torture cannot therefore be regarded as an 
essential modern-day function of a silence privilege. Nevertheless, some proponents argue, a 
criminal justice system without the silence privilege would severely tempt police and prosecution 
to solicit self-incriminatory statements through the overt or disguised employment of physical and 
psychological coercive tactics. The real danger is not that the accused will be beaten in open 
court, but rather the possibility of mistreatment which falls short of actual torture. Examples 
include prolonged interrogation without sleep or food, isolation, and other psychological tricks of 
the trade in which police and prosecution are well versed. 
The protection of official morality requires the existence of a silence privilege because it removes 
the temptation to employ short cuts. It is far more enjoyable to sit in a sheltered police station 
and extract coerced confessions than to go about in the sun hunting up evidence.172 The silence 
"privilege" prevents official lassitude and acts as an additional incentive for effective police work. 
According to Ayers, "the privilege is a prophylactic which deters not only the commission of 
inhumane acts, but also the manufacture and reliance on unreliable testimony''. 173 In defence of 
this argument, proponents cite Wigmore, "any administrative system which permits the 
prosecution to trust habitually to compulsory self-disclosure as a source of proof must itself 
suffer morally thereby". 174 The truth of this assertion is by no means self-obvious. A principle 
which prevents police investigators from questioning the very person best qualified to render a 
truthful account is patently irrational. Friendly comments, "it requires the police to operate under 
the rules of blind man's buff' and "assumes what is not always the case, namely that other forms 
of evidence will be available without interrogation, if only the police are bright enough to find 
them".175 Interrogation of the accused and the search for evidence aliunde should not be seen 
as alternative or conflicting avenues to the same result. They are complementary methods and 
the use of both promotes a thorough and comprehensive investigation, more so than could be 
achieved by the use of each method separately. The practical reality is that if state authorities 
wish to torture a suspect then no legally constituted silence principle will effectively deter them. 
A silence "privilege" is a rather weak protection against police interrogation. The violent 
171 Torture was exclusively confined to politically motivated crimes. The physical extraction of information 
concerning treason, sedition and identification of accomplices. There is little documented use of torture in 
the ordinary common law courts after 1603 and by 1640 the use of torture even for political crimes had 
disappeared. Torture was never directed at obtaining self-incriminatory evidence for civil or criminal 
purposes. The movement to abolish torture was therefore not a likely role-player in the development of a 
silence privilege: See supra chapter 2 notes 155, 159 and accompanying text. 
172 Stephen A History Of The Criminal Law In England (1883} 442. 
173 Ayers supra note 133 at 850. 
174 Wigmore para 2281 at 296 n2 (McNaughton Ed 1961}. Although it could be said that Wigmore was 
referring only to judicial conduct and not to police practice. 
175 Friendly ''The Fifth Amendment Tomorrow, The Case For Constitutional Change" (37) Un. Cin. L. Rev 
671, 691. See also Black J's dissenting opinion in Berger v New York 388 U.S 41, 70 (1967), "it is always 
easy to hint at mysterious means available just around the corner to catch outlaws". 
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treatment of Black detainees, despite the existence of a right to silence, during the Apartheid 
decades is sufficient proof of this. Furthermore, studies in England show that a majority of 
suspects make incriminating statements under police questioning. 176 The silence principle is a 
weak buffer against a criminal justice system deliberately organized around the pressures of 
interrogation, confession and the guilty plea. The silence principle would disrupt this well-oiled 
process, hence its relative ineffectiveness. The psychologically oppressive environment of a 
police station, coupled with the isolation of the suspect, combines to make it extremely difficult 
for the average person to consciously assert a right to silence.177 The silence principle is not an 
adequate protection in the police station. There are other and better safeguards against the 
dangers of compulsive and manipulative questioning. Safeguards against inhumane 
interrogation are best sought for in the technical rules which render coerced confessions 
inadmissible.178 Statutory rules of this nature make it highly improbable that police interrogators 
would adopt coercive methods to solicit evidence ultimately rendered inadmissible. In England, 
the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (PACE) has made an enormous contribution towards 
limiting and controlling the exercise of police power over the suspect in custody. The emphasis 
of the code is in creating physical and procedural conditions which minimize the risk of unreliable 
statements. Sec 76(2) in particular obliges the prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt 
that evidence was not oppressively obtained.179 
The provisions of Code C and E set out in detail the limits of police questioning. These codes of 
police practice are reinforced by the increasing willingness of the English courts to apply the 
statutory discretion in terms of sec 78. The recent introduction of mandatory tape-recordings of 
police interviews 180 has now given the courts a greater ability to exclude involuntary admissions 
and confessions. 181 Scottish jurists have advocated the establishment of a Sheriffs tribunal 
wherein the voluntariness of certain statements made during police interrogation may be 
challenged. Justice Schaefer proposes a system of judicially supervised interrogations in the 
176 Moston, Stephenson, Williamson "The Incidence, Antecedents And Consequences Of The Use Of The 
Right To Silence During Police Questioning" (3) Criminal Behaviour and Mental Illness (1993) 30-47. 
Gudjonsson The Psychology Of Interrogations, Confessions and Testimony Chichester Wiley (1992). 
177 In the police station the hardened professional criminal is more likely to gain an advantage from the 
silence privilege, whereas the ordinary suspect is likely to be intimidated into giving up his rights. 
178 Sec 217A and 219 of the C.P.A. (1977). 
179 Menlowe ibid note 87 at 239. Zuckerman "The Inevitable Demise Of The Right To Silence" N.L.J. 
~1994). 
80 Tape, video-recordings, accompanied by precautions against tampering and editing have proved to be 
effective protections within the formal police interrogation interview. Of course, realistically, no device or 
technique or legal rule can effectively protect against intentional police coercion but these technological 
devices offer a far greater practical protection than a mere legal silence rule. 
181 English judges have made no attempt to justify the PACE statutory discretionary powers in terms of a 
silence rationale. But have instead sought justification in terms of a reliability principle. R v Canale (1990) 
91 Cr. App. R 1 "the need to respect statutory rights". R v Walsh (1989) 91 Cr. App. R 161 "the need for 
police propriety in obtaining evidence". See supra chapter 8 p.293-295. 
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presence of a magistrate, or perhaps for practical reasons 182 before an impartial third party 
observer specially appointed to oversee pre-trial interrogation. Essentially a balance must be 
found between police efficiency in crime control and the protection of the individual against 
coercive treatment at the hands of law enforcement officers. Whether a silence "privilege" forms 
part of such a balance is usually determined by a socio-political compromise within each legal 
system. The Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 is the compromise arrived at in 
England. A compromise which allows the accused a limited but well defined silence "privilege" 
without inhibiting effective law enforcement. The use of silence by the accused offers certain 
pre-trial and trial advantages, but it also entails certain disadvantages. The accused or his legal 
adviser must tactically balance the use made of the accused's silence against the known 
adverse inferences which the state is entitled to draw from such usage.183 
Proponents also advance the plausible argument that a silence "privilege" protects unpopular 
minority opinion against potential prosecution by the mainstream orthodoxy. Without a right to 
silence, the state would be tempted to set up investigatory committees and other forms of roving 
inquisitions with the express purpose of ferreting out dissident minority opinion. Citizens could 
be harassed by these belief probes into providing compelled incriminatory testimony about 
unpopular political, moral or religious beliefs. The silence principle provides the individual with 
the ability to frustrate government inquiries which may result in a potential abuse of power.184 
Senator McCarthy's anti-communist witch hunt during the 1950s immediately springs to mind. 
Targeted individuals who took refuge behind the silence "privilege" were instantly and 
disapprovingly characterized as fifth amendment Communists. In addition, any number of 
persons could be rounded up by the police in fishing expeditions, brought before investigatory 
tribunals and cross-examined to determine whether or not they had committed crimes. The 
silence "privilege" therefore serves to protect various politically and criminally targeted 
individuals from state exploitation. 
162 It is impractical and costly to maintain a supply of magistrates on a 24-hour basis. Although many 
countries do so on a rotational basis. Friendly ibid note 175 at 714-5. Schaefer The Suspect And Society 
Maxwell Ed (1967} 59-60. 
163 Infra chapter 8. See the comments of Lord Lane C.J. in R v Alladice (1988} 87 Cr. App. R. 380, 385 
on the permissible use of adverse inference drawn from silence. Lord Lane's comments had a major 
influence on the drafting of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 .. 
164 McNaughton ibid note 56 at 145. Kalven "Invoking The Fifth Amendmenf' (a} Bull. Atom. Scientists 
(1953} 182-183. 
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The argument however, confuses the antiquated historical role of a silence "privilege" with its 
narrowly defined modern functions. First, belief probes target the kind of person who is least 
likely to want to remain silent.185 Indeed, the non-conformist with a strong political or religious 
conscience will want to speak out in defence of his beliefs. The silence principle as a protection 
against belief probes is practically superfluous in the normal day-to-day criminal investigation 
which targets non-political crime.186 It is doubtful whether the average rapist or murderer 
harbours particularly strong beliefs. Anyway, a silence "privilege" cannot defend the non-
conformist against subtle indirect non-criminal government tactics designed to extract sensitive 
information and to ostracise suspected radicals. Silence is simply an ineffective safeguard 
against administrative rules barring dissidents from government employment, blacklists or 
deportation of unwanted radicals. Second, the silence principle does not offer an adequate 
protection against state inspired criminal fishing expeditions. An individual does not become a 
criminal defendant until a reasonable quantum of evidence has been accumulated against him. 
He cannot simply be brought before the court on mere suspicion alone. The police cannot arrest 
at random but must possess at least some reasonable cause. Sec 39 of the C.P.A. (1977) 
(South Africa) compounded by possible state exposure to charges of illegal arrest and malicious 
prosecution are thus far more efficient tools in frustrating criminal fishing expeditions. Third, the 
language of the South African Constitution narrowly construes the right to silence, making it 
applicable only to criminal proceedings. During the course of a criminal trial there is usually no 
question of controversial beliefs or unpopular associations arising as facta propanda. The 
limited modern right to silence is thus grossly inadequate as a protection against politically 
motivated belief probes. Other constitutional shields, in particular the rights to equality (sec 9), 
freedom of person (sec 12), of religion, belief and opinion (sec 15), of speech and expression 
(sec 16), of association (sec 18), of assembly, demonstration and petition (sec 17), and 
reasonable access to unrestricted information held by the state (sec 32) are collectively far more 
effective in thwarting this species of state tyranny. A typical South African example would be the 
now repealed act which made membership in the Communist Party and other proscribed political 
organizations illegal. Citizenry protection against such exploitative state action is best found in 
other constitutional safeguards and not in a principle of silence. State action which seeks to 
create new opportunistic and oppressive crimes contrary to constitutional provisions would 
undoubtedly be struck down by the Constitutional Court. The argument that a citizen should not 
be harassed or exploited by the police and other state organs suffers from the same logical flaw 
which bedevils other rationales favouring the silence principle. It simply does not lead to the 
required conclusion. Certainly, the state must not harass the citizenry, but how does a silence 
185 John Lilburne, the 11'h century religious and political non-conformist, is a stereotypical example of the 
dissident. See supra chapter 2 p.42. 
186 Wigmore Evidence para 2251 at 314 (McNaughton Ed 1961 ). 
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principle actually protect the individual against such harassment. In truth, what protects the 
citizen is a democratic political system which curbs the power of the state and awards the citizen 
with various and multiple remedies against it. 
4.4.4 State Legitimacy 
The state ability to regulate a structured society consensus populi, would be severely 
undermined without a strong belief in the legitimacy of the criminal justice system. The silence 
principle has traditionally illustrated the relationship between a free man and the state and would 
seem the ideal medium by which to foster a common public belief in such legitimacy. In this 
regard, the silence principle is variously referred to as an important advance in the development 
of liberty,187 a safeguard of human conscience,188 and the hallmark of democratic values. 189 The 
attempt to compel self-incriminatory evidence is distasteful to the citizenry, because compelling 
evidence infringes human dignity and weakens the democratic linchpin cementing society. This 
argument is particularly influential in South Africa. A cynical manipulation of justice mechanisms 
by the old Apartheid regime has heightened sensitivities towards the justice establishment and 
significantly eroded popular esteem. In order to erase a tarnished image, prevent recidivism and 
restore popular respect, it is thought necessary to constitutionally entrench a fundamental right 
to silence. The silence principle is thus viewed as an essential tool in the restoration of an 
efficient, moral and legitimate criminal justice system free of the old apartheid baggage. The 
argument presumes a direct empirical connection between the silence principle and the idea of 
legitimacy, a nexus which has never been substantiated by reliable evidence. Indeed, the 
contrary view may be equally valid, namely a silence "privilege" actually erodes rather than 
improves the respectability of a criminal system. In South Africa there is a widely held belief that 
the criminal justice system fosters a culture of "criminal rights" while ignoring "victim rights". A 
silence privilege is said to be part of criminal rights. The general public often perceives the 
exercise of silence by the accused as an inference of guilt. Certainly in England and the United 
States, there is a strong undercurrent notion that silence is for all practical purposes a sanctuary 
for the guilty.19° Courts in America are obliged to instruct laymen juries to ignore the 
inference.191 Moreover, in the words of Schaefer, "Those who advocate a right to silence bear 
the burden of justifying its divergence from everyday morality''.192 According to Judge Friendly, 
187 Per Frankfurter J in Ullmann v United States 350 U.S. 422-426 (1956). 
188 Per Douglas J in Ullmann v United States at 631. . 
189 Per Warren J in Miranda v Arizona 384 U.S. 436-660 (1966). 
19
° Frank J believed it likely that jurors would view the accused's failure to testify as evidence of guilt. 
"This powerful inference has the effect of coercing a defendant into abandoning his privlege". United 
States v Grunewald 353 U.S. 391 (1957). 
191 Carterv Kentucky450 U.S. 288 (1981) and Griffin v California 380 U.S. 609 (1965). 
192 
"Federalism And State Criminal Procedure" (70) Harv. L. Rev. (1956) 26. 
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"A right to silence is generally perceived to be contrary to normal moral behaviour''. 193 Hook 
sees the privilege as an insult to the average man's common sense.194 Louisell, a strong 
supporter of the silence "privilege" is forced to admit that in the field of criminal procedure, "the 
rule is psychologically and morally unacceptable as a general principle in human relationships. 195 
There exists a chaotic ambivalence about the so-called "right" to silence. On one hand the 
· silence principle is viewed as an old valuable, fundamental and morally enhancing privilege. On 
the other hand, it is easily encroached upon. Society readily departs from its company because 
it is not perceived as containing a fundamental or inherent moral component. Common sense 
alone dictates that there are more effective methods of bolstering the legitimacy of the criminal 
justice system. In reality, public perceptions of institutional state legitimacy are profoundly 
influenced by political, educational and economic criteria. Developments in these fields 
overshadow whatever puny influence a silence privilege may or may not exert. 
In essence therefore, a silence "privilege" popularly viewed as contrary to common sense and 
plebian morality simply has no effect on the supposed moral turpitude prevalent in the South 
African justice system.196 The inescapable conclusion must be that a right to silence does not 
justify nor operate as a device for achieving any of the objectives imputed to a criminal system. 
The silence principle as an instrumental justification for individual interests within the Anglo-
American criminal justice system has neither intrinsic nor coherent worth. As a procedural rule 
which operates to the advantage of the suspected wrongdoer, it may even contribute to the 
erosion of the legitimacy of the South African criminal system, at least in the eyes of society. 
The vision of the silence principle as a human right and an instrumental expression of a 
fundamental decency in the relationship between government and citizen has great symbolic 
value. To the libertarian the silence principle is worth protecting as a bulwark against the ever-
increasing state tendency to encroach upon the prerogatives of its citizenry. Unfortunately, it is a 
symbol with hollow foundations. A legal rule or a legal right must be based at a bare minimum 
on the building blocks of logic and reason. Without these essential elements of Western 
jurisprudence, the concept of a silence principle as a rallying point against government 
exploitation is simply illusionary. This point is well illustrated by the confusion and ambivalence 
surrounding the American fifth amendment. Moreover, the libertarian warning is unnecessary. It 
193 Friendly ibid note 175 at 690. 
194 
"Let any sensible person ask himself whether he would hire a babysitter for his children if she refused 
to reply to a question bearing upon the proper execution of her duty with a response equivalent to the 
~rivilege against self-incrimination?" Hook Common Sense And The Fifth Amendment (1957) 121. 
95 
"Criminal Discovery And Self-Incrimination" (89) Cal. L. Rev. (1965) 94. 
196 Indeed, the current belief amongst professional criminals in South Africa is that true guilt or innocence 
is not determined by the actual facts but by the ability of defence counsel and the inability of the state to 
sustain a successful prosecution against the accused. 
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is not suggested that the suspect or the witness be compelled to answer nor that the accused be 
coerced into giving testimony. Extracting answers by means of physical compulsion or 
psychological pressure is unequivocally wrong. Instead, the proposal is advanced that the 
defendant who refuses to respond to the police within a properly constituted interview, or to give 
evidence in court must do so in the full knowledge that his defensive use of silence may draw a 
reasonable and adverse inference against him.197 This logical proposal does not erode the 
protection against torture (a danger which is in any event anachronistic in modern Western 
jurisdictions) nor should it impose an unacceptable psychological compulsion on the criminal 
defendant. What it does mean though is that the silence principle is at best an ordinary 
evidentiary rule. Its nature is such that it cannot be elevated into a fundamental right without 
obfuscating its purpose and distorting its legal effect. In the following chapters an in-depth 
analysis will be made of the silence principle. Beginning with an examination of the American 
fifth amendment clause which raises the silence principle to the status of a constitutional right. 
In counterpoint, a comparative analysis will also be made of the present statutory limitations on 
the common law definition of silence brought about by the English Criminal Justice and Public 
Order Act 1994. The conclusion will be that a silence principle is best suited to the role of an 
evidentiary rule and is most unsuited to that of a constitutional right. 
197 It may be noted that the personality rationale (cruelty, privacy, autonomy) does not logically support a 
rule barring the use of adverse inferences drawn from the suspect's silence during interrogation. The 
traditional American rule barring adverse inference usage is based in reliance theory. In Doyle v Ohio 426 
U.S. 610 (1976), the court barred the use of adverse inferences from interrogatory silence as a violation of 
due process underpinned by reliance (an instrumental protection). However, this kind of reasoning is 
unconvincing as the reliance interests of the suspect may always be modified by informing him about the 
use and effect of adverse inferences. This is the current practice in England and Europe. In Murray v 
United Kingdom 22 EHRR 29 (1996) the court held that drawing on adverse inference from silence is not a 
breach of the European Convention on Human Rights. 
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CHAPTERS 
THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE 
5.1 The Watershed Years 
At first glance the privilege against self-incrimination contained within the fifth amendment of 
the United States Constitution appears to be fairly straightforward. The language simply 
provides, "no person shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against 
himself'. This single sentence has had a profound effect on domestic jurisprudence and has 
influenced many other foreign constitutional entrenchments of the right to silence and the 
privilege against self-incrimination. For example, the South African right to silence contained 
in the Interim Constitution (1993) is heavily influenced by its American predecessor and 
several of the key features incorporated into the Final Constitution (1996) may be traced to 
the jurisprudence developed around the fifth amendment.1 Although the wording of the fifth 
amendment is simple enough, the meaning has undergone extensive judicial interpretation 
through an evolutionary process covering some 200 years. Judicial interpretation during 
these years has expanded the scope of the privilege well beyond the literal meaning of the 
wording.2 The Supreme Court has remarked, "to apply the privilege narrowly or 
begrudgingly, to treat it as a historical relic .... is to ignore its development and purpose".3 In 
this sense the Supreme Court has adopted a broad policy based interpretation of the 
privilege as an expanding right capable of sustaining growth and encompassing new 
situations as they arise. 4 The fifth amendment must be construed in a manner which is 
consistent with the following baseline criteria. First, a legitimate evaluation of the fifth 
amendment must include a proper analysis of the literal language and meaning of the clause, 
1 Sec 25 (1993 constitution) particularly sec 25(3)(d) " ... and not to be a compellable witness against 
himself or herself'. See also sec 35 (1996 constitution) particularly sec 35(3)0) " ... not to be 
compelled to give self-incriminating evidence". 
2 See Berger "Taking The Fifth" (1946) at 49-50 "if the privilege was interpreted narrowly it would 
simply prohibit the prosecution from compelling the defendant from testifying. 150 years ago this kind 
of interpretation would have been redundant since the defendant was already an incompetent witness 
at his own trial, a testimonial disqualification only removed in America (1878) and England (1898). 
3 Quinn v United States 349 U.S 155, 162 (1955). "The privilege is a right hard earned by our 
forefathers. The reason for its inclusion in the constitution and the necessity for its preservation are to 
be found in the lessons of history'', Ullmann v United States 350 U.S 422, 426 (1956). 
4 Gompers v United States 233 U.S 604, 610 (1915), the interpretation of constitutional provisions is 
to be gathered "not simply by taking the words and a dictionary but by considering their origin and the 
line of their growth". 
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interpreted against the background of the entire constitutional text. 5 Second, an account 
must be taken of the intention, so far as it may be perceived, of the original constitutional 
authors.6 Third, consideration must be given to previous precedent. Within this contextual 
framework the United State Supreme Court has liberally interpreted the fifth amendment to 
include a right to silence, a right to have counsel present during interrogation, a right to be 
advised of the right to silence and a no-inference rule. Despite the fact that nowhere in the 
actual wording of the fifth amendment clause are these rights literally described. 7 The 
wording itself raises a number of difficulties. Why the phrase "to be a witness against 
himself' was selected instead of the more appropriate and specific "evidence against himself' 
is unclear. Why the words "self-incrimination" or "silence" were so deliberately omitted also 
remains a mystery. Perhaps by leaving the phrase deliberately opaque the original authors 
intended to allow for its expansion as the need arose. It may also be that the original drafters 
of the fifth amendment did not attach any particular importance to the clause. In Twining v 
New Jersey 8 it was noted that of the thirteen states which ratified the 1791 Federal 
Constitution, four did so without making any reference to the privilege. Early Federal and 
State court decisions virtually ignored the privilege and matters involving self-incrimination 
were invariably decided under the common law doctrine of voluntariness (the exclusionary 
evidentiary rules governing confession). 9 In 1897 the Supreme Court in Bram v United 
States 10 held for the very first time that questions addressing the common-law doctrine of 
voluntariness should also involve an inquiry into the fifth amendment right against 
compulsory self-incrimination. 11 The court noted "[when] a question arises whether a 
confession is incompetent because it is not voluntary ... the issue is controlled ... by the fifth 
5 Hoffmann v United States 341 U.S 479, 486 (1951). Counce/man v Hitchcock 142 U.S 547, 562 
(1892), "a liberal contextual construction is necessary to protect the right, the fifth amendment was 
intended to secure". 
6 But see Wigmore Sec 2252 at 324-5, McNaughton Ed (1961) ''whatever the original authors of the 
privilege meant by the wording is not known and there are today few legislative guides allowing for an 
insight into those 18th century minds". Wigmore also argues that the privilege should be recognized 
only within the narrowest limits required by the privilege, "Nemo Tenetur Seipsum Prodere" (5) Harv. 
L. Rev. (1891) 71, 87. 
7 The Supreme Court has expanded the meaning of the privilege one step at a time, case by case. 
This lack of consistency and clear guidance has deprived the lower courts of a proper framework in 
which to apply the privilege to cases a quo. Tarallo "The Fifth Amendment Privilege Against Self-
Incrimination" (27) New EngL. Rev. (1992) 138-139. 
8 211 U.S 78, 109 (1908). Wigmore, sec 2252 at 325 notes that of 15 Federal cases by 1868 
involving the problem of self-incrimination, none were decided by reference to the fifth amendment. 
See also Kauper, Beytagh Constitutional Law Little Brown and Co. (1980) 548. 
9 Hopt v Utah 110 U.S 574, 584-85 (1884). Pierce v United States 160 U.S 355 (1896). 
10 168 u.s 532 (1897). 
11 Confession law and the privilege against self-incrimination follow different traditions and serve 
different purposes. According to Levy Origins Of The Fifth Amendment (1968) 329, n43, the privilege 
originates in the struggle against the ex officio oath whereas confession law is the result of a grradual 
accretion of ad hoc decisions starting in the early 1700s. 
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amendment''.12 Early American procedural law held the privilege to be binding only on a 
federal level. The Supreme Court of those days concluded that the fifth amendment was not 
so fundamental as to require enforcement on the local state level. The states were left to 
decide on their own initiative whether or not to incorporate a constitutional protection into 
their local constitutions. Twining v New Jersey 13 found the fifth amendment binding only on 
the federal level and concluded that it was not an "immutable principle of justice". It was 
much later in 1964 that Malloy v Hogan 14 reversed earlier precedent and held the fifth 
amendment fully binding upon all states through the due process mechanism of the 
fourteenth amendment. Over the intervening years the Supreme Court has established a 
number of basic rules in the application of the privile.ge. First, all invocations of the privilege 
must be liberally interpreted, always in favour of the claimant rather than against him.15 
Second, an invocation of the privilege is not dependent on a particular choice of words and 
no specific ritual formula is required. 16 Third, the privilege may be asserted in all 
proceedings, civil or criminal, administrative or judicial, investigatory or adjudicatory.17 
Fourth, waiver of the privilege must be made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently.18 Fifth, 
the accused's privilege in the courtroom (more appropriately his right to silence) is a blanket 
privilege, whereas the witness privilege against self-incrimination is a relative one which must 
be invoked on a question to question basis. Sixth, once the privilege has been claimed, no 
evidentiary use may be made of the suspect's pre-trial silence du~ing custodial interrogation, 
nor of the accused's silence or failure to testify during the trial. 
In the early twentieth century the American privilege against self-incrimination and its 
corollary right to silence was regarded as belonging to a distinctly second-class group of 
constitutional safeguards. None of these safeguards was considered essential to an orderly 
12 Bram ibid note 10 at 542. 
13 ibid note 8 at 223, "It would go too far to rate [the privilege] as an immutable principle of justice 
which is an inalienable possession of every free citizen of a free government . . . it cannot be ranked 
with the right to a hearing before condemnation ... it has no place in the jurisprudence of civilized and 
free countries outside the domain of the common law''. This decision reaffirmed in Snyder v 
Massachusetts 291 U.S 97 105 (1934). Cohen v Hurley 366 U.S 117, 127-28 (1961). 
14 378 U.S 1, 6 (1964). The first 10 amendments (Bill of Rights) to the 1791 Constitution were initially 
intended to protect the individual against Federal Government interference (Barron v The Mayor and 
City Council of Baltimore 32 U.S (7 Pet} 243, 8 LEd 672 (1833). After the enactment of the fourteenth 
amendment (A Civil War amendment}, the question arose as to whether the Bill of Rights was 
protected against state abridgement. Consequently the 201h century has seen the application of the 
Bill of Rights to state proceedings. 
15 Hoffman v United States 341 U.S 479, 486 (1951). Counce/man v Hitchcock 142 U.S 547, 562 
(1892). "The privilege is as broad as the mischief against which it seeks to guard", which was partly 
overruled by Kastigar v United states 406 U.S 441, 455 (1972). 
16 Quinn v United States 349 U.S 155, 162 (1955) "no magic language is required to assert the 
privilege which is effectively invoked by any language which the court should reasonably be expected 
to understand as an attempt to claim the privilege". 
17 Kastigar v United States 406 U.S 441, 444 (1972). 
18 Midrand v Arizona 384 U.S 436, 444 (1966) citing Escobedo v Illinois 378 U.S 478, 490 n14 (1964). 
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criminal procedure system or a just society. Palkov v Connecticut 19 exemplifies the 
prevailing philosophy of those days, "[the immunity from self-incrimination] might be lost and 
justice still be done .... no doubt there would remain the need to give protection against 
torture, physical or mental. Justice, however, would not perish if the accused were subject to 
a duty to respond to orderly inquiry". During the 1960s the shift towards a culture of Human 
Rights triggered a number of significant changes in American criminal procedure. The liberal 
Warren Supreme Court was instrumental in initiating major modifications to criminal 
procedure based on a re-interpretation of the constitution. These changes are illustrated by 
Massaih v United States (1964),20 for the first time a right to counsel is extended to the 
accused at post-indictment interrogation. Jackson v Denno (1964),21 a jury may only hear a 
voluntary confession. Escobedo v Illinois (1964),22 the suspect is entitled to legal counsel 
immediately after arrest. Griffin v California (1965),23 the state may not draw any adverse 
inferences from the accused's failure to testify at trial. Miranda v Arizona (1966),24 a seminal 
decision in which the Supreme Court equates confessional law with the privilege against self-
incrimination. The term compelled self-incrimination becomes an almost generic category 
encompassing both the traditional privilege and the voluntary or involuntary confession which 
arises from the interrogational relationship between the suspect and the police interviewer. 
In United States v Wade ( 1967), 25 the suspect is entitled to a right to legal counsel at post-
arrest identification parades. With these and other decisions the Warren court elevated the 
privilege against self-incrimination into the first rank of constitutional protections. The fifth 
amendment high water mark was reached in Miranda and Griffin which established a culture 
of comprehensive constitutional safeguards for the criminal defendant. The Burger Supreme 
Court of the 1970s and subsequent courts, especially the Supreme Court of the Reagan 
years, have gradually chipped away at these amplified fifth amendment protections. 
Currently the parameters of the privilege are being redefined and in the perpetual 
antagonistic struggle between government and individual interest, the balance has begun to 
swing in favour of the state interest. 
Social-testimonial privileges abound in the law of evidence and other than the privilege 
against self-incrimination include the husband-wife privilege, the attorney-client privilege, the 
state-citizen privilege and some not recognized by law such as the priest-penitent privilege, 
19 302 U.S 319, 325-26 (1937) per Cardozo J. 
20 377 u.s 201 (1964). 
21 378 u.s 368 (1964). 
22 378 u.s 478 (1964). 
23 380 u.s 609 (1965). 
24 384 u.s 434 (1966). 
25 388 U.S 218 (1967). 
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the doctor-patient privilege and the journalist-source privilege.26 Of all these identifiable 
privileged relationships only the privilege against self-incrimination has been held important 
enough to achieve an elevated constitutional status. The first ten amendments of the United 
States Constitution are collectively referred to as the Bill of Rights. Yet of all these rights, 
only the principle of self-incrimination has been labeled a "privilege". All the other 
constitutional protections are referred to as rights. (The right against unreasonable searches 
and seizures (fourth amendment), the right to a jury trial (seventh amendment), the right to 
confront the accuser (sixth amendment) and the right to counsel (sixth amendment)). In 
American jurisprudence there appears to be a semantical and conceptual confusion between 
the use of the word "right" and the word "privilege".27 Nevertheless, despite the difference in 
language, the privilege against self-incrimination has the same constitutional force as all the 
other entrenched rights. Because the privilege against self-incrimination is constitutionally 
entrenched, it has not been subject to the same erosion and subtraction of its influence as 
has recently characterized the contraction of the English right to silence. The scope and 
reach of the American privilege is correspondingly much wider than its English counterpart. 
The criticisms launched against the American privilege are more subdued than those 
launched against the English right to silence.28 A common characteristic of some American 
commentators is to elevate the Constitution into a "holy grail". The privilege against self-
incrimination is a typical example of an essentially legislative enactment elevated to the often 
unreasonable status of natural law, immutable and untouchable. 
Across the Atlantic this vision is not shared by even the most fanatical of English supporters. 
Constitutional entrenchment of the privilege may have benefited the accused but it has also 
had a number of negative effects. By limiting the government's ability to use the suspect as 
a testimonial source in pre-trial interrogation, the privilege has driven interrogation 
techniques underground. Substitute interrogation techniques involving deception, trickery, 
wiretaps, sting operations and the use of bribed informants have become commonplace. 
26 Wigmore ibid note 6 at sec 2192 note 11. Friendly "The Fifth Amendment Tomorrow, The Case For 
Constitutional Change" (37) U. Cin. L. Rev. (1968) 671, 672 states that unlike other testimonial 
privileges the fifth amendment sanctions conduct which would be unacceptable socially and ethically 
outside of the courtroom. 
27 There is a significant jurisprudential difference between a privilege and a right. Rights impose 
limitations on the exercise of state power. Rights are not gifts of the state. Privileges on the other 
hand, are derived from and may be revoked by the state : A right is in theory far superior to a privilege, 
see supra chapter 3 p.81. 
28 See infra chapter 8. 
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Trial avoidance in the form of plea-bargaining is now the norm and the trial process has been 
relegated to a backwater. In England, legislative curtailment of the right to silence has 
reduced the perceived pressure on law enforcement organs in the face of rising crime levels. 
In the United States this is not an option. The tension between the state interest and the 
criminal defendant's private interests, the ever-changing search for the correct balance 
between these interests will continue to bedevil American constitutional law. An obvious 
target in this dynamic tension is the privilege against self-incrimination. Doctrinally the 
influence of the privilege has spread across every nook and crevice of American substantive 
and procedural law. In the last twenty years alone almost seven hundred academic journal 
entries have been cited describing the privilege against a background of all conceivable 
areas of the law. From drug enforcement through to juvenile correction and even the 
treatment of war criminals. 29 The sheer immensity of the privilege has added to the problems 
of American scholars who find it increasingly difficult to persuasively explain what the 
privilege means and why.30 
In its modern form the fifth amendment has been extended outside of its traditional pre-trial 
and trial sphere. The scope of the privilege now includes grand jury proceedings,31 
legislative investigations,32 and civil cases where truthful assertions may result in forfeiture, 
penalty or criminal prosecution. The fifth amendment protection is triggered from the time 
the inquiry has begun to focus on a particular suspect through to police interrogation and to 
the trial itself, including other quasi-judicial and non-judicial procedures.33 However, not all is 
expansion and the privilege has suffered a number of limitations. It has been curtailed 
somewhat through the mechanism of immunity grants.34 "Implied consent" and the "required 
29 The privilege has been applied to environmental issues, professional disputes concerning teachers, 
lawyers, public officials, military personnel, employers, pilots and police officers. The privilege is 
incorporated into legislative reforms such as the Gun Control Act, Interstate Commerce Act. Also to 
quasi-public records, congressional investigations, deportation hearings and psychiatric examinations. 
For example, see Lillquist "Constitutional Rights At The Junction" (81) Virginia L. Rev (1995) 1989, 
Freitas "Extending The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination To Juvenile Hearings" (62) Un. Ch. L. Rev 
(1995) 301, lijima "The War On Drugs" (29) Har. Civ. Rights-Civ. Lib. L. Rev (1994) 101, Patton The 
World Where Parallel Lines Converge (Civil and Criminal Child Abuse) (24) Georgia L. Rev. (1990) 
473, Stanley "Conflict Between The Internal Revenue Code And The Fifth Amendmenf' (15) Un. Bait. 
L. Rev. (1986) 527, Hazard, Beard "A Lawyer's Privilege Against Self-Incrimination In Professional 
Disciplinary Hearings" (96) Yale L. Rev. (1987) 1060. 
30 As a result of the great influence of the privilege, the courts and academic commentators have 
sometimes over-emphasised the privilege, thereby ignoring or eclipsing other constitutional clauses of 
equal legal standing. 
31 United States v Korde/397 U.S. 1, 6 (1970), Gardner v Broderick 392 U.S. 273 (1968). 
32 Watkins v United States 354 U.S. 178, 195-6 (1957), Emspak v United States 349 U.S. 190 (1955). 
33 Quinn v United States 349 U.S. 155 (1955) legislative classifications; Counce/man v Hitchcock 142 
U.S. 547 (1892) grand jury proceedings; McCarthy v Arndstein 266 U.S. 34 (1924) civil proceedings; 
Garrity v New Jersey 385 U.S. 493 (1967} grand jury investigating state corruption; Baxter v 
Palmigiano 425 U.S. 308 (1976) prison disciplinary hearing. 
34 Kastigar v United States 406 U.S. 444 (1972). 
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records" doctrines have also imposed limitations on privacy interests and by extension 
increased the exposure of the individual to legitimate state compelled self-incrimination.35 
The Supreme Court's decision in Schmerber v California36 to distinguish between 
communicative personal testimony and real physical evidence has caused the privilege to 
retreat. Hale v Henkel 37 and United States v White 38 draw a line between natural and 
juristic personae. Unlike English and European Community La~9 the American privilege is 
considered to be the sole prerogative of the human being and cannot be claimed by the 
corporate entity. The periodic waxing and waning of the privilege is the result of judicial 
interpretations and culturally influenced constructions of the rationales which traditionally 
underlie the historical privilege. It is also the result of societal cultural ambivalence which on 
one hand demands a strong guarantee against government tyranny and yet on the other, 
frowns upon any impediment to the law enforcement functions of the state. Despite the 
Supreme Court's elaborate praise of the privilege, it remains difficult for the discerning 
commentator to unravel the central reasoning which supposedly underlies the privilege.40 By 
contrast, the language of the first amendment is crisp, and makes it possible to build an 
easily understood and well reasoned constitutional rule of prohibition. The wording of the 
fourth amendment clearly confines the issues to a factual question of reasonability, but the 
language of the fifth amendment, although straightforward, does not yield to a convenient 
formula. The Supreme Court has been obliged to fashion for itself standards on which to 
hang the privilege and, in doing so, has never quite managed to make up its mind as to what 
the privilege is supposed to do or whom it is intended to protect.41 The difficulty with these 
standards are that they conceal fundamental uncertainties about the privilege. The policy of 
the Supreme Court has been to endorse the privilege with generous praise but without 
explaining the underlying rationales or translating them into logically consistent applications 
of a clearly understood purpose. When a legal principle fails to meet the simple test of logic, 
it results in ambiguity. The history of the Supreme Court's treatment of the fifth amendment 
privilege is one riddled with inconsistency. For example, in Miranda v Arizona 42 the court 
speaks of the privilege as "a noble principle transcending its origins" and "a right which is the 
hallmark of our democracy". Yet, in Schmerber v California, the court concludes, "the 
35 Shapiro v United States 335 U.S. 1 (1948); Marchetti v United States 348 U.S. 922 (1966); 
Baltimore City Dept v Bouknight 493 U.S. 549 (1990). 
36 384 U.S. 757, 760-65 (1966). See also Gilbert v California 388 U.S. 263, 265-7 (1967). 
37 201 u.s. 43 (1906). 
38 322 u.s. 694 (1944) 
39 See infra chapter 1 0 . 
40 See supra chapter 4. 
41 For a comprehensive list of Supreme Court policy justifications, see Murphy v Waterfront 
Commission 378 U.S. 52, 55 (1964), Tehan v Shott 382 U.S. 404, 414-16 (1966), Miranda v California 
348 U.S. 436, 460 (1966) and Malloy v Hogan 378 U.S. 1, 8 (1964). 
42 384 u.s 436, 460 (1966). 
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privilege has never been given the full scope which the values it helps protect suggest".43 In 
one breath the Supreme Court recognizes the privilege as a fundamental hallmark of 
democracy and in another elects to interpret it in a way which denies its full scope. 
According to the Supreme Court, the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination may 
be invoked at two distinct stages of the criminal process. First, during the custodial police 
interrogation, the Miranda procedural safeguards may be triggered to protect the suspect and 
to guarantee his voluntary statements by dissipating the coercive atmosphere in the interview 
room. The Miranda rule is a brave attempt at finding a workable compromise to the 
antagonistic pressures of balancing the individual's protective interest against the state 
interest in achieving low cost convictions. The Miranda balance of interest test is a flexible 
approach which deters unlawful police practices and limits the obstacles against the 
admissibility of probative evidence. While the Miranda rights are not themselves a 
constitutional protection, they are a sturdy prophylactic standard designed to safeguard the 
fifth amendment privilege. Second, in the courtroom the accused may evoke an absolute 
privilege against self-incrimination which does not allow for a balance of interest test. 
According to New Jersey v Portash,44 balancing of interests is thought of as necessary in a 
Miranda type case when the attempt to deter unlawful police practices collides with the need 
to prevent perjury. However, in the courtroom where the constitutional privilege in its most 
pristine form operates, a balancing of interests is simply impermissible.45 
In all its seminal decisions, the Supreme Court has paid an arbitrary lip service to the notion 
of a pure privilege. The only practical method by which the various judgements may be 
reconciled and reduced to a coherent formula is by applying a balancing of interests analysis. 
The increase or decrease in the scope of the privilege and the exceptions which exclude the 
privilege entirely can only be systematically explained if regard is had to the perpetual 
struggle between the state and the individual. When the state interest is more important the 
privilege wanes, when the individual interest is in the ascendancy the privilege waxes. 
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court, in theory at least, holds fast to a single defining standard. 
43 384 u.s 757, 762 (1966). 
44 440 U.S. 450,459 (1979). See also Michigan v Harvey494 U.S. 344, 351 (1990). 
45 
'The fifth amendment has always been interpreted as an absolute "liberty" type right, imposing 
limitations on the exercise of governmental powers. It is set forth in absolute terms, neither 
conditioned nor qualified and therefore not subject to judicial inventiveness. Where other 
constitutional rights, the first amendment (free speech} and the fourteenth amendment (searches and 
seizures) are interpreted in relative terms, it is suggested that these rights are not so much absolute 
rights as they are deliberately intended to be mere limitations on state interference". Douglas 
"Statutory Immunity And Its Constitutionality'' (22) M. L. Rev. (1957) 75, 87-88. The fifth amendment is 
absolute because it protects a complex of values based on the substantive dignity and integrity of the 
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Whenever the state seeks to induce self-incrimination in order to secure a criminal 
conviction, the privilege is absolute, but on the periphery in non-criminal regulatory practices 
a balance of interests is permissible. In California v Byers46 Justice Harlan attempted to set 
out a uniform balance of interest test. This is not a particularly easy task as neither 
constitutional history nor the fifth amendment itself offers a clear guideline as to the purposes 
and values underlining the privilege. Despite these difficulties, the weighing of the state 
interest against the individual interest and the resultant choice should include an assessment 
of the following : 
a) Whether the choice infringes the purposes served by the privilege; 
b) The extent of the infringement; 
c) Whether the state interest in infringing the privilege is justifiable. 
Justice Harlan's model is flexible as it recognizes that the privilege protects different interests 
whose significance varies according to the circumstance. For example, a state infringement 
of the individual interest in a civil proceeding should be treated differently to one in a criminal 
proceeding. The Harlan model provides the court with a reasonable test which rationally 
accommodates the state interest in securing reliable information from its citizens against the 
individual's need in receiving adequate procedural protection. Justice Harlan's model is 
similar to the specific balancing test deliberately incorporated into the South African 
Constitution. In terms of the limitation clause, sec 36, specific provision is made for the 
limitation of citizen rights in the furtherance of a legitimate state interest (Sec 36 is a legal 
and social safety valve). In assessing justifiable infringements on individual rights, the South 
African court must take into account purpose, proportionality and the benefit to the state. 
Determining the proper balance requires an analysis of a number of relevant factors set out 
in sec 36(a)- (e) : 
a) the nature of the right; 
b) the importance of the purpose of the limitation; 
c) the nature and the extent of the limitation; 
d) the relationship between the limitation and the purpose; 
e) less restrictive means to achieve the purpose. 
The South African constitutional right is a relative right whereas the American fifth 
amendment has always been interpreted in near absolute terms. For this reason the South 
African balancing of interest test is better developed, more refined and takes into account a 
individual. It makes the procedural demand that the state, in seeking to punish the accused, must do 
so through its own independent labours, Miranda v Arizona 348 U.S. 436, 460 (1966). 
46 402 u.s. 424, 434 (1970). 
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greater variety of factors than the Harlan model. In this respect American constitutional 
jurisprudence has much to learn from recent South African developments. 
Notwithstanding a lack of clear guidance and conflicting decisions by the United States 
Supreme Court, the privilege against self-incrimination may be taken to include the following 
bare essentials. In criminal proceedings the suspect is entitled to procedural protection from 
the moment the criminal inquiry begins to focus upon him (Escobedo v lllinois}47 • The 
privilege once triggered, is sustainable throughout the custodial interrogation stage, although 
susceptible to a balance of interest analysis (Miranda v Arizona)48• At trial the privilege is 
absolute and the prosecution may not comment on the accused's failure to testify as this 
would impose an impermissible burden on the accused's constitutional rights (Griffin v 
California }49• 
In civil proceedings the witness may not be compelled to answer incriminating questions 
which risks a subsequent criminal prosecution before a criminal court, an administrative 
tribunal or a legislative investigatory committee (Counce/man v Hitchcock)50• The privilege 
protects the witness from being compelled to provide evidence of a testimonial and 
communicative nature (Schmerber v California)51 , but not in respect to real physical forms of 
evidence. Documentary evidence is protected but is subject to an act of production 
compelled by the state (Fisher v United States)52• Certain private records are not protected 
and are subject to a required record's exception (Shapiro v United States)53 . Once the 
danger of incrimination has been removed by a sufficient use and derivative use grant of 
immunity, the witness must testify and may no longer evoke the privilege (Kastigar v United 
States}54. Even if the privilege is successfully invoked in respect to a particular question, it 
cannot operate to end other examinatory questioning. The privilege is deemed waived 
47 378 u.s. 478 (1964). 
48 348 U.S. 436, 468 (1966). Miranda warns the prosecution, "It is impermissible to penalize an 
individual for exercising his fifth amendment privilege when he is under police custodial interrogation. 
The prosecution may not ... use at trial the fact that he stood mute or claimed his privilege in the face 
of accusation". 
49 380 U.S. 609, 614 (1965), "the accused cannot be compelled to take the witness stand, neither 
may the judge or prosecution comment on the failure to testify''. The accused may refuse to answer 
auestions which infer guilt or which causally lead to a conclusion of guilt. 
5 142 u.s. 547 (1892). 
51 384 u.s. 757 (1966). 
52 425 u.s. 391 (1976). 
53 335 u.s. 1 (1948). 
54 406 us 441 (1972) .. 
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unless it is unequivocally invoked and the decision to grant the privilege lies with the court 
and not the witness (Colorado v Connelly) 55. 
It must be noted that there is a conceptual and jurisprudential difference in the manner in 
which the American constitutional privilege, as opposed to the English principle, is 
interpreted. The American conceptual distinction between a privilege against self-
incrimination and the right to silence is a weak one. Since the fifth amendment speaks only 
of a compulsion, both self-incrimination and silence are indiscriminately analysed against the 
background of a state-induced compulsion. Within this compulsion paradigm silence 
inevitably becomes simply another question of self-incrimination. By contrast, English and 
Commonwealth jurisprudence tends to draw a sharp distinction between the privilege against 
self-incrimination (usually claimed by a witness to the criminal proceeding) and the right to 
silence (usually claimed by the accused in a criminal proceeding). The English common law 
right to silence and the privilege against self-incrimination is based on an "absence" of any 
obligation on the part of the criminal defendant to speak and an "absence" of any right by the 
police or prosecution to infer or coerce testimony from the defendant. The American 
tradition, by contrast, places an "absolute" and "positive" bar on the coercion of self-
incriminatory statements. English jurisprudence suggests that it is inaccurate to describe the 
compellable witness as possessing a right to silence, for the witness must take the stand and 
may only refuse to answer self-incriminating questions. On the other hand, the right to 
silence, as a right not to speak, belongs only to the criminal accused. The distinction 
between a right to silence and a privilege against self-incrimination is an important one 56• For 
the sake of logic and consistency, the distinction shall be maintained throughout this thesis. 
However, the use of the word privilege as a generic term for the American silence principle 
shall be retained for the next three chapters as this is the most familiar designation of the fifth 
amendment clause. 
55 479 U.S. 157 (1986). See also Moran v Burbine 475 U.S. 412 (1986), an explicit claim must be 
made or else the witness is tacitly considered to have waived the privilege. The claim must be 
~redicated upon a substantial risk of a subsequent criminal prosecution. 
6 Canada : the Canadian constitutional right is heavily influenced by its American counterpart. Sec 
11 (c) and sec 13 of the Charter refer only to the witness's right against self-incrimination while failing 
to expressly mention a right to silence. The Canadian silence principle is only saved from an 
Americanised blurring of the distinction between the privilege against self-incrimination and the right to 
silence. by its strong English common law inheritance (sec 7 indirectly incorporates a right to silence 
into the Charter). 
South Africa: sec 35(1)(a}(b), sec 35(3}(h)(i}(1996) Constitution refers to both the accused's right to 
silence and his right against self-incrimination. In theory the accused possesses a right to silence in 
the sense that he may refuse to testify. Once he elects to testify, he loses his protection and may be 
cross-examined on all the issues he has put into dispute. His right to silence diminishes but he does 
not acquire a corresponding right against self-incrimination. The accused is not in the same position 
as the non-defendant witness, he cannot elect to selectively answer questions. To award the accused 
a right against self-incrimination as the South African Constitution does, is at least in theory, illogical. 
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The vast majority of American jurists consider the constitutional right to be a fundamental 
principle of American jurisprudence but are unable to advance a sufficiently persuasive 
raison d'etre to support a notion built largely on an uncritical adherence to a slavish stare 
decisis. For example, the libertarians, Greenwalt57 and Gerstein58, influential protagonists of 
the privilege, are unable to provide reasoned justifications which are moral and logical in 
theory and consistent in practice. American theorists who are critical of the privilege are 
strangely hesitant in calling for its abolition. Perhaps this is the result of a monumental and 
authoritative constitutional jurisprudence which frowns on direct criticism. Friendly59, despite 
a wide ranging attack on the principle, concedes the usefulness of silence at least until 
alternative protections for first amendment rights are in place. Dolinko60, the most persuasive 
of American critics, also draws back from advocating the abolition of the silence privilege on 
the rather flimsy ground that a rule whose existence lacks any principled justification is 
nevertheless functionally important, because its repeal may do violence to the legal system 
as a whole. A reasoning which is both tenuous and contradictory to the. main theme of his 
impressive work. Wigmore, who initially advocated the negation of the privilege was 
eventually to concede the necessity of its existence, but within narrowly prescribed 
boundaries61 . Stuntz62 would topple the silence privilege from its fundamentalist pedestal 
and reduce it to the petty rank of a mere substantive law principle. Amongst American 
theorists therefore, the privilege has been largely safe from radical attack. Debate has 
centred more on an analysis of the periodic broadening and erosion of its protective sphere 
without touching on the sensitive issue of whether there should be a privilege at all. In the 
main, the reluctance of the American legal fraternity to criticize the privilege against self-
incrimination is based on a common desire to preserve the functional integrity of the criminal 
justice system. If there is a uniform theme in the dicta of the Supreme Court, then it is this. 
Yes, we recognize that we have been unable to provide a rational justification for the 
existence of the privilege! Yes, we admit that in all probability we will be unable to develop a 
principled foundation, but to abolish the privilege would remove one of the established 
57 Greenawalt "Silence As A Moral And Constitutional Right" (23) William and Mary L. Rev. (1981), 
"Perspectives On The Right To Silence" in Crime Criminology and Public Policy Hood Ed. See supra 
chapter 3 p.92-93. 
58 Gerstein "Privacy And Self-Incrimination" (80) Ethics (1970) 87, "Punishment And Self-Incrimination" 
Am. J. Juris (1971) 84, 'The Demise of Boyd, Self-Incrimination And Private Papers In The Burger 
Court'' (27) UCLA. L. Rev (1979) 343. See supra chapter 4 p.124-129. 
59 Friendly ibid note 26. 
60 Dolinko "Is There A Rationale For The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination" (33) U.C.L.A. L. Rev 
i1986) 1063. 
1 Wigmore ibid note 6. 
62 Stuntz "Self-Incrimination And Excuse" (86} Colombia L. Rev (1988) 1227, and The Substantive 
Origins Of Criminal Procedure" (105) Yale L. J (1995) 393. See supra chapter 4 p.129-134. 
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functional mainstays of the adversarial trial process and cause immense damage to the 
American criminal system as a whole! 
5.2 The Miranda Legacy- Custodial Interrogation 
The Warren Supreme Court in its 1966 decision Miranda v Arizona 63 deliberately sets out a 
landmark judgement which has significantly influenced the course of United States pre-trial 
criminal procedure over the past three decades. 54 The controversial decision has profoundly 
affected the nature of the fifth amendment privilege,65 as well as channeling the rules 
governing confessional law into an altogether new direction. In essence Miranda draws a 
"bright line" to be followed by law enforcement officials, the suspect and the court. A "bright 
line" defined as an automatic exclusionary rule for coerced statements made by a suspect 
during custodial interrogation. Miranda aims at placing the suspect on an equal footing with 
the interrogator by providing the suspect with certain procedural safeguards and by 
demanding that any admission or confession made by the suspect be dependent on a 
knowing and intelligent waiver of fifth and sixth amendment rights. The Miranda exclusionary 
rule is based on a framework of four essential elements. Before interrogation, the police 
must warn the suspect of his right to remain silent.66 Anything said may be used against the 
suspect at trial. The suspect has a right to consult with an attorney of his choice and to have 
the attorney present during interrogation. If the suspect is indigent, an attorney will be 
appointed to represent him.67 When the interrogation is conducted without the presence of 
an attorney, the state bears a heavy burden to show that the suspect waived his rights in a 
voluntary and intelligent manner.68 Two reasons are advanced by the Warren Court for 
developing a new fundamental rule. First, the common law involuntary confessional test was 
63 384 U.S 436 (1966). The "Warren Court" named after the incumbent Chief Justice at the time, C J 
Warren. 
64 There is a vast literature on the Miranda decision : The more influential articles are : Weisselberg 
"Saving Miranda" (84) Cornell L. Rev (1998) 109. Garcia "Is Miranda Dead, Was It Overruled Or Is It 
lrrelevanf' (10) StThomas L. Rev (1998) 461. Stack "Criminal Procedure, Confessions, Waiver Of 
Privilege" (25) Seton Hall L. Rev (1994) 353. Dripps "Beyond The Warren Court And Its Conservative 
Critics" {23) U. Mich. J. L Rev (1990) 591.. Saltzburg "Miranda Revisited : Constitutional Law Or 
Judicial Fiaf' (26) Washburn. L. J (1986) 1. Marcus "The Supreme Court And The Privilege Against 
Self-Incrimination" (38) Oklahoma L. Rev {1985) 719. Grano ''Voluntariness Free Will And The Law Of 
Confession" (65) Va. L. Rev (1979) 859. Sunderland "Self-Incrimination And The Constitutional Law 
Principle" (15) Wake Forest L. Rev (1979) 171. Berger "The Unprivileged Status Of The Fifth 
Amendment Privilege" (15) Am. Crim. L. Rev (1978) 201. Kamisar "A Dissent From The Miranda 
Dissents" (65) Mich. L. Rev (1966) 59. Other interesting articles on Miranda are Markman "The Fifth 
Amendment And Custodial Questioning. A Response To Considering Miranda" (54) U. Chi. L. Rev 
~1987)938. Caplan "Questioning Miranda" {38) Vand. L. Rev(1985) 1417. 
5 The Miranda decision breaks new ground because the Fifth Amendment literally only applies to 
criminal trials and makes no mention of the pre-trial police interrogation process. 
66 Miranda ibid at 478. 
67 Ibid at 467-473 and 479. 
68 Ibid at 475. 
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a vague, unclear and insecure test of admissibility. The exclusionary test set out in Miranda 
is clear and unambiguous. Second, the atmosphere of custodial interrogation is inherently 
coercive. The Miranda safeguards counter-balance and dissipate the coercive interrogation 
room atmosphere and make the possibility of a voluntary confession more likely. From the 
outset both the policy and the legal nature of the Miranda doctrine were in doubt. The 
doctrine was initially intended to serve two policy functions. Primarily it was designed as a 
protection for the suspect's personal right to silence (and not to incriminate himself) during 
custodial interrogation. Secondarily, it was also intended as a disciplinary tool with the 
purpose of dissuading police from exploiting the coercive atmosphere of the police station 
and from employing dubious interrogation techniques. In practice though, the doctrine has 
driven interrogation techniques underground and has stimulated a plethora of police 
interviewing manuals concerned with circumventing the Miranda warnings. The legal status 
of Miranda is also open to doubt. Is the doctrine an absolute (no balance of interest) or a 
relative (balance of interest allowed) constitutional right? If it has no constitutional authority, 
may it be reduced to a mere prophylactic safeguard? Numerous post-Miranda Supreme 
Court decisions have leveled the doctrine to no more than a prophylactic standard 
announcing rights which are not themselves constitutionally protected. 59 
The scope of the Miranda protection has been subject to deep erosion. Evidence going to 
"credibility" may be used in cross-examination where the accused testifies inconsistently to 
some element of his confession70 or in rebuttal of his confession.71 There is a "public safety 
exception" allowing the police officer to exclude the Miranda catalogue in a circumstance 
endangering public safety.72 The fruits of the "poisonous tree doctrine" (which excludes 
derivative evidence acquired indirectly from an infringement of a constitutional right) is not 
applicable to some kinds of Miranda breaches.73 The Miranda doctrine is generally a 
controversial attempt to find a workable compromise to the perennial problem of balancing 
the state public interest in achieving low-cost convictions against the personal interest of the 
accused in a fair and just criminal process. 74 Many such compromise solutions have been 
proposed and have spawned heated debate on both sides of the Atlantic. In England the 
fulcrum has shifted in favour of the state public interest through the enactment of both the 
69 Michigan v Tucker 417 U.S 433, 444 (1974) per Rehnquist J "[the Miranda rules) are not 
themselves protected by the Constitution but were instead measures to insure that the right against 
self-incrimination was protected ... to provide practical reinforcement of that right". See also Oregon v 
Elstad 470 U.S 298 (1985). 
70 Harris v New York 401 U.S 222 (1971 ). 
71 Oregon v Hass 420 U.S 714 (1975). 
72 New York v Quarles 467 U.S 649 (1984). 
73 Michigan v Tucker417 U.S 433 (1974). 
74 Miranda ibid at 479, 488- 490. Miranda has downplayed the interests of society in favour of the 
individual. Miranda emphasizes personal privacy from unsolicited state intrusions. 
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Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (PACE) and the tough Criminal Justice and Public 
Order Act 1994 (CRIMPO). In the United States, the Supreme Court has over the past thirty 
years gently but persistently chiseled away at the edifice of the Miranda safeguards. 
Nevertheless, it is a fundamental principle that after triggering the Miranda warning, the 
government is absolutely prohibited from making evidentiary use of the suspect's silence. 
The suspect's silence in the face of interrogation and inferences drawn from this silence are 
inadmissible at trial. 
Traditionally, the United States Supreme Court has adhered to the common law 
voluntariness doctrine which defines coerced confessions in terms of ordinary evidentiary 
rules and without reference to constitutional principles.75 In Hopt v Utah,76 Wilson v United 
States77 and Pierce v United States, 78 the Supreme Court defined the common law rule in the 
following terms : "[a confession] is admissible in evidence if it is freely and voluntarily made 
and inadmissible where induced as a result of a threat or promise by or in the presence of a 
person in authority, which threat or promise operates on the fears or hopes of the accused, 
depriving him of the freedom of will or self-control".79 The common law voluntary test 
examines the subjective state of mind and the credibility of the accused's testimony, rather 
than the procedural rules used in obtaining the testimony. The nexus between evidentiary 
confessional law and the constitution was first tentatively explored in Bram v United States.80 
After an examination of historical precedent, Bram held that the fifth amendment and the 
common law voluntariness rule were causally related because both prevented similar wrongs 
75 Wigmore Evidence In Trials sec 824 (McNaughton Ed) (1961) identifies two ways of excluding 
confessions (a) is the confession trustworthy; b) whether the facts surrounding the confession suggest 
that it is false. Wigmore applies this reasoning only to the common law confession definition because 
he interprets the fifth amendment narrowly. Grano ''Voluntariness, Free Will And The Law Of 
Confession" (65) Val. L. Rev (1979) 859 notes that there are two standards subsumed in a proper 
definition of voluntariness : (a) a right not to be coerced into confessing (a volitional and mental 
freedom), (b) the right not to have police use tactics that result in an unfair advantage or improper 
exploitation. 
76 110 U.S 574, 584-585 (1884). 
77 162 U.S 613, 622-23 (1896). 
78 160 u.s 355, 357 (1896). 
79 Hopt v Utah at 584 - 585. See also Ogletree "Are Confessions Really Good For The Soul? A 
Proposal To Mirandize Miranda" (100) Harv. L. Rev (1987) 1826, 1831. Tomkovicz "Standards For 
Invocations And Waiver Of Counsel In Confession Contexts" (71) Iowa L. Rev (1986) 975. Please 
note that for the purpose of this thesis no distinction is drawn between a confession (to all the crime) 
and an admission (to part of the crime), nor between exculpatory or inculpatory statements. Miranda 
holds that for the purpose of explaining the connection between confessional law and the fifth 
amendment privilege, no such distinction need be made (at 476, 477). See also Aschcraft v 
Tennessee 327 U.S 276, 278-279 (1946). 
80 168 U.S 532, 542 (1897). For a discussion of Bram see Dix "Mistake, Ignorance, Expectations Of 
Benefit And The Modern Law of Confessions" Wash. U. L. Q (1975) 275, 960. Uniman "The Soap Box 
Exception To The Miranda Rule: Fifth Amendment Protections Slip Down The Drain" (15) Seton Hall 
L.Rev(1985)685,688. 
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and secured similar safeguards.81 Bram has been criticized for its unsubstantiated 
assumption that the fifth amendment necessarily determines the voluntariness of a 
confession.82 The Bram decision applied only on the federal level and subsequent state 
court decisions reverted to the pre-Bram evidentiary voluntariness rule. Ziang Sung Wan v 
United States83 and Perovich v United States,84 defined coerced confessions purely in terms 
of traditional evidentiary rules. The traditional rule was modified in Brown v Mississippi,85 
which made no reference to the fifth amendment and grounded its decision on the fourteenth 
amendment "due process" rule. The Brown test concentrates on due process and the police 
conduct used in eliciting confessions.86 Brown effectively merges the common law 
component which focuses on the suspect's state of mind and the credibility of his statement 
with the procedural due process component of the fourteenth amendment which focuses on 
the interrogation methods employed by the police.87 From the 1940s through to the 1960s 
the "modified due process" model continued to be the preferred norm determining on an ad 
hoc case by case basis whether a confession was truly the product of the suspect's free 
will. 88 The Supreme Court eventually adopted a "totality of the circumstances"89 due process 
model to assess whether a confession was the product of a rational intellect and a free will or 
whether the accused's will was overborne by police tactics.90 Despite a shift from the 
common law emphasis on the overall reliability of the statement to an emphasis on a scrutiny 
of police conduct the Supreme Court did not articulate the totality of circumstances approach 
with any great degree of specificity. The due process standard did not allow for a 
81 Bram ibid at 543, 583, 585. 
82 Wigmore ibid note 75 describes Bram as the height of absurdity in the misapplication of the law. 
83 266 U.S 1,14-17 (1924). 
84 205 U.S 86, 91 (1907), noting that the Supreme Court's unwillingness to confront the constitutional 
issue of confession was based on precedent and the common law which excluded confessions purely 
in terms of evidentiary rules. 
85 297 U.S. 278 (1936) the court excluded an involuntary confession in a state court by using the 
fourteenth amendment due process clause (at 286- 287), due process requires that all state action 
"be consistent with the fundamental principles of liberty and justice which underlie our civil and political 
institutions". 
86 The fourteenth amendment due process clause reads in part, "nor shall any state deprive any 
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law". 
87 See Link "Fifth Amendment - The Constitutionality Of Custodial Confessions" (82) J. Crim. L. 
Criminology (1992) 878. 
88 For a full discussion on the development of the voluntary test see Kamisar "On The Fruits Of 
Miranda. Violations, Coerced Confessions And Compelled Testimony'' (93) Mich. L. Rev (1995) 929, 
936-41. 
89 The "totality of circumstance" requires an assessment of police conduct in procuring the confession 
as well as the status and characteristics of the suspect. Crossley "Note : Miranda And The State 
Constitution : State Courts Take A Stand" (39) Vand. L. Rev (1986) 1693, 1705. The classic 
formulation of this approach is in Co/umber v Connecticut 367 U.S 568, 602 (1961 ), "is the confession 
the product of an essentially free will and unconstrained choice by its maker? If it is, the confession 
may be used against him. If it is not, if his will has been overborne and his capacity for self-
determination critically impaired, the use of his confession offends due process". 
9° Factors to be assessed were the ability to withstand interrogation, the length of interrogation, 
opportunity for sleep and eating, suspect's education, the use of physical and psychological pressure. 
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satisfactory judicial review, gave little guidance to the police on correct interrogatory 
techniques and was based on an elusive, measureless standard of psychological coercion.91 
According to Irving v Stone,92 "the chief result of the ad hoc case-by-case assessment of due 
process was an unpredictability, in which inchoate notions of propriety concerning local 
police conduct guides the court decision and which does not shape the conduct of local 
police one whit". Similarly, in Miranda v Arizona,93 Justice Harlan remarks, "The court has 
never pinned the voluntariness rubric down to a single meaning but on the contrary infused it 
with a number of different values .... apart from direct physical coercion [in which the police 
overreach normal civilized behaviour] ... no single or fixed combination of [values] 
guarantees exclusion [of confessions]". The dissatisfaction with the common law 
voluntariness rule in England has also triggered significant changes in the standard of 
confession admissibility. Sec 76 and sec 78 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 
(PACE) now embody unique statutory modifications to confessionallaw.94 (By contrast, the 
South African rule of confessional admissibility is a statutory formulation of the ordinary 
English common law as it was in 1830).95 
By the mid-1960s the United States Supreme Court was ready to replace the vague 
voluntariness rule with an objective concrete standard. In a number of cases beginning with 
Malloy v Hogan,96 the Supreme Court abandoned the modified due process voluntary 
approach and made the admissibility of confessions dependent upon an objective 
constitutional standard based on the fifth and sixteenth amendment.97 Malloy proclaimed 
that the admissibility of confessions in state courts would be governed by the same 
standards employed in the federal courts since Bram. The new objective standard was made 
applicable to the state courts by means of the familiar fourteenth amendment due process 
91 The due process totality model was a soft value-laden standard difficult to apply because it lacked 
uniform factors. It lacked clear guidelines for the courts and clear procedural standards for the police. 
92 347 u.s 128, 138-139 (1954). 
93 384 U.S at 507 - 508. See Kasimar "What Is An Involuntary Confession" (17) Rutgers L. Rev 
(1963) 745 - 46 who suggests that the voluntariness rule is an old threadbare generality, an empty 
abstraction designed to vilify certain effective interrogation techniques. 
94 See infra chapter 8 p.290-292. 
95 The South African common law voluntary definition of confession is statutorily defined in sec 217 
(confessions) and sec 219A (admissions). Zeffertt and Hoffmann South African Law of Evidence 4th 
Ed (1996). Australia has chosen to follow the English example and has statutorily modified its 
confession rule by excluding the voluntariness concept, i.e. Evidence Act 1995 (Cth), Evidence Act 
1995 (NSW). Dennis ''The Admissibility Of Confessions Under Sec 84 And 85 Of The Evidence Act 
1995" (18) Sydney L. Rev (1996) 34. 
96 378 U.S 1 (1964). Malloy is the first twentieth century state case to merge the fifth amendment with 
the confessional rule (Bram is a nineteenth century federal case). Malloy noted the state/federal court 
distinction and concluded that the same standard must govern the accused's silence in both federal 
and state proceedings (at 7 and 11 ). 
97 Malloy justified the shift from a due process model to a fifth and sixth amendment model on the 
ground that the American criminal justice system was accusatorial not inquisitorial in nature (at 7). 
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clause.98 Following hard on the heels of Malloy, the Supreme Court announced two other 
decisions which illustrated the dissatisfaction with the modified due process approach. In 
both cases the Supreme Court applied a sixth amendment rather than a fifth amendment 
type analysis. In Massaih v United States,99 the court held that a suspect possessed a right 
to counsel during a post-indictment interrogation. Any infringement of the suspect's sixth 
amendment right rendered his confession inadmissible. Following logically from Massaih's 
reasoning the court in Escobedo v Illinois 100 extended the sixth amendment protection to 
pre-indictment confessions by holding that the suspect's right to counsel becomes operative 
the moment the police investigation focus shifts from the preliminary investigatory to the 
formal accusatory stage. 101 Malloy, Massaih and Escobedo laid the initial foundations for the 
Miranda decision and foreshadow the demise of the voluntary and due process model. The 
linking of confessional law with the sixth amendment and the dramatic switch from a due 
process to a six amendment analytical scheme did not solve the problem concerning the 
unclear standards applied in confession cases. State and federal courts continued to 
struggle with the ambiguous Escobedo sixth amendment focus standard.102 
The confusion surrounding the vague and shifting standards of confessional law was finally 
resolved in Miranda v Arizona. Miranda represents a radical departure from prior precedent. 
Police interrogation before Miranda had never been fully analysed in the language of fifth 
amendment jurisprudence. In Miranda the Supreme Court comprehensively rejects prior 
confession admission standards based on common law voluntary rules, due process or sixth 
amendment principles. Instead, the Miranda rule looks to the fifth amendment's self-
incrimination clause to prohibit the use, in court, of inculpatory statements made during a 
custodial interrogation. The Miranda intention is to seek a meaningful, precise and clear 
standard of confession voluntariness which covers not only inadmissible inculpatory 
98 Shulhofer "Reconsidering Miranda" (54) U. Chi. L. Rev (1987) 440 - 46, criticizes the Supreme 
Court for confusing the fifth amendment concept of "compulsion" with the due process concept of 
"involuntariness". This confusion has led to an uncertainty about the nature of a confession in the 
Miranda decision. 
99 377 u.s 201, 204 (1964). 
100 378 u.s 478 (1964). 
101 Escobedo at 490 - 491, 492, ''where the investigation is no longer a general inquiry ... but has 
begun to focus on a particular suspect . . . and the suspect has requested and been denied an 
opportunity to consult with a lawyer ... no statement elicited by the police may be used against him in 
a criminal trial". Escobedo has been criticized because prior precedent does not indicate that a 
suspect can invoke a sixth amendment right to counsel before the criminal charge, neither does the 
sixth amendment guarantee a right to silence. 
102 Some state courts interpreted Escobedo narrowly (a constitutional violation occurs onc_e the 
suspect specifically requests and is refused counsel). Hawaii v Cummings 49 Hawaii 522 423 P2d 
{1967). Other courts adopted a broader view (once the suspect has effectively been denied counsel). 
State v Neely 239 Oregon 487, P2d 482 (1965), See Bowman "The Right To Counsel During 
Custodial Interrogation" (39) Vand. L. Rev (1986) 1159. Warden "Miranda : Some History, Some 
Observations And Some Questions" (20) Vand. L. Rev (1966) 39. 
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statements induced by extreme forms of physical and psychological interrogatory pressures. 
but also those statements obtained through more subtle techniques such as persuasion, 
trickery and deception. The Miranda doctrine would produce voluntary statements by 
establishing a set of procedural safeguards designed to dissipate the coercion inherent in 
custodial interrogation. 
Miranda v Arizona 103 is really four cases sharing similar facts, deliberately joined together for 
the sole purpose of allowing the Supreme Court a forum in which to articulate the new pre-
trial standard. All four cases involve the isolation of the suspect in a police dominated 
environment resulting in the extraction of self-incriminatory statements induced in the 
absence of sufficient warnings about constitutional rights. Miranda seeks to provide a non-
coercive neutral environment in which the suspect may make an informed choice, whether or 
not to exercise the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination.104 An environment 
which relieves the suspect of the pressure to speak and which allows for a free and rational 
decision making process.105 Where the suspect elects to waive his rights and privilege, the 
choice must be made knowingly, intelligently106 and constitute an unfettered exercise of free 
will. The essence of the Miranda safeguard may be defined in the following sentence, 
"where the suspect is detained or placed in custody and is about to be subjected to police 
interrogation, the suspect must be informed of his right to silence 107 and his right to have 
legal counsel present. 108 These rights must be rigidly honoured, 109 unless the suspect 
waives his right and does not at a later stage re-assert them. If the suspect voluntarily 
chooses to waive his right he must be informed of the possible subsequent use and effect of 
103 384 U.S 436 (1966). Miranda is the deliberate co-joining of one federal and three state cases. 
Westover v United States 342 F2d 684 (1965), Miranda v Arizona 98 Ariz 18, 401, P2d, 721 (1965), 
California v Stewart 62 Cal 2d 571, 400 P2d 97, 43 Cal repts (1965), Vignera v New York 15 N.Y. 2d 
970, 207, N.E 2d 527, 529, N.Y. 2d (1965). 
104 Miranda at 461, "an individual swept from familiar surroundings into police custody, surrounded by 
antagonistic forces and subjected to the techniques of persuasion ... cannot be otherwise than under 
a compulsion to speak". 
105 The Miranda warning is a strong per se exclusionary rule, "no evidence obtained as a result of the 
interrogation can be used" (at 476 - 477, 479), expressly tied to the fifth amendment (at 476). By 
holding that the fifth amendment protects the suspect in an inherently coercive interrogation which 
may only be dissipated by a specific procedure, the Miranda doctrine establishes an irrebuttable 
presumption (at 476- 77, 467- 69). By contrast, Grano Confessions, Truth And The Law (1993) 185 
- 189 concludes from an examination of constitutional history that there is nothing in the fifth 
amendment which authorizes the court to create a code-like set of rules. Friendly "A Postscript On 
Miranda" in Benchmarks ( 1967) 266 - 67, criticizes Miranda for utilizing the Bill of Rights to prescribe a 
detailed code of criminal procedure. 
106 Ibid at 444,479. 
107 Ibid at 467 - 468. 
108 Ibid at 471. 
109 Ibid at 473-74. 
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self-incriminatory evidence during triat. 110 In order to strengthen procedural safeguards, the 
suspect is also empowered to claim the right to legal counsel. 111 However, the right to have 
legal counsel present during the interrogation process does not flow from the sixth 
amendment's express conferral of that right. Instead it arises indirectly from the fifth 
amendment. According to Miranda, the right to have legal counsel present is an 
indispensable adjunct of the fifth amendment privilege. 112 Despite the similar and 
overlapping protection offered by both the fifth and the sixth amendments, the two clauses do 
not duplicate but rather complement each other. In order for the sixth amendment right to 
counsel to become operative, there must be a deliberate inducement of statements by the 
state after the institution of formal legal proceedings. On the other hand, for the fifth 
amendment ancillary right to counsel to arise, there must be a coercive interrogation in a 
custodial setting before legal proceedings have been initiated.113 
The Miranda procedural safeguards are not directly mandated by the Constitution. The fifth 
amendment does not contain language which directly confers these safeguards on the 
suspect. Rather, these warnings flow indirectly from the constitution and are deliberately 
designed to protect and consolidate the suspect's right to silence and privilege against self-
incrimination which is itself constitutionally entrenched. Whether or not the Miranda rules 
should be constitutionally mandated remains an unanswered question. Majority academic 
opinion supported by a number of Supreme Court dicta suggest that the safeguards are 
mere prophylactic rules not protected by the Constitution.114 Nevertheless, the Supreme 
Court supports the reasoning that the Miranda rules may only be modified or replaced by 
alternative and equally effective substitutes. Absent other safeguards at least as effective, 
the Miranda rules are constitutionally necessary to deter compelling interrogatory pressures 
which violate the fifth amendment.115 (A similar debate rages in England where it has been 
held that the procedural safeguards established by the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 
1984 (PACE) provide sufficient guarantees for a voluntary confession). 
The Miranda decision breaks through to a new ground, and extends the fifth amendment into 
an arena not previously contemplated by the eighteenth century authors of the constitutional 
110 Ibid at 467 - 69. 
111 Ibid at 469. 
112 Ibid at 469 and 471. 
113 United States v Henry 447 U.S 264, 272-75 (1980), finding that in the absence of custodial 
interrogation, the sixth amendment right to counsel is preferable to the fifth amendment. 
114 Michigan v Tucker 417 U.S 433, 444 (1974), New York v Quarles 467 U.S 649, 654 (1984), 
Oregon v Elstad 470 U.S 298, 291 (1985). See also Strauss 'The Ubiquity Of Prophylactic Rules (55) 
U. Chi. L. Rev (1988) 190. 
115 Withrow v Williams 507 U.S 680, 594 (1993) "absent safeguards at least as effective, the Miranda 
rules are constitutionally necessary". 
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privilege. Miranda justifies going beyond the traditional parameters by emphasizing the 
benefit to both society and the individual. The Supreme Court embraces a "carefully crafted 
balance designed to fully protect both the defendant's and society's interests".116 A designed 
test which must on one hand prevent coerced confessions and yet on the other hand, 
facilitate law enforcement efforts. Whether or not Miranda has achieved a proper and finely 
poised balance is an unsettled question. Conventional wisdom holds that Miranda has had a 
negligible effect on law enforcement. The number of convictions and the overall number of 
confessions has not decreased as a result of the ft1iranda safeguards.117 A minority school 
holds the opposite view and advances statistical and empirical evidence indicating a small 
but significant decrease in the post-Miranda confession rate. 118 International comparisons 
with England and Canada suggest further evidence of a declining confession rate. 119 In 
England similar statistical comparisons between the English pre-PACE regime (one which 
did not contain strict Miranda type safeguards) and the post-PACE regime (one which now 
possesses similar Miranda type protections) shows a comparable confessional rate decline 
towards American levels. One of the reasons for the enactment of the Criminal Justice and 
Public Order Act 1994 was to curtail the declining confessional rate. In effect Miranda is a 
libertarian attempt at a workable compromise. Miranda does not prohibit all interrogation. 
Interrogation even without counsel present may continue subject to procedures which protect 
fifth amendment rights. Neither does Miranda prevent police officers from questioning 
individuals who possess relevant information but are as yet not suspected of any crime. The 
procedures set out in Miranda are the minimum necessary to protect the fifth amendment but 
other procedures may be implemented so long as they are fully as effective in informing 
suspects of their right to silence and in affording a continuous opportunity to exercise it.120 
116 Moran v Burbine 475 U.S 412, 434, n4 (1986). 
117 Schulhofer "Miranda's Practical Effect : Substantial Benefits And Vanishing Small Social Costs" 
(90) Nw. U. L. Rev (1996) 552, n214, and "Bashing Miranda Is Unjustified ... And Harmful" (20) Harv. 
J. L. and Pub Po/y(1997) 347,348. 
118 Cassell "Miranda's Social Costs: An Empirical Reassessment (90) Nw. U. L. Rev (1996) 387, 408-
409 and "All Benefits, No Costs, The Grand Illusion of Miranda's Defenders" (90) Nw. U. L. Rev (1996) 
1084. Thomas "Is Miranda A Real-World Failure? (43) UCLA L. Rev (1996) 821. 
119 Statistics from Britain and Canada suggest a declining confession rate after the incorporation of 
Miranda-type protections. Under the old pre~PACE regime, the English police obtained confessions in 
between 61% to 85% of the cases, a rate at least 20% higher than the prevailing American confession 
rate after Miranda. See Cassel ibid at 419-22. 
120 Miranda as a compromise, see Herman 'The Supreme Court, The Attorney-General And The 
Good Old Days Of Police Interrogation" (48) Ohio. St. L. J (1987) 733, 735-736. Klein "Miranda 
Deconstitutionalized" (143) U. Pa. L. Rev (1994) 423-26. 
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The Miranda judgement draws a number of other conclusions which are important for a 
comprehensive understanding of the pre-trial application of the privilege against self-
incrimination and the right to silence. The decision sets out the following : 
a) An analysis of some of the philosophical rationales underpinning the privilege 
against self incrimination. 
b) Judicial recognition of the nexus between the fifth amendment privilege and the 
confessional exclusionary rule. 
c) A right to silence and to legal advice justified in terms of the fifth amendment 
(which is silent on legal advice) rather than in terms of the sixth amendment 
(which specifically refers to legal advice). 
d) A brief judicial definition of the concept "custodial interrogation", and an 
anticipation of the problems besetting the question of waiver of constitutional 
rights. 
In respect to the first point, the court assesses the philosophical nature of the privilege 
against self-incrimination against the familiar background of the two inherently conflicting 
interests which exist in the pre-trial stage. On one hand, society's need for a professional 
interrogation service and low-cost criminal processing. On the other hand, the preservation 
of the individual interest against unjust government intrusion. Miranda illustrates the shift 
away from the traditional rationales which emphasise protection of the innocent and the 
furtherance of truth, to the more fashionably modern idea that government respect the dignity 
and integrity of its citizens. 121 The court assumes that the protection of the individual interest 
far outweighs the social interest in effective law enforcement, "the whole thrust of our 
discussion demonstrates that the constitution has prescribed the rights of the individual when 
confronted with the power of government, when it provided in the fifth amendment that an 
individual cannot be compelled to be a witness against himself. That right cannot be 
abrogated."122 The court speaks of a noble principle which, "transcends its origins" and 
nurtures the individual's unassailable right to a "private enclave 123 where [the individual] may 
lead a private life, a hallmark of our democracy". The privilege is reduced to a simple but 
fundamental value reflecting "the inviolability of the human personality" and the "avoidance of 
cruel124 expedients compelling evidence from an individual's own mouth" .125 The mechanism 
which protects these values is borne by the government which shoulders the entire burden 
121 See supra chapter 4 p.112-113. 
122 Miranda at 479 and 488-90. 
123 See supra chapter 4 p.118. 
124 See supra chapter 3 p.114 
125 Ibid at 459-61. 
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by maintaining a "fair-state individual balance.126 The danger to be guarded against is the 
physical or psychological compulsion intrinsic to the interrogation process.127 Compulsion is 
inhumane as it infringes the desire for self-preservation and liberty fundamental to the 
American socio-political system. These libertarian arguments have been confronted and 
exposed in chapter four. Miranda is a typical illustration of the sentimentality expounded by 
libertarians in their search for fifth amendment justifications. It is the product of a post-World 
War human rights culture. 
The second point examines the causal relationship between coerced confessions and the 
privilege. Miranda addresses the rule against the admission of involuntary confessions, not 
in evidentiary language, but in constitutional terms. The confessional exclusionary rule now 
forms part of the privilege against self-incrimination and is encompassed by the fifth 
amendment. Is there a nexus between the confession rule and the privilege against self-
incrimination? Wigmore thought not and found no historical connection between the two.128 
Levy on the other hand, while acknowledging the historical differences between the two 
concepts, does recognize an intimate connection. "There remains ... an indissolvable nexus 
between the two, because both involve the involuntary acknowledgement of guilt. Every 
coerced confession was a violation of the right against self-incrimination".129 The right 
against self-incrimination and the confession rule seem logically to merge in the fifth 
amendment because of the element of compulsion common to both. The confessional 
exclusionary rule and the privilege reflect the same common idea, "a determination to hold 
public authorities up to a humane and honourable standard of conduct in the treatment of 
persons suspected or accused".130 According to Miranda, it matters not if the compulsion 
takes the form of psychological coercion in the case of an inadmissible confession or 
whether the coercion is an unfree choice between perjury and self-incrimination. Humane 
126 Ibid at 460. ''The fifth amendment is the mainstay of our adversarial system. Distinguishing our 
adversarial system from an inquisitorial system. 
127 Justice White dissenting (Miranda at 533-534} notes the following incongruity. A suspect in custody 
who spontaneously blurts out an admissible confession, without first being warned of his right is not 
being coerced, but if the police ask him a single question, without warning him and he makes a 
spontaneous admission, his response is somehow compelled. 
128 Wigmore Evidence In Trials McNaughton Ed (1961} sec 823 (338-339} "a confession is not 
rejected because of any connection with the privilege". Grano Confessions, Truth And The Law 
(1993} "Miranda erred from an historical perspective in perceiving an intimate connection between the 
privilege and the admissibility of confessions". 
129 Levy "Origins Of The Fifth Amendment' (1968} 328, 329 "the voluntary confession rule functioned 
as an exclusionary rule that protected the accused's right against self-incrimination in the pre-trial 
stages of the criminal process". 
130 Maguire Evidence Of Guilt (1959} 109. 
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conduct is the standard which links confessional law to the privilege against self-
incrimination. Both serve as a protection against physical or psychological compulsion. 
Third, Miranda stresses the need for ready access by the suspect to legal assistance.131 The 
suspect may request the presence 132 of an attorney at any time during the interrogation 
process. A right to counsel at this stage is said to protect the suspect from an unwitting and 
unknowing incrimination. It helps the accused in dealing with the highly technical criminal 
process. The fifth amendment right to counsel has been strongly criticized because it draws 
its formulisation and precedent from the sixth amendment which has no application to police 
interrogation.133 The fifth amendment is silent on the issue of legal advice and the Miranda 
court appears to have conjured a right to legal assistance from thin air. Justice Harlan 
(dissenting) remarks that there is "powerful historical and precedential evidence ... the [sixth] 
amendment does not justify the type of rule fashioned in Miranda" .134 The sixth amendment, 
literally interpreted, is directed at safeguarding the post-indictment procedural rights of the 
accused.135 To employ sixth amendment precedent to justify the extension of a fifth 
amendment right to counsel to the pre-indictment stage of police interrogation is simply 
incorrect and bad law. Furthermore, in creating a fifth amendment right to legal counsel, the 
court has partially shifted the focus away from the question of the suspect's free will to a 
question about the will of the counsel and the counsel's influence over the suspect.136 
Nevertheless, on a practical level, both the fifth amendment right to counsel and the sixth 
amendment right to counsel dovetail with each other and provide a continuous level of legal 
assistance from the moment of arrest through to the moment of trial. 
The Miranda judgement touches briefly on the meanings of custodial interrogation and 
waiver. Custodial interrogation is defined as "questioning initiated by law enforcement 
officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of 
131 Miranda at 469, 471. See also Tomkovicz "Standards For Innovation And Waiver In Confessional 
Contexts" (71) Iowa L. Rev (1986} 975, 977 (note 1) 983, 990-91. 
132 Unlike the sixth amendment right to counsel which arises automatically, the fifth amendment right 
to counsel must be consciously invoked by the suspect. Miranda at 470. 
133 Grano Confessions, Truth And The Law (1993) 186-189, suggests that the court made a mistake 
when it abandoned the sixth amendment (the Escobedo ruling, supra note 100-101) in favour of the 
fifth amendment. But even the sixth amendment has its problems. Neither the constitutional text nor 
the history of the right to counsel support its extension into the interrogation room (prior to the filing of 
charges). The sixth amendment only guarantees the right to the accused "in all criminal prosecutions" 
and as "assistance for his defence". The arrested suspect who is sitting in a police interrogation room 
hardly fits the description created by the text. (Grano at 157 -60). 
134 Harlan J (dissenting) at 510, 514. 
135 The sixth amendment reads, "in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a 
speedy public trial, by an impartial jury ... and to have the assistance of counsel for his defence". 
136 White J (dissenting) at 536-537. 
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action in any significant way".137 In determining custody, a court should ask the question 
whether or not a reasonable person in the suspect's circumstance would regard himself as 
formally arrested or otherwise free to leave the station house.138 Interrogation is defined as 
an express questioning with a determinable goal in mind or the functional equivalent of an 
express questioning.139 Interrogation includes practices, actions or utterances which the 
interviewer should know will reasonably invoke an incriminatory response from the suspect. 
The Miranda safeguards, based as they are on the suspect's free choice, may be waived at 
any stage.140 In order for the suspect's waiver to be valid, the waiver must have been made 
voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently.141 Waiver is decided against a strict standard.142 The 
standard required is an express assertion by the suspect that he is willing to speak to the 
police followed immediately by a written statement to that effect. A waiver may not be 
presumed from mere silence; it must consist of a positive act. The fact that a confession is 
eventually obtained from the suspect does not automatically infer a valid waiver of rights. 143 
Neither may a waiver be implied simply because the suspect has answered a few questions 
·or given information prior to invoking the privilege.144 A waiver obtained under coercive 
circumstances, in which the suspect is threatened, tricked, cajoled or persuaded into 
confessing may never be construed as a valid waiver.145 Where the waiver is obtained in 
questionable and suspicious circumstances, the state bears a heavy burden of proving the 
validity of the waiver. 146 
The Miranda majority opinion was severely criticized by the minority dissent.147 Justice 
White, in particular, strongly attacks the conclusion reached by the majority as unsupported 
by both the history and the language of the fifth amendment.148 White J identifies the 
137 Miranda at 444. 
138 See further the definition of custody in Berkermer v McCarthy 468 U.S 420, 442 (1984) as the 
functional equivalent of arrest. 
139 Interrogation defined in Rhode Island v Innis 446 U.S 291, 300 (1980) as any conduct which the 
police know is likely to elicit an incriminating response. 
140 Miranda at 444, 479. See also Thomas "An Assault On The Temple Of Miranda" (85) J. Grim. Law 
And Criminology (1995) 807-27. 
141 Ibid at 479. but note the logical flaw in the Miranda doctrine. If the interrogation room is inherently 
coercive, how can the suspect validly waive his Miranda rights? (White J dissenting at 536). 
142 Ibid at 475. the Miranda court applied the strict standard suggested in Johnson v Zerbst 304 U.S 
458, 464 (1938), "courts indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver ... and do not presume 
acquiescence in the loss of fundamental rights". 
143 Miranda ibid at 475. 
144 Ibid at 475-476. 
145 Ibid at 476, "even absent threats or promises by the police a waiver may be deemed invalid if 
obtained under coercive circumstances". 
146 Because the state controls the interrogation process, a heavy burden rests on the state to prove a 
valid waiver of rights. 
147 Miranda is a 5 to 4 decision, written by Warren C.J. and supported by Justices Black, Douglas, 
Brennan and Fortas. Justices White, Harlan, Stewart and Clark dissenting. 
148 White J at 531-532, 526-527. 
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privilege only as a trial right in which the state may not compel the testimony of the accused. 
The privilege does not encompass a right against police custodial interrogation. In effect, 
White J accuses the majority of judicial legislation. The Miranda doctrine establishes a new 
constitutional barrier to the ascertainment of the truth. He also challenges the majority's 
underlying assumption that compulsion is inherent in every custodial interrogation.149 He 
perceives the majority as having unjustifiably elevated personal autonomy over societal 
interests in security, noting, "more than the human dignity of the accused is involved, the 
human personality of others in society must also be preserved" .150 White J characterizes the 
basic function of government as the duty to provide a continuous protection to the individual 
and his property. 151 The Miranda doctrine hinders this essential function. White also points 
to the inherent reliability of a confession which contributes to the certitude with which we may 
believe the accused is guilty, especially when corroborated by external physical evidence.152 
The majority's contention that a confession is harmful to the accused is rejected, instead the 
confession is deemed to "provide a psychological relief and enhances the prospects for 
rehabilitation". 153 The majority's exclusionary rule also gives rise to a number of practical 
problems. First, the assertion of the warning during custodial interrogation results in an 
immediate cut-off of all questioning, including reasonable questioning, but coercive 
questioning may continue indefinitely after a waiver of rights. The Miranda rule smacks of 
impracticability. Second, if custodial interrogation is inherently coercive, how does the 
warning go about reducing the coercive level? Alternatively, how does a failure to give the 
• 
warning contribute to an increase in the coercion level? 
5.3 The Retreat From Miranda 
The Supreme Court retreat from Miranda began almost immediately. The resignation of 
Chief Justice Warren, a reshaping of the Supreme Court personnel and a reactionary 
conservative political environment gradually becoming more intolerant of constitutional rights 
for criminals combined to trigger a reappraisal of the Miranda safeguards.154 A number of 
149 White J at 532-537. 
150 Ibid at 537. 
151 Ibid at 539. 
152 Ibid at 538. 
153 Ibid at 538. 
154 Blaine "Miranda (Miranda v Arizona) Under Fire" (10) Seton. Hall. Const. L. J (2000) 1007-52. 
Dripps "Is The Miranda Case Law Really Inconsistent? A Proposed Fifth Amendment Synthesis" (17) 
Constitutional Comm (2000) 19, 48. Weisselberg "Saving Miranda" (84) Come// L. Rev (1998) 109-92. 
Marcus "A Return To The Bright Line Rule Of Miranda" (35) Wm. And Mary L. Rev (1993) 93, 143, 
"suggesting that the Supreme Court has invited police to evade Miranda's normative prescriptions". 
Kamisar "On The Fruits Of Miranda. Violations, Coerced Confessions And Compelled Testimony" (93) 
Mich. L. Rev (1995) 929-1010. Chertoff "Chopping Miranda Down To Size" (93) Mich. L. Rev (1995) 
1713-23. 
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key factors have contributed to the gradual erosion. First, the Supreme Court has been 
unable to explain the intimate legal connection between the confessional rule and the 
privilege against self-incrimination. The court has made several conceptual leaps of faith. It 
initially equated the exclusionary-evidentiary confession rule of "involuntariness" with the 
involuntariness doctrine of the fourteenth amendment due process clause. It then 
subsequently conflates the "involuntariness" principle of due process with the 
"compulsion/coercion" principle of the fifth amendment. Much of the debate and confusion 
surrounding the Miranda decision arises from the opaque nature of these apparently 
necessary and intimate connections. 
Second, the fundamental weakness of the Miranda "bright line" exclusionary rule is that it 
seeks to do everything and in practice, ends up doing very little. The strict inflexible rule is 
both over-inclusive and under-inclusive. If Miranda's aim is to negate the inherent coercion 
of custodial interrogation, then logically, the exclusionary rule should apply to all statements 
made by the suspect, regardless of a knowing waiver.155 The Miranda rule is also under-
inclusive because it does not prevent coercion by unscrupulous police officers who will use 
trickery or deception to get round the waiver requirement. 156 To empower the police officer 
with the task of administering the Miranda warning is a little like asking the cat to warn the 
mouse that it is about to be eaten. The focus has shifted from an analysis of a "voluntary 
confession" traditionally hedged by a large number of protective rules, to an analysis of an 
effective and "knowing waiver". In practical reality, it is now easier for the dishonest police 
officer to fabricate a simple waiver of rights rather than to counterfeit convincing indications 
of voluntariness. Instead of strengthening the suspect's position, Miranda has made it easier 
for police to obtain a waiver of rights and consequently, an admissible confession. 
Third, in order to strengthen pre-trial procedural safeguards, Miranda has awarded the 
suspect with a right to legal advice. The right to legal counsel does not arise from the sixth 
amendment as would be naturally expected, but indirectly from the fifth amendment itself. 
Yet, the fifth amendment is expressly silent about legal counsel. Miranda appears to have 
conjured a right to counsel from thin air. In doing so, the court has partially shifted the inquiry 
away from the suspect's knowing waiver to a question about the intention of the legal 
counsel, his advice and influence over the suspect. 
155 Miranda, White J (dissenting) at 533. 
156 Miranda, Harlan J (dissenting) at 505. 
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Fourth, within three years of Miranda, the U.S Congress passed the Omnibus Crime Control 
and Safe Streets Act 1968 (codified in 18 U.S.C. sec 3501 (1994)) allowing for the federal 
legislative re-establishment of the evidentiary confessional rule which Miranda had rejected. 
The relevant provision allows the judge, in deciding the admissibility of confessions, to take 
into account not only the Miranda rule, but also to examine voluntariness. "A confession 
shall be admissible if it is voluntarily given".157 Although successive federal administrations 
have declined to argue that sec 3501 does supercede Miranda, at least in theory, federal 
courts were bound to apply sec 3501 and not Miranda. The Supreme Court has in Dickerson 
v United States, 158 declared sec 3501 to be unconstitutional. The court has in effect upheld 
the principle that a violation of the Miranda safeguards gives rise to an irrebuttable 
presumption of involuntariness rendering the suspect's confession inadmissible.159 The 
court relies entirely on precedent for its decision and does not analyse the fifth amendment 
privilege on its merits. In the words of Chief Justice Rehnquist, "whether or not we would 
agree with Miranda's reasoning and its resulting rule ... the principles of stare decisis weigh 
heavily against overruling it now" .160 Miranda survives on technical grounds, but the doctrinal 
nature of the Miranda rule and the pre-trial silence principle remains unclear. 
Fifth, Miranda does not apply in an impeachment procedure. In Harris v New York, 161 Chief 
Justice Burger argued that a statement taken in violation of Miranda could be used to 
impeach the suspect's testimony at trial. 162 Subsequently, in Oregon v Hass,163 the suspect's 
statement made while police deliberately ignored his request for legal counsel was deemed 
to be admissible for impeachment purposes. 
157 18 U.S.C sec 3501 (a)(b) 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, "a confession shall be admissible in evidence if it is 
voluntarily given". The statute overrules Miranda and decrees a return to the voluntariness standard 
discarded by Miranda. See Cassel "The Statute That Time Forgot : 18 U.S.C Sec 3501 And The 
Overhauling Of Miranda" (85) Iowa L. Rev (1999) 175 "arguing that determining confessions on a 
case-to-case basis as prescribed in sec 3501 is constitutionally and socially acceptable". 
158 120 S. Ct. 2326 (2000) particularly at 2329-30. 
159 Grano "Prophylactic Rules In Criminal Procedure :A Question Of Article Ill Legitimacy'' (80) Nw. U. 
L. Rev (1985) 154-56, suggesting "that Miranda's prophylactic rule is overbroad because it establishes 
an irrebuttable presumption". 
160 Ibid, Dickerson at 2336. The Su~reme Court overturned the decision of the fourth Circuit in United 
States v Dickerson 166 F.3d 667 (4 Cir 1999) which had ruled that 18 U.S.C. sec 3051 superceded 
the Miranda warning requirements. Blaine supra note 154 at 1042-1052 argues that sec 3501 by 
adopting the pre-Miranda voluntariness test, fails to replace the Miranda safeguards with adequate 
substitutes which effectively protect the suspect's constitutional rights". See also Lunney "The Erosion 
Of Miranda: Stare Decisis Consequences" (48) Cath. U. L. Rev (1999) 727. 
161 401 u.s 222 (1971). 
162 Ibid at 224-25, Harris creates an inducement for police to violate Miranda. 
163 420 U.S 714, 723 (1975). Haas gives an open invitation to police to ignore the suspect's request 
for counsel in certain circumstances. 
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Sixth, it is still unclear whether the Miranda safeguards are constitutionally mandated or 
whether they are mere prophylactic rules. Michigan v Tucker164 appears to be Miranda's 
nemesis. Tucker has declared the Miranda procedural safeguards to be mere prophylactic 
measures without constitutional authority.165 The primary effect of Tucker is to cut off 
Miranda from its constitutional foundation and to make it easier for police to circumvent and 
infringe the procedural safeguards. Modern police manuals devote much space to methods 
by which the prophylactic rules may now be safely circumvented. The secondary effect of 
Tucker is to make "the fruit of the poison tree" doctrine166 which is constitutionally grounded, 
unavailable to violations of the Miranda safeguards, 167 Tucker is endorsed by Oregon v 
Elstad, 166 which stresses the prophylactic nature of the Miranda warnings. "A Miranda 
violation does not necessarily contravene the fifth amendment, sometimes it merely triggers 
a presumption of coercion". 169 Elstad serves as the perfect inducement to lower courts which 
seek to avoid the application of the poison fruit doctrine to Miranda type violations. 
Seventh, in New York v Quarles, 170 the Supreme Court carved out a public safety exception 
to the Miranda doctrine. The court labeled the Miranda warnings as "prophylactic . . . not 
themselves rights protected by the Constitution, but ... measures [designed] to insure that 
the right against self-incrimination is protected".171 On a cost-effective basis the concern for 
public safety justifies dispensing with the Miranda warnings,172 thereby making the suspect's 
statement admissible at trial. 
Eighth, the clear Miranda definitions of custody and interrogation have been blurred, 
narrowed and softened in Rhode Island v Innis, 173 and Illinois v Perkins. 174 One of the 
consequences of these softened definitions is that police use of interrogatory tactics outside 
of custody have increased as have confessions obtained on the street. 
164 417 U.S 433,444 (1974). 
165 Ibid at 434, 444, "we cannot say that the Constitution necessarily requires adherence to any 
particular solution for the inherent compulsions of the interrogation process". 
166 The fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine is uniquely American and excludes derivative evidence 
acquired indirectly through breach of a constitutional right - the doctrine is inapplicable to Miranda 
breaches. 
167 See also Stone "The Miranda Doctrine In The Burger Court'' Sup. Crt. Rev. ( 1977) 99 , 1 06. 
168 470 U.S 298 (1985} and Duckworth v Eagan 492 U.S 195, 203 (1989) "Miranda is a prophylactic 
rule not required by the Constitution. Roberts "Duckworth v Eagan : Changing Miranda's Requirement 
To A Reasonably Clear Warning" (43) Rutgers. L. Rev (1990} 91. 
169 Elstad ibid at 305, 306-7. "Miranda may provide a remedy, even to the suspect who has suffered 
no identifiable constitutional harm". 
170 467 u.s 649 (1984). 
171 Ibid at 654. 
172 Ibid at 649. "The need for answers to questions in a situation posing a public safety threat 
outweighs the need for the prophylactic rule protecting the fifth amendment" (Rehnquist J at 657). 
173 446 u.s 291,303 (1980). 
174 496 u.s 292, 297 (1990). 
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Ninth, over the last thirty years the Supreme Court has devoted much of its precious time to 
the establishment of exceptions to the Miranda doctrine. The debate around Miranda has 
always been somewhat negative in the sense of where and how to limit it. The previous 
debate around the common law confessional rule as an evidentiary exclusionary principle 
was never subjected to the same intense controversy, nor indeed, were equivalent 
exceptions created for the confessional rule. The pre-Miranda voluntariness rule now 
appears paradoxically to offer a greater protection to the suspect than the Miranda 
safeguards. 
Finally, apart from Dickerson v United States, the counter-argument and the attempt to claw 
back lost ground, to re-affirm Miranda is to be found in Edwards v Arizona175 and Withrow v 
Williams. 176 Withrow stands as a strong consolidation of the Miranda principle. The court 
describes Miranda as a bulwark protecting a fundamental trial right, "prophylactic though it 
may be, in protecting a defendant's fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination. 
Miranda safeguards a fundamental trial right" .177 The Withrow decision is a reinforcement of 
the revisionist view that absent an alternative, equally efficient rule, the Miranda safeguards 
are constitutionally mandated to negate compelling interrogatory pressures. Miranda 
safeguards cannot simply be abrogated without replacement by a substitute set of rules 
which cancel compelling interrogation pressures in the interview room and serve to establish 
a clear bright line rule for police interview practices.178 However, the Withrow judgement is 
ambiguous as it confuses the distinction between a prophylactic rule and a fundamental trial 
right by running them together. It is either one or it is the other, it cannot be both.179 
Edwards v Arizona, 180 in turn, strengthens the Miranda imperative that once a suspect 
invokes his right to counsel, interrogation must cease immediately. The police cannot 
continue interrogation without the presence of counsel, even if they manage to persuade the 
175 451 u.s 477 (1981 ). 
176 507 U.S 680 (1993). See also Rosenberg "Withrow: Reconstitutionalizing Miranda" (30} Hous. L. 
Rev (1993) 1685. 
177 Ibid at 691-92. 
178 Schulhofer "Miranda's Practical Effect : Substantial Benefits And Vanishingly Small Social Costs" 
(90) Nw. Un. L. Rev (1996) 555, "In sum Miranda's safeguards (prophylactic though they may be} 
cannot simply be abrogated. They can be replaced only by other rules, likewise prophylactic and such 
substitutes must serve at least equally well to dispel compelling interrogation pressures". 
179 O'Conner J (dissenting in part) Withrow at 697-714, describes Miranda "not as an impenetrable 
barrier to the introduction of compelled testimony'', but as "leaking as a sieve", riddled with 
ambiguities, qualifications and exceptions. 
180 451 u.s 477 (1981 ). 
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accused to change his mind.181 When a suspect unequivocally demands an attorney before 
being questioned, he must receive the full weight of the Miranda safeguards. 182 The flaw in 
Edwards is that it demands a strong unequivocal waiver. The irony of Miranda is that 
although it was designed to protect the indigent, weak and intimidated suspect, it ends up 
protecting the tough, hardened recidivist criminal who has the emotional make-up to resist 
the "inherent" pressures of custodial interrogation. Neither Miranda or Edwards serves to 
protect the cowed, intimidated or the frightened. Edwards compounds the problem by 
placing the decision on whether the suspect made an unequivocal waiver in the hands of the 
police officer, the very person in control of the inherently coercive interrogation process. 
Whatever protection Edwards offers to the suspect is more than counter-balanced by the 
decision in Davies v United States.183 In qualifying Edwards' use of the sentence, 
"unequivocal claim to legal assistance", Davies holds that the suspect must unambiguously 
and with sufficient clarity, articulate his desire for counsel, "absent an unequivocal request 
for counsel Miranda safeguards are evanescent".184 By requiring a direct assertive request, 
Davies has in practice rewarded the hardened criminal suspect and penalized the weak and 
the frightened. Edwards has been further circumscribed by the public safety exception 
carved out by New York v Quarles. The Miranda safeguards and the Edwards rule, as 
deterrents, evaporate in the face of public safety concerns. Society's need to procure 
information from the suspect about the location of a dangerous weapon overrides the 
suspect's need for an attorney.185 Both Davies and Quarles appear to be effective and 
practical limitations on the Miranda, Withrow and Edwards protections. 
In the aftermath of the Miranda judgement, the Supreme Court has sought to find a natural 
balance between the interests of society in securing reliable confessions and the competing 
interests of the individual in remaining free from compulsory self-incrimination.186 In practice, 
the Supreme Court has chosen to restrict Miranda and to narrowly define the scope and 
nature of the individual's right to pre-trial silence. While acknowledging the advantage of a 
bright line standard for confessional admissibility, the Supreme Court has also been reluctant 
181 Arizona v Robertson 486 U.S 675 (1988) and Minnick v Mississippi 498 U.S 146 (1990) reinforce 
and extend Edwards to its logical limits. 
182 Smith v Illinois 469 U.S 91, 95 (1994) the court expressly declined to answer to what would 
constitute a valid and binding invocation of the right to counsel. 
183 512 U.S 452, 459-60 (1994). 
184 Ibid at 462. 
185 United States v Mobley 40 F.3d 688 (4th Cir 1994) Trice v United States 662 A.2d 891, 895 (D.C. 
1995). 
186 Garcia "Is Miranda Dead, Was It Overruled, Or Is It lrrelevanf' (1 0) St. Thomas. L. Rev (1998) 461, 
"the Supreme Court has handed down a number of opinions which has rendered Miranda 
meaningless through a series of contradictory and baffling interpretations, which has stripped Miranda 
of its allure as the symbol of an attempt to balance individual rights against potential law enforcement 
abuse". 
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to extend the meaning of the silence principle beyond the traditional fifth amendment 
parameters. The fencing in and containment of the Miranda doctrine is clearly illustrated in 
the normal course of the pre-trial criminal process, particularly in the categories of custody, 
interrogation, waiver, impeachment and public safety. 
Custody : The Supreme Court's primary concern in Miranda is that the atmosphere created 
by a police interrogation may coerce the suspect and "subjugate the individual to the will of 
the examiner'' .187 The court broadly defines custody as a significant deprivation of the 
suspect's freedom by the authorities. The crucial question to be asked before the Miranda 
safeguards are triggered is whether or not the suspect has been "deprived of freedom" and 
"placed in custody" .188 These custodial parameters were initially defined in very generous 
terms. For example, in Orozco v Texas, 189 the court extended the meaning of custody to 
police questioning outside the formal interview room. The suspect being questioned and 
arrested in his own bedroom. Orozco has been heavily criticized as an absurd extension of 
the Miranda safeguards outside of the police station.190 In reaction subsequent cases 
narrowly restricted the definition of custody. Berkemer v McCarthy191 held that the Miranda 
safeguards were not triggered by a routine police stop and search, "questioning incidental to 
an ordinary traffic stop is quite different from a station house interrogation which is frequently 
prolonged and the defendant is aware that questioning will continue until he provides his 
interrogators with the answers they seek" .192 In Beckwith v United States, 193 the court 
refused to apply Miranda to an I.R.S. investigation conducted at a private home. The present 
definition of custody judged against the standard test of "deprived of freedom in a significant 
way" is a question of degree and circumstance. The Supreme Court has failed to issue an 
authoritative ruling on this question and it is uncertain whether the Miranda safeguards 
187 Miranda ibid at 457. 
188 Crucial questions to be considered when determining custody are : (a) whether the individual is a 
suspect or an arrestee (not in custody until arrested). United States v Davies 646 F.2d 1298, 1302 (8th 
Cir 1980), (b) the period of the suspect's detention (twenty minutes in the back of a squad car 
sufficient to constitute custody), United States v Chamberlin 644 F.2d 1261, 1267 (9th Cir 1980), (c) 
the constraints placed upon the suspect prior to questioning (was the suspect handcuffed), United 
States v Booth 669 F .2d 1231 , 1236 (9th Cir 1981 ). 
189 394 U.S 324, 326 (1969). See also Mathis v United States 391 U.S 1 (1968). 
190 Critics appear to ignore the reality that even outside the police station, the suspect may perceive 
himself to be in a coercive atmosphere, deprived of his freedom and surrounded by police 
interrogators. Oregon v Mathiason 429 U.S. 492 (1977), "if the respondent entertains an objectively 
reasonable belief that he is not free to leave during questioning, then he is deprived of his freedom". 
191 486 U.S 420 (1984). Berkermer also holds that Miranda is not applicable to "stop and frisk" 
procedures (body search procedures) where there is a reasonable suspicion that the suspect is 
involved in a criminal activity (at 441). See also Terry v Ohio 392 U.S 1 (1968). 
192 Bekermer ibid at 425. 
193 425 u.s 341 (1976). 
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should apply to police interrogation on the street, in the squad car, or at the scene of the 
crime. This is in marked contrast to the English position where the Police and Criminal 
Evidence Act (PACE) 1984 has thoroughly canvassed the issue and established easily 
understood guidelines. 
Interrogation : Simply defined in Miranda as questioning initiated by a law enforcement 
officer after the suspect has been taken into custody. In Brewer v Williams, 194 the court gives 
a wide meaning to the notion of interrogation. Police cajoled a murder suspect into revealing 
the location of the victim's body by emphasizing the necessity of finding the body quickly in 
order to give it a Christian burial. The detectives purposively sought to isolate the suspect 
from his attorney in order to obtain self-incriminatory admissions.195 The court found the 
manipulative "burial speech" to be an interrogation falling within the Miranda definition. A 
narrower meaning to interrogation is given in Rhode Island v lnnis. 196 While in a squad car, 
police persuaded the suspect into giving up the location of a missing shotgun by stressing 
the importance of discovering the weapon before it could be found by handicapped pupils 
from a nearby school. Rhode Island held that there had been no interrogation by the police 
officers as their questions and conversation had not been purposively designed to elicit 
incriminatory answers. 197 The court noted that interrogatory practices do not only involve 
express questioning, but may include other tactics designed to persuade or coax answers. 
The key is whether words or actions on the part of the police are reasonably likely to elicit an 
incriminatory response. Despite the factual similarity between the two cases, in Brewer the 
"burial speech" was found to be interrogatory in nature, whereas the Rhode Island "gun 
speech" was found to be non-interrogatory. The Supreme Court has failed to explain the 
distinction. 
Resumption of interrogation : According to Miranda, the right to silence must be 
scrupulously honoured. An important question is whether the police may resume 
interrogation at a later date, after the suspect has at first declined to speak. In Michigan v 
Mosley,198 the suspect asserted his right to silence after being advised of his Miranda rights 
194 430 U.S 387 (1977), "the suspect was being transported from one city to another after an 
agreement had been reached between the police and legal counsel that no interrogation would be 
undertaken during the journey''. 
195 Ibid at 399. 
196 446 U.S 291( 1980). See also White "Interrogation Without Questions: Rhode Island and Henry'' 
(78) Mich. L. Rev (1980) 1209 Helderman "Revisiting Rhode Island v Innis : Offering A New 
Interpretation Of The Interrogation Tesf' (33) Creighton L. Rev (2000) 729. 
197 Ibid at 298-299. 
198 423 u.s 96, 104 (1975). 
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and on the commencement of questioning about certain robberies. Some two hours later, a 
different police officer resumed questioning about a murder unrelated to the robberies. The 
suspect, although once again advised of his Miranda rights, incriminated himself.199 The 
question is whether Miranda prohibits a second attempt at interrogation. The Mosley court 
held that police may take a second bite at the apple. Once the suspect indicates a desire to 
remain silent, interrogation must cease. Police may resume questioning after a significant 
period of time has elapsed, a fresh Miranda warning is issued, and the right to cut off 
questioning is scrupulously honoured.200 To hold otherwise would be to transform the 
Miranda safeguards into a wholly irrational obstacle to legitimate investigative activity.201 In 
contradiction to Mosely, Edwards v Arizona202 fashions an altogether different rule. The 
suspect asserted not his right to silence, but his right to legal assistance, asking "I want an 
attorney before making a deal". The police officer immediately ceased interrogation. The 
next day different police officers interrogated the suspect, advised him of his Miranda rights 
and proceeded to obtain a confession. The court held the confession to be inadmissible 
because once the suspect invokes his right to counsel, he cannot ever again be questioned 
without an attorney present. 203 There is a significant difference between the Mosely and the 
Edwards decisions. According to these two decisions, the Miranda doctrine places more 
importance on the long-term effects of a right to counsel, while downplaying the effect of a 
right to silence. A request for an attorney means that interrogation must cease immediately 
and cannot recommence without an attorney present.204 A request to remain silent has no 
such limitation and interrogation may recommence after a reasonable period has elapsed. 205 
In Edwards, the balance of interests tips clearly in favour of the accused and against the 
interests of law enforcement. Edwards is a temporary re-affirmation of the Miranda doctrine. 
After Edwards the court resumes the normal practice of striking the balance of competing 
interests firmly in favour of law enforcement. In Oregon v Bradshaw,206 the suspect, after 
199 Ibid at 98. 
200 Ibid at 104, 107. 
201 Ibid at 102. 
202 451 u.s 477 (1981 ). 
203 Unless the suspect re-initiates further communication (at 485-486). See also Minnick v Mississippi 
498 u.s 146 (1990). 
204 Edwards requires a direct unequivocal claim for legal counsel. In this sense, it supports the 
hardened criminal and fails the weak, intimidated suspect who is much too frightened to claim his 
rights. Ainsworth "In A Different Register : The Pragmatics Of Powerlessness In Police Interrogation" 
(103) Yale L. I (1993) 259, 261 suggests that Miranda and Edwards discriminate against the indirect 
speech patterns of females, Afro-Americans, Asian and other ethnic minorities who are not culturally 
adapted to make assertive and direct claims. See also Clarke "Say It Loud : Indirect Speech And 
Racial Equality In The Interrogation Room" (21). Un. Arkansas L. Rev (1999) 813-27 
205 Edwards at 482, "Miranda distinguishes between two requests made by the suspect ... if [he] 
indicates that he wishes to remain silent the interrogation must cease. If he requests counsel the 
interrogation also ceases until an attorney is present (quoting Miranda at 474). Shapiro "Thinking The 
Unthinkable: Recasting The Presumption Of Edwards v Arizona" (53) Oklahoma L. Rev (2000) 11-34. 
206 462 u.s 1039 (1983). 
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claiming his right to counsel, proceeded to ask the police officer, "Well, what will happen 
now?". According to Bradshaw a question of this nature opens a window and shows a 
willingness for further questioning, rendering a continued interrogation permissible.207 Other 
subsequent cases, such as Moran v Burbine208 and Davis v United State~09 are examples of 
a deliberate and well-crafted attempt by the Supreme Court to limit the Edwards ruling and to 
prevent the police from unnecessarily losing an opportunity for interrogating uncounselled 
suspects. The Supreme Court has clearly stated that society has a "legitimate and 
substantial interest in law enforcement's ability to secure reliable admissions from the 
suspect".210 In the balance of competing interests, the suspect's interests are adequately 
protected by the Miranda panoply. Any additional benefits a properly warned suspect may 
obtain from an extension of the Miranda safeguards would be minimal at best and come at a 
great cost in lost admissions and confessions.211 
Waiver : Miranda establishes a strict constitutional standard for the waiver of a suspect's 
rights. A valid waiver must be made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently. The strongest 
proof of waiver would be an express written or oral statement to that effect. In practice 
though, other means of establishing waiver should not be ruled out. The burden is on the 
state to establish a legitimate waiver of rights. According to Miranda, an express statement 
that the individual is willing to make a statement could constitute a waiver. But a valid waiver 
will not be presumed simply from the silence of the accused after a warning is given.212 In 
North Carolina v Butler,213 the Supreme Court endorsed a" totality of circumstances" 
approach for the determination of a valid waiver. An express statement of waiver is not an 
absolute prerequisite for the finding of a valid waiver, "at least in some cases waiver can be 
clearly inferred from silence, coupled with a course of action indicating waiver, including the 
words of the suspect at interrogation".214 The question of waiver is essentially determined by 
the particular facts and circumstances surrounding each individual case, including the 
background, experience and conduct of the suspect.215 Against this standard, any waiver 
obtained in a coercive atmosphere or one suggestive of trickery or deceit will be deemed 
invalid. The Supreme Court has been flexible in defining the exact meaning of police trickery 
207 Ibid at 1045-46. 
208 475 u.s 412 (1986). 
209 512 u.s 452 (1994). 
210 Moran ibid at 427. 
211 Ibid at 427. 
212 Miranda at 475. 
213 441 u.s 369 (1979). 
214 Butler at 373, 376. 
215 Ibid at 374-375. See also Johnston v Zerbst 304 U.S 458 (1938). 
187 
or deceit and has often granted the police a wide latitude in this respect.216 Moran v 
Burbine217 is a deliberate example of how the court skews the balance away from the 
Miranda protection of individual rights in favour of effective police law enforcement.218 In 
Moran police intentionally failed to warn the suspect of his attorney's attempt to contact him 
· and also misinformed the attorney about the time and place of formal interrogations. During 
an interrogation in the absence of his attorney, the suspect confessed. At trial the attorney 
attempted to suppress the initial confession. The court held that events occurring outside of 
the suspect's knowledge and presence could not affect his ability to intelligently waive his 
rights. 219 The deceitful misinformation of the suspect's attorney was irrelevant as it had no 
influence on the validity of the suspect's waiver. To hold otherwise would unnecessarily 
injure the interests of law enforcement.220 With reference to the fifth amendment, the court 
concluded that the police are under no obligation to inform the suspect of his attorney's 
attempt to reach him. 
A further elaboration is suggested by Colorado v Connelly,221 which defines a voluntary 
waiver in substantially the same terms as a voluntary confession. The suspect must be 
acting out of his own free will, without coercion, and in an atmosphere free of overt police 
pressure.222 A voluntary waiver requires a certain quantifiable degree of knowledge and 
intelligence in its exercise. Knowledge is determined by the suspect's ability to fully 
understand and access all information concerning his circumstance. A valid waiver in terms 
of the Miranda standard must amount to an intelligent and knowledgeable awareness of his 
factual and legal circumstance. But this does not mean that the police are obliged to supply 
the suspect with additional information over and above the bare Miranda warning. The 
Moran v Burbine judgement reduces the Miranda standard to a mere residual, basic and 
abstract knowledge of the suspect's fifth amendment right, "The constitution does not require 
that police supply the suspect with a flow of information to help him calibrate his self-interest 
216 Ironically the English courts have also been lenient in interpreting the meaning of police deceit or 
trickery. See infra chapter 8 p.296-197. 
217 475 u.s 412 (1986). 
218 Moran is an example of the Supreme Court's attempt to limit the scope of both Miranda and 
Edwards. The basis of the Moran reasoning is that police should not be unnecessarily deprived of the 
opportunity to interrogate an uncounselled suspect. See further Kuller "Note Moran : Supreme Court 
Tolerates Police Interference With The Attorney-Client Relationship" (18) Loyola. U. Chi. L. J (1986) 
251. Hirsch "Criminal Procedure II: The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination" Ann. Surv. Am. L (1988) 
251. 
219 Moran at 422. The consequence of Moran will inevitably muddy Miranda's otherwise clear waters 
(at 425). 
220 Ibid at 423-424, 426-427. 
221 479 u.s 157 (1986). 
222 Ibid at 173-4. 
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in deciding whether to speak".223 A valid waiver of the suspect's right to silence and right to 
counsel must be voluntary and based on a certain quantifiable level of knowledge. However, 
the police are not obliged to add to this knowledge beyond a bare acknowledgement of the 
suspect's Miranda and fifth amendment rights. 
A problem which remains unresolved in this regard is the effect of an equivocal and vague 
assertion of the Miranda protections. Particularly an uncertain and equivocal request for 
legal counsel. Three different standards based on an analysis of the word "equivocal" have 
been proposed. First, a threshold of clarity standarcf24 is advanced in which the suspect's 
request must conform to a clear and unequivocal invocation of the right to counsel. All 
requests for legal assistance must reach a certain threshold of clarity in order to trigger the 
fifth amendment protection. Second and at the other extreme, the ambiguity standarcf25 
would allow all and any ambiguous or equivocal requests for an attorney to immediately 
terminate the interrogation. Third, an intermediate proposal or clarification standarcf26 seeks 
a compromise solution, in terms of which the interrogator must immediately attempt to clarify 
the suspect's vague invocation. The interrogator must cease the interrogation and ask 
questions deliberately designed to determine whether or not the suspect is indeed seeking 
legal advice. The clarification standard is a well balanced middle course between two 
extremes in which the threshold of clarity standard unduly weakens the suspect's right to 
counsel and the ambiguity standard unnecessarily restricts the police officer in his 
investigation. Despite the balanced nature of the clarification standard, the Supreme Court 
has elected to adopt the extreme threshold of clarity approach. In Davis v United States,227 
the suspect mentioned during the interrogation, "maybe I should speak to a lawyer'', but 
continued answering questions. A while later, he repeated, "I think I want a lawyer before 
saying anything else" and the interview was terminated. The Davis court, in a further 
restriction of the Miranda ideal, held that the suspect must articulate his desire to have 
counsel present with a sufficient degree of clarity. If the sufficient clarity threshold is not 
223 Moran at 423. 
224 First announced in People v Krueger412 N.E. 2d 537 (Ill. 1980). See also Eaton v Commonwealth 
397 S.E. 2d 385, 395 (Va. 1990). 
225 Maglio v Jago 480 F.2d 202 (6th Cir 1978). See also Ochoa v state 573 S.W2d 796 Tex Crim App. 
(1978). 
226 Towne v Dugger 899 F.2d 1104 (11th Cir 1990). See also United States v Fouche 833 F.2d 1284, 
1286 (9th Cir 1987). Nash v Estelle 597 F.2d 513, 517 (5th Cir 1979). 
227 512 U.S 452 (1994). It is instructive to note that the lower courts have extended the Davis ruling 
and hold that during custodial interrogation police are entitled to ignore a suspect's equivocal request 
to remain silent. United states v Johnson 56 F.3d 947, 955 (8th Cir 1995). Leyva v state 906 P.2d 
894, 901 (Utah) Ct App (1995). State v Baron 658 A.2d 54, 65 Vt (1995). 
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reached, the interrogator may validly continue with the interrogation.228 The police may 
therefore ignore the suspect's equivocal request for counsel and continue in the normal 
way.229 The court does recognize certain disadvantages which may prevent the suspect 
from clearly articulating his request for counsel. Factors such as fear, intimidation, lack of 
linguistic skills and ignorance are also to be assessed in determining the threshold of clarity. 
Davis is the perfect illustration of the prevailing modern and antagonistic approach to the 
Miranda ideal.230 The interest of a properly warned suspect in having an attorney present in 
equivocal circumstances is outweighed by society's substantial interest in having the police 
interrogate uncounselled suspects.231 In effect, the Supreme Court is saying about Miranda, 
so far but no further. 
Impeachment and the Public Safety Exception : In defining the Miranda doctrine as a 
mere prophylactic rule232 not mandated by the Constitution, the Supreme Court has driven a 
wedge between the pre-trial process and the fifth amendment. It has also allowed lower 
courts an opportunity to re-interpret the nature of impeachment law and to create a 
necessary exception in favour of law enforcement. In both English and American evidentiary 
law, it is accepted practice to use certain kinds of evidence for the limited purpose of 
attacking the suspect's credibility at trial. The question is whether inculpatory statements 
induced in violation of the Miranda safeguards may be admitted for impeachment purposes. 
Harris v New York is one of the precursors of the prophylactic rule and is a strong illustration 
of the Supreme Court's reluctance to characterize Miranda as a constitutional right. Harris v 
New Yor~33 holds that where a confession has been obtained contrary to Miranda (i.e. the 
police have failed to give an adequate Miranda warning) the suspect may nevertheless be 
cross-examined in order to undermine the credibility of his testimony at trial. Harris suggests 
as a matter of principle, "the shield provided by Miranda cannot be perverted into a licence to 
228 Ibid at 459-60. 
229 Ibid at 460-65. 
230 Holly "Ambiguous Invocations Of The Right To Remain Silent : A Post Davis Analysis And 
Proposal" (29) Seton Hall. L. Rev (1998) 558-98. Faulkner "So You Kinda, Sorta, Think You Might 
Need A Lawyer? Ambiguous Request For Counsel After Davis" (49) Arkansas L. Rev (1996) 275-303. 
Kennelly "Note Davis v U.S. : The Supreme Court Rejects A Third Layer Of Prophylaxis" (26) Loyola. 
Un. Chi. L. J(1995) 594-595. 
231 Shortly after the Davis decision, the Eleventh Circuit in Coleman v Singletary 30 F.3d 1420 (1994) 
extended the Davis rule to equivocal invocations of the right to remain silent. 
232 For an analysis of the prophylactic rule see Strauss "The Ubiquity Of Prophylactic Rules" (55) U. 
Chi. L. Rev (1988) 190, "arguing that in constitutional law prophylactic rules are the norm not the 
exception. LaFave "Constitutional Rules For Police: A Matter Of Style" (41) Syracuse L. Rev (1990) 
849; Grano "Prophylactic Rules In Criminal Procedure, A Question Of Article Ill Legitimacy'' (80) Nw. 
U. L. Rev (1985), "the Miranda prophylactic rule is much too broad and presumptive". 
233 401 U.S 222 (1971) the accused was convicted of selling heroin to an undercover agent. At trial, 
he admitted only to selling baking powder. The judge allowed the admission of an earlier statement 
made to the undercover agent as a prior inconsistent statement, even in the face of an initial 
inadequate Miranda warning. 
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use perjury by way of defense ... the petitioner's credibility was appropriately impeached by 
use of his earlier conflicting statements.234 As long as the evidence is trustworthy, it may be 
used in the normal truth-testing impeachment process. The police conduct in the 
circumstance was considered to be a "minor'' Miranda infringement as the suspect's 
statement was neither induced through coercion, nor involuntary in terms of the fourteenth 
amendment. What the court really means without saying so, is that a mere Miranda 
infringement does not violate the Constitution. Harris therefore tears the Miranda ruling away 
from its fifth amendment foundation. 
Harris also sends a mixed message to the police. On the one hand, it half-heartedly 
punishes them for inducing statements contrary to Miranda. On the other hand, it 
encourages police to continue with an improper practice on the good chance that an illegally 
obtained statement may be admitted at trial for a limited purpose.235 The crucial importance 
of Harris is that it constitutes an important retreat and dilution of the fifth amendment basis of 
the Miranda doctrine. By characterizing Miranda as a mere prophylactic standard and 
embracing a deterrence rationale, Harris also deliberately ignored the main object of the 
Miranda judgement. Miranda surrounds and protects the individual with a strong buffering 
shield in order to produce a genuine voluntary confession. By weakening that shield, Harris 
symbolizes the slow but steady retreat by the Supreme Court from the Miranda236 ideal. 
Another major limitation of the Miranda doctrine occurs in the circumstance in which the 
public safety is at risk. A persuasive argument is adduced that police officers in the field 
ought to be allowed to solicit statements from the suspect, even in violation of Miranda, 
whenever the public interest demands it. In New York v Quarles,237 the police cornered a 
rape suspect in a late-night supermarket, overpowered him and then, in violation of the 
suspect's Miranda rights, proceeded to interrogate him on the whereabouts of his hidden 
gun.238 A statement induced from the suspect in this circumstance is inadmissible at trial. 
However, Quarles ruled that where the public safety is endangered, police officers should not 
be discouraged from interrogating a detained suspect " ... the need for answers in a situation 
posing a threat to the public safety outweighs the need for the prophylactic rule protecting the 
234 Ibid at 224 - 226. 
235 See Stone "The Miranda Doctrine In The Burger Court" Sup. Ct. Rev (1977) 99, at 112 and 114. 
236 The Harris decision is expanded in Oregon v Hass 420 U.S 714 (1975) "the suspect's statement 
may be used to impeach his testimony at trial even when the police deliberately ignored the suspect's 
request for legal counsel (at 715-16). According to Stone, ibid note 235 at 129, "Hass constitutes an 
open invitation to the police to disregard the suspect's right to legal assistance". 
237 467 U.S 649 (1984). Rehnquist J (as he was then), the Miranda warnings are, "prophylactic ... not 
themselves rights protected by the constitution" (at 654). 
238 Ibid 655. 
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fifth amendment against self-incrimination. We decline to place officers ... in the untenable 
position of having to consider, often in a matter of seconds, whether it best serves society for 
them to ask the necessary questions without the Miranda warnings and render whatever 
probative evidence they uncover inadmissible, or for them to give the warning in order to 
preserve the admissibility of evidence they might uncover''.239 Quarles, by applying a cost-
benefit analysis, makes it clear that the Miranda warnings can now be excluded in an 
emergency situation where public safety takes preference over individual rights.240 
The cumulative effect of post-Miranda precedent may be read as a steady retreat from the 
Miranda constitutional ideal. The definition of custody and custodial interrogation has been 
softened and blurred. Harris v New York allows for the impeachment of a suspect's 
credibility at trial by statements induced in violation of the Miranda requirement. The Harris 
exception is extended in Oregon v Hass and both decisions push the Miranda rule further 
from its constitutional underpinning. Michigan v Tucker undermines Miranda by 
characterizing its safeguards, not as constitutional rules, but as mere prophylactic measures 
designed specifically to protect the right against compulsory self-incrimination. The Tucker 
reasoning is further developed in Oregon v Elstad. The prophylactic rule cannot exclude as 
the fruit of an earlier unwarned statement, any subsequent statements given after a proper 
warning. The hesitant and rather weak re-affirmation of Miranda in Withrow v Williams and 
more recently in Dickerson v United States does little to counteract the alienation of Miranda 
from the fifth amendment. The labeling of Miranda as non-constitutional and prophylactic 
contributes to the creation of a wholesale public safety exception in New York v Quarles. 
The Quarles judgement represents a radically different vision of fifth amendment values than 
the vision expressed in Miranda. The contraction of Miranda reflects the changing 
composition of the Supreme Court (the Burger Court of the 1970s has had a substantial 
impact on the Miranda ruling) and the conservative political climate of the Reagan- Bush 
presidencies.241 In New York v Quarles, O'Conner J remarks, "the Court is sensitive to the 
substantial burden the Miranda rule places on local law enforcement efforts, and 
consequently refuses to extend the decision or increase its strictures on law enforcement 
239 Ibid at 657, "the court refuses to force a police officer the choice between a concern for public 
safety and a desire to obtain a confession". See also Reiner "The Public Safety Exception To 
Miranda: Analyzing Subjective Motivation" (43) Mich. L. Rev (1995) 377-407. 
240 Weller "The Legacy Of Quarles : A Summary Of The Public Safety Exception To Miranda" (49) 
Baylor. L. Rev (1997) 1107-29. Goodman "Case Note - New York v Quarles" (16) St. Mary's L. J 
(1985) 489. 
241 The Reagan administration threw up some of the most ardent critics of Miranda and the right to 
silence. Attorney-General E. Meese being the most visible public figure supporting the abolition of the 
silence principle. See Agronsky "Meese v Miranda: The Final Countdown" A.B.A.J (1987) 86. During 
the decade of conservative government in England both Thatcher and Major promoted a crime fighting 
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agencies in any way".242 It is instructive to note that the English pre-trial silence principle has 
also suffered attenuation during the conservative reign of the Thatcher - Major combination. 
In the face of considerable controversy, Chief Justice Burger, himself a vehement critic, said, 
"the meaning of Miranda has become reasonably clear ... I would neither overrule Miranda, 
disparage it, nor extend it at this late date".243 Nevertheless, the present trend is to dilute the 
constitutional basis of the Miranda safeguards. To disparage and to reduce Miranda to a 
porous standard which may be re-evaluated when it conflicts with other more important or 
immediate social interests. 
The reduction of Miranda has in turn diminished the silence principle in the pre-trial context. 
The right to silence is now regarded as an obstacle which, although it cannot be ignored, 
may at least be circumscribed and circumvented when it proves an obstacle to efficient 
police interrogation and low-cost convictions. Despite Chief Justice Burger's opinion that 
Miranda is a reasonably clear rule, many critics regard the per se exclusionary rule as just 
one more attempt to establish another constitutional straightjacket. Far from clarifying and 
simplifying the confessional rule, Miranda has given rise to a jurisprudence which is 
structurally more complex than anything that existed under the common law voluntariness 
standard.244 The voluntariness component of the confessional rule has been buried under an 
avalanche of words about the definitions of custody, interrogation and the intractable problem 
of waiver. The Miranda doctrine has become, despite the warning spoken by Bentham some 
two hundred years ago, a technical rather than a natural rule which is distorting "the fact-
finding process with its Byzantine complexity". 245 The differences between the Miranda 
proponents and its opponents are centred on two recurring but divergent philosophical 
themes explained in libertarian and utilitarian terms. Proponents argue for a libertarian focus 
policy, the result of which was the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 which limits both pre-
trial and trial silence. 
242 Quarles, O'Conner J at 662. 
243 Rhode Island v Innis, Burger C.J at 304. 
244 Oregon v Elstad 470 U.S 298 (1985) is the perfect illustration of the Supreme Court's ambivalence 
towards Miranda : While stressing the prophylactic nature of the Miranda doctrine (at 305), the court 
notes that an infringement of Miranda does not necessarily also mean an infringement of the fifth 
amendment (at 326-7). Miranda is only a preventative medicine used to provide a remedy, even to 
the defendant who has suffered no identifiable constitutional harm (at 307). Apart from its complexity, 
the Elstad decision is also somewhat illogical. (a) Both Miranda and the fifth amendment prohibit the 
extraction of coerced confessions. Yet, according to Elstad, a coerced confession infringing Miranda 
may at the same time not be a coerced confession as defined by the fifth amendment; (b) Miranda is 
sometimes explained as a bright-line rule clearly defining custodial interrogation (at 317) and at other 
times, it is criticized for raising unnecessarily difficult questions about custody and admissibility (at 
316). Either Miranda is a good precedent or it is not, it can't be both, (c) The fruit of the poisonous 
tree doctrine is held to be inapplicable to Miranda breaches (at 318). Why bother excluding the initial 
confession if its derivative evidence (which has the same evidentiary value as the confession) is 
admissible. See also Wollin "Policing The Police : Should Miranda Violations Bear Fruit?" (53) Ohio 
St. L. J (1992) 805. 
245 Bentham Rationale Of Judicial Evidence Bowring Ed (1843) Chp 3, 42-46. 
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on human rights and due process. Opponents are more concerned with utilitarian efficiency 
and a crime control process which places more value on societal interests than on ordinary 
individual human needs. In the middle of this helter-skelter of conflicting interests, stands the 
Supreme Court hesitant and unsure. Its most influential argument for maintaining the 
Miranda doctrine is based more on functional necessity than on a principled reasoning. The 
Court has argued that abolishing Miranda would send a negative rather than a positive 
message to both law enforcement organs and society. Overruling Miranda might cause the 
police to believe that society does not care how they extract confessions. To some extent 
Miranda has become a symbol for the disadvantaged. On the surface at least, Miranda 
suggests an equality of treatment. It permits all suspects, including the indigent and the 
ignorant, to make intelligent choices about co-operation with the police.246 Overruling 
Miranda may convey the message that the criminal system does not care for the 
downtrodden. 
The main jurisprudential problem with the Miranda doctrine and with which the Supreme 
Court is unable to grapple, is the twofold question about the effectiveness of its procedural 
safeguards and the resultant exclusion of truthful evidence. If Miranda is effective, then it 
generally benefits the guilty suspect more than it does the innocent. Why should the courts 
automatically suppress confessions by guilty suspects simply because the police by some 
oversight failed to adhere to the strict technical Miranda ruling? As a result of defining 
custodial interrogation as inherently coercive, the Miranda doctrine has generated an 
unjustified hostility towards police interrogation both within and outside of the criminal justice 
system. At the same time, it undeservedly elevates the pre-trial right to silence into some 
kind of holy grail, immutable and inviolable. In the light of the present redevelopment and 
reorganization of a modernized Miranda rule, it may well be argued that Miranda no longer 
constitutes a strong statement about the constitutional dimensions of the fifth amendment 
and the right to silence. It has become merely another weak prophylactic non-constitutional 
rule only effective within the pre-trial custodial process. 
246 On a purely practical level, the modern re-interpretation of Miranda gives the police a wide 
functional latitude. For example, (a) Harris, by admitting prior statements made in violation of Miranda 
for impeachment purposes, provides the police with a practical method of indirectly admitting 
incriminating evidence; (b) Hass, by permitting statements made after a claim for legal representation 
to be admitted for impeachment purposes, allows the police to safely disregard the suspect's 
invocation of a right to legal counsel in certain circumstances; (c) Quarles, by carving out a public 
safety exception allows police to detain and question without mirandising; (d) Tucker, by defining 
Miranda as a mere prophylactic rule, encourages police to find new ways of circumventing the 
Miranda safeguards. The functional message to police is that they need not cease interrogating a 
suspect simply because he has asserted the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination. 
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CHAPTERS 
THE PRE-TRIAL AND TRIAL NO-INFERENCE RULE 
6.1 Evidentiary Value of Silence 
Fifth amendment jurisprudence permits only a limited evidentiary use of the silence 
principle.1 In theory, absent both statutory and constitutional prohibitions, the prosecution is 
free to use the accused's pre-trial and trial silence in one of two ways. The prosecution may 
use the accused's silence substantively as part of its prima facie case-in-chief in establishing 
guilt directly, or it may use the accused's silence indirectly for impeachment purposes only. 
In practice, the Supreme Court assumes, without explaining, that the fifth amendment 
permits only the impeachment use of silence and bars the use of silence to establish guilt. In 
certain limited circumstances pre-trial silence may be admissible to impeach the accused's 
credibility.2 In this sense, silence is admissible as a prior inconsistent statement undermining 
the accused's in-court exculpatory testimony.3 The accused who elects to testify and who 
seeks to excuse himself, risks the impeachment of his testimony at cross-examination. The 
right to testify grants the accused the power to present a defence, it does not guarantee 
protection against the state's truth testing techniques. The accused who testifies casts aside 
his cloak of silence and opens himself to a comprehensive cross-examination and 
impeachment.4 In the appropriate circumstance, silence in the face of a pre-trial interrogation 
may be used by the prosecution as testimonial evidence.5 In fact, the Supreme Court has 
sometimes permitted the prosecution to impeach the testifying accused with pre-trial 
testimony induced contrary to the Miranda safeguards and which is constitutionally 
inadmissible in the case-in-chief.6 By contrast, the accused's silence at trial (i.e. the failure to 
1 Silence is a refusal to provide information. The American definition relies on a refusal to provide 
self-incriminatory facts, either complete, partial or even implied. Generally, silence cannot be used as 
evidence to prove a fact-in-issue, it is relevant only if it bears on the accused's credibility. 
2 The presumption behind silence as an impeachment tool is that the individual does not know of any 
exculpatory facts, otherwise he would deny the accusation. Jenkins v Anderson 447 U.S 231, 239 
(1980), "impeachment means that the accused who remained silent during custodial interrogation 
cannot now at trial be telling the truth". 
3 The court decides on a case-by-case basis if the prior silence is sufficiently inconsistent to be 
admissible as impeachment evidence. See Jenkins v Anderson ibid at 240. 
4 Weston and Mandell "To Talk, To Balk, Or To Lie, The Emerging Fifth Amendment Doctrine Of The 
Preferred Response" (19) Am. Grim. L. Rev (1992) 521-22, "the privilege protects the accused who 
remains silent, but not the accused who chooses to testify falsely''. 
5 Aranella "Schmerber And The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination : A Reappraisal" (20) Am. Grim. L. 
Rev(1952) 31. 
6 Miranda supra chapter 5 p.169-173. Harris v New York supra chapter 5 p.179, 189-191 .. Oregon v 
Elstad supra chapter 5 p.179. The Supreme Court allows the prosecution to impeach the accused 
with evidence which violates the Miranda safeguards. 
195 
testify) is an absolute protection. No evidentiary use may be made of trial silence, either as 
substantive evidence of guilt or for the limited purpose of impeachment. Through judicial 
precedent, the Supreme Court has developed two basic models for the evidentiary 
evaluation of pre-trial and trial silence. 7 The coercion model focuses on the various 
interpretations of the functional nature of the compulsion/coercion dynamism as defined in 
the fifth amendment. The coercion model may be interpreted in three different ways : (a) 
Testimonial evidence is inadmissible when it is coercively induced in direct violation of the 
constitutional prohibition. A Constitutional prohibition rule based on the precedent of 
Adamson v California;8 (b) No adverse inferences either direct or indirect, may be drawn 
from such coerced evidence. A prohibited-inference rule based on Jenkins v Anderson, 
Fletcher v Weir, Griffin v California and Lakeside v Oregon;9 (c) Evidence is inadmissible 
when it is induced by improper police conduct during coercive custodial interrogation. A 
prophylactic-exclusionary rule drawn from Miranda v Arizona.10 
The second approach or the impermissible-burden model is a unique analysis which 
excludes evidence whenever the accused's constitutional rights are unjustifiably and unfairly 
burdened. The impermissible-burden model is based largely on the seminal case Griffin v 
California. 11 The coercion and the impermissible-burden models, although clearly designed 
for the evaluation of affirmative and positive testimony, may also be adapted for the analysis 
of negative testimony in the form of silence. The fundamental question in fifth amendment 
jurisprudence is the extent to which the constitution protects the silence principle based on 
the accused's unequivocal claim of privilege and whether or not negative inferences may be 
drawn from a claim of privilege. 
Unlike the ordinary evidentiary use of testimony as a positive statement, silence is at best 
circumstantial evidence based on a negative inference. The question is whether relevant 
and admissible evidence may be logically derived from the negative assertion of silence. A 
number of essential requirements must be met before silence acquires evidentiary weight. 
First, the silence on which the prosecution intends to rely must amount to a testimonial 
7 Ratner 'The Consequences Of Exercising The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination" (24) Un. Chi. L. 
Rev {1957). Ayers "The Fifth Amendment And The Inference Of Guilt From Silence : Griffin After 
Fifteen Years" (78) Mich. L. Rev (1980) 841. Poulin "Evidentiary Use Of Silence And The 
Constitutional Privilege Against Self-Incrimination" (52) Geo. Wash. L. Rev (1984) 191, "Poulin is 
probably the most influential work on evidentiary use of silence. Patrick "Towards The Constitutional 
Protection Of A Non-Testifying Defendant's Pre-arrest Silence" (63) Brooklyn. L. Rev {1997) 897. 
8 332 U.S 46 (1947). 
9 Jenkins 447 U.S 231, 238 {1980), Fletcher 455 U.S 603, 606-7 {1982), Lakeside 435 U.S 333 
(1978). 
10 384 u.s 436 (1966). 
11 380 u.s 609 {1965). 
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communication. The crucial test of testimonial silence is whether or not it involves, "[the 
accused's] consciousness of the facts and the operation of his mind in expressing it" [or not 
expressing it].12 In this sense, the accused's silence in the face of an accusation must 
amount to a tacit admission of the truth of the facts contained in the accusation. Second, 
improper state action is a necessary requirement for the assertion of the fifth amendment 
right to silence. "The sole concern of the fifth amendment ... is government coercion. The 
fifth amendment privilege is not concerned with moral and psychological pressures to 
confess emanating from sources other than official coercion" .13 One of the integral problems 
faced by the Supreme Court in its analysis of fifth amendment silence has been the 
determination of the presence or absence of compulsion. On a strict interpretation 
compulsion must be present in order to trigger the fifth amendment privilege. Third, the main 
question about silence is one of probative value. Relevance and thus the admissibility of all 
kinds of positive evidence is determined by weighing probative value against prejudicial 
effect. Silence is negative evidence and it is therefore conceptually difficult to weigh its 
probative value against the prejudicial effect of its reception. 14 Usually silence is accorded 
the evidentiary weight that commonsense dictates it should have in that particular 
circumstance. As a result of the conceptual problems posed by an evidentiary analysis of 
silence, the Supreme Court has sometimes confused and misapplied the coercion and 
impermissible-burden approaches. In a number of its decisions, the Supreme Court has 
made use of the language of one model and the reasoning of the other. It is therefore 
difficult to clearly distinguish the Court's reasoning in the more important cases. 
Fourth, once it has been decided that silence has evidentiary weight, the prosecution may 
proceed to use silence against the accused in three possible ways. (i) The prosecution may 
in cross-examination use the accused's pre-trial silence to impeach his credibility; (ii) The 
prosecution may draw an adverse inference from the accused's pre-trial and trial silence in 
its closing argument; (iii) The judge may instruct the jury to consider the accused's pre-trial 
and trial silence in their deliberations. The prosecution's use of silence is conditioned upon 
whether or not the accused takes the stand. By taking the stand the accused effectively 
waives his in-trial constitutional protection. His usually exculpatory statements on the stand 
may now be subject to prosecutorial cross-examination. As prosecutorial questioning begins 
12 Pennsylvania v Muniz 496 U.S 582, 594 (1990). See also Doe v United States 487 U.S 201 (1988). 
13 Colorado v Connelly479 U.S 157, 169-170 (1988). 
14 Jenkins v Anderson ibid at 240, "each jurisdiction remains free to formulate evidentiary rules 
defining the situations in which silence is viewed as probative or prejudicial". United States v Hale 422 
U.S 171, 176 (1975), "in most circumstances silence is so ambiguous that it is of little probative value 
. . . silence gains more probative weight where it persists in the face of accusation . . . in such 
circumstance, the accused would be more likely than not to dispute an untrue accusation. Failure to 
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to unravel these exculpatory statements the accused can no longer re-invoke his shield.15 
When the accused refuses to respond to further cross-examination, the prosecution is 
entitled to draw an appropriate inference from the accused's silence and to direct such 
comment to the jury. Fifth, whereas silence during the trial is concerned with the accused's 
failure to testify, pre-trial silence mainly but not exclusively, deals with the impeachment 
evidentiary value of the accused's exercise of his right to testify. Silence is most commonly 
used by the Supreme Court for its impeachment value. 16 The evidentiary value of 
impeachment is dependent on the establishment of an inconsistency between the accused's 
exculpatory in-trial statements and his contradictory pre-trial silence. Silence therefore, must 
be shown to have a valid testimonial capacity. 
Sixth, the question of waiver is important. The scope and nature of the accused's waiver of 
his right to silence determines the proper use to which silence and other evidence may now 
be put.17 A waiver of privilege is the intentional, conscious, informed and unambiguous 
giving up of a known right. Waiver may either be express or it may be inferred from the 
accused's decision to testify or from the substance of his testimony. Waiver may also be 
inferred from the accused's conduct or behaviour during the pre-trial custodial process. 
When the accused waives his fifth amendment privilege, the prosecution is entitled to use 
silence as substantive or impeachment evidence, provided that it is admissible in terms of 
ordinary evidentiary principles. The Supreme Court has never defined the limit of the scope 
of a waiver, but it is generally assumed to mean that the state may cross-examine the 
accused. Waiving the right to silence does not mean that the normal procedural protections 
of evidence are also excluded. Cross-examination will still be controlled by the usual 
procedural rules. These procedural rules are intended to promote other values and are 
contest an accusation ... is considered evidence of acquiescence only if it would be natural under the 
circumstances to object to the assertion in question". See infra note 94. 
15 Brown v U.S 356 U.S 148, 155-156 (1958), "to allow the accused to re,.invoke the privilege at will 
during cross-examination is a positive invitation to the accused to mutilate the truth". Jenkins v 
Anderson ibid at 238, "[an accused] may decide not to take the witness stand because of the risk of 
cross-examination. But this is a choice of litigation tactics. Once [the accused] decides to testify, [the] 
interests of the other party and regard for the function of courts of justice to ascertain the truth, 
become relevant and prevail in the balance of considerations determining the scope and limits of the 
privilege". 
16 Testimony may be impeached by showing prior contradictory statements or bad character (Federal 
rules of evidence, 608, 609, 613). Jenkins and Anderson ibid at 238-39 suggests "common law ... 
allows witnesses to be impeached by their previous failure to state a fact in circumstances in which the 
fact naturally would have been asserted". The effect of impeachment is to impair the accused's 
credibility and to enhance the prosecutional prima facie case. Impeachment evidence may also 
unduly influence the jury, who may draw an adverse inference of guilt from impeachable silence. 
Impeaching silence infringes the following philosophical policies : (i) Impeaching silence invades the 
accused's mental privacy; (ii) It forces the accused to confront the cruel dilemma; (iii) it erodes the 
protection surrounding the innocent and threatens the fair-state balance. 
17 Jenkins v Anderson ibid at 235, "an accused waives his fifth amendment immunity from giving 
testimony when he offers himself as a witness". 
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therefore not waived along with the right to silence. Similarly, if the accused elects to testify 
and to waive his trial right to silence, it does not mean that he intends to waive his pre-trial 
right to silence. The election to testify should not be construed as implying a waiver of other 
independent constitutional protections.18 Finally, there is a conceptual difference between 
silence and self-incrimination. In English jurisprudence, this distinction is faithfully reflected 
in both case and statutory law. However, in American jurisprudence, the distinction is 
somewhat obscure. The fifth amendment speaks only of a "compulsion" which must not 
induce the individual to be a "witness against himself'. Within this witness compulsion 
paradigm there is no mention of silence. Fifth amendment analysis focuses entirely on the 
meaning of "compulsion/coercion" or "burden" and self-incrimination of a ''witness". Silence 
within this analysis tends to be subsumed by the meaning of compulsion and merged within 
the notion of self-incrimination. 
6.1.1 The Coercion Model 
The constitutional-prohibition rule : In general testimony improperly coerced by the state 
is an infringement of the accused's fifth amendment constitutional right and is therefore 
inadmissible at trial. In certain circumstances, silence may amount to a compelled 
testimonial statement and the evidentiary use of the compelled silence is accordingly 
prohibited.19 Coercion or compulsion (both terms are sometimes used interchangeably) is 
normatively defined as a force, influence or pressure deliberately exerted upon the mind of 
the individual with the aim of inducing speech. Compulsion is narrowly concerned with the 
exertion of psychological pressure, either subtle or overt. Coercion encompasses all forms 
of compulsion and is widely defined as amounting to an overt use of both psychological and 
physical force. Coercion is usually found in the police interrogation room and in the 
courtroom. Interrogation is specifically designed to subjugate the mind of the interrogee to 
the will of the interrogator. Isolation, deprivation of freedom, fear, intimidation and forceful 
questioning techniques are all forms of coercion inherent within custodial interrogation. 
Within the courtroom the prosecution's ability to comment on the accused's failure to testify 
may amount to a coercive pressure, compelling the accused to speak up in his own defence. 
The coercion model is best explained by the words of Murphy J (dissenting) in Adamson v 
18 New Jersey v Portash 440 U.S 450 (1979), inconsistent statements made to a grand jury under a 
grant of immunity could not be used to impeach the accused when he elects to testify at trial. By 
contrast, both Raffel and Jenkins allow the court to use prior testimonial silence for impeachment 
purposes once the accused elects to testify at trial, on the basis that an election to testify is a broad 
implicit waiver of constitutional rights. Both Raffel and Jenkins are in conflict with Portash. 
19 See in particular Griffin v California 380 U.S 609, 615 (1965) and Raffel v United States 271 U.S 
494 (1926). 
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California,20 "(a) if the [accused] does not take the stand, his silence is used as the basis for 
drawing unfavourable inferences against him ... thus he is compelled, through his silence, to 
testify against himself; (b) if he does take the stand, thereby opening himself to cross-
examination . . . he is necessarily compelled to testify against himself. In that case, his 
testimony on cross-examination is the result of the coercive pressure of the [statutory] 
provision rather than his own volition". 
The coercion model concentrates on an analysis of whether or not the accused's pre-trial 
and trial silence is the result of some kind of state-induced coercion. When confronted by an 
accusation, the accused has a number of choices; he may testify and become a witness 
against himself or he may remain silent. If the accused's silence is the basis for a negative 
inference against him, the accused has in essence become a compelled witness against 
himself. The accused has been coerced by the state to be a witness. The constitutional-
prohibition model examines the compulsion which places the accused in a position where he 
must either speak or remain silent. If the result of that coercive choice is silence, the fifth 
amendment prohibits the accused's silence being used as testimony against him. Griffin v 
California is a perfect example of the coercion model at work. The accused is given the 
choice of remaining silent or testifying. The Griffin court defines this choice as coercive and 
the accused's subsequent silence cannot be used against him. The accused's pre-trial 
choice of silence may also be defined as coercive. When the interrogator confronts the 
suspect with a choice between speaking up or remaining silent, and the suspect chooses 
silence, no evidentiary use may be made of such a compelled silence. When the state 
intends to make use of both the accused's pre-trial silence (a negative statement) and his 
affirmative (positive) statements made during custodial interrogation, the accused is placed 
under a double-bind coercion. Here the accused is damned if he does and damned if he 
doesn't.21 However, where the state leaves the accused with a choice which does not violate 
his constitutional rights, then his compelled silence may nevertheless be admissible. For 
example, the accused is sometimes confronted by the coerced choice of either taking a 
blood test (to prove intoxication) or refusing one in which case a presumption of guilt arises. 
The accused's refusal amounts to a testimonial choice but not one which is the product of a 
prohibited constitutionally defined coercion. Similarly, the accused's silence in Jenkins v 
Anderson is deemed admissible as impeachment evidence against him as it is not the 
product of a constitutionally prohibited coercion. At the time of Jenkins's silence, the police 
20 332 u.s 46, 123, 124 (1947). 
21 Adamson v California ibid at 220. See also Herman "The Supreme Court And Restrictions On 
Police Interrogation" (25) Ohio St. L. J (1964) 449-467. 
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had neither interviewed him nor arrested him. Jenkins's silence has admissible testimonial 
value because he has not as yet been subjected to any state coercion. 
The prohibited-inference rule : The accused's silence is only relevant as evidence if it 
gives rise to an inference consistent with the prosecution's prima facie case. If the accused's 
silence is the result of a proper exercise of his fifth amendment right, no evidentiary use may 
be made of the accused's silence.22 Two kinds of inferences are possible. Clearly 
inadmissible would be a direct inference of guilt drawn from either the accused's pre-trial or 
trial silence. However, within certain circumstances, the indirect use of the accused's pre-
trial silence is permissible but only for the limited evidentiary purpose of impeaching the 
accused's credibility. Griffin v California23 is authority for the prohibition of adverse 
inferences flowing from the accused's failure to testify at trial. Jenkins v Anderson and 
Fletcher v Weif4 are authority for the drawing of adverse inferences from pre-arrest pre-trial 
silence for impeachment purposes. The impeachment testimonial value of silence is 
conditioned upon two presumptions. The presumption that in a similar situation a reasonable 
person would have denied the accusation unless it was true (an objective-reasonable test). 
The evidentiary use of impeachable silence is also dependent on the probative value of the 
inference to be drawn and the effect of any resultant prejudice.25 There are any number of 
reasons why the accused chooses silence. Ignorance, fear, intimidation, uncertainty about 
future legal consequences are all factors which may decrease the probative value of the 
inference or increase its possible prejudicial effect (a subjective test). Nevertheless, the 
accused's silence as an impeachment device is a well-established prosecutional tool. The 
prosecution will usually use silence to contradict the accused's testimony and to draw a 
testimonial inference inconsistent with the accused's trial testimony. The prosecution may 
also use the accused's silence to infer that the accused has no truthful exculpatory story to 
tell. In Lakeside v Oregon,26 the court applied a prohibited inference rule which distinguished 
between adverse inferences deemed improper and positive instructional adverse inferences 
considered proper as they did not encourage the jury to make negative speculations. 
22 See Poulin supra note 7 at 222-28. Ratner supra note 7 at 491-492. See also Bradley "Griffin v 
California: Still Viable After All These Years" (70) Mich. L. Rev (1981) 1290-1293. 
23 Griffin ibid at 614-615. 
24 Jenkins ibid at 238, Fletcher ibid at 606-7. 
25 Grunewald v United States 353 U.S 391 (1957), United States v Hale 422 U.S 171 (1975) both hold 
that silence has absolutely no probative value. Baxter v Palmigiano 425 U.S 308, 316, 320 (1976) in 
allowing an adverse inference to be drawn from a prisoner's exercise of silence during a prison 
disciplinary board, held that adverse inferences from silence do have probative value in a disciplinary 
hearing but not in a formal criminal proceeding. The Baxter decision is illogical since silence should 
have the same probative value, irrespective of the nature of the proceedings. 
26 435 u.s 333 (1978). 
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The prophylactic-exclusionary rule : Is also formulated to deter improper state violations of 
constitutional rights.27 The suspect's statements are inadmissible if police improperly infringe 
the prophylactic standard endorsed by Miranda. When the suspect is exposed to an 
inherently compelling pressure",28 his silence cannot be held against him. The state has 
placed the individual in a situation in which, regardless of his response, he is compelled to 
provide incriminating testimonial evidence, either in the form of a negative silent statement, 
or a positive affirmative statement. Underlying the prophylactic-exclusionary rule is the 
concern that "during custodial interrogation, the pressure on the suspect to respond flows 
[not from the threat of contempt sanctions], but rather from the inherently compelling 
pressures which work to undermine the individual's will to resist and. to compel him to speak 
where he would not otherwise do so freely".29 The custodial post-arrest interrogee is faced 
with three possibilities. He may respond and thereby incriminate himself. He may lie and 
thus expose himself to the inference of a guilty conscience or he may remain silent. The 
prophylactic-exclusionary rule is designed to protect this kind of silence and to prevent it from 
being used as testimony against the accused.30 The pre-arrest interrogee is in a similar but 
slightly worse situation. His silence in the face of police questioning is not protected by the 
prophylactic rule which is triggered only after arrest. Pre-arrest silence may be used as 
testimonial evidence. Whether the fifth amendment attaches to the evidence of a non-
testifying pre-arrest suspect has not as yet been resolved by the Supreme Court. The 
prophylactic exclusionary rule has limited utility in assessing testimonial evidence in the form 
of silence. The exclusionary rule is best suited to cases in which the state attempts to admit 
positive evidence obtained in violation of a constitutional protection. If the reaction to 
improper state conduct is silence, a negative response, it is difficult to see exactly how the 
exclusionary rule applies. The Miranda rule is specifically formulated to deter the evidentiary 
use of improper affirmative testimony and is not designed to deal with the opposite, namely a 
negative expression of silence.31 More importantly, silence by definition emphasizes fifth 
amendment values which are different from those identified in Miranda. Ideally, when the 
suspect invokes his right to silence, the court should concentrate on protecting the exercise 
27 The two most important decisions defining the exclusionary rule are : Mapp v Ohio 367 U.S 643 
(1961 ), "evidence is inadmissible if obtained in terms of an unreasonable search and seizure - a 
violation of the fourth amendment. Miranda v Arizona 384 U.S 436 (1966), "evidence is inadmissible if 
obtained in terms of a coercive police interrogation", a violation of a prophylactic exclusionary rule. 
28 Miranda ibid at 467. 
29 Pennsylvania v Muniz 496 U.S 596-97 (1990). 
30 This reasoning is based on the cruel trilemma argument. At trial the accused may remain silent and 
have an adverse inference drawn against him; he may speak up and incriminate himself, or he may 
lie and face a perjury/contempt charge. At the pre-trial stage, the suspect faces the same trilemma 
except that the perjury threat is substituted by an inference of a guilty conscience threat. The cruel 
trilemma applies equally to the pre-arrest suspect, the custodial interrogee and the accused. 
31 See in particular Harris v New York and Oregon v Elstad supra chapter 5 p.179, 189-191. 
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of the right rather than shifting the focus to an examination of improper state conduct.32 Of 
course, once the suspect has waived his constitutional right to silence, there is no reason to 
limit the evidentiary use of the suspect's pre-trial silence.33 
6.1.2 The Impermissible-Burden Model 
The impermissible-burden model examines the state's evidentiary use of the accused's 
silence by determining whether or not the burden placed on the accused's right is 
unconstitutional. Evidentiary use of testimony is prohibited when it places a compulsive 
burden on the exercise of the individual's fifth amendment privilege. 34 The impermissible-
burden rule makes use of a three pronged test : (i) whether the state use of silence as 
testimony burdens the exercise of the accused's fifth amendment, (ii) whether this kind of 
silence usage impairs the fundamental policies underlying the fifth amendment,35 (iii) whether 
the advancement of the state interest warrants the impairment of the fifth amendment.36 The 
rule involves an intricate balance of interests and suffers from a certain degree of 
unpredictability. What constitutes a burden, what degree of weight is to be attached to the 
accused's interest as opposed to the state interest is purely a matter of subjective 
selectiveness. The factors to be balanced are left entirely to the court's subjective discretion. 
The test specifically prohibits the evidentiary use of silence which infringes the fifth 
amendment's underlying policies. Yet an examination of Supreme Court case law reveals no 
consensus on the kind, type and number of justifications which supposedly underly the fifth 
amendment privilege. Indeed, as has been demonstrated in Chapter 4, all of the underlying 
policies enumerated in seminal decisions such as Murphy v Waterfront Commission and 
Miranda v Arizona contain fundamental moral and logical flaws.37 One of the main problems 
with the impermissible-burden test is determining how and where the line is to be drawn 
between a burden which amounts to a compulsion,38 a burden which may perhaps not be 
32 Logically where the suspect remains silent in the face of state interrogation, there is no improper 
conduct to deter. 
33 Anderson v Charles 447 U.S 404, 408 (1980), "unless the silence represents a tacit revocation of 
waiver''. · 
34 See also Carter v Kentucky 480 U.S 288 ( 1981 ). 
35 See also McGautha v California 402 U.S 183, 213 (1971), "the threshold question is whether 
compelling the balance of interests impairs to an appreciable extent any of the policies behind the right 
involved" 
36 Ayers "The Fifth Amendment And The Inference Of Guilt From Silence : Griffith v California After 
Fifteen Years" (78) Mich. L. Rev (1980) 841,851. 
37 According to the impermissible-burden model, the use of silence by the state would shift the state-
individual balance towards the prosecution, erode protections for the innocent, increase the likelihood 
of coercing statements from the accused and present the accused with a cruel trilemma. 
38 Garrity v New Jersey 385 U.S 493 (1967), police officers under internal investigation were advised 
that claiming a right to silence would mean removal from employment. The use of affirmative 
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strictly defined as compulsive, but is nevertheless heavy enough to deserve exclusion and a 
burden which is slight and thus permissible.39 There should be some kind of a threshold 
which distinguishes impermissible burdens from permissible burdens. The Supreme Court 
has never clearly articulated such a threshold level. The classical application of the 
impermissible-burden rule is to be found in the seminal case Griffin v California.40 The court 
specifically holds that prosecutorial use of the accused's trial silence amounts to an 
impermissible burden on the accused's fifth amendment privilege.41 The prosecution is 
barred from making use of the accused's failure to testify either as direct or indirect evidence 
of guilt. However, the Griffin decision is conceptually flawed as it fails to distinguish between 
the burden placed on the accused's in-trial silence and the accused's pre-trial silence. A 
comparison between the two burdens indicates that prosecutorial use of pre-trial silence 
would amount to a far heavier burden. Prosecutorial commentary on the accused's trial 
silence places only a small additional burden on the accused's constitutional right as the jury 
is already in a position to observe the accused's failure to testify. By contrast, the jury is 
usually unaware of the accused's pre-trial silence and once this testimony is admitted, it 
places a far heavier burden on the accused's constitutional right.42 Yet the use of pre-trial 
silence is permitted, although narrowly for impeachment purposes only, but trial silence 
usage is absolutely prohibited. 
In Jenkins v Anderson, the Supreme Court for the first time applied the impermissible-burden 
test enunciated in Griffin to pre-arrest silence.43 The court distinguished between the two 
types of burdens by reasoning that the state interest more than outweighed the burden 
placed on the accused's pre-arrest right to silence. The impeachment use of the accused's 
pre-trial right to silence did not seriously impair the policies underlying the constitutional right 
to testify, "impeachment follows the accused's own decision to cast aside his cloak of silence 
and advances the truth-finding function of the criminal trial".44 Once the accused elects to 
statements induced in such a coercive atmosphere amounted to an impermissible burden at trial on 
their fifth amendment rights. 
39 The mere threat of using pre-trial silence adversely against the accused at trial did not amount to an 
impermissible burden. McGautha v California ibid at 213, "it is not contended ... that the mere force of 
evidence is a compulsion of the sort forbidden by the privilege". 
40 380 u.s 615 (1965). 
41 Griffin ibid at 614-615 defines the prohibition on trial silence as an impermissible burden, but the 
court does not use the word compulsion, nor does the court explain the difference between a "burden" 
and a "compulsion". 
42 The analysis of a burden is compounded by the problem that a suspect, when he makes the 
election to remain silent, does not as yet foresee that his pre-trial silence may be used against him at 
some remote future trial. Usually the suspect is advised of his right to remain silent by his legal 
counsel. The Supreme Court has not commented on the effects of a lawyer advised silence on the 
impermissible burden test. 
43 Jenkins ibid at 236-238. 
44 Ibid at 238. 
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testify, he loses his protection and opens himself to cross-examination. Jenkins expressly 
declines to comment on the extent to which pre-trial silence is or is not protected by the fifth 
amendment.45 Two conceptual alternatives present themselves. If pre-arrest silence falls 
within the constitutional ambit of the fifth amendment then prohibiting a substantive inference 
of guilt derived from pre-arrest silence builds naturally on the Griffin decision. On the other 
hand, if pre-arrest silence does not amount to an exercise of the fifth amendment privilege, 
then pre-arrest silence may be treated like any other item of evidence. In terms of this 
reasoning, pre-arrest silence may only be inadmissible if it were found to be an impermissible 
burden on the accused's constitutional right not to testify at trial. The impermissible-burden 
test, despite a certain degree of unpredictability, has become the Supreme Court's main 
analytical tool. In essence, present fifth amendment jurisprudence prohibits the use of either 
pre-trial or trial silence as a substantive indication of guilt. Pre-trial silence is admissible, but 
only for the narrow purpose of impeaching the accused's credibility once he has voluntarily 
elected to testify. 
6.2 Miranda To Jenkins : The Pre-Arrest And Pre-Trial Impeachment Cases 
The Supreme Court has held that the fifth amendment not only informs the arrested suspect 
of his right to remain silent, but also prohibits any use of the cautioned suspect's silence as 
substantial evidence by the prosecution. The arrested suspect on invoking his constitutional 
right cannot be penalized in court for remaining silent. At most, the prosecution may 
impeach the credibility of the accused with his pre-trial silence but only once the accused has 
voluntarily elected to testify. Evidentiary use of silence by the prosecution is only permissible 
when the accused has knowingly and voluntarily waived the fifth amendment privilege as a 
constitutional procedural protection. Although these general rules appear to be a clear 
summary of the Supreme Court's position, a closer examination of the more important court 
decisions shows a remarkable degree of inconsistency.46 The admission or exclusion of pre-
arrest and pre-trial silence as evidence, the inferences to be drawn from such silence usage, 
varies significantly from one case to the other. The ambivalence surrounding the evidentiary 
usage of pre-arrest silence is largely due to a number of contradictory factors. 
45 Jenkins ibid at 236 n 2. 
46 Jackson "The Right To Silence : The Use of Pre-Arrest Silence" (68) Un. Ginn. L. Rev (2000) 
505.29. Speek "The Weight Of Silence, Determining The Use Of Pre-Arrest Silence As Substantive 
Evidence" (21) Am. J. Trial Advocacy (1997) 413. Patrick "Towards The Constitutional Protection Of A 
Non-Testifying Defendant's Pre-Arrest Silence" (63) Brooklyn L. Rev (1997) 897. Notz "Pre-Arrest 
Silence As Evidence Of Guilf' (64) Un. Chicago L. Rev (1997) 1009. Pettit "Should The Prosecution 
Be Allowed To Comment On A Defendant's Pre-Arrest Silence In Its Case-In-Chief' (29) Loyola. Un. 
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First, the fundamental problem with the Supreme Court's analysis of pre-arrest silence is that 
the court has failed to give an authoritative opinion on whether or not pre-arrest silence may 
be used by the prosecution as substantive evidence of guilt. The result is a conspicuous 
gap. The seminal case, Jenkins v Anderson,47 addresses only the use of pre-arrest silence 
for impeachment purposes. The court expressly leaves open the constitutionality of a 
substantive use of pre-arrest silence.48 The Federal Courts of Appeal have been asked to fill 
the gap on their own. The predictable result is a number of contrary judgements. In 
reaching diverging conclusions the circuit courts have relied on two distinct strands of fifth 
amendment case law.49 The circuit courts favouring the substantive exclusion of pre-arrest 
silence rely on the authority of Griffin v California. 50 According to Griffin, silence is an 
absolute constitutional right and the prosecution is absolutely precluded from the evidentiary 
use of silence. If Griffin is taken to its logical conclusion, it should also preclude the 
substantive use of pre-arrest silence. The Supreme Court has previously held that fifth 
amendment protections are not limited to the trial context. 51 An inability to protect the right at 
one stage of the criminal process may make its invocation useless at a later stage. 52 Using 
the suspect's pre-trial silence to suggest guilt may impermissibly burden the fifth amendment 
right. Such a penalty would discourage the accused from exercising the fifth amendment. 
Prosecutorial comment on pre-arrest silence is also likely to penalize the accused more 
heavily than prosecutorial comment on a failure to testify at trial.53 On the other hand, the 
circuit courts favouring a substantive evidential inclusion of pre-arrest silence rely on Jenkins 
v Anderson. 54 The Jenkins reasoning is in some regards contrary to the spirit of Griffin. The 
evidentiary use of silence is determined by an impermissible-burden test in which the court 
weighs the legitimacy of the challenged silence usage against the burden such usage places 
Chic. L. J (1997) 181. Abaray "Note: Jenkins v Anderson" (49) Uni. Ginn. L. Rev (1980) 858. Schiller 
"On The Jurisprudence Of The Fifth Amendment Right To Silence" (16) Am. Grim. L. Rev (1979) 197. 
47 447 U.S 231 (1980). 
48 Ibid at 236 n. 2. 
49 See McKeegan "Note : The Fifth Amendment And A Defendant's Pre-Arrest Failure To Come 
Forward" (46) Albany L. Rev (1982) 546, 555, who argues for the substantive admission of pre-arrest 
silence on the ground that it is not a compelled self-incrimination as defined in the fifth amendment. 
50 380 U.S 609 (1965) particularly 613-615. 
51 Kastigar v United States 406 U.S 441, 445 (1972), "the privilege protects against any disclosure 
that the witness reasonably believes could be used in a criminal prosecution or could lead to other 
evidence that might be so used". 
52 Michigan v Tucker417 U.S 433,440-1 (1974). 
53 The First, Seventh and Tenth Circuit Courts favour the exclusion of all substantive use of pre-arrest 
and pre-trial silence on the reasoning set out by Griffin. See United States v Burson 952 F .2d 1196 
(1oth Cir) 1991, Coppola v Powe/1878 F.2d 1562, 1568 (1 5t Cir) 1989. Savory v Lane 832 F.2d 1011, 
1017 (7th Cir) 1987. 
54 The Fifth, Ninth and Eleventh circuits allow a substantive inference of guilt to be drawn from the 
accused's pre-arrest silence. Taking advantage of Jenkins's failure to render an express opinion in 
this regard. See United States v Oplinger 150 F.3d 590, 593 (5th Cir) 1996, United States v Rivera 
944 F .2d ·t563, 1568 (11th Cir) 1991, United States v Thompson 82 F .3d 849 (9th Cir) 1996. 
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on the policies behind the fifth amendment. 55 Jenkins differs from Griffin in arguing that, in 
certain circumstances, the evidentiary use of silence is a permissible rather than an 
impermissible burden. The pre-arrest use of silence is permissible, especially when the 
accused has voluntarily chosen to take the stand and testify. In addition, some kind of state 
action is a necessary prerequisite for the triggering of the fifth amendment. The fifth 
amendment has no constitutional force in the face of a purely private action. The criminal 
suspect who has no contact with a law enforcement organ prior to his arrest may not bar 
prosecutorial use of his pre-trial silence made to the face of another private individual. The 
fifth amendment may only be raised when the prosecution seeks to make testimonial use of 
"silence" induced or coerced by the state from the accused.56 The consequence of such 
diversity of opinion is a certain conceptual confusion about the nature of pre-arrest silence. 
What kind of testimonial relevancy should be attached to pre-arrest silence? May the 
prosecution's use of pre-arrest silence be defined as a constitutional infringement? If so, is it 
an infringement of the accused's fifth amendment silence right or of his fourteenth 
amendment due process right? 
Second, some commentators have argued that pre-trial silence should not be analysed in 
terms of constitutional law principles. Instead, pre-trial silence should be examined for its 
probative value as an item of circumstantial evidence57 in accordance with ordinary 
evidentiary rules. When pre-arrest silence is used to directly infer guilt its probative value is 
extremely low.58 Its prejudicial effect is extremely high because pre-arrest and pre-trial 
silence is too ambiguous and by itself cannot determine the innocence or guilt of the 
accused. When pre-arrest silence is used for impeachment purposes only, it becomes less 
intrusive on the accused's constitutional rights. 59 The probative value of pre-arrest silence as 
impeachment evidence is high and its prejudicial effect limited. The use of pre-arrest silence 
55 See Snyder "A Due Process Analysis Of The Impeachment Use Of Silence In Criminal Trials" (29) 
Wm. And Mary L. Rev (1988) 285, 330, who argues for the view that Jenkins was wrongly decided 
and should have been founded on an analysis of the fourteenth amendment. 
56 Colorado v Connelly 479 U.S 157, 169-70 (1988), ''the sole concern of the fifth amendment is 
government coercion. The fifth amendment is not concerned with moral or psychological pressures 
emanating from sources other than official coercion". For example, in United States v Oplinger 150 
F.3d 1061, 1063-64 (91h Cir) 1998, the accused's silence was in response to questions from his bank 
supervisors. The fifth amendment was not violated by the substantive admission of his pre-arrest 
silence because the accused at that stage was not being subjected to an interrogation by law 
enforcement officials. 
57 Circumstantial evidence consists of proved facts from which other connected facts (by inference) 
are established. 
58 Silence is ambiguous since there may be other innocent reasons for its existence, including 
intimidation, ignorance, hostility to questioning and a strong belief in the right to remain silent. 
59 The use of pre-arrest silence for impeachment purposes is constitutionally permissible because the 
accused has already made the voluntary choice of testifying. Consequently, the accused is not forced 
or compelled by the state to be a witness against himself. 
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as impeachment evidence is further legitimized by the fact that the accused voluntarily takes 
the stand and is not forced to be a witness against himself. The problem of pre-trial silence 
may be solved purely in terms of evidentiary principles without the need to refer to confusing 
constitutional definitions. 
Third, a fundamental reason for prohibiting the evidentiary use of silence is that it unfairly 
infringes the accused's constitutional rights. In terms of the impermissible-burden test, 
silence as evidence is prohibited because it penalizes the accused's fifth amendment right by 
burdening the policy justifications underlying the fifth amendment. It is argued that allowing 
the prosecution to rely on silence transforms the accused's silence into a testimonial 
admission. A testimonial admission which is then substituted for the hard evidence the state 
is obliged to obtain through its own endeavours. It amounts to a shift in the burden of proof 
from the state to the accused.60 The substantive use of silence to infer guilt would also 
violate the fifth amendment's ability to act as a shelter for the innocent accused.61 
Furthermore, when the accused's silence is used to imply his guilt, a definite cruel trilemma 
is created in which the accused has the choice of either making a self-accusatory affirmative 
statement, or of perjuring himself, or by remaining silent open himself to an adverse 
inference of guilt. 52 The fifth amendment is also employed to deter police misconduct. If the 
police know that the accused's pre-arrest silence is available for use at trial, there is the 
incentive to manipulate the time of arrest and the delivery of the Miranda warning in order to 
ensure the admissibility of pre-arrest silence. However, all of the policies supposedly 
justifying the fifth amendment and precluding the evidentiary use of silence are based on 
justifications which have been rationally refuted (see Chapter Four). The impermissible-
burden test and the policies which support it are based on a shallow foundation.63 The 
Supreme Court's continued reliance on these irrational policies is one of the reasons for the 
confusion about the nature, purpose and evidentiary value of pre-arrest silence. 
Fourth, the Supreme Court's reduction of the Miranda post-arrest custodial safeguards to a 
mere prophylactic rule has an important spillover effect on the treatment of pre-arrest silence. 
The porous nature of the Miranda safeguards allow the police a wide latitude. Quite often 
the court favours the interrogator to the detriment of the interrogee. The circuit courts, in 
60 See Poulin "Evidentiary Use Of Silence And The Constitutional Privilege Against Self-Incrimination" 
(52) Geo. Wash. L. Rev(1984) 191,210-211. 
61 Ibid at 212. See also Ullmann v United States 350 U.S 422, 426-28 (1956) and Grunewald v United 
States 353 U.S 391, 421 (1957) "the basic function of the privilege is to protect innocent men. The 
privilege serves to protect the innocent who otherwise might be ensnared by ambiguous 
circumstances". 
62 Ibid Poulin at 211. 
63 See supra chapter 4. 
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particular, exhibit an ambivalence in dealing firmly with dubious police interrogation methods 
involving deception and trickery. Judgements on waiver of suspect's rights are often 
weighed and interpreted in favour of the police interrogator. The wide latitude granted to the 
police after the suspect's arrest is also reflected in the flexible police friendly way the courts 
deal with the suspect's pre-arrest silence. The circuit courts have traditionally been biased in 
favour of the police. In contrast to the inconsistency of American court decisions, English 
case law and statute is clear about the kind and extent of the various inferences to be drawn 
from both pre-arrest and post-arrest silence.64 There is an urgent need for the United States 
Supreme Court to follow in the footsteps of its English cousin and to develop a uniform and 
systematic set of rules on the correct pre-arrest and post-arrest evidentiary use of silence. 
What is called for is a proper federal system of rules which would enable the defence 
attorney to give correct legal advice and allow the accused to plan a reasonable trial 
strategy. A federal rule-based system of information is vital to the accused as he determines 
when to remain silent, when to speak out, when to testify and the possible consequences of 
cross-examination. A federal system would also take into account the potential prejudice 
effect of silence on the jury, who are well known for their propensity to consider silence as an 
admission of guilt. 
Fifth, the Supreme Court's ambivalence towards the substantive use of pre-arrest silence is 
largely built on a confusion about the appropriate impeachment use of silence. Impeachment 
is an evidentiary tool which allows the prosecution through cross-examination to attack the 
credibility of the suspect and permits the trier-of-fact to draw reasonable adverse inferences 
about the accused's truthfulness. Impeachment technique must establish a contradiction 
between the evidence given at trial and a statement made by the accused on a previous 
occasion before the trial. In certain circumstances silence (if it is to have testimonial value) 
may be used to establish the contradiction. When the suspect (as he then is) remains silent 
upon hearing an accusing statement, his silence may be construed as an agreement to that 
statement. At trial the accused's (as he now is) exculpatory evidence may be contradicted 
by his previous silence. Silence is not a statement as such, rather it is a kind of negative 
"omission" which may have communicative value. Silence if it is to have impeachment value, 
must be inconsistent with either other acts of silence or other positive exculpatory 
statements. Impeachment use of silence may only be made where there is no other 
reasonable explanation for the suspect's silence. Impeachment of an accused's trial 
testimony involves specific considerations more important than the traditional concerns about 
the evidential use of silence. The Supreme court's readiness to admit "silence" evidence for 
64 See infra chapter 8 p.283-287. 
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an impeachment purpose is grounded on the following considerations. Primarily, 
impeachment use of silence concerns the question of credibility or perjury and only becomes 
a trial issue when the accused decides to take the stand. Perjury or credibility are not in 
issue if the accused decides not to testify. Every criminal accused has the right to choose to 
testify or to refuse to testify. If the accused chooses to testify and then perjures himself, the 
fifth amendment cannot be construed to include the right to be protected against the 
consequences of such perjury.65 Secondarily, when the accused chooses to testify, he is 
assumed to have waived his fifth amendment right. Raffel v United States66 clearly holds, 
"the safeguards against self-incrimination are for the benefit of those who did not wish to 
become a witness on their own behalf and not for those who do". This aspect of the Raffel 
judgement is reaffirmed by Jenkins.67 Finally, on a practical level, the impeachment use of 
silence is less likely to discourage the accused from exercising his fifth amendment right than 
the substantive use of silence. One of the reasons for barring the use of pre-arrest silence 
(as an inference of guilt) is that it is likely to interfere with the accused's voluntary decision to 
exercise the fifth amendment. Impeachment use of silence (as an inference which goes only 
to credibility) is less likely to interfere with the accused's choice. Although the Supreme 
Court regards impeachment as a traditional truth-testing device, there has been no uniformity 
in the way the court interprets the nature of impeachment use. The Supreme Court's 
conflicting interpretations of impeachment usage can be traced from the prior silence stage 
right through to the post-arrest stage. 
Prior Trial Silence : Raffel v United States68 is the earliest case to analyse the evidentiary 
use of prior trial silence as a prosecutorial impeachment tool. During the accused's first trial, 
he elected not to testify and at his second trial he changed his mind, took the stand, and was 
cross-examined by the prosecution on his prior trial silence. The court argued that 
impeachment of the accused by the drawing of adverse inferences from a previous trial 
protected silence did not infringe the accused's fifth amendment right. 69 The prosecution 
may, during cross-examination at the second trial, impeach the accused's credibility in terms 
of the prior-inconsistent statement rule regardless of whether the prior inconsistency is a 
positive contradictory statement or a prior trial silence or any other type of inexplicable 
65 Impeachment of the accused's credibility has a long history. It is clearly framed in the Federal 
Rules of Evidence, FRE 801 (d)(1)(A) and FRE 613. Harris v New York supra chapter 5 and Oregon 
v Hass, supra chapter 5 allow the impeachment use of evidence even when such evidence is obtained 
in violation of the Miranda rule. 
66 271 u.s 494, 499 (1926). 
67 447 U.S 231, 240-241 (1980). 
68 271 u.s 494 (1926). 
69 Ibid at 499. 
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silence.70 Especially when the accused has voluntarily waived his constitutional protection by 
deciding to testify during the second trial. Raffel is an anomaly as a number of cases 
following it refused to be bound by its reasoning. In Grunewald v United States,71 the 
accused remained silent during a pre-trial grand jury hearing, but chose to testify at his trial. 
The prosecution's attempt to impeach the accused's credibility by a cross-examination of his 
prior grand jury silence was held to be improper. Grunewald based its decision on the 
supervisory powers granted to it over federal courts72 and made no mention of the 
constitutional nature of silence.73 In Stewart v United States,74 the accused took the stand at 
his third trial, having remained silent during the inconclusive previous two. The prosecution 
comment, "this is the first time you have gone on the stand, isn't it Willie?" was held to be an 
improper breach of trial rules because the potential prejudice to the accused could not be 
rectified by a judicial cautionary instruction.75 Both Grunewald and Stewart base their 
reasoning on principles of evidentiary law and make no reference to constitutional law. The 
irony is that Raffel bases its reasoning on constitutional principles and allows for the 
impeachment use of prior trial silence. Grunewald and Stewart base their reasoning on 
evidentiary principles, but do not allow for the impeachment use of prior-trial silence. 
Pre-Arrest Silence : The evidentiary effect of pre-arrest pre-Miranda silence was dealt with 
by the seminal case Jenkins v Anderson.76 According to Jenkins. the use of pre-arrest 
silence to impeach the accused's credibility at trial does not violate either the fifth 
amendment or the fourteenth amendment due process clause.77 Impeachment use of pre-
arrest silence does not infringe the accused's constitutional rights because the accused 
voluntarily takes the stand and knowingly waives his protective constitutional shield.78 By 
making use of an impermissible-burden test (first mooted in Griffin v California) the court 
reasons that the policies underlying the fifth amendment are not significantly burdened by the 
impeachment use of pre-arrest silence. 79 The court does not however, discuss what it 
believes these pertinent policies to be.80 Jenkins also declines to discuss, whether and to 
70 Ibid at 499 but see also Reagan v United States 157 U.S 301, 305 (1895). 
71 353 U.S 391 (1957). 
72 Ibid at 424. 
73 Though Grunewald distinguishes the Raffel judgement on the facts, the court makes no comment 
on Raffefs constitutionally based reasoning (at 421 ). 
74 366 u.s 1 (1961). 
75 Ibid at 2, 4 and 5. The prosecution actually commented twice on the accused's prior trial silence. 
76 447 U.S 231 (1980}, "the accused waited two weeks before reporting the murder to the police. The 
prosecution impeached the accused on the ground that he should not have waited so long before 
telling the police". 
77 Ibid at 232, 238, 240-41. 
78 Ibid at 238. 
79 Ibid at 236-7. 
80 Ibid at 236. Commentators are forced to fall back on the traditional policies as outlined in Murphy v 
Waterfront Commission 378 U.S 52 (1964). 
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what extent, pre-arrest silence is privileged under the fifth amendment at all.81 Reliance on 
the Raffel precedent enables the court to sidestep the issue of whether the accused's 
silence is actually an invocation of the fifth amendment right to silence. On a fundamental 
level, Jenkins illustrates the Supreme Court's inability to articulate a philosophical justification 
for the silence principle. This inability is encapsulated by the court's failure to determine, (a) 
to what extent, if any, pre-arrest silence falls under the fifth amendment, (b) its express 
failure to decide whether substantive use may be made of pre-trial silence, and (c) by its 
failure to explain the nature of the so-called underlying policies. The constitutionality of a 
prosecutorial use of pre-trial silence is important because it influences the application of the 
impermissible-burden test. If pre-arrest silence falls within the ambit of the fifth amendment, 
then the focus of the impermissible-burden test is on whether or not pre-arrest silence is 
impermissibly burdened by its use as evidence at trial. If pre-arrest silence does not fall 
within the ambit of the fifth amendment, then the test must focus on the accused's choice to 
remain silent at trial, namely, is the right not to testify at trial impermissibly burdened by the 
accused's exercise of a pre-arrest refusal to answer interrogatory questions. Jenkins also 
adopts a Harris-style balance of interest analysis. The accused's interest in avoiding 
impeachment is outweighed by the state's substantial interest in obtaining a conviction and 
enhancing the truth-finding capacity of the criminal process. The impeachment use of 
silence is permissible because it ensures that the accused speaks truthfully and accurately 
and does not perjure himself when he takes the stand.82 By allowing the state to make use 
of impeachment silence the reliability of the criminal process is also enhanced. 
The court reaches its decision partly on the reasoning of Raffel v United States which it 
logically distinguishes from Grunewald and Stewart. Impeachment use of silence is 
justifiable because it does not significantly add to the trial pressure exerted by the jury 
expectation on the accused to take the stand and explain his innocence. Grunewald and 
Stewart do not establish a constitutional judicial precedent as they are merely case-by-case 
decisions concerning evidentiary rules on the probative value of silence usage. 83 
Commentators have criticized Jenkins, because it equates a Raffefs prior-trial type of silence 
with a pre-trial type of silence. A factual divide which may be too wide to adequately bridge. 
Other commentators have argued that pre-trial impeachment use of silence should always be 
81 Ibid at 236 n 2, but see Poulin supra note 7 at 215-217 who argues that allowing impeachment use 
of pre-arrest silence does in fact impermissibly burden the fifth amendment. 
82 Both Harris v New York 401 U.S 222, 223 (1971) and Jenkins at 238, admit otherwise inadmissible 
evidence for the purpose of challenging the credibility of the accused's testimony and to ensure that 
the accused does not perjure himself. 
83 The minority opinion in Jenkins (Marshal J, Brennan J) hold that Raffel was wrongly decided and 
logically undermined by Grunewald, Miranda and Griffin. 
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construed as an impermissible burden on the accused's constitutional rights which never 
enhances the state interest above the individual interest (a reasoning based on the absolute 
nature of the Griffin prohibition rule) and on the notion that compelling the accused to supply 
a link in the evidence against him before arrest is contrary to the inherent nature of an 
adversarial system of justice.84 By contrast, in England, clear statutory rules have been set 
out which clearly indicate what kinds of adverse inferences from pre-arrest silence may be 
safely drawn by the prosecution at trial.85 Lower court decisions generally reflect the 
confusion found at the Supreme Court level.86 Some circuit courts, for example, United 
States ex ref, Allen and Rowe,87 argue that pre-trial silence must first be established as 
contradictory before it may be used as an impeachment device. Usually, silence is so 
ambiguous that it fails to establish the necessary contradiction. Other lower courts, for 
example, United States v Vega,88 hold the exact opposite and allow the impeachment use of 
pre-trial silence especially in the circumstance where the accused silence is highly probative. 
Post-Arrest, Pre-Miranda Silence : The prosecution is entitled to use the accused's silence 
for impeachment purposes if the silence occurs after arrest but before the Miranda warning is 
administered. In Fletcher v Weir,89 the accused's exculpatory defence at trial was impeached 
on the basis of his post-arrest but pre-Miranda silence. The court reasons that when the 
accused has not yet been advised of his rights, impeachment use of silence does not violate 
the fourteenth amendment due process clause.90 At the pre-Miranda stage, there is as yet 
no positive state guarantee that the accused's silence will not be used against him. 91 
Although Fletcher argues along constitutional and not evidentiary lines, it evaluates silence in 
terms of the fourteenth amendment and makes no mention, as would be expected, of fifth 
amendment principles. Both Jenkins and Fletcher taken together, establish the notion that 
84 The Jenkins minority (at 245-46) cite three criticisms for their dissent : (i) the accused's silence at 
any stage of the criminal process is ambiguous; (ii) the possibility of impeachment now compels the 
suspect to speak up at interrogation in order to preserve the right to present an exculpatory defence at 
trial without being penalized, (iii) impeachment impermissibly burdens constitutional rights and cuts 
down on the accused's choices at trial. 
85 See infra chapter 9 p.327-334. 
86 Note the logical contradiction between the minority and the majority positions in Jenkins. The 
minority argue that impeachment use of pre-arrest silence is unconstitutional and contrary to the 
inherent nature of an adversarial system of justice. The majority argue that impeachment use 
r,revents perjury and enhances the reliability and truth-finding capacity of the adversarial system. 7 591 F.2d 391, 394 (7'h Cir) 1979. 
88 589 F.2d 1147, 1151 (2nd Cir) 1978. 
89 455 U.S 603 (1982). 
90 Fletcher establishes that only the accused's express reliance on the Miranda safeguards activates 
the protection and not some general notion of fairness. As a matter of constitutional law, the use of 
pre-arrest silence does not violate due process rights until the state induces the suspect to remain 
silent be reading to him his Miranda rights (at 607). 
91 The flaw in Fletcher is that it encourages police officers to delay giving the Miranda warning in the 
hope of using the suspect's silence against him. 
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pre-arrest and post-arrest but pre-Miranda silence may be utilized to impeach the accused's 
credibility at trial. Unfortunately, both courts decline to comment on whether or not the 
prosecution may make substantive use of pre-Miranda silence as an adverse inference of 
guilt. A significant distinction therefore, exists between the substantive value of pre-Miranda 
and post-Miranda silence. 
Post-Arrest, Post-Miranda Silence : As has been previously stated, Miranda v Arizona92 
establishes an affirmative duty on the state to warn the suspect of his custodial rights at the 
pre-trial interrogation stage. In terms of the prophylactic-exclusionary rule, "it is 
impermissible to penalize an individual for exercising his fifth amendment privilege when 
under police custodial interrogation. The prosecution may not ... use at trial the fact that he 
stood mute or claimed his privilege in the face of accusation".93 Hale v United States94 builds 
on the Miranda doctrine and holds that post-arrest silence is inadmissible for impeachment 
purposes and may not be used to contradict later exculpatory testimony. Once the Miranda 
warning has been administered, the accused's silence would lack sufficient probative value 
and thus have no evidentiary relevance. Unlike Miranda, Hale does not structure its 
reasoning on a fifth amendment foundation and interprets silence purely in terms of 
traditional evidentiary principles.95 Accordingly, Hale notes that silence is ambiguous and its 
probative value is significantly outweighed by its high potential prejudice. 96 A jury would 
likely misinterpret silence and award it more probative value than is appropriate. 
In addition to Miranda and Hale, Doyle v Ohio97 probably represents the high water mark of 
the accused's protective defence against the prosecution's impeachment use of silence. 
Doyle does not analyse pre-trial silence either in terms of evidentiary rules or fifth 
amendment principles, instead it elects to rely on the fourteenth amendment due process 
clause.98 The accused's post-arrest silence exercised as a result of a properly administered 
92 384 u.s 436 {1966). 
93 Ibid at 468. 
94 422 u.s 171, 176 {1975). 
95 Hale neatly sidesteps the issue of whether impeachment use of the accused's post-arrest silence 
impermissibly burdens his choice to remain silent at trial, or whether such use impermissibly coerces 
him to take the stand and explain himself, or whether his post-arrest silence is the product of a state 
coercion {at 181). 
96 The court noted {at 176-177) that silence has no probative value, (i) because of the intimidating 
atmosphere of the interview room, (ii) emotional reasons, misunderstanding of questions, fear or 
unwillingness to incriminate another, (iii) hostile and unfamiliar conditions. In sum, the inherent 
pressures of custodial interrogation compounds the difficulty of identifying the probative value of 
silence. 
97 426 u.s 610 (1976). 
98 Stevens J dissenting (at 620-621) criticizes the majority's due process reasoning as "estoppel" in 
disguise. By informing the suspect of his right to remain silent, the state is in effect estopped from 
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Miranda warning may not be used for impeachment purposes, to do so would constitute a 
fundamentally unfair process. The use of post-arrest silence violates due process for two 
reasons. First, the accused's silence is ambiguous once the Miranda warning has been 
administered.99 Second, even if silence has a high probative value, it would be procedurally 
unfair to penalize the accused for relying on his right. 100 Doyle has been criticized because it 
bases its reasoning on the fourteenth amendment rather than on the more appropriate fifth 
amendment. By basing its reasoning on fourteenth amendment grounds, Doyle skillfully 
avoids a re-interpretation of the Raffel decision. According to Doyle, the prosecution is 
entitled to make use of the accused's pre-arrest silence because no Miranda warning has as 
yet been administered and therefore, no procedural unfairness arises. In Doyle, the 
procedural unfairness arises because the accused has already been mirandised and his 
silence consequently cannot be used against him. In contrast to Doyle, it has also been 
previously noted that Harris v New York101 allows for the impeachment use of the accused's 
prior inconsistent statements even where the police have failed to properly mirandise the 
accused and are in violation of the fourteenth amendment. Harris is distinguished from the 
other post-arrest silence cases on the ground that it involves impeachment by previous 
positive contradictory statements and not impeachment by silence. Nevertheless, the 
underlying Harris principle is applicable to the post-arrest silence situation. 
The prosecution is entitled to make impeachment use not only of the accused complete pre-
trial silence, but also of his incomplete silence. In Anderson v Charles, 102 the court is 
concerned with the circumstance in which the accused is only partially silent following arrest. 
When the accused makes one incomplete statement on arrest and other contradictory 
statements at trial, the court speaks of a "formulastic silence". Each of two inconsistent 
descriptions of an event may be said to involve formulastic silence whenever the one version 
omits facts included in the other version. Apart from its definition of formulastic silence, the 
Anderson court reasons that cross-examination which merely seeks to inquire into prior 
inconsistencies 103 makes no unfair use of silence. The problem with Anderson is that it 
draws a very fine distinction between permissible impeachment use of silence and 
relying on silence as evidence at trial. Estoppel theory is also adopted in a limited fashion by Fletcher 
v Weir. 
99 Ibid at 617. 
100 Ibid at 617, 618. 
101 401 U.S 222, 223 (1971}. The impeachment use of positive prior inconsistent statements is 
admissible only in the limited circumstance when the failure to Mirandise is the result of a public 
emergency in which the police must act quickly. The state interest in obtaining the truth is balanced 
against the accused's interest in avoiding impeachment. 
102 447 u.s 404 (1980}. 
103 Ibid at 406. 
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impermissible use of silence. It also fails to determine the exact degree of inconsistency 
required before impeachment use may be made of the accused's partial silence. 
In general, the use of silence as an impeachment tool has become common practice in the 
American courtroom despite the ambivalent nature of some of the Supreme Court dicta. In 
theory, the constitution is supposed to protect the criminal defendant through all the stages of 
the criminal process. The mirandised accused is entitled to remain silent at the post-
interrogatory stage, including bail hearings, preliminary grand jury proceedings and motion 
hearings. In practice though, realistic considerations, including reduction in crime levels, 
cost-efficient convictions, necessitate a gradual erosion of both the Miranda prophylactic 
safeguards and the Doyle fourteenth amendment due process protection. Miranda and 
Doyle taken together, illustrate the Supreme Court's high-minded attempt to fashion a strong 
pre-trial protective buffer. Jenkins and Anderson on the other hand, highlight the Supreme 
Court's pragmatism and the practical necessity for leaving open wide loopholes in the 
substantial pre-trial barrier. An astonishing contradiction. What the Supreme Court 
concedes with Miranda, it apparently wants to take back with Jenkins. 
Across the continental divide in Commonwealth jurisdictions, common law evidentiary use of 
silence follows a similar but more consistent pattern. Pre-trial pre-caution silence is 
admissible at trial and the prosecution may use silence in its argument, but the use of silence 
as evidence may never amount to a direct inference of guilt. The normal practice is for 
silence to be used in evaluating other evidence once a prima facie case has already been 
established. Pre-trial post-caution silence as evidence is inadmissible at trial. In most 
commonwealth jurisdictions, pre-trial silence is regarded as an important protection to be 
nurtured at all costs. Nevertheless, a number of important exceptions exist. In terms of sec 
34 of the English Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994,104 the prosecution is entitled to 
comment on the accused's pre-trial silence whenever the accused attempts to make use of 
an alibi ambush tactic at trial. The accused's silence at the pre-trail stage about his alibi may 
be turned against him by the prosecution in undermining the credibility of an alibi belatedly 
introduced at trial. Similar statutory powers exist in Singapore and Malaysia. In Canada the 
prosecution may also draw an adverse inference against the accused who has failed to 
disclose his alibi timeously during the pre-trial stage in a manner sufficient to allow the police 
to fully investigate the merits of the alibi. However, in Australia and New Zealand, no 
adverse inference may be drawn from the accused's belated alibi defence, either directly or 
104 See infra chapter 9. 
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indirectly, as to credibility.105 In South Africa, pre-trial silence may draw an adverse inference 
in common law when the suspect is unable to explain a suspicious circumstance. The court 
is also entitled to take into account a surprise alibi-defence or any other fact which is first 
disclosed at trial and not to the police during the pre-trial interrogation. The failure to 
disclose an alibi-defence timeously thereby preventing the police from verifying it may 
weaken the defence and strengthen the state's prima facie case. 
The Supreme Court's uncertain approach to the nature and scope of pre-trial silence is 
illustrated by its inability to produce a clear and uniform jurisprudential foundation for its 
contrary decisions. Is the admissibility of pre-trial silence for impeachment purposes 
predicated on an evidentiary rule in which admissibility is determined by weighing probative 
value against potential prejudice? Is it a constitutional principle, in which case does it fall 
within the ambit of the fourteenth or the fifth amendment? In Doyle v Ohio and Fletcher v 
Weir, the Supreme Court relies on the fourteenth amendment to deny the prosecution the 
use of the accused's post-Miranda silence. In Jenkins v Anderson, the Supreme Court relies 
on a fifth amendment impermissible-burden test to allow the prosecution to impeach the 
accused's pre-trial silence. Any burden on pre-arrest silence is outweighed by the 
importance placed by the legal system on the crucial role of cross-examination and the 
process of truth finding. "Impeachment follows the [accused's] own decision to cast aside his 
cloak of silence". Alternatively, it may be possible to dispense with the constitution altogether 
and to base the admissibility of pre-trial silence purely on evidentiary grounds alone. The 
Supreme Court has previously indicated a willingness to use an evidentiary analysis in order 
to resolve difficult issues regarding the admissibility of the accused's pre-trial silence. In 
Grunewald v United States, the prosecution is prohibited from using the accused's grand jury 
silence for impeachment purposes because the prejudicial effect of the silence outweighs its 
probative value. Similarly, in United States v Hale, the precursor to Doyle, the court holds 
that the accused's post-Miranda silence may not be used against him because of its 
potentially high prejudicial effect. Silence need not always be subject to a constitutional 
analysis. A constitutional analysis of silence will often lead to conceptual problems. The 
better method of explaining silence is to reduce it to the level of an ordinary evidentiary rule. 
The contradiction and conflict sometimes found between the various Supreme Court 
judgements mirrors the volatile undercurrent of a "push and pull" dynamism between a 
utilitarian philosophy which seeks to admit all relevant evidence (in terms of evidentiary rules) 
and a libertarian ethos which seeks to limit (in terms of constitutional human rights), the 
amount of relevant evidence available to the "trier-of-fact". 
105 See infra chapter 8 p.315. 
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6.3 The Griffin No Comment rule : Trial Silence 
The straight forward and simple language of the fifth amendment has created many grey 
areas and left many unanswered questions. The attempts by the Supreme Court to fill in the 
blank spaces has resulted in a large measure of uncertainty. The literal language of the fifth 
amendment, "no one shall be compelled to be a witness against himself' does not directly 
apply to the problem of trial silence.106 After all, when the accused chooses not to testify and 
the prosecution comments on such silence, it cannot be said that the accused has been 
compelled to incriminate himself.107 Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has held that basic 
jurisprudential policies such as "a witness compulsion", "human dignity" and "trial fairness" 
are compromised when the prosecution makes an adverse inference (usually one of guilt) 
from the accused's silence at trial and draws the jury's attention to it. In the American legal 
system the silence principle at trial is generally understood to consist of an interactive 
melange of two specific immunities. The traditional fifth amendment privilege as interpreted 
by its original authors was limited to a narrow immunity, possessed by the accused, against a 
state-induced compulsion to give evidence or to answer questions at trial. In the course of 
the twentieth century, the Supreme Court has reshaped and elevated the silence principle 
into a constitutional right of the first rank. As a consequence of this constitutional elevation, 
the Supreme Court has grafted on to the traditional immunity a modern immunity, possessed 
by the accused at trial, from having adverse inferences drawn or made by the prosecution on 
the failure to give evidence or a failure to testify. 
This modern immunity has no historical or rational justification and is a pure invention of the 
United States Supreme Court108 and its fraternal brothers in England, Australia, Canada, 
New Zealand and South Africa. 109 Trial silence should also be separated from pre-trial 
silence as there is a significant jurisprudential difference between silence at the pre-trial and 
silence at the trial stage of the criminal system. The analysis of pre-trial silence, from 
Miranda through to Jenkins, always involves some form of direct or indirect interest 
106 The original authors of the Constitution had no need to incorporate a protection for the accused's 
failure to testify, as the accused was at that stage an incompetent witness. This disability was only 
removed at the end of the 19th century. 
107 A minority of academics have argued that although prosecutional commentary does not compel 
testimony, it does compel self-incrimination. If silence can be defined as self-incriminatory, then 
silence becomes compulsive by being unavoidable and forcing the accused to take the stand in 
rebuttal. However, this is a flawed argument because, if taken to its logical conclusion, it would label 
all types of incriminatory evidence as compulsory, rendering the trial process impossible. 
108 See the dissent in Mitchell v United States 526 U.S 314 (1999) per Scalia J at 325. 
109 See infra chapter 8. 
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balancing. Trial silence is different. The right not to testify is an absolute and inflexible right 
which is not susceptible to a reasonableness criterion or interest balancing analysis. 
Although it is internationally recognized that rights are relative, in the American context, the 
prosecution's inability to comment on the accused's failure to testify is an inflexible and 
absolute rule which does not allow for limitation or exception. The Supreme Court's 
landmark decision in Griffin v California110 may be regarded as an absolute rule of prohibition 
against the infringement· of the accused's trial right to silence. The prosecution is prohibited 
from drawing adverse inferences from silence and communicating it to the jury. The Griffin 
rule is unique. In England and other commonwealth jurisdictions the accused may refuse to 
testify, but the judge may comment on a failure to testify and the court is generally allowed to 
draw adverse inferences from trial silence. 
The accused's trial right to a no-inference instruction on the federal level has its origin in 
statutory law .111 The federal statute creates a statutory bar on the prosecution ability to. 
comment on the accused's failure to testify. In Wilson v United States,112 the Supreme Court 
interprets the statute to mean, "any comment, especially hostile comment, upon a failure to 
testify must be excluded".113 Bruno v United States114 expands the statutory meaning by 
requiring the judge, on a defence request, to instruct the jury not to draw an adverse in-
ference from the accused's exercise of a right to silence. The federal statutory protection was 
extended to state proceedings through the mechanism of the fourteenth amendment by 
Malloy v Hogan.115 Malloy emphasized the importance of maintaining a uniform standard of 
constitutional rights at both the federal and state level.116 Notwithstanding the reference to 
the federal statute, Griffin v California is the first Supreme Court decision to hold that 
prosecutorial comment on the accused's failure to testify amounts to a direct infringement of 
the fifth amendment.117 The court directly prohibits prosecutorial comment on the accused's 
silence as well as a jury instruction which equates silence with guilt. The effect of defining the 
110 380 u.s 609 (1965). 
"' Federal Statute 18 U.S.C Sec 3481 (1948) amended (1976) and (1988), "a person charged, shall 
at his own request, be a competent witness. His failure to make such a request shall not create a 
presumption against him". 
"
2 149 U.S 60 (1893). 
"
3 Ibid at 62, 65. The following prosecution comment was held to violate federal law, "if I am ever 
charged with a crime ... I will go upon the stand and hold up my hand before heaven and testify to my 
innocence of the crime". 
"
4 308 U.S 287 (1939). 
"
5 378 U.S 1 (1964). 
116 Malloy overruled both Twining v New Jersey 211 U.S 78 (1908) and Adamson v California 332 U.S 
46 (1947) which had held the fifth amendment inapplicable in state proceedings. 
117 380 u.s 609, 613-615 (1965). 
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no-comment rule in constitutional terms means that no legislative amendment of the rule is 
now possible. 
To a certain degree, the Griffin rule, as a constitutional prohibition, has placed limits on 
prosecutorial maneuverability during the trial process. The prosecution is now faced with an 
often imprecise and shifting boundary between proper and improper commentary. The 
prosecution bears the full burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt and is required to 
prove every principal fact-in-issue. To establish a prima facie case and to meet the standard 
of proof, the prosecution should be allowed to use not only all relevant forms of extraneous 
positive evidence, but also testimony based on what amounts to an absence of key 
evidences or defences. Not all crimes produce extraneous evidence, the private and 
secretive nature of crime is such that evidence may be highly personal and within the 
knowledge of only the accused. As any experienced trial lawyer well knows, the absence of 
a key evidence or defence is often relevant to the fact-in-issue. Yet the Griffin rule constrains 
the prosecution in the use it may make of the accused's failure to testify and present 
evidence. The prosecutor must also take extreme care in the precise language which he 
employs at examination-in-chief, cross-examination and final summation in order to avoid 
making improper comments which infringe the Griffin no-comment rule. 118 Improper 
commentary may well lead to appeal and dismissal on technical grounds. One certainty the 
prosecution may rely on. No improper comment is made when the prosecution, in closing 
argument, refers to its prima facie case as "unrefuted", or "uncontradicted" by the accused's 
failure to testify. 119 The judge is also faced with a problem of interpretation and application. 
How to determine the thoughts of jurors and the influence on juries of prosecutorial 
statements which may or may not contain an impermissible meaning? The effect of the 
Griffinno-inference rule is to make it tactically difficult for the prosecution to prove its case. 
The result has been a systematic trial avoidance and a preference to settle matters by 
means of easy plea-bargains. 
During the initial state trial proceeding, Griffin failed to testify. The prosecution was allowed 
to draw the jury's attention to the accused's silence, "[the defendant] has not seen fit to take 
the stand and deny or explain. [The victim] is dead, she can't tell you her side of the story, 
118 To assess improper commentary, the judge must examine (i) the language, intention and effect of 
the comment on the jury, (ii) the judge may also look to his own perception of the comment. Once 
improperness is established, the next question is to assess whether the comment is prejudicial or 
harmless. The standard test is reasonable doubt. If the comment is not prejudicial beyond a 
reasonable doubt, then the error is harmless. Chapman v California 386 U.S 18 (1967). 
119 See Lockett v Ohio 438 U.S 586, 595 (1978), "the prosecution's closing remarks add nothing to the 
impression already created by the accused's refusal to testify after the jury had been promised by the 
accused's lawyer that the accused would take the stand". 
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the defendant won't" .120 Prosecutorial commentary in which deliberate adverse inferences 
could be drawn from the accused's failure to testify was a common practice in California and 
entrenched within the Californian state constitution (since repealed). 121 In rejecting the lower 
court decision and forcing an amendment to the Californian constitution, the Supreme Court 
clearly sets out a strong prohibition which prevents judicial and prosecutorial comment on the 
accused's silence. Drawing adverse inferences from trial silence would in effect, "[impose a 
penalty] ... for exercising a constitutional privilege". Griffin's penalty doctrine prohibits the 
drawing of adverse inferences because these inferences "cut down on the [fifth amendment] 
privilege by making its assertion costly ... what the jury may infer, given no help from the 
court, is one thing. What it may infer when the court solemnizes the silence of the accused 
into evidence against him, is quite another. We hold that the fifth amendment ... forbids 
either commentary by the prosecution on the accused's silence or instructions by the court 
that such silence is evidence of guilt".122 In terms of this reasoning adverse inference 
comment imposes an impermissible-burden upon the accused's constitutional rights by 
weighing down the exercise of a right to silence and undermining the policies which support 
the right. The burden placed on the accused right will always outweigh any possible 
advantage to the state interest. 
The Griffin rule has been criticized because it shifts the focus away from the traditional 
definition of compulsion. The impermissible burden and penalty doctrine advocated by 
Griffin is conceptually at odds with the state coercion model which traditionally triggers the 
fifth amendment.123 In addition, whatever compulsion may exist in the trial does not emanate 
from the prosecution, but arises from the accused's own conscious choice in not testifying. 
The burden test is also illogical as it concentrates on analyzing the impermissible burden 
imposed upon negative non-testimonial silence when it should instead concentrate on 
prohibiting the compulsion of positive testimony. It is difficult to understand why the 
individual interest must always outweigh the state interest. Surely when evaluating a burden 
or penalty (particularly commentary directed at the jury) more weight should be given to the 
prosecution interest in ascertaining the truth through the use of carefully controlled jury 
instructions. It has also been argued that the Griffin rule 124 is at once much too wide and 
much too narrow. It is too wide because it necessitates an almost automatic reversal when 
there is improper comment on the accused's silence, irrespective of the strength of the 
120 Ibid Griffin at 611. 
121 California Constitution Art 1 sec 13 (repealed 1974). 
122 Ibid Griffin at 614-615. 
123 Ibid Griffin per Stewart J at 620-622. 
124 Ayers "The Fifth Amendment And The Inference Of Guilt From Silence" (78) Mich. L. Rev (1980) 
841-871. 
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prosecution's prima facie case.125 It is too narrow because it fails to counteract the natural 
inference of guilt which arises in the minds of a layperson jury when confronted by a non-
testifying accused.126 Often the strength or weakness of the prosecution's prima facie case 
will determine the type of inference drawn by the jury. Common sense dictates that an 
innocent accused would want to testify especially in the face of a strong prima facie case. 127 
When the prosecution's prima facie case is based on facts beyond the knowledge of the 
accused, a failure to testify will carry little weight. If the facts are necessarily within the 
knowledge of the accused, a failure to explain will logically point to a consciousness of guilt. 
In the words of Adamson v California,128 "It seems natural that when the [accused] fails to 
testify ... the prosecution should bring out the strength of the evidence by commenting upon 
the accused's failure to explain or deny if'. 
The main problem with the Griffin rule or the penalty test, is in the court's failure to explain 
the exact nature of the burden. A fundamental dichotomy in the Griffin reasoning is that it 
fails to reconcile the traditional constitutionally defined "state coercion test" with the radically 
new "impermissible burden test". How does prosecutorial commentary impose a penalty 
which weighs down the accused's exercise of the fifth amendment? What precise degree of 
weight is required to make the burden on the accused's right impermissible? Griffin fails to 
define the meaning of the key concept "compulsion" even though it recognizes that 
prosecutorial comment would in effect "compel" the accused to testify.129 The trial process is 
replete with all kinds of evidentiary burdens which place equally strong pressures on the 
accused to testify, yet are nevertheless constitutionally admissible. Why does the so-called 
compulsion arising from the prosecution's commentary deserve special protection over and 
above other kinds of evidentiary compulsions? These central issues have not been 
addressed by Griffin nor by subsequent Supreme Court decisions. There are a number of 
different burdens placed on the accused during the trial process. The primary burden or 
125 Ibid Ayers at 844. In contrast, Chapman v California 386 U.S 18, 24 (1967) notes that an 
infringement of the Griffin rule does not always result in automatic reversal, but merely shifts the onus 
on to the prosecution to show that its improper comment did not contribute to the guilty verdict. 
126 Ibid at 845. While it is a realistic truth that no judicial instruction will prevent the jury from drawing 
an adverse inference if it is so inclined, it does not follow that the court should abandon rules which 
increase fairness. Bradley "Griffin v California, Still Viable After All These Years" (179) Mich. L. Rev 
(1981) 1291. It should be noted that most juries actually heed judicial instructions. 
127 Ibid Ayers at 846. Common sense assumes that innocent accused would want to explain their 
innocence. A failure to testify may give rise to a logical and rational inference that the accused has 
something to hide. 
128 332 U.S 46, 56 (1947). See also Baxter v Palmigiano 425 U.S 308, 319 (1976). 
129 The Supreme Court is vague about the new meaning of compulsion. For example, Carter v 
Kentucky 450 U.S 288, 306 (1981) per Powell J, holds "a defendant who chooses not to testify can 
hardly claim that he was compelled to testify'' ... But in contrast, Lakeside v Oregon 435 U.S 333, 339 
(1978) holds, "unconstitutional compulsion is inherent in a trial where prosecutor and judge are free to 
ask the jury to draw adverse inferences from the defendant's failure to take the stand". 
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compulsion to testify usually arises from the strength of the prima facie evidentiary case 
against the accused. A strong prosecutorial case based on direct evidence will exert a 
strong compulsion on the accused to testify. On the other hand, a weak circumstantial case 
may exert no pressure at all. 130 The Supreme Court has always held that evidentiary driven 
pressures will never amount to improper forms of compulsion.131 In McGautha v 
California, 132 the choice to testify or remain silent during a unitary proceeding 133 did not 
amount to an unconstitutional compulsion, but was characterized as one of the many "difficult 
judgement choices" often confronted by the accused. Other kinds of evidentiary pressures 
such as commentary based on inferences derived from the accused's possession of 
unexplained firearms,134 stolen property135 or drugs136 has been held to be constitutionally 
admissible. No compelled self-incriminatory pressures arise from such adverse prosecutorial 
commentary, nor is the accused's exercise of the fifth amendment penalized or impermissibly 
burdened. The presentation in court of all these kinds of evidences and a prosecutorial 
commentary on these evidences generates a significant pressure on the accused to testify in 
order, at a minimum, to rebut the prima facie case against him. Yet such evidentiary 
compulsions are tolerated because any attempt to eliminate them would seriously inhibit the 
truth-finding capability of the criminal system. The nature of the evidentiary pressure to 
testify is rationally not increased or decreased in any significant way by penalizing the 
prosecution from drawing an adverse inferences from the accused's failure to testify. The 
average jury will draw the appropriate inference anyway. The pressure to testify which Griffin 
defines as a constitutional penalty is really a product of the cogency and weight of evidence. 
Prosecutorial commentary on the accused's silence is merely a rational outcome of this 
evidentiary pressure and does not add to it. It is therefore illogical to assert that prosecutorial 
comment on the accused's silence amounts to a compulsion which places an impermissible 
burden on the accused's constitutional rights. 
The nature of the compulsion, deduced from the Griffin judgement, is conceptually different 
from the traditional and historical definition of fifth amendment compulsion. The Griffin notion 
of compulsion can be defined in any number of different ways. Instead of labeling 
prosecutorial commentary as a compulsion, it can just as easily be defined as a device for 
130 William v Florida 399 U.S 78, 84 (1979), "the pressure on the defendant varies greatly depending 
on the nature of the government's proof'. 
131 McGautha v California 402 U.S 183,213 (1971). 
132 Ibid at211-213. 
133 A unitary proceeding is a combined system of trial and sentencing which forces the accused to 
testify if he wishes to qualify for the right to address the sentencing authority. 
134 County Court Ulster v Allen 442 U.S 140, 145 (1979). 
135 United States v Barnes 412 U.S 837, 846 (1973). 
136 Turner v United States 396 U.S 398,417 (1970). 
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promoting rational inquiry and accurate fad finding. 137 The confusion about the exact 
meaning of compulsion in Griffin is illustrated by the dictum of Douglas J, who speaks of 
prosecutorial commentary which draws adverse inferences as, "a remnant of the inquisitorial 
system of criminal justice which imposes a penalty on the privilege".138 This kind of 
reasoning highlights a number of fallacies. First, as has been amply demonstrated in 
Chapter 2, the historical right to silence was a limited procedural defence directed against 
state compulsion of self-incriminatory evidence only. It was never a wide protection against 
the drawing of adverse inferences. Historically the drawing of adverse inferences from the 
accused's trial silence was always a central feature of the accusatorial court and indeed still 
plays a prominent role in the English and other Commonwealth trial processes. The nexus 
sought to be drawn by Douglas J, between the infringement of the accused's "free will" and 
the "coercion" of an inquisitorial process is based on a sentimental libertarian philosophy 
which is conceptually irrational. The compulsive pressures to be found in a modern 
inquisitorial system are no less and no more severe than in the accusatorial system, merely 
different.139 Ango-American jurists are sometimes ignorant of the nature of the modern 
inquisitorial system. When reference is made to the inquisitorial system, it is usually a 
derogatory reference to a system based on the compulsion of self-incriminatory evidence. 
The medieval inquisition was such a system but the modern civilian system is totally 
different. If Douglas J is instead referring to the old medieval inquisition, then his reasoning 
is simply an historical oddity. Nevertheless, a valuable point may be made by distinguishing 
between the inherent compulsion central to the medieval inquisition and the modern 
compulsion incidental to an accusatorial system. The investigatory process of the medieval 
inquisition was integrally based on the extraction of confessions by direct physical 
compulsion. The penalty of physical coercion was imposed as a matter of indiscriminate 
routine, both on the guilty and innocent alike. The compulsion which arises in a modern 
accusatorial trial process is more discerning, completely different and based on a 
psychological pressure induced by a developing prosecutorial case and the cogency of the 
evidence presented. Prosecutorial commentary is merely a procedural device which 
highlights these evidentiary pressures. The compulsion induced by prosecutorial 
commentary in an accusatorial trial, unlike the medieval inquisition, will therefore selectively 
penalize only the guilty accused and not the innocent accused who chooses to remain silent. 
137 Ibid Griffin per Stewart J (dissenting} at 621-622. 
138 Ibid Griffin per Douglas J at 614-615. 
139 See infra chapter 11. 
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The Griffin no comment-no inference rule was further refined in Lakeside v Oregon. 140 In 
terms of this judgement only a prosecutorial comment which seeks to draw an adverse 
inference is susceptible to a constitutional impermissible burden.141 The trial judge who 
intends to provide the jury with a cautionary no-inference instruction does not impermissibly 
burden the exercise of the accused's fifth amendment rights, 142 even if the no-inference 
caution is issued against the wishes of the accused. Critics have noted that Lakeside is 
partly inconsistent with Griffin as it appears to favour the state interest above the individual 
interest. A judge should not have the procedural discretion to override the accused's wishes 
in this regard. 143 By increasing judicial discretion at the expense of the accused's interest, 
Lakeside has somewhat narrowed the scope of the Griffin rule. Carter v Kentucky, 144 in turn, 
addresses a number of issues left unresolved in both Griffin and Lakeside. The Carter 
decision (per Stewart J) holds that the fifth amendment gives the accused a right to a no-
inference instruction upon a proper request. 145 The judge has a constitutional obligation, 
when so requested by his defence, to reduce jury speculation about the accused's silence by 
instructing the jury on the nature of the fifth amendment privilege. Oral argument, counsel 
argument or even the presumption of innocence by themselves are an inadequate substitute 
for a proper judicial no-inference instruction.146 The court reasons that although the penalty 
exacted in Griffin was based on an adverse comment, the penalty may be just as severe 
when, although the prosecution draws no adverse inference, the jury is given no instruction 
on the accused's silence. In such a circumstance, the uninstructed jury may well draw 
adverse inferences from the accused's silence. However, Carter does not explain whether a 
judicial failure to give the instruction when requested to do so will ever constitute harmless 
reversible error. In the sole dissent, Rehnquist J,147 makes a number of important criticism&. · 
He argues that neither precedent nor the constitution serve as authority for the Supreme 
Court's development of a no-inferences commentary rule. On the contrary, as a matter of 
logic and constitutional interpretation, an adverse-inference instruction to the jury does not 
140 435 U.S 333 (1978}. The Griffin rule prohibits only adverse comment on the defendant's failure to 
testify. A judicial instruction that the jury draw no inference at all is an entirely different kind of 
comment. This type of no-inference comment does not create the same kind of compulsion on the 
defendant found impermissible in Griffin. 
141 Ibid at 34-341. 
142 Ibid at 399, "the basis of the judgement is to provide appropriate and correct instruction to the jury. 
To clarify the issues in the juror's mind. 
143 Lakeside rejects the argument that a judicial instruction which overrides the defence objection is 
contrary to the sixth amendment. A judge has an overriding duty to ensure a fair trial and counsel 
cannot interfere with this duty. 
144 450 U.S 288 (1981 }. Note that as a matter of federal law, the decision in Carter had already been 
pre-empted by Bruno v United States 308 U.S 287 (1939}. 
145 Ibid at 300-303. 
146 Powell J (concurring} reasoned that the precedent laid out by Griffin compelled the court's 
judgement, which was not decided on constitutional principles (at 312}. 
147 Ibid Rehnqist J (dissenting} at 314. 
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amount to a constitutionally impermissible burden on the accused right because the 
prosecution by making the comment, has not compelled or coerced the accused to 
incriminate himself. Renhquist also criticizes judgements such as Griffin and Carter which 
make use of vague concepts such as "burdens" and "penalties" to limit judicial control over 
criminal proceedings, and then compound the problem by not giving proper definitions for 
these burden or penalty tests. 
The effect of both Griffin and Carter is to expand the scope of the right to silence at trial. To 
emphasise the interest of the individual accused over the government interest and to make 
trial silence into an inflexible instrument with absolute overtones. Mitchell v United States148 
considers whether or not the accused's invocation of silence and a refusal to testify extends 
to the sentencing stage of the criminal process. Kennedy J, for the majority, argues that the 
fifth amendment applies equally to the sentencing proceeding and the accused does not 
waive the right to silence at the sentencing stage simply by pleading guilty during the main 
trial.149 Using Griffin as its authority, the court declares that at sentencing the prosecution 
may not draw an adverse inference from the accused's silence when it determines facts 
relating to the circumstances of the crime. 150 According to the dissent, Scalia J151 and 
Thomas J, 152 Griffin itself is wrongly decided and it is illogical to extend the ambit of Griffin 
into the sentencing stage. To do so would create an impediment to accurate fact-finding 
during sentencing in a circumstance in which the traditional rationales for the fifth 
amendment have lost much of their force because the accused has voluntarily incriminated 
herself by pleading guilty. According to the minority, Griffin's questionable no-inference 
privilege Jacks "foundation in the Constitution's text, history or /ogic."153 
148 526 U.S 314, 325-28 (1999). 
149 Ibid at 325 per Kennedy J, ''were we to accept the government's position ... The result would be to 
enlist the defendant as an instrument in his or her own condemnation, undermining the long tradition 
and vital principle that criminal proceedings rely on accusations proved by the government not on 
inquisition conducted to enhance its own prosecutorial power". 
150 Ibid at 325, "if the defendant was left unprotected by the Griffin rule at the sentence stage, the 
prosecutor could charge him with crimes without specifying all the aggravating factors. The prosecutor 
could then secure a guilty plea and prove the aggravating factors by enlisting the defendant's self-
damaging silence". 
151 Ibid Scalia J (dissenting) at 331-337. 
152 Ibid Thomas J (dissenting) at 341-342. 
153 Ibid at 341. 
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The Supreme Court has created a unique trial protection for the accused which does not 
exist in other Anglo-American jurisdictions. The prosecution may not draw an adverse 
inference from the accused's failure to testify and may not comment to the jury on the 
accused's trial silence. In practice, of course, the no-comment rule cannot prevent the jury 
from drawing its own adverse inference from the accused's silence (Griffin v California). The 
trial judge may issue a no-adverse inference instruction to the jury, even against the 
accused's objection (Lakeside v Oregon). The judge is obliged to give a no-adverse 
inference instruction to the jury on the accused's proper request (Carter v Kennedy). The no-
comment rule does not prevent prosecutorial commentary on the cogency of the state's 
prima facie case. Comment may also be made on the absence of potential defence witness 
testimony other than the accused. Judicial comment on the accused's failure to explain the 
possession of stolen property may be directed to the jury. The fifth amendment right to trial 
silence also extends to the sentencing stage despite the accused's plea of guilt at the main 
trial (Mitchell v United States). The scope of the right to trial silence has been expanded and 
now offers the accused a substantial constitutional protection. 
During the last thirty years and under the influence of a burgeoning yvestern culture of 
human rights, the Supreme Court has plucked the fifth amendment from an obscure group of 
second-class rights and has moulded it into a sophisticated first-class shield. The court has 
also shifted its focus from the traditional requirement of a state-induced compulsion, as 
historically defined in the fifth amendment, in favour of broader and looser definitions. The 
Supreme Court has, surprisingly, failed to give an accurate definition of the proper scope and 
limitation of the accused's right to silence. The difficulty in interpreting the ambiguous 
language, unclear history and disputed policies of the fifth amendment is the main cause of 
the Supreme Court's contrary and uneven treatment of the silence principle. Without a 
meaningful and comprehensive review of the policies underlying the privilege against self-
incrimination, Supreme Court judgements will always be inhibited by a narrow reliance on 
ambiguous language, irrational libertarian sentimentality and disputed history. Instead of 
becoming a flexible, reasonable and adaptable protection, the fifth amendment has grown 
into an inflexible, rigid protection with certain absolute overtones. In Commonwealth 
jurisprudence, silence-at-trial is treated somewhat differently. Although silence has no direct 
evidentiary value in itself, it may play a role after the state has established a prima facie 
case. A failure to testify adversely affects the accused by strengthening the state's prima 
facie case, and by leaving it uncontroverted on vital facts-in-issue. In England, sec 35 of the 
Criminal Justice and Public Order Act (1994) is a statutory consolidation in precise language, 
of what is generally a common law doctrine in other Commonwealth jurisdictions. In terms of 
the common law, judicial but not prosecutorial comment on the accused's silence at trial may 
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be directed to the jury in certain factual circumstances. In most Commonwealth jurisdictions, 
the judge is allowed a carefully worded comment which neither over or under-emphasises 
silence. A balanced commentary which should objectively assess, for the jury's benefit, the 
permissible inferences which may be drawn in the particular circumstance. The judge must 
however, make it clear that silence in itself does not amount to an admission of guilt, nor may 
it constitute corroboration of guilt. Sec 35(3) of the English Criminal Justice and Public Order 
Act (1994) allows the judge and the prosecution a much wider commentary discretion than is 
allowed in other Commonwealth jurisdictions. A similarly wide discretion is statutorily given 
to judicial commentary in Singapore and Malaysia. South Africa, despite elevating the 
silence principle into a constitutional right, will hopefully continue to apply common law rules 
as currently adapted for non-jury trials. 154 
154 For a comment on the South African non-jury trial system see infra chapter 11. 
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CHAPTER 7 
THE AMERICAN WITNESS PRIVILEGE 
7.1 The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination 
The fifth amendment clause reads: 
"no person (1) shall be compelled (2) in any criminal case (3) to be a witness 
(4) against himself (5)". 
To successfully rely on the testimonial privilege against self-incrimination the reluctant 
witness must prove to the court's satisfaction that each of the five elements of the privilege 
as set out in the fifth amendment clause are applicable. The modern definition and scope of 
the privilege is the result of the United States Supreme Court's interpretation of these 
individual elements.1 The Supreme Court recognizes that the "Constitution contains no 
formulae with which we can calculate the full scope of the privilege"2 The Court has been 
obliged to fashion ad hoc standards for the application of the privilege. These standards are 
derived mainly from the history and purpose of the privilege including the character and 
urgency of other public interests. An important distinction must be borne in mind. The non-
party witness privilege is always a relative constitutional right, whereas the accused's trial 
privilege has certain absolute features. The accused need not take the stand and his refusal 
to testify may not be held against him. While other constitutional rights may give way in 
certain circumstances, the use of the words "no person shall" implies that the fifth 
amendment privilege does not bend under the weight of competing interests during the 
course of a criminal trial. On the other hand, the witness privilege is a relative one which 
may be claimed on a question by question basis and only when there is a reasonable 
apprehension of a future criminal sanction. No adverse inferences may be drawn from the 
witness claim of privilege. The reasonable apprehension of civil fines, penalties and other 
forfeitures may also be sufficient to trigger the privilege. 
1 Tarallo "The Fifth Amendment Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, The Time Has Come For The 
U.S. Supreme Court To End Its Silence" (27) New. Eng. L. Rev (1992) 137. 
2 Spevack v Klein 385 U.S 511, 522-23 (1967) Harlan J dissenting. 
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7.1.1 "Person": Who May Claim The Privilege? 
The subject of the Constitutional guarantee has been literally described as a "person". The 
word "person" in the fourteenth amendment has been defined as both a natural and a juristic 
person.3 By contrast, the reference to a person in the fifth amendment has been narrowly 
construed to mean a "natural person". The privilege against self-incrimination is said to be a 
highly personal kind of testimonial privilege. Since the seminal case of Hale v Henke/,4 the 
Court has regularly restricted the availability of the privilege to natural persons, noting a clear 
distinction between the individual and the corporation. Natural personal rights flow from the 
Constitution, while corporate rights flow from the company charter of incorporation. (By 
contrast, the South African Constitution specifically binds both the natural and the juristic 
person, by taking into account the extent, the nature of the right and the duty imposed by the 
right (sec 8(2)). According to American jurisprudence, a charter of incorporation is a state 
benefit granted to the juristic person in the interest of the public weal. The Corporation owes 
its existence to the state and cannot shield its actions from scrutiny in the public interest. On 
a practical level it would be difficult to prosecute corporations if they were allowed to hide 
behind a privilege. Incriminating corporate documents are often the only evidential source of 
corporate wrongdoing. The person-corporation dichotomy is justified in terms of a "visitation 
powers" doctrine which allows the state the power to investigate the corporation.5 United 
States v White 6 describes the privilege as a purely personal one, "designed to prevent the 
use of legal process to force from the lips of the [witness] the evidence necessary to 
convict".7 White, in denying the privilege to a labour union, also develops an "impersonality 
test", which is a reasonable assessment in the circumstances that, "a particular type of 
organization has a character so impersonal in scope [from] its membership it cannot be said 
to embody or represent the purely private or personal interests of its constituents, but rather 
to embody their common or group interests only".8 Bellis v United States 9 justifies the 
privilege by examining its historical antecedents, "[the privilege] should be limited to its 
3 Santa Clara County v Southern Pac. R.R 118 U.S 394, 396 (1886). 
4 201 U.S 43 (1906). See also Rogers v United States 340 U.S 367,371 (1951). 
5 Critics have argued that in developing a "visitation powers" rationale, the Supreme Court has been 
motivated primarily by expediency. Meltzer "Required Records, The McCarran Acf' (18) Un. Chi. L. 
Rev (1951) 687, 701. The visitation rationale may simply disguise the Court's true purpose which is to 
promote the state regulatory interest. The English Court has also developed a visitations power 
theory but extends the privilege to the corporation. Sweeney "The Fifth Amendment Privilege And 
Collective Entities" (48) Ohio St. L. J (1987} 295-316. Shapiro "From Boyd To Braswell" (11) Whittier 
L.Rev(1989)295,305. 
6 322 U.S 694 (1944). 
7 Ibid at 698. 
8 Ibid at 701. 
9 417 u.s 85 (1974). 
230 
historical function of protecting only the natural individual from compulsory incrimination" .10 
In terms of the "collective entity doctrine"11 to which the Supreme Court has adhered to for 
some sixty years, the privilege is denied to corporations, associations of all kinds, churches, 
political parties, social clubs and even to partnerships.12 The Hale v Henkel rule has also 
formed the basis for the denial of the privilege to corporate officers holding corporate 
documents in a representative custodial capacity. 13 In Braswell v United States, 14 a 
corporate custodian may not invoke the fifth amendment and refuse to produce corporate 
records, even if the act of production might be personally incriminating. Again, the court 
notes that a corporation is not guaranteed the fifth amendment right because it is created 
and limited by the state.15 In his representative capacity, the corporate custodian assumes 
the duty to comply with the state order to produce corporate documents.16 The refusal of the 
privilege to the corporate custodian is justified on the ground that otherwise, "it would have a 
detrimental impact on the government's ability to prosecute white collar crime". 17 The 
American interpretation of the privilege against self-incrimination stands in sharp contrast to 
the English, Commonwealth and European position which extends the privilege to all artificial 
or juristic personae. The only exceptions to this fairly universal rule are Canada and 
Australia, which, under American influence, have recently shifted camp and now deny the 
privilege to artificial entities. 18 The practical consequence, in American law, of limiting the 
privilege only to the natural person means that the privilege may only be invoked by the 
individual and only when compelled testimony incriminates the individual personally. 
10 Ibid at 90. 
11 The collective entity doctrine is the cumulative result of the reasoning in the Hale, White and Bellis 
cases. The entity is defined as "an organization which is recognized as an independent entity apart 
from its individual members". See Braswell v United States 487 U.W 99, 104 (1987). Massing "Note: 
The Fifth Amendment, The Attorney-Client Privilege And The Prosecution Of White Collar Crime" (75) 
Virginia L. Rev (1989) 1179. 
12 Wilson v United States 221 U.S 361 (1911 ). 
13 Bellis ibid at 88, Wilson ibid at 384-395, Braswell ibid at 110. 
14 Braswell v United States 487 U.S 99 (1987). 
15 Ibid at 1 05. 
16 Ibid at 110. 
17 Ibid at 115. "the Government may make no evidentiary use of the custodian's personal 
incrimination" (at 118-119). 
18 In South Africa, the question whether the constitutional right against self-incrimination (as opposed 
to the common law privilege) is possessed by a corporation was avoided in Seapoint Computer 
Bureau (Pfy) Ltd v McLoughlin and Others N.N.O 1996 (8) BCLR 1071 (W). In Canada the 
Constitutional human rights status of the privilege prevents its extension to the corporation (the 
common law position being reversed in R v Amway Corporation (1989) 1 SCR 21 and BC Securities 
Commission v Branch (1995) 2 SCR 3,29. In Australia, despite the absence of the privilege from the 
Constitution, the human rights status of the privilege is recognized in Environment Protection Authority 
v Caltex (1993) 178 CLR 477. 
231 
7 .1.2 "Shall be Compelled" : What is Compulsion? 
The privilege does not prohibit the admissibility of all incriminatory statements made by the 
witness. It prohibits only incriminating testimony which has been forced from the witness by 
a government compelled act.19 In traditional terms "compulsion", apart from its obvious 
physicality, also means the power to force a witness to testify by the use of subpoena, 
contempt, imprisonment or other state induced legal sanctions.20 The authors of the 
Constitution clearly did not design the fifth amendment to prevent voluntary self-incrimination 
but only to shield the witness from official state compulsion or coercion. In United States v 
Washington, 21 per Burger C J, when the witness chooses to answer questions the privilege 
will not apply, "absent some officially coerced self-accusation, the fifth amendment privilege 
is not violated by even the most damning admissions".22 
Some confusion has been generated by the Supreme Court's interchangeable use of the 
words compulsion and coercion. However, both words appear to have substantially the 
same meaning.23 Compulsion which renders testimony inadmissible need not always rise to 
the level of an overbearing physical or psychological pressure. Any necessary pressure, 
penalty or interference deliberately imposed for the purpose of eliciting self-incriminatory 
testimony is sufficient to violate the fifth amendment privilege. Bram v United States 24 notes, 
"the law cannot measure the force of the influence used or decide its effect upon the mind of 
the prisoner [or witness] and therefore excludes the [oral or written] declaration if any degree 
of influence has been exerted".25 The two most obvious and important forms of compulsion 
on the criminal defendant, namely police compulsion within the custodial interrogation 
context (Miranda v Arizona) and prosecutorial compulsion at trial (Griffin v California) have 
already been canvassed at some length.26 The remaining instances of compulsion are the 
following. First, a legal compulsion exerted on the witness through the court's ability to 
subpoena the reluctant witness to appear and take the stand. The witness who disobeys the 
19 State v McKnight 52 N.J 35, 52-53, 243, A2d, 240 (1968) the war against crime would be lost if all 
incriminating evidence were excluded, "it is no more unfair to use the evidence [the accused himself 
may furnish] than it is to turn against him clues at the scene of the crime which a brighter criminal 
would not have left". 
20 Wigmore Sec 2266 McNaughton Ed (1961 ). 
21 431 u.s 181 {1977). 
22 Ibid at 187. Of course where the witness voluntarily waives the privilege, the state may admit any 
evidence obtained, Garner v United States 424 U.S 648, 654 {1976). 
23 The similar definitions of coercion and compulsion have been confirmed in James v Kentucky 466 
U.S 341 {1984) and Carter v Kentucky450 U.S 288 {1981). 
24 168 u.s 532 {1897). 
25 Ibid at 543. 
26 See supra chapter 5 (Miranda) and chapter 6 (Griffin) .. 
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court order may be guilty of contempt.27 This kind of compulsion is regarded as part of the 
legitimate court procedure. Secondly, administrative sanctions imposed on the individual 
outside the courtroom may sometimes attract the privilege. In Garrity v New Jersey,28 and 
Gardner v Broderick, 29 a number of police officers were threatened with dismissal if they 
invoked the privilege and did not testify before a grand jury investigating police corruption. 
The Supreme Court held that testimony induced under such compelled circumstances could 
not be used in a subsequent criminal proceeding. Similarly, in Lefkowitz v Cunningham, 30 
the threat by the government to take away potential economic benefits by firing public 
employees was defined as a form of compulsion amounting to a violation of the fifth 
amendment. One of the main characteristics of government compulsion is that it must focus 
directly on the person claiming the privilege. The privilege is a personal protection and 
cannot be invoked against incriminating evidence compelled from third parties. In Couch v 
United States,31 the defendant's accountant and in United States v Fisher,32 the defendant's 
attorney were compelled by the Internal Revenue Service to produce highly incriminating tax 
documents. In both instances the Supreme Court held that the privilege was not available to 
the defendants because the compulsion was exerted upon their agents and not upon them 
personally. In Andresen v Maryland,33 the defendant stood passively by as documents were 
seized from his office. The court held that the seizure of the documents and their 
subsequent use at trial did not "compel the petitioner to testify against himself'.34 The court 
makes a distinction between the seizure of documents and a subpoena of personal records. 
"Although the privilege may protect an individual from complying with a subpoena for the 
production of his personal records [because the act of production constitutes a compulsory 
authentication of incriminatory information], a seizure of the same material by law 
enforcement officers differs in a material respect, the individual against whom the seizure is 
directed is not required to aid in the discovery, production or authentication of the 
incriminatory evidence".35 The privilege is not a shield against incrimination. It merely 
shields the defendant from being compelled as a witness, to be the instrument of his own 
incrimination. 36 
27 Brown v United States 359 U.S 41 (1959). 
28 385 u.s 493 (1967). 
29 392 U.S 273 (1968). 
30 431 u.s 801 {1977). 
31 409 u.s 457 (1913). 
32 425 u.s 391 (1976). 
33 427 U.S 463 (1976). 
34 Ibid at 471. 
35 Ibid at 473-74. 
36 United States v Doe 465 U.S 605, 610 (1984), the element of compulsion is missing if records are 
voluntarily created. See also Gilbert v California 388 U.S 263, 265-67 (1967), Katz v United States 
389 u.s 347, 354 (1967). 
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7.1.3 "Any Criminal Case" 
The Supreme Court has refused to give a literal and narrow37 meaning to the sentence, in 
"any criminal case". In Counce/man v Hitchcock, 38 the word "criminal" was given a liberal 
meaning. A grand jury or other administrative proceeding falls within the fifth amendment 
context when it is criminal in nature and the deponent or the witness is faced with the 
possibility of a criminal charge. The privilege is widely available in all proceedings, civil or 
criminal, legislative or judicial, investigative or adjudicative, in which testimony is compelled 
and may subsequently be used against the witness in a future criminal trial.39 The privilege is 
not ordinarily dependent upon the nature of the proceedings in which the testimony is sought. 
It applies alike to criminal and civil proceedings, "whenever the answer might tend to subject 
to criminal responsibility him who gives it".40 The compelled testimony must causally place 
the witness at risk of a possible criminal charge.41 The privilege is not triggered if the 
compelled testimony exposes the witness to the danger of a sanction other than a criminal 
charge. In U.S. Ex re : Bilokumsky v Tod,42 the privilege could not be invoked during the 
hearing as the sanction contemplated was a deportation order, and was therefore non-
criminal in nature. Similarly, in Baxter v Palmigiano,43 a prison disciplinary hearing, "the use 
of the prisoner's silence against him was permissible because his silence was not dispositive 
of guilt and was given no more evidentiary value than was warranted by the facts".44 When 
the proceeding is essentially civil, the presence of some safeguards usually associated with 
a criminal trial does not convert the proceeding into a criminal prosecution, nor provide the 
witness with a full range of criminal rights".45 On the other hand, when the proceeding is civil 
37 To have done so would have restricted the development of the scope of the privilege and excluded 
grand jury investigations, legislative proceedings, civil trials, coroner's inquest and other investigations 
by administrative agencies. Wigmore sec 2252 at 326-328 McNaughton Ed (1961} and Kastigar v 
United States 406 U.S 441, 444 (1972}. 
38 142 U.S 547 (1892}. 
39 The use of the word "any" as a prefix to the fifth amendment clause beginning "any criminal trial", 
implies a broad interpretation. In McCarthy v Arndstein 266 U.S 34 (1924} it was held that the 
privilege may be invoked in a civil trial (i.e. bankruptcy hearing} as long as the testimony places the 
individual at risk of a criminal prosecution. 
40 McCarthy v Arndstein ibid at 40. 
41 Good examples of conduct in civil actions which also gives rise to a crime are : civil rights actions 
involving assault, securities actions involving fraud, personal injury actions involving criminal 
negligence, etc. 
42 263 U.S 149 (1923} where silence is not protected, it is accorded its usual evidentiary value. 
Silence is often evidence of the most persuasive character (at 153-154 }. Deportation hearings are 
civil in nature and there is no provision which forbids the drawing of adverse inferences from silence 
(at 154-155}. 
43 425 U.S 308 (1976} "the fifth amendment does not preclude the drawing of adverse inferences 
where the privilege is claimed by a party to a civil cause" (at 318}. 
44 lbidat318. 
45 United States v Ward 448 U.S 242 (1980} and Allen v Illinois 478 U.S 364 (1986}. 
234 
but is punitive in purpose and effect, so as to negate the civil intention, it must be considered 
criminal and the privilege will apply.46 
7.1.4 "To be a Witness": Testimonial and Non-Testimonial Evidence 
The fifth amendment is a testimonial based privilege47 and does not prohibit the compelled 
production of physical real evidence. Unfortunately, both the meaning of this limitation and 
the underlying rationale which justify it are flawed. The Supreme Court has recently 
acknowledged that physical evidence has certain communicative aspects which are 
functionally similar to testimony.48 In some cases the blurring of the distinction between non-
physical testimonial and physical non-testimonial evidence has led to an expansion of the 
privilege.49 In other cases similar expansionist attempts have failed.50 Nevertheless the 
Supreme Court has gradually eroded the distinction between testimonial and non-testimonial 
evidence. Under Wigmore's immense influence a traditional distinction has developed 
between testimonial evidence which requires the co-operation of the witness and non-
testimonial non co-operative passive forms of evidence; "The object of the privilege is plain. 
It is the employment of legal process to extract from the person's own lips an admission of 
his guilt, which will take the place of other evidence".51 The distinction is also based on 
evidentiary probative value. Non-testimonial physical evidence has a high probative value, 
while testimonial non-physical evidence attracts the privilege because it is far more likely to 
be susceptible to coercive influences. To be "a witness against oneself', the Supreme Court 
has reasoned, relates only to the act of testifying. The fifth amendment therefore proscribes 
compulsion of incriminating evidence only insofar as the evidence compelled is testimonial in 
nature. Intimate, non-intimate blood fluid, D.N.A.,52 body samples, fingerprints and 
handwriting samples are not testimonial but purely physical, non-intrusive and passive 
46 Ward ibid at 248-9, Allen ibid at 369. A proceeding is essentially civil when it does not promote the 
traditional aim of punishment, retribution and deterrence. 
47 Volk "Automobiles : Refusals Of Test, Admissibility, North Dakota's Privilege Against Self-
Incrimination" (71) North Dakota L. Rev (1995) 821. Geyh "The Testimonial Component Of The Right 
Against Self-Incrimination" (36) Cath. U. L. Rev (1987) 611. Moylan et al "The Privilege Against 
Compelled Self-Incrimination" (16) Wm. Mitchell L. Rev (1990) 287. 
48 United States v Hubbe/120 S. Ct. 2037, 2043 (2000) and Pennsylvania v Muniz 496 U.S 582, 594-
98 (1990). 
49 Hubbel ibid at 2048. United States v Doe 465 U.S 605, 612-14 (1984) both holding that an act of 
producing documents may be testimonial. 
50 Muniz ibid at 592, South Dakota v Neville 459 U.S 553, 564 (1983). 
51 Wigmore Sec 2250 McNaughton Ed (1961). 
52 D.N.A. sampling is highly accurate for identification purpose, and is non-intrusive in the sense that a 
simple hair sample or saliva swab will suffice. 
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means of identification. Holt v United States 53 suggests the traditional distinction, "the 
prohibition of compelling a man in a criminal court to be a witness against himself is a 
prohibition of the use of physical or moral compulsion to extort communications from him, not 
an exclusion of his body as evidence when it may be materia1".54 In the seminal judgement 
Schmerber v California,55 the court elaborates on the distinction and introduces a new 
"communicative" element, "unless a defendant is somehow compelled to reveal, through 
words or actions, the contents of his thought processes, he cannot be compelled to be a 
witness against himself'.56 The Schmerber definition extends further than Wigmore's narrow 
testimonial analysis.57 A nod or a head shake and other assertive acts which reflect the 
witness's subjective intention to communicate thoughts to another are as much testimonial 
as the spoken word.58 According to the assertive Schmerber conduct test, certain body 
responses (for example, responses to polygraphs and lie detector tests) also have a 
testimonial quality, "[] lie detector tests measuring changes in body functions, may actually 
be directed to eliciting responses which are essentially testimonial. To compel a person to 
submit to testing in which an effort will be made to determine his guilt or innocence on the 
basis of psychological responses, whether willed or not, is to evoke the spirit of the fifth 
amendment".59 On this basis polygraph measurements of the defendant's involuntary 
physiological responses are not to be labeled as physical or real evidence.60 It should be 
53 218 U.S 245 (1910) the defendant was forced to model a blouse for fitting and identification 
purposes. The defendant claimed that the physical act of modeling was a compelled self-
incrimination. The court rejected the claim. 
54 Ibid at 252. Ho/fs definition follows Wigmore's narrow historical view of the privilege. A witness 
may be defined as a person who reveals the contents of his mind, Curcio v United States 354 U.S 
118, 128 (1975), regardless of the format of the revelation. The privilege protects a private inner 
sanctum of individual feeling and thought. 
55 384 U.S 757, 763-64 (1966). A blood sample forcibly taken from the accused and its resultant 
chemical analysis was used as evidence. 
56 Ibid at 761. 
57 Ibid at 764. Blood sample evidence is not a product of the accused's testimonial capacity (he 
merely acted as a donor) but of the state's independent labours in testing. It is not compelled from the 
defendant's own mouth. Therefore, the use of a blood sample for physical identification purposes is 
not evidence of a testimonial-communicative nature. 
58 The assertive conduct test draws a distinct line between : (a) conduct which reflects the individual's 
subjective intention to communicate to another (a clear testimonial act); (b) conduct which may 
convey something about the individual's state of mind to an objective observer, even though the 
individual does not intend to communicate anything (not a testimonial act and not covered by the 
privilege). For example, evidence of flight from the crime scene or escape from custody is not 
testimonial as the individual does not intend to communicate a consciousness of guilt to the objective 
observer, even though the observer gains some insight from the individual's action, the insight is 
gained without any help from the individual. 
59 Schmerber ibid at 764. 
60 Arenella "Schmerber And The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination : a Reapparaisal" (20) Am. Grim. 
L. Rev (1982) 44-45, proposes a more comprehensive definition of what constitutes communicative 
and testimonial conduct. Conduct is testimonial, (a) when it reflects the witness's subjective intent to 
communicate his thoughts to another, (b) when the state forces the witness to involuntarily disclose 
his private thoughts, feelings, belief about the crime, (c) the state proposes to make use of these 
thoughts as evidence. 
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noted that in Germany lie detector evidence is absolutely inadmissible (German Penal Code 
Section 136{a)) because the equipment records the unconscious process of a person's 
respiration and blood pressure. The use of this kind of physical data may mean that the 
accused is forced to supply evidence against his free will. Schmerber clearly allows for the 
prosecutorial use of physical evidence even though the compulsion of such evidence impairs 
fundamental fifth amendment justifications. The question sought to be answered by 
Schmerber is the extent to which the individual may be forced to participate in his own self-
condemnation. To exclude the application of the privilege from physical and passive forms of 
incriminatory evidence reflects a practical compromise between the state interest in 
unrestricted access to all relevant evidence and the individual interest in refusing to assist in 
self-accusation. In practical terms, the efficiency of law enforcement would be severely 
compromised61 if the defendant could not be compelled to give up non-intimate and intimate 
body identification samples. The Supreme Court has acknowledged that the compromise is 
a difficult one,62 and that the outer boundaries of the testimonial category, as opposed to its 
core notion, are as yet unclear.63 
The Schmerber reasoning is consolidated in United States v Wade, 64 and Gilbert v 
California.65 In Wade the defendant (a bank robber) was identified after being compelled to 
participate in an identification parade and forced to utter the words, "put the money in the 
bag". In Gilbert the defendant (also a bank robber) was compelled to participate in a line-up 
and to furnish a sample of handwriting for comparison purposes with the original demand 
note abandoned at the crime scene. According to Gilbert, "It by no means follows ... that 
every compulsion of an accused to use his voice or writings compels a communication. A 
mere handwriting exemplar, in contrast to the content of what is written, like the voice or the 
body itself, is an identifying physical characteristic outside of its protection".66 As long as the 
defendant is a mere actor, and not the author, speaking or writing words chosen for him by 
others, for the purpose of identifying physical characteristics, the use of voice or handwriting 
is no more testimonial than the display of his face. The obvious criticism of the Gilbert 
judgement is that it is manifestly inconsistent with the compelled production of document rule 
developed in United States v Fishefl7 and United States v Doe.68 While speech and hand-
61 Pragmatism and practicality are two of the reasons, advanced by Wigmore, for restricting the 
privilege to testimonial self-incriminatory statements. 
62 Doe v United States 487 U.S 201, 214-215 (1988). 
63 See Muniz ibid note 48 at 589 and Kimmet "Fifth Amendment At Trial" (87) Geo. L. J (1999) 1627. 
64 388 u.s 218 (1967). 
65 388 u.s 263 (1967). 
66 Ibid at 266-267. 
67 425 U.S 391 (1976). 
68 465 u.s 605 (1984). 
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writing exemplars are non-testimonial in themselves, the state coerced act of producing 
them, forces the defendant to make a testimonial communication of his ability to speak or 
write the words. 69 Such an act of production is testimonial evidence attracting a use 
immunity.70 Despite this inconsistency, in United States v Dionisio,71 a voice recording was 
held to be non-testimonial and in California v Byers,72 a Californian stop and report law 
requiring the individual to stop at the scene of an accident, was held to be non-testimonial.73 
By contrast in Germany, a secretly tape-recorded voice exemplar made for comparison 
purposes was held to be inadmissible as an infringement of basic human dignity. 
In terms of the "implied consent" test developed in South Dakota v Neville,74 a refusal by the 
defendant to submit to the taking of a blood sample is admissible evidence and may be 
commented upon at trial. Neville ignores the debate over the testimonial, non-testimonial 
divide and develops its argument along the lines of a Miranda type custodial interrogation. A 
request to submit to a blood test is normal police procedure (and not of the kind Miranda was 
designed to protect against). The test is also painless, non-intrusive, safe, and does not 
induce the suspect to incriminate himself rather than submit to the pain of the testing 
procedure. The choice to take or refuse the test is therefore made voluntarily.75 The 
evidentiary admission of the suspect's refusal to take the test does not constitute a violation 
of the fifth amendment, because the request to take the test does not constitute an 
interrogation which compels the suspect to incriminate himself. The Neville decision may be 
an overly complicated judgement. A refusal creates a presumption which is easily 
accommodated by the ordinary rules of evidence. A refusal to take a blood test is normally 
defined as circumstantial evidence from which an appropriate inference may be drawn. In 
69 Fisher at 411 acknowledges the criticism, "the act of producing exemplars is communicative, but 
these kinds of communication are not sufficiently testimonial to meet fifth amendment requirements". 
70 Doe at 616. The court also decided that immunity can only be granted on a statutory request and 
cannot be imposed judicially. In terms of 18 U.S.C. sec 6002 (1994), the state may make non-
evidentiary use of the subpoenaed documents but may not make any evidentiary use of them at a 
criminal proceeding against the accused. 
71 410 u.s 1, 18 (1973). 
72 402 u.s 424 (1970). 
73 Ibid at 431-432. The act of stopping (at the scene of the accident) is no more testimonial than 
requiring a person in custody to stand and walk in a police line-up. But (Brennan, Douglas and 
Marshal J, dissenting) suggest that the act of stopping and giving a name and address are testimonial 
because of what the act reveals about the actor's belief (i.e. he has been in an accident). 
74 459 U.S 553 (1983}. The defendant refused to take the test, on the ground that he was too drunk 
and would not pass. 
75 But on the other hand at 562, 563-64, it was noted that a defendant's silence or refusal to submit to 
the test is a tacit communication of his thoughts. To this extent the refusal may be characterized as 
communicative. 
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this evidential sense, it is similar to other forms of guilty conduct, particularly escape from 
custody and flight from the crime scene. The admissibility of these kinds of presumptions is 
determined by relevancy and should not trigger the fifth amendment protection.76 
The Schmerber "assertive communicative" test has been qualified by a "sufficiency" test 
developed in United States v Fisher. 77 The sufficiency test focuses on a state compelled 
production of incriminating testimony. The fifth amendment privilege is triggered when the 
state subpoenas (compels) the production of incriminatory testimooy (in the form of 
documents}, even though the act of production does not involve the actual creation of the 
incriminatory documents.78 In both United States v Fisher and United States v Doe,79 the 
court reasons that a state compelled act of production may arise to the level of a protected 
testimonial communication whenever the act amounts to a sufficient admission of the 
existence, possession or authentication of the subpoenaed documents.80 The sufficiency 
test determines whether or not the act of production passes beyond the threshold of a mere 
passive production of physical evidence and becomes an implied assertion of fact amounting 
to a testimonial communication.81 The Fisher doctrine has met with a number of criticisms. 
First, the defendant's state compelled act of production must rise to a sufficient level of 
testimony in order to trigger the fifth amendment privilege. But the court has failed to set out 
the exact standard and threshold level of the "sufficiency" required. Second, the act of 
production must amount to a "substantial" threat of self-incrimination. Again, the court has 
failed to delineate the degree and value of the quality of self-incrimination required. 
An examination of the case law reveals that the Supreme Court's focus has shifted from a 
singular inquiry into "whether or not state compulsion extorts a communication from the 
defendant" (Holt v United States) to a sophisticated assertive conduct test (Schmerber v 
76 But critics have pointed out a number of differences between refusal and flight evidence. (i) a 
refusal to take a test is an unwilling, intentional communication to another (usually the police), 
whereas escaping or fleeing from the crime scene is not an intentional communication to another. (ii) 
In a Neville-type situation the suspect must respond to the police request, whereas fleeing does not 
compel the suspect to communicate a response. 
77 425 U.S 391 (1976). See also De Marco et al "Confusion Amongst The Courts, Should The 
Contents Of Personal Papers Be Privileged" (9) St. John. J. Legal. Comm.(1993) 219. Melelli "Act Of 
Production Immunity" (52) Ohio St. L. J (1991) 223. 
78 The court must ask itself two questions : (i) did the state compel incriminating evidence? If the state 
has not forced the individual to write the document, the contents are voluntary and unprotected; (ii) Is 
the evidence testimonial in nature? The inquiry here is whether the state compelled act of production 
(not the contents) is testimonial or not. 
79 465 u.s 605 (1988). 
8
° Fisher ibid at 409-410, Doe ibid at 613. The compelled act of production must communicate the 
following : (i) the document exists; (ii) the document is in the control of the defendant; (iii) the 
defendant believes that the documents compelled are described in the subpoena. 
81 Fisher ibid at 410-411. 
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California) and presently to a sufficiency test based on a compelled act of production doctrine 
(United States v Fisher and United States v Doe). Emerging from these cases is the idea 
that the fifth amendment should be influenced by a balancing of state and individual interest. 
The privilege only becomes effective once the identification evidence compelled from the 
defendant is sufficiently testimonial. The fundamental problem with the Supreme Court's 
reasoning is that it is difficult to determine which choices and interests (state or individual) 
trigger the privilege and which do not. The Supreme Court has failed to reach a consensus 
as to the purpose, value and policies supporting the privilege. The Supreme Court is 
balancing on an ad hoc basis against a scale which changes from case to case. As a result, 
the court is unable to provide a clear definition of what qualifies as a testimonial act or 
properly define the ambiguous distinction between testimonial and non-testimonial physical 
evidence.82 For example, is the physiological response from a lie detector a testimonial or a 
non-testimonial act? Does a non-verbal gesture always signify a non-testimonial act or may 
body language in the form of demeanour and posture which provide visual clues as to mental 
disposition, indicate a testimonial communication? The attempt to analyse testimonial and 
non-testimonial evidence in the language of constitutional rights appears to result in an 
endless chain of conceptual problems. Certainly, were the privilege against self-incrimination 
to be abolished, these conceptual problems would fall away and self-incriminatory evidence 
would then be admissible or inadmissible purely on the basis of its relevancy. 
7.1.5 "Against Himself': The Nexus 
The privilege is identified with a compelled disclosure of testimony which exposes the 
witness to a risk of a state imposed punishment. 83 A relevancy test is applied to the notion of 
self-incrimination.84 The privilege does not attach to a compelled testimony which subjects 
the witness to mere infamy, disgrace85 or the fear of reprisal.86 The self-incrimination must 
be relevant to the risk of a formal criminal conviction. Hoffman v United States 87 holds that a 
witness response will only be considered incriminatory when it furnishes "a link in the chain 
of evidence needed to prosecute".88 The establishment of a link or nexus in the chain of 
evidence is assessed both qualitatively (does the causal connection extend to all or only 
82 Easton The Case For The Right To Silence 2"d Ed (1998) 207-35, criticizes the testimonial/physical 
evidence distinction as fundamentally flawed as a rationale for the privilege. The non-physical 
(communicative) and the physical (non-communicative) dualism is based on a discredited and 
philosophically artificial distinction between the "mind" and the "body''. 
83 Doe v United States 487 U.S 201, 212 (1988). 
84 Ibid at 212. 
85 Brown v Walker 161 U.S 591, 598 (1896). 
86 Peimonte v United States 367 U.S 556, 559 n2 (1961 ). 
87 341 U.S 479 (1951). 
88 Ibid at 486. 
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certain kinds of testimony which places the witness in danger?) and quantitatively (how close 
must the causal connection be?). First, there must exist a real89 and reasonable danger90 of 
a criminal prosecution. The danger must be practical, substantial and realistic. Second, the 
judge is normally sympathetic to the witness and will accept the witness claim, unless it lacks 
a reasonable foundation,91 and is impossible or incredible.92 Procedurally the witness will be 
favoured over the state. Third, the privilege may only be claimed for testimony which tends 
to prove guilt or would lead to evidence that tends to prove the guilt of a criminal act.93 
Hoffman v United States 94 defines the witness's genuine fear as the possibility (going 
beyond a mere fanciful possibility) of a criminal prosecution. To be privileged the compelled 
testimony need not amount to a prima facie case but one which merely furnishes a probable 
link in the chain of evidence. According to Emspak v United States,95 "it is enough that the 
trial court be shown by argument how a prosecutor may conceivably by building on a 
seemingly harmless answer, proceed step by step to link the witness to the crime". (Note: it 
may be argued that the American test is more flexible and less severe than the English 
test).96 
When there is no possibility of a conviction or the threat of direct incrimination is not present 
the witness cannot claim the privilege. However, once successfully claimed, the privilege 
continues to apply, even when the witness has been convicted but not yet sentenced. Once 
the witness's various appeals have been exhausted, the privilege falls away. An acquittal or 
a presidential pardon conferred in advance of trial obviates the need for the privilege. The 
court has a discretion whether or not to grant or deny the privilege. Hoffman v United 
States97 recognizes that the ultimate determination must be made by the court and not by the 
witness. The witness may not claim the privilege when immunity from prosecution has been 
granted. The privilege is also not available where the statute of limitations has run its 
course. Hale v Henkel 98 suggests "if the testimony relates to criminal acts long since past 
and against the prosecution of which the statute of limitations has run ... the amendment 
does not apply". The privilege applies only to the danger of personal incrimination and does 
89 Heike v United States 227 U.S 131, 144 (1913). 
90 Rogers v United States 340 U.S 479,488 (1951). 
91 Hoffman v United States 341 U.S 479, 488 (1951). 
92 Emspak v United States 349 U.S. 190, 198-199 n18 (1955). 
93 McCarthy v Arndstein 254 U.S 71, 72 (1920). United States v Johnson 488 F.2d 1206 (1 51 Cir) 
( 1972} incorrectly defines the nexus as an unlikelihood of further prosecution. 
94 Ibid at 486. 
95 Ibid at 199. 
96 R v Boyes (1861) 121 E. Rep. 730, 738 and Morrison "Commentary" Antitrust Law Journal (1980) 
421-26. See infra chapter 10. 
97 Ibid at 479. 
98 201 u.s 43 (1906). 
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not attach to the incrimination of spouse, child, parent, neighbour, church, partnership or 
company.99 In Roberts v United States,100 the Supreme Court noted that the duty to report 
the criminal behaviour of others remains a badge of responsible citizenship. 
7.2 Documentary Evidence 
The question of a state coerced compulsory production of documents is a difficult one to 
answer, as documentary evidence often straddles the grey line between communicative -
testimonial and passive physical non-testimonial evidence. It is important to separate the 
issue of seizure from the issue of compelled production and disclosure. The seizure of pre-
existing evidence which exists independently of the defendant cannot be defined as a 
compelled self-incrimination to which the privilege attaches. Seizure of pre-existing 
documents may violate both the fourth amendment right and the right to privacy. It may also 
have other adverse evidential consequences, but it does not trigger the fifth amendment. 
Documents, although containing "communications" from their maker, do not become 
compulsorily produced communicative evidence when they are merely seized. According to 
United States v Fisher, 101 and United States v Doe,102 the compelled production of 
incriminating pre-existing documents, known by the state to be in existence, should also not 
by itself violate the privilege against self-incrimination. The one exception to this general rule 
is Boyd v United States, 103 in which a reliance upon the fifth amendment coupled with the 
fourth amendment led the court to declare all compulsory production of documents to be a 
violation of the privilege.104 This aspect of the Boyd judgement has been tacitly overruled by 
the decision in United States v Fisher. On the other hand, the disclosure of documents 
which then leads to a state compelled seizure or production of the documents in question, 
clearly creates a self-incrimination problem. Self-incrimination arises because the act of 
99 United States v Murdock 284 U.S 141 (1931). 
100 291 U.S 121 (1883). 
101 425 U.S 391 (1976). See also King "Note : The Fifth Amendment Privilege For Producing 
Corporate Documents" (84) Mich. L. Rev (1986) 1544. Heidt "The Fifth Amendment Privilege: Cutting 
Fisher's Tangled line" (49) Miss. L. Rev (1984) 339. 
102 465 U.S 605 (1984). See also Gerena eta/ "Comment: U.S. v Doe And Its Progeny'' (40) Miami L. 
Rev (1986) 793. Webb eta/ "U.S. v Doe: The Supreme Court And The Fifth Amendment" (16) Loyola 
Un. Ch. L. J (1985) 729. Greenspan "In re Doe : Required Records And The Fifth Amendment" (16) 
Conn. L. Rev(1984) 1021. 
103 116U.S616(1886). 
104 The running together of the fourth and fifth amendment is conceptually flawed. (i) A fourth 
amendment search or seizure focuses on inanimate objects and does not require the co-operation of 
the defendant. A fifth amendment subpoena is directed at a person and seeks to compel cooperation. 
(ii) The fourth amendment is broad but its prohibition is not absolute. It forbids only unreasonable 
searches and seizures. The fifth amendment is narrow and applies only to compelled self-
incrimination. But within this sphere its prohibition is absolute, it forbids all kinds of state coerced 
compulsion of evidence. Boyd's reasoning is impractical because it denies these differences. The 
problem of immunity serves to illustrate the confused blending of two different constitutional rights. 
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disclosure may be used by the state as an admission against the accused. The documents 
so disclosed constitute compelled testimony which the state may use against the defendant. 
Especially when the state subpoenas the defendant to produce documents the existence of 
which is unknown to the state or is in dispute. 
Traditionally the fifth amendment was intended to protect only oral incriminatory testimony. 
In Boyd v United States, 105 the Supreme Court, in a fit of liberal excess, developed a 
"contents-based" privilege and advanced the scope of the fifth amendment to include 
documentary testimony. According to Boyd, in compelling private documents the privacy 
rights of the witness are superior to the state interest. The Boyd judgement is founded on 
the idea that a private document is private property, "an indefeasible right of personal 
security ... and private property" .106 The privacy-property rationale prevents the state from 
compelling the production of records over which its proprietary right is inferior to that of the 
witness. 107 Consequently the witness may withhold all incriminatory personal papers from 
state scrutiny.108 The privacy rational is limited to private documents and does not extend to 
partnership, corporate or other organizational business papers.109 Boyd's privacy reasoning 
is based on the notion that a witness's written thoughts are closely connected and an 
extension of the innermost thoughts of the individual personality. Organisational papers do 
not lie within the sanctum of individual thought because they are always open for inspection 
by other organization members. 110 The Boyd privacy rationale has now been superceded111 
by an alternative model based on a compelled "act of production" doctrine developed in 
United States v Fisher. 112 The new test does not focus on the contents of the document but 
105 116 U.S 616 (1886) Boyd is one of the high water marks of the privilege as it protects private 
papers and private business papers of the defendant in both criminal and civil actions. Note the 
criticism of Gerstein 'The Demise Of Boyd : Self-Incrimination And Private Papers In The Burger 
Court" (27} U.C.L.A. L. Rev (1979) 344, under the influence of Boyd, the sharp outlines of the fifth 
amendment have been overlain with an undifferentiated concern for allowing people to maintain the 
privacy of all their papers. 
106 Ibid at 624. For the relationship between the privilege and privacy see supra chapter 4 p.118-129. 
107 See Heidt "The Fifth Amendment Privilege And Documents : Cutting Fisher's Tangled Line" (49) M. 
L. Rev (1984) 439, 447. Mosteller "Simplifying Subpoena Law, Taking The Fifth Amendment 
Seriously'' (73) Virginia L. Rev (1987) 1. 
108 Bradley J "any forcible extortion of a man's .... private papers [is] contrary to the principles of a free 
government" (at 630, 632). 
109 Bellis v United States 417 U.S 85,87 (1974). Documents belonging to a partnership are not 
privileged, but documents belonging to a sole proprietorship are privileged. 
110 United States v White 322 U.S 694 (1944). Company papers fall outside the privacy domain 
because "individuals lack control over their contents, location and the right to keep them from the view 
of others" (at 699-700). 
u 1 Boyd's demise is attributable to abandonment of the mere evidentiary rule, and the acceptance 
that non-testimonial evidence may be compelled. Since Boyd, society has made several fundamental 
changes to the rules of privacy and proprietary interests. See Gerstein ibid note 105 at 361. 
112 425 U.S 391 (1976). Fisher appears to set fifth amendment jurisprudence on a new course. While 
appearing to reject the entire framework on which Boyd rests, Fisher stops short of expressly 
overruling Boyd. 
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instead, concentrates on the testimonial and communicative nature of a state compelled act 
of production. The switch from a privacy based rationale to an act of production rationale is a 
fundamental change, the ramifications of which have yet to be properly settled. In effect, the 
fifth amendment no longer provides a protection for the contents of private papers. The 
Fisher test focuses on a compelled testimony standard previously developed in the context of 
oral and non-documentary evidence.113 According to the Fisher standard, the private nature 
of the document is irrelevant and the document falls within the scope of the privilege, only if 
the state compelled act of production rises to a "sufficiently" communicative and testimonial 
level.114 When the element of state compulsion is absent, documents created voluntarily and 
containing self-incriminatory communications, are not covered by the privilege. The essence 
of the Fisher test is that the state compulsion need not relate to the creation of the document, 
but merely to its production and disclosure. In this sense, the act of production must rise to a 
sufficiently testimonial and communicative self-incriminatory level in order to trigger the fifth 
amendment protection. The witness's act of production is deemed to be testimonial when he 
is forced to attest to the existence, control and authenticity of the document. The act of 
production is also sufficiently testimonial when the state necessarily relies on the compelled 
document as an important element of the charge against the witness.115 Of course, if the 
prosecution were to establish the existence, control and authenticity of the document 
independently of the witness's communicative act of production, then the act of production 
(no matter how incriminating the contents), would not by itself involve testimonial self-
incrimination.116 The ability of the prosecution to establish an alternative means of proving 
existence, control and authenticity of the document, effectively prohibits the witness from 
asserting the privilege in the face of a government subpoena. The Fisher test lays out the 
following guidelines for the interpretation of a fifth amendment claim on a document 
subpoenaed by the state.117 
i) The privilege does not apply when the document is voluntarily created in the 
absence of state compulsion; 
113 Fisher establishes a three element test based on (a) a compulsion element, (b) a testimonial-
communicative element, and (c) a self-incrimination element. 
114 The abandonment of the privacy rationale is in conflict with the common law which generally 
adheres to a privacy rationale. 
115 A sufficiently testimonial communication must assert a fact of evidentiary significance. An act of 
production has evidentiary significance if it adds to the sum of the state's knowledge. An act of 
production will trigger the privilege when the state has no means of verifying the accuracy of the 
communication, other than relying on the fact that the defendant made it. 
116 Fisher ibid at 411 . 
117 The act of production test is not unique to Fisher. Wigmore uses much the same reasoning in his 
criticism of Boyd (Sec 2264, McNaughton Ed 1961 at 380). 
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ii) The privilege applies only when the elements of compulsion, testimonial 
communication and self-incrimination are present; 
iii) The act of production is testimonial when it implicitly communicates the existence, 
possession and authenticity of the document; 
iv) In order to trigger the privilege the act of production must rise to the level which is 
sufficiently testimonial and self-incriminatory; 
v) A "sufficiency" level is reached when the state prepares to use the compelled 
document as an important element of the charge against the witness; 
vi) In this standard analysis the private nature of the document content is irrelevant. 
It may be said therefore, that an act of production is considered testimonial (and 
communicative) when the act constitutes an implied assertion or disclosure of fact, 118 and 
results in the individual revealing his knowledge of the facts connecting him to the offence. 
The doctrine is designed to protect the individuals' subjective knowledge (i.e. his knowledge 
about the existence, possession and authenticity of the document) and not the underlying 
facts which may be revealed by the compelled act of production.119 An act of production will 
not be privileged if it amounts only to a Schmerber type production of real or physical 
evidence. It only becomes privileged if it infers relevant incriminating facts. United States v 
Doe 120 describes the difference most succinctly. The compelled act of production may be 
similar to "being forced to surrender a key to a strongbox containing incriminating 
documents", or it may be similar to "being compelled to reveal the combination to [one's] wall 
safe".121 When the state is merely demanding the surrender of the key, there is no violation 
of the fifth amendment (because obliging the individual merely to produce documents does 
not require him to disclose the contents of his mind).122 But when the state demands a 
disclosure of the safe combination, there is a violation of the fifth amendment (because the 
individual is being compelled to make either a factual assertion or a disclosure of the 
contents of his mind).123 
The Fisher doctrine leaves unresolved a number of important issues. First, although the act 
of production must be sufficiently testimonial in order to trigger the privilege, no clear 
threshold level of "sufficiency" has been set out.124 Second, the Fisher court has failed to 
118 Fisher ibid at 410-11. 
119 Fisher ibid at 409-1 0. 
120 465 U.S 605 (1984). 
121 Ibid at 210 n9. 
122 Fisher ibid at 411. 
123 The same explanation is used in United States v Hubbe/120 S. Ct 2037 (2000) at 2046-48. 
124 Geyh "The Testimonial Component Of The Right Against Self-Incrimination" (36) Cath. U. L. Rev 
(1987) 611, 634, criticizes the idea of "sufficiency'' as a testimonial standard. The court's inability to 
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resolve the question of whether the act of production doctrine applies to private business 
records. While Fisher does not expressly overrule Boyd, it has specifically rejected the Boyd 
concept of personal privacy,125 without discussing the application of the privilege to private 
business records. Third, the act of production doctrine has a number of practical flaws. The 
doctrine is inordinately abstract and may not be clearly understood by the busy run of the mill 
attorney or public prosecutor. It is also out of touch with the practicalities of subpoena 
practice. Both the. prosecutor who serves and the witness who receives a document 
subpoena are more likely to concentrate on the contents of the document instead of on the 
testimonial component of an abstract act of production test.126 A number of unresolved 
issues raised by the Fisher decision have been settled in United States v Doe, 127 which 
reinforces the spirit of the Fisher rationale. In particular, the contents of voluntarily prepared 
business records are not shielded by the privilege. 128 Compelled production of business 
records may only trigger the privilege if the state subpoena induces the witness to implicitly 
testify as to the existence, possession and authenticity of the business document under his 
personal control. 129 In this circumstance the state is required to make a formal offer of 
immunity. The immunity is granted only on a proper statutory request and may not be 
imposed judicially.130 Under the use immunity provided for in 18 U.S.C sec 6002 (1994), the 
state may use the subpoenaed documents, but it may not use any information derived from 
the act of production of these documents in a criminal proceeding (except in a prosecution 
for perjury, for giving a false statement or for failing to comply with the document production 
order). While a majority of academic commentators have endorsed the content-neutral 
differentiate between what constitutes sufficient testimony and what constitutes insufficient testimony, 
makes the judgement rather arbitrary (at 635). As a purely semantic matter, the existence of a 
testimonial communication is a yes or no proposition. The phrase "not sufficiently'' testimonial is a 
nonsensical juxtaposition of terms (at 638). 
125 See Melilli "Act Of Production Immunity'' (52} Ohio St. L. J (1991) 234-244. The framers of the 
Constitution did not seek in the fifth amendment to achieve a general protection of privacy but to deal 
with a specific issue of compelled incrimination. 
126 A witness served with a documentary subpoena has a number of realistic options : (i) to comply 
with the order, (ii) to claim the privilege, (iii) to deny the existence of, or destroy, the document. 
Common sense dictates that when the state cannot independently verify the document's existence, 
the untrustworthy witness will simply destroy or turn over only those documents which are not 
incriminatory. 
127 465 u.s 605 (1984). 
128 The Doe minority (per Marshal J) conclude that there are certain documents no person ought to be 
compelled to produce at the state request. For example, subpoenas which infringe the first 
amendment and attempt to probe a person's religious, political beliefs and associations (at 619). See 
also McKenna 'The Constitutional Protection Of Private Papers" (53) Ind. L. J (1977) 55, 67. 
129 See Rothman "Life After Doe : Self-Incrimination And Business Documents" (56) Un. Cinn. L. Rev 
(1987) 387. Ong "Fifth Amendment Privilege And Compelled Production Of Corporate Papers After 
Fisher And Doe" (54) Fordham L. Rev (1986) 935. King "Corporate Document Production" (84) Mich. 
L. Rev (1986} 1544. 
130 Ibid at 614-617. Doe regards an "act of production" immunity as different from the usual full use 
immunity. An act of production immunity immunizes the testimonial component of the act of producing 
the document but not the document's contents. See infra note 171. 
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rationale of both Fisher and Doe, the lower courts have not strayed from the content-based 
rationale formulated in Boyd.131 The First, Sixth, Eight and Eleventh circuits have reserved 
judgement.132 Only the Second, Fourth, Ninth and the Columbia circuits have adopted an act 
of production based privilege.133 In common with all fundamental changes in constitutional 
jurisprudence, the Fisher rationale will have far ranging effects. Fortunately, the new 
analysis will only necessitate minor amendments to the artificial entity doctrine and to the 
well-established rule which denies the privilege to public corporate documents. In order to 
minimize a conflict between the act of production doctrine and the artificial entity doctrine, the 
suggestion is made that a subpoena for corporate documents be directed to the artificial 
entity itself and not to a particular corporate official. The entity may then select the person 
who will hand over the documents. The choice should fall on someone who will not be 
incriminated by the act of production. 
In United States v Hubbel, 134 the most recent case to apply the act of production doctrine, the 
state subpoenaed the defendant to produce a number of unspecified documents. The 
defendant invoked the privilege against self-incrimination, but the state (although unable to 
describe the subpoenaed documents with any reasonable particularity) obtained an order 
forcing the defendant to produce the documents subject to a "use immunity" .135 The state 
then used these documents in tax and fraud charges against the defendant. The defendant 
argued that the charges be dismissed because they were substantially based on immunized 
testimony derived from his production of the documents the documents.136 The prosecution 
relying on the Fisher doctrine, argued that a taxpayer's act of production response to a 
subpoena did not represent a substantial threat of self-incrimination because the taxpayer 
did not prepare the papers and could not vouch for their accuracy. Stevens J (for the 
majority) in rejecting the state's interpretation of Fisher, states, "the assembly of hundreds of 
pages of material in response to a [state] request for any and all documents reflecting, 
referring or relating to any direct or indirect sources of money . . . . is the functional 
equivalent of the preparation of an answer to either a detailed written interrogatory or a 
series of oral questions at a discovery deposition".137 Stevens J separates Hubbel from 
Fisher on the following basis; "while in Fisher the [state] already knew that the documents 
131 For example, United States v Davis 636 F.2d 1023 (5th Cir) 1981. United States v Van Artsdalen 
632 F.2d (3rd Cir) 1980. 
132 In re Steinberg 837 F.2d. 527, 530 (1st Cir) 1988. Butcher v Bailey 753 F.2d 465, 469 (6th Cir) 
1985. 
133 United States v Wujkowski 929 F.2d, 981, 983 (4th Cir) 1991. United States v Lacoste 800 F.2d 
981,984 (9th Cir) 1986. in reSealed Case 877 F.2d 83,84 (D.C. Cir) 1989. 
134 120 S. Ct. 2037 (2000). 
135 Ibid at 2040. 
136 Ibid at 2041. 
137 Ibid at 2046-48. 
247 
were in the attorney's possession and could independently confirm their existence and 
authenticity through the accountants who created them, here the [state] has not shown any 
prior knowledge of either the existence or the whereabouts of the ... documents produced by 
the respondent". 138 In following the logic of the court, the following conclusion may be 
reached. Fishers act of production is "insufficiently" testimonial and therefore unprotected by 
the privilege against self-incrimination, because the documents were known to exist. The act 
of production coerced from Hubbel however, was "sufficiently" testimonial and therefore 
protected by the privilege because the state had no prior knowledge of these documents. 
What criterion should be used to distinguish between an insufficiently and sufficiently 
testimonial act of production? Hubbel apparently supplies the answer. In Hubbel the state 
relies on the truth telling of the person forced to produce the documents,139 but in Fisher, it 
does not.140 The person's ability to choose between truth and falsehood distinguishes the 
two cases and determines the boundary between a protected and an unprotected act of 
production. 
7.3 The Required Records Doctrine 
In certain circumstances the individual may be required by statutory law to communicate in 
writing with the state, even though such a communication is self-incriminating. The purpose 
of these regulatory statutes is to ensure a continuing supply of information necessary for 
effective governance in today's increasingly complex society. The "required records" rule 
mandates each citizen to maintain certain obligatory records which the state may 
subpoena.141 In Shapiro v United States, 142 the defendant was directed by state subpoena to 
produce all relevant records relating to commodity sales regulated by the Emergency Price 
Control Act (1942). The state subsequently prosecuted Shapiro on the basis of information 
extracted from the subpoenaed records. The Supreme Court noted that the privilege against 
self-incrimination did not apply to records required by law. 143 In the majority opinion (per 
Vinson J) a record with public aspects falls within the same exception which permits the state 
138 Ibid at 2046. 
139 Ibid at 2047. 
140 Ibid at 2047. 
141 Saltzburg "The Required Records Doctrine, Its Lessons For The Privilege" (53) Un. Ch. L. Rev 
(1986) 11-24. 
142 335 u.s 1 (1948). 
143 Although Shapiro does not expressly refer to the Boyd privacy rationale, it may be inferred that 
Shapiro distinguishes between public and private records. Records required in terms of a regulatory 
regime are public documents and public documents are not protected by the privilege (at 16-19). In 
this regard Shapiro relies on the decision in Wilson v United States 221 U.S 361 (1911 ). 
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to compel production of corporate organizational papers. 144 The court found a clear 
congressional intent to use the statutory record-keeping requirement as a means of obtaining 
crucial information in the public interest. The Shapiro decision has been criticized because it 
gives the state an almost unlimited licence to strip away the fifth amendment protection from 
private documents simply by enacting a statute which converts private papers into public and 
discoverable documents.145 The minority (per Frankfurter J) noted that virtually every major 
public law enactment contains some kind of record-keeping requirement giving the state 
unbounded powers of trespass. 146 
In Albertson v Subversive Activities Control Board, 147 the Supreme Court effectively ignored 
the Shapiro doctrine, by developing a new test which in theory limits state access to 
regulatory required records. The court accepted the defendant's contention that the 
Subversive Activities Control Act (1964),148 which required communist sympathizers to 
register their party affiliations, was a direct infringement of the fifth amendment right against 
self-incrimination. The court, in analyzing statutory compelled disclosures of this nature, 
developed a three step test : (i) Is the statute aimed at a selective group? (ii) Is the identified 
group likely to be linked to criminal activity? (iii) Are there other criminal statutes which serve 
the same regulatory function as the identified statute? The Albertson judgement, while 
sidestepping the Shapiro doctrine, also shifts the focus of fifth amendment analysis away 
from the traditional emphasis on individual self-incrimination to a self-incrimination centred 
upon a selective group. The judgement in essence, would strike down a statute which 
compels individuals to register with the government purely by reason of membership in a 
political party. An obvious infringement of the fifth amendment especially in an area of law 
already well permeated and controlled by other criminal statutes. In a trilogy of cases 
decided on the same day, the Supreme Court attempted to reconcile the Shapiro doctrine 
with the Albertson test. In Marchetti v United States,149 a federal wagering tax statute 
compelling professional gamblers to register and pay occupational tax, was held to be a 
direct infringement of the petitioners' fifth amendment right. The court reasoned that 
gamblers were by definition a selective group, often suspected of criminal activity and 
operated in an area which was already sufficiently regulated by other criminal statutes. 
144 Vinson J at 32-35, "no serious misgivings that [constitutional] bounds have been overstepped 
would appear to be evoked when there is a sufficient relationship between the activity sought to be 
regulated and the public concern, so that government can constitutionally regulate or forbid the basic 
activity concerned and can constitutionally require the keeping of particular records". 
145 Jackson J dissenting at 70-71. 
146 Frankfurter J dissenting at 51, "if records merely because required to be kept by law, ipso facto, 
became public records, we are indeed living in glass houses". 
147 382 u.s 70 (1965). 
148 The McCarran Act codified at 50 U.S (sec 783(f))(1982). 
149 390 u.s 39 (1968). 
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Gamblers may reasonably expect any information handed to the state in terms of the statute 
to provide the evidence for possible future prosecutions, thereby infringing the privilege 
against self-incrimination.150 In Grosso v United States, 151 a requirement to submit monthly 
forms detailing wagering activity in terms of treasury regulations, was held to be a violation of 
fifth amendment rights. State access to information contained in the monthly forms would 
constitute a substantial risk of self-incrimination. Similarly, in Haynes v United States,152 the 
court held that compelling the registration of firearms in terms of the National Firearms Act, 
violates the defendant's fifth amendment privilege. The Supreme Court has distinguished 
Marchetti, Grosso and Haynes from Shapiro on the practical basis of the differing functions 
and purposes intended by the various regulatory statutes.153 The regulatory systems 
inherent in registration, wagering or firearm statutes (Marchetti, Grosso and Haynes) were 
significantly different to the regulatory mechanism inherent in an ordinary price administration 
statute (Shapiro). Records customarily mandated by pure administration statutes were more 
likely to be defined as public documents than personal records required by political, wagering 
and firearm statutes. Price administration records were less likely to entail the risk of a future 
criminal prosecution as these business-type records are essentially non-criminal in nature. 
The Supreme Court has over the years and in various dicta suggested a number of 
alternative reasons for the existence of a required records doctrine: (i) Statutory 
requirements obliging the keeping of records and which deny the fifth amendment are a 
reflection of the will of Congress. (ii) The fifth amendment is suspended by reason of an 
implied waiver. Individuals who wish to engage in regulated activity must accept the 
conditions attached thereto and impliedly waive the fifth amendment right. (iii) Statutory 
registration requirements may necessarily (in the state interest) oblige the suspension of the 
privilege by individuals engaged in peripheral unlawful civil activities. A required records 
doctrine exists simply because important government regulatory interests urgently outweigh 
the individual right to fifth amendment protection.154 
150 Ibid at 40-42 and 52-54 (per Harlan J). 
151 390 u.s 62 (1968): 
152 390 u.s 85 (1968). 
153 Although this practical analysis helps to explain logically why Shapiro differs from the Alberston 
doctrine, it fails to establish a unifying philosophical rationale which explains why the privilege is 
available in one type of regulatory circumstance and not the other. For example, in United States v 
Sullivan 274 U.S 259 (1927), the court held that the privilege applied to the refusal to answer 
questions about the failure to file a tax return. Yet tax returns are public records and part of the 
required records regulatory regime. If a taxpayer in terms of Sullivan may refuse to answer questions, 
why is it that Shapiro could not refuse to keep or produce records (Saltzburg ibid not 141 at 24 ). 
154 Saltzburg ibid note 141 at 24-25 suggests a remodeled doctrine which reconciles Shapiro, 
Albertson and Marchetti and is based on the following guidelines : (a) the government has a valid 
regulatory authority over all recorded activity; (b) the records should be rationally related to the 
government's regulatory purpose; (c) the government must clearly specify both the records required 
to be kept and the rules that govern the activity; (d) a person who chooses to engage in a regulated 
activity tacitly admits that a required records doctrine is the condition for doing business. 
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The required records doctrine needs to be re-evaluated in the light of the act of production 
doctrine developed in Fisher and Doe. The typical required records statute compels three 
different acts concerning the contents of a document by directing the individual to : (a) 
preserve the record; (b) organize existing records; and (c) where necessary, create new 
records. In line with the Fisher doctrine, each of these compelled acts must be analysed to 
determine whether or not they are sufficiently testimonial and self-incriminatory. 
Preservation of records as a compelled act may be readily ignored as the individual's failure 
to preserve documents has insufficient or trivial testimonial value. But the compulsory 
organization and creation of records is clearly testimonial in nature and sometimes the act of 
producing these records is sufficiently self-incriminatory. Clearly, in terms of the Fisher 
doctrine, an individual may properly claim the privilege in the face of a state subpoena to 
produce, organize or create records. The state would be obliged, in line with Doe, to grant 
an immunity against the use of all information derived from the compelled act. The individual 
should be allowed to make a contemporaneous objection and claim of privilege to the act of 
organization or creation of documents compelled by the regulatory statute. If no such claim 
is made, the fifth amendment would not protect the contents of the document when they are 
subsequently subpoenaed by the state. 
The Shapiro doctrine illustrates a practical reality in today's information driven society. The 
government's need for regulatory information is sometimes more important than the 
individual's fifth amendment rights. The Supreme Court recognizes the necessity for finding 
ways to sustain a flow of information in order to maintain effective governance. The 
Supreme Court finds it legally acceptable to place restrictions on the fifth amendment and to 
enforce compliance with regulatory regimes. While the Fisher act of production rule has 
done much to ameliorate the stringency of the required records doctrine, there is the tacit 
assumption that government interests are sometimes sufficiently important to curtail 
individual fifth amendment rights. Nevertheless, the existing jurisprudence concerning the 
role of the fifth amendment privilege in statutory regulatory record-keeping is open to several 
possible analyses. The inability of the Supreme Court to rationalize why it sometimes 
chooses one and sometimes another reasoning has left the law in a state of confusion. This 
is further compounded by the Supreme Court's inability to justify the policy reasons for 
extending the scope of the privilege far beyond its historical context. From being a privilege 
which traditionally applied to the "witness in a criminal case", the privilege now extends to 
questions of private or public business papers, tb the act of producing these papers and to 
modern regulatory statutes. The Supreme Court has been unable to justify this extraordinary 
expansion. 
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Baltimore City Department of Social Services v Bouknight 155 highlights the Supreme Court's 
struggle to establish a consistent fifth amendment jurisprudence. Unfortunately, the 
Bouknight decision serves only to underline the Court's inability to provide a rational and 
conceptual foundation for the right against self-incrimination. In straining to apply current fifth 
amendment jurisprudence to new and different circumstances, the traditional reasoning 
simply breaks down. This jurisprudential incoherence is once again illustrative of the 
irrational and empty rhetorical sentimentality of libertarian philosophy which supports the 
Supreme Court's twentieth century attempt to expand the nature, meaning and scope of the 
fifth amendment into areas outside of its historical context. 156 The Bouknight court confronts 
the moral dilemma of whether or not a mother, suspected of child abuse but nevertheless 
given protective custody of her child in terms of an original court order, is protected by the 
fifth amendment from being compelled to produce the child by a subsequent court order. 
The circumstance is such that the state fears the child may have been murdered by his 
parent. The defendant claimed the fifth amendment protection on the ground that she was 
being compelled to "verbally or physically produce statements or evidence that may tend to 
be incriminatory". The court cites the act of production principle of Fisher and Doe in denying 
the fifth amendment protection to the defendant. Bouknight's production of the child was not 
sufficiently testimonial to trigger the fifth amendment. The order to produce the child does 
not compel the defendant to concede the existence, possession or control of the infant. In 
terms of the custody order, the defendant has already conceded her control over the child 
and has never denied his existence. The act of producing the child is therefore insufficiently 
testimonial as the defendant adds little or nothing to the sum total of the government's 
information. In additioh, the defendant cannot invoke her fifth amendment privilege because 
she has assumed a custodial role 157 and production is required as part of her custodial duty 
155 493 U.S 549 (1991). See Ruffing "Fifth Amendment: Preventing An Abusive Parent From Hiding 
Behind The Self-Incrimination Privilege" (81) J. Grim. L. and Criminology (1991) 925. Rosenberg 
"Bouknight : Of Abused Children And The Parental Privilege" (76) Iowa L. Rev ( 1991) 535. Rowe 
"Constitutional Law : Bouknight" (25) Wake. Forest. L. Rev (1990) 885. Patton "The World Where 
Parallel Lines Converge : Civil And Criminal Child Abuse Proceedings" (24) Georgia L. Rev (1990) 
473. 
156 In refusing to extend the privilege to Bouknight, the court is essentially forcing the defendant to aid 
the state in a possible subsequent criminal prosecution. The fair state-individual balance rationale is 
infringed. The court also places Bouknight in a cruel trilemma situation, in which she must choose 
between self-accusation, perjury or contempt. By refusing the privilege to the parent, the court is 
denying that the parent is presumed innocent until proven guilty, a principle which underlines the 
accusatorial system and upholds the parent's right to silence. The right to privacy is also infringed. 
See Murphy v Waterfront Commission, supra chapter 4 p.112. 
157 It is difficult to define the parent as a corporate representative who assumes a custodian's role. 
Corporate representatives hold their positions by choice. Here the parent signs the custody order out 
of fear of losing her child. 
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in a non-criminal regulatory regime. 158 The fifth amendment has no application against a 
regulatory regime constructed to serve the public purpose unrelated to the state's 
enforcement of its criminal laws. When the individual assumes control over "items" which are 
within the legislative scope of the government's non-criminal regulatory powers, the ability to 
invoke the privilege is greatly reduced. The custody order granted to the mother creates a 
relationship between her and the state. As an agent of the state, the mother must comply 
with a court order.159 Implicit in the mother's acceptance of the custodial order is a waiver of 
her ability to invoke the privilege and to avoid state inspection. The court therefore reasons 
that the state's regulatory power over custodians of children in need of care renders the act 
of producing the child no more privileged than the production of corporate or public 
documents. In reaching its complicated and somewhat artificial conclusion, the court makes 
use of Fisher's act of production doctrine, Shapiro's required regulatory records doctrine and, 
for good measure, throws in the collective entities doctrine. 160 Bouknight has been criticized 
for distorting legal logic in applying both an act of production and a required records doctrine 
to the production of a human being and equating the production of a child to the production 
of a document. 
The application of current fifth amendment jurisprudence to new situations falling outside of 
traditional fifth amendment categories, necessitates a certain degree of artificial reasoning on 
the part of the Supreme Court. In order to justify reasonable state compelled disclosures of 
self-incriminatory information, the Court has produced judgements, which because of their 
artificial logic, are difficult to reconcile. A rationale which reconciles conflicting cases and 
provides for a consistent and logical framework against which to assess the fifth amendment 
should be based on a reasonable balance of interest approach. Yet the Supreme Court is 
reluctant to give recognition to a balancing approach and has in New Jersey v 
Portash161even gone to the extreme of rejecting a balance of interest analysis. The 
158 The juvenile system is interpreted to be a non-criminal, regulatory regime in which the state may 
compel production without targeting a specific group inherently suspected of criminal activity. See 
California v Byers 402 U.S 424 (1971). But as critics have noted, violations of the juvenile code may 
well lead to criminal prosecution. 
159 Children are subject to the control of their parents, but if parental control falters, the state must take 
over as parens patriae. See Schall v Martin 467 U.S 253, 265 (1984). 
160 Bouknight cites Wilson v United States, Braswell v United States, supra note 6 and 14 and the 
collective entity doctrine as authority. In terms of the doctrine, corporate records (the child) held by a 
representative custodian (the parent) are subject to inspection. But it seems illogical to regard the 
parent as the custodian of a corporate document (the child). The doctrine is not only illogically 
applied, it is also a misapplication outside of its historical purpose. Bouknight also misapplies the 
Braswell decision, by failing to grant the parent immunity from personal self-incrimination. 
161 440 U.S 450, 459 (1979). See Lefkowitz v Cunningham 431 U.S 801 (1977) where the court 
rejected the idea that "the state's overriding interest in preserving public confidence in the integrity of 
its political process justifies the [individual's] constitutional infringement (at 808). The court rejects a 
balancing of interests approach. See also Alito "Documents And The Privilege Against Self-
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Bouknight judgement is just another example of the Supreme Court's ambivalence. In 
Bouknight, the Supreme Court has chosen to apply a narrow, artificial and customized 
balance of interest analysis. Instead of addressing the broad issues of state interest versus 
the individual's privilege and thereby establishing a rationale which would form a logical 
framework for a future fifth amendment jurisprudence, the Supreme Court continues the 
practice of dealing with large questions in the most narrow way. 162 Common sense dictates 
that in some circumstances reasonable state compulsion of incriminating evidence serves a 
legitimate goal and should take precedence over the individual's fifth amendment right. 
Several fundamental problems about the Supreme Court's approach to the privilege against 
self-incrimination may now be identified and illustrated. First, despite having used a 
balancing approach in peripheral non-criminal areas since California v Byers, 163 and Braswell 
v United States, 164 the Supreme Court has rarely been explicit in its balancing reasoning and 
has produced no logical or sustainable standard. The Supreme Court's insistence on 
applying a tacit but practical balancing test on a case-by-case basis while publicly and 
rhetorically confirming the absolute nature of the fifth amendment, is a practice unique to 
American jurisprudence. In other Anglo-American jurisdictions, particularly South Africa and 
Canada, the privilege against self-incrimination is a relative right and subject to a coherent 
well reasoned balancing of interest principle. According to Arenella, 165 "what is missing in the 
Supreme Court's approach is the development of a coherent normative theory explaining 
why some fifth amendment purposes are more important than others, and why some of these 
values, but not others, might justify restrictions on the state's capacity to promote valid 
societal interests". Second, there is no philosophical reason why state compelled disclosure 
of incriminatory personal documents (non-financial or financial) cannot be regulated by non-
constitutional means. The law of evidence recognizes a host of non-constitutional privileges. 
Incrimination" (48) Un. Pitt. L. Rev (1986) 27, 36 "within the limited sphere of self-compulsion, the fifth 
amendment prohibition is absolute. It does not merely regulate procedures, it forbids any compulsion 
of self-incrimination". 
162 Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co v Sawyer 343 U.S 579, 635 (1952). 
163 California v Bayers 402 U.S 424 (1971 ). A Californian "hit and run" statute (requiring the driver at 
the scene of an accident to stop and give police his name and address) was held not to be an 
infringement of the fifth amendment. Byers reasoned that the statute was essentially regulatory, non-
criminal and dependent on self-reporting. The policy in favour of the statute outweighed the 
incremental infringement on the defendant's constitutional right (at 430-432). Reference is made to 
Schmerber where it was suggested that the fifth amendment must be interpreted against two factors : 
(a) the history and purpose of the privilege, and b) the urgency of other public interests involved (at 
449). 
164 487 u.s 96 (1988). 
165 Arenella "Schmerber And The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination :A Reappraisal" (20) Am. Crim. 
L. Rev (1982) 31, 38. 
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The problem of regulating and assessing incriminatory documents may be logically solved by 
reducing the admissibility of documents to the level of an evidentiary rule. The solution does 
not lie in the testimonial component of an artificially defined "act of production" nor even in 
the language, history or policies of the fifth amendment privilege. Instead, what is required is 
a sensitive balancing of individual privacy interests against the needs of state law 
enforcement. The problem is then reduceable to an objective weighing of extra-constitutional 
values. In the words of Alito, 166 "it becomes a problem of balancing, of picking and choosing, 
of drawing fine lines. Legislative and rule-making bodies are well equipped for this task; 
court's are not". 
7.4 Immunized Testimony 
The maintenance of a silence privilege entails a heavy cost to society because it deprives the 
state of vital evidence needed to convict the guilty defendant. Often the best source of 
evidence is the accused or his co-conspirators. Since all the participants in a crime may 
claim the privilege, there is an obvious need to substitute or at least to supplement the 
privilege.167 As a result, different kinds of common law and statutory immunities have 
developed which are nearly as old as the privilege itself.168 Historically the lack of an 
organized police force made it difficult to prosecute criminals. Prosecutors of those early 
days often immunized lesser crime accomplices by promising pardons in exchange for 
testimony against the main perpetrators. Early immunity agreements were consensual in 
that the witness bargained away the privilege in exchange for leniency. Modern grants of 
immunity are more complex and usually result from the operation of a statute or sometimes 
from informal agreements between the prosecutor and the prospective witness. The state 
may sometimes compel testimony from a reluctant witness in exchange for immunity. An 
immunity grant forced on a reluctant witness in terms of a formal immunity statute must be 
approved by the State Attorney-General acting in the interest of both the witness and the 
state. Informal immunity grants have none of the procedural safeguards of a formal immunity 
and it is often unclear to what extent a prosecutor has the authority to grant immunity, or to 
what extent the immunity applies across jurisdictional boundaries. The immunity grant is 
166 See Alito supra note 161 at 81 . 
167 
"The idea of immunity is to seek a rational accommodation between the imperatives of the [fifth 
amendment] privilege and the legitimate demands of government to compel citizens to testify'' Kastigar 
v United States 406 U.S 441, 44 7, n 15 ( 1972). 
168 Immunity developed alongside the privilege and served to limit the adverse effect of the privilege 
on law enforcement, Gordon "Right To Immunity For Defence Witnesses" (20) Conn. L. Rev (1987) 
153, 157. One of the earliest forms of immunity was the approvement, a common law practice which 
allowed a felony accused to point out his accomplice in exchange for a pardon, Hughes "Agreements 
For Cooperation In Criminal Cases" (45) Vand. L. Rev (1992) 1,7. See also Wigmore, sec 2281 at 
491 McNaughton Ed (1961). 
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designed to be a part of a comprehensive scheme of law enforcement.169 The essential 
question in considering immunity is to determine whether the public need for a particular 
testimony is great enough to override the social cost of granting immunity to a known 
criminal. Unlike the privilege against self-incrimination, the determination of immunity is 
fundamentally a question of a balance of interests. Apart from this difference, immunity has 
the same legal effect as the privilege. A formal statutory170 immunity is the most generally 
used instrument and is traditionally based on either simple use immunity, derivative use 
immunity or transactional immunity. Simple use and derivative use immunity are somewhat 
limited in scope. These merely protect the witness against the use of the immunized 
testimony by the state as evidence in a subsequent prosecution. Transactional immunity is 
broader and it prohibits all subsequent prosecutions of the immunized witness. The witness 
is protected against the use of the entire criminal transaction about which he has testified or 
produced evidence. Transactional immunity prevents a prosecution entirely. Mere use and 
derivative use immunity prevents only the subsequent use of the immunized testimony, but it 
does not prevent a future prosecution founded on an independent source of evidence outside 
the immunized testimony. The development in United States v Fisher 171 of an act of 
production immunity has added a new category of immunity. The act of production immunity 
operates in a similar fashion to use and derivative immunity. It is a narrow and more 
specialized immunity which protects only the testimonial component of the act of producing a 
document but not the document's contents. 
Immunity procedure operates in a fairly straightforward manner. The witness is lawfully 
subpoenaed and required to present himself at trial, to take the oath, 172 and to claim the 
privilege against self-incrimination on a question-by-question basis. If the prosecutor wants a 
question answered, an application for a grant of immunity is made to the court. 173 Only the 
criminal prosecutor is empowered to apply for immunity (a civil litigant has no such power). 
Once granted, the immunity order compels the witness to testify in spite of the privilege 
against self-incrimination. The immunity order prohibits the use of testimony and the use of 
169 See Bloch "Police Officers Accused Of Crime : Prosecutorial And Fifth Amendment Risks Posed 
By Police-Elicited Use Immunized Statements" (3) Un. Illinois L. Rev (1992) 625. Sherman "Informal 
Immunity, Don't You Let The Deal Go Down" (21) Loyola Los Angeles. L. Rev (1987) 1. Feldman et al 
"Compelling Testimony In Alaska : The Coming Rejection Of Use And Derivative Use Immunity (3) 
Alaska L. Rev (1986) 229. Lushing "Testimonial Immunity And The Privilege Against Self-
Incrimination" (73} J. Grim. L and Criminology (1982) 1690. Hoffmann ''The Privilege Against Self-
Incrimination And Immunity Statutes (16} Grim. L. Bull (1980) 421. 
170 The present federal immunity statute is 18 U.S.C., Title II, sec 6002-5 (1988). 
171 425 u.s 391 (1976). 
172 18 U.S.C sec 1623 (1976) penalty for false testimony. 28 U.S.C sec 1826 (1976) penalty for failure 
to testify. 
173 In terms of sec 6001 of the Federal Immunity Statute (1982, 1985, 1988}. 
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information derived from the testimony by the prosecutor in a subsequent criminal 
proceeding, except in the case of a perjury prosecution.174 If the immunized witness refuses 
to testify, he faces a contempt citation and if he testifies falsely, he faces a perjury charge. 175 
In Counce/man v Hitchcock,176 it was accepted that transactional immunity was the bare 
minimum constitutional substitution for the privilege against self-incrimination. The court 
argued that a constitutionally valid immunity statute must provide a broad spectrum of 
protection, "in view of the Constitution, [for] a statutory enactment to be valid, it must provide 
an absolute immunity against future prosecution" .177 Transactional immunity remained the 
settled constitutional substitute for some eighty years, 178 endorsed in Brown v Walker, 179 and 
later in United States v Ullmann. 180 
Immunity in general presents a number of problems. Despite the wide scope of a criminal 
immunity the witness is still exposed to a plethora of non-criminal sanctions including civil 
liability, termination of employment as a result of testifying and exposure to personal or 
professional humiliation.181 In United States v Ullmann, Douglas J (dissenting) exposed a 
number of important flaws in the immunity concept. First, immunity is frequently a lesser 
protection than an absolute silence privilege.182 The witness is not immunized against an 
attempted prosecution. Even though an attempt at prosecution is likely to fail, the witness is 
forced to incur legal and other collateral expenses. This inconvenience is absent if the 
witness instead selects the protection of a silence privilege. When the witness chooses 
immunity, he is in effect exchanging the absolute silence privilege for a partial and somewhat 
vague immunity. The state in this sense gives far less than it takes away.183 Second, 
immunity is a weak, while the silence privilege is a strong, protection of the witness's privacy, 
conscience, dignity and freedom of expression.184 Third, an immunity grant cannot shield the 
174 In terms of sec 6002 (1988). 
175 United States v Apfelbaum 445 U.S 115 (1980). 
176 142 U.S 547 (1892). The privilege could only be supplanted by a grant of statutory immunity "as 
broad as the mischief against which it seeks to guard" (at 562). Simple use immunity fails this test (at 
586). 
177 Ibid at 586. 
178 The state rarely granted a transactional immunity because of its absolute nature - essentially a full 
pardon. Sugar "Federal Immunity Problems And Practices Under 18 U.S.C Sec 6002-3" (14) Am. 
Grim. L. Rev (1976) 1568, Between 1893 and 1970, Congress enacted some fifty transactional 
immunity statutes. Shapiro v United States 335 U.S 1, 6 n4 (1948) sets out an abridged list of these 
statutes. 
179 161 u.s 591 (1896). 
180 350 u.s 422 (1956). 
181 Brown ibid at 605-06, "the design of the privilege [and its supplement the immunity grant] is not to 
aid the witness in vindicating his character, but to protect him against furnishing evidence which will 
convict him". 
182 Ullmann ibid at 445-449. 
183 Ibid at 445. Although fear of a prosecution should not be a legally protected harm. 
184 Ibid at 445-6. This is a weak criticism, as the sixth amendment specifically allows for a person to 
be compelled as a witness even if his conscience tells him not to testify. 
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witness against exposure to infamy and disgrace.185 Douglas J amplified this particular 
argument in Kastigar v United States. 186 The privilege protects against the defendant being 
compelled to admit guilt, but the immunity grant does not offer this type of protection. The 
immunized witness is compelled to admit guilt and he is merely protected against the 
consequence of the admission. Immunity is therefore not co-extensive with the privilege, its 
protective sphere is weaker and more ambivalent. Fourth, transactional immunity, in 
particular, is a risky strategy for the prosecution. If the prosecutor makes an incorrect 
assessment of the crime, the result may well be an immunity for the principal perpetrator 
rather than a minor accomplice. 
In the seminal case Murphy v Waterfront Commission,187 the reasoning behind immunity 
changed significantly. The Supreme Court suggested that a form of immunity narrower than 
transactional immunity would pass federal constitutional scrutiny, "once a defendant 
demonstrates that he has testified, under a state grant of immunity, to matters relating to a 
federal prosecution, the federal authorities have the burden of showing that their evidence is 
not tainted by establishing that they had an independent legitimate source for the disputed 
evidence". 188 Murphy signals judicial approval for a derivative use immunity the goal of which 
is: (i) a protection of the witness's fifth amendment right, (ii) securing trustworthy information 
from the witness, and (iii) preserving accountability in the criminal system.189 In exchange 
for the witness's testimony, the prosecution will not use the testimony or its fruits against the 
witness in any criminal proceeding.190 Derivative use immunity conceptually and practically 
favours the prosecution over the witness. The witness may be compelled to testify and be 
prosecuted as well, provided the state establishes an independent, legitimate source for the 
disputed immunized testimony. The prosecution's principal problem in this regard is to 
clearly prove that there is no derivative use being made of the compelled testimony. 191 The 
Murphy judgement served as the catalyst for the enactment of the Organized Crime Control 
Act of 1970, which empowers the state to compel testimony and in exchange to offer an 
185 Ibid at 449. Another weak criticism. A witness who associates with criminal elements brings 
disgrace upon himself, why should an immunity grant shield him from his own disgraceful action. 
186 406 u.s 441,467 (1972). 
187 378 u.s 52 (1964). 
188 Ibid at 79 n 18. 
189 In theory derivative use immunity, by allowing for the possibility of a future prosecution on 
independent evidence preserves the witness's accountability in the criminal justice system. 
190 Derivative use immunity is similar to the fruits of the poisonous tree doctrine in criminal procedure. 
If the original evidence (the tree) is illegally obtained, then all subsequent evidence derived from it (the 
fruits) is also inadmissible. Both immunity and the poisonous tree doctrine allow for evidence derived 
from an independent source. By contrast, in England, although illegally obtained evidence is usually 
inadmissible, this is not the absolute sanction of the American version, some kinds of illegal evidence 
may be admissible. 
191 Murphy develops an independent source doctrine. 
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immunity significantly narrower in scope than the traditional transactional immunity. The 
Crime Act creates a comprehensive uniform federal immunity standard based on a use and 
derivative use immunity. 192 The new standard guarantees that across all federal jurisdictions, 
no compelled testimony (either directly or indirectly derived) may be used against the witness 
in a criminal case. 193 The act also provides procedural safeguards to insure that immunity is 
not granted carelessly. 194 In Kastigar v United States,195 the court examined and upheld the 
constitutionality of the Organised Crime Act. In order to displace the silence privilege, an 
immunity statute must be co-extensive with the scope of the privilege.196 By contrast, 
England has no uniform immunity statute, in many English immunity statutes the grant of 
immunity is often not as co-extensive as the original silence privilege which it supplants. This 
is also true of South African immunity statutes. Unlike the flexible English approach, 
libertarian American constitutional law demands an immunity which is exactly co-extensive 
with the scope of the fifth amendment. According to Kastigar, transactional immunity is a 
protection unnecessarily broader than the privilege itself, 197 whereas derivative use immunity 
is an exact match anti therefore constitutionally sufficient.198 Kastigar also imposes a heavy 
burden on the state to prove direct independent sources of evidence in any subsequent 
prosecution.199 The burden amounts to an affirmative duty on the prosecution to prove a 
legitimate and wholly independent source of evidence outside of the immunized testimony.200 
The main problem with the Kastigar decision is that it offers insufficient guidelines on defining 
the boundary and scope of use immunity. The decision merely implies a broad and 
comprehensive scope201 in which no evidentiary use may be made of immunized testimony. 
192 Codified at 18 U.S.C. sec 6001-05 (1988). The constitutional validity of the immunity statute was 
judicially confirmed by Kastigar v United States 406 U.S 441 (1972). See Erickson "Pronouncements 
Of The United States Supreme Court Relating To Criminal Law'' (5) Nat. J. Grim. Def. (1979) 37-39. 
Mykkeltveldt "To Supplant The Fifth Amendment's Right Against Compulsory Self-Incrimination : The 
Supreme Court And Witness Immunity'' (30) Mercer. L. Rev (1979) 633-34. 
193 Sec 6002 (1988). The statute is broadly drafted, leaving much scope for judicial interpretation. It 
applies in all criminal proceedings including grand jury hearings : It is intended to be co-extensive with 
the fifth amendment. The scope and boundaries of immunity are therefore determined by the scope of 
the privilege itself. 
194 The decision to grant immunity is only made after a cost balance of interest analysis. The 
immunized evidence must be worth more to society than the reduced chance of the witness's 
conviction. 
195 406 u.s 441 (1972). 
196 Ibid at 453. 
197 Ibid at 453. 
198 Ibid at 455. 
199 Ibid at 460. the court does not give a definition of "heavy burden". It has been given a beyond 
reasonable doubt meaning and is not limited to a mere negation of the poisonous taint, but requires 
evidence to be sourced wholly independently. 
200 Ibid at 460. 
201 In several parts of the Kastigar judgement, there is an extravagant use of language which suggests 
a broad scope indistinguishable from transactional immunity. "This total prohibition on use provides a 
comprehensive safeguard" and "the prosecutorial authorities [are barred] from using the compelled 
testimony in any respect" (at 460, 461-62}. See Strachan "Self-Incrimination, Immunity And 
Watergate" (56} Texas L. Rev (1978) 807. 
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The court repeatedly emphasizes that an immunity grant excludes the use of the witness's 
testimony in all respects. The state and the witness must be in the same position before and 
after the testimony is immunized. Immunity simply mirrors the protection offered by the 
privilege. Kastigar is ambivalent about the non-evidentiary use of compelled testimony.202 
This uncertainty has created a degree of confusion amongst the lower courts. The Eighth 
Circuit expressly forbids all prosecutorial use of compelled testimony including non-
evidentiary use. 203 The First, Second and Eleventh Circuits suggest that some kinds of non-
evidentiary use of compelled testimony do not necessarily violate the fifth amendment.204 
When may the state make use of the witness's immunized testimony as evidence in a 
subsequent proceeding? The question arises in two circumstances : (i) may the state make 
use of the witness's immunized testimony to prove perjury, and (ii) may the immunized 
testimony be used as an inconsistent statement to impeach the witness's credibility. New 
Jersey v Portash,205 relying on Kastigar's broad definition of immunity,206 held that immunized 
testimony could not be introduced to impeach the witness's credibility even in the face of his 
inconsistent statements at a subsequent trial.207 The court reasoned that compelled 
testimony is similar to an involuntary statement. Because compelled testimony is involuntary 
(like a coerced confession) the state's act of compelling the immunized testimony effects the 
fifth amendment in its most pristine form.208 Consequently the court may not balance a 
violation of the witness's constitutional right against the competing interest of the state's need 
for truthful disclosures in judicial proceedings. 209 United States v Apfelbaum 210 is somewhat 
contrary to Portash. The prosecution may make direct evidentiary use of truthful compelled 
202 Although Kastigar rejects non-evidentiary use of immunized testimony (at 459), its language is 
ambivalent. It constantly refers only to the immunity of compelled evidence (at 443). To the state use 
of evidence gained independently (at 460). It compares immunity to a confession illegally coerced by 
the police (at 461 ). Cases after Kastigar are also silent on the state's non-evidentiary use of the 
witness's immunized testimony. 
203 United States v McDaniel 482 F .2d 305 (8th Cir) 1973. United States v Semkiw 712 F .2d 891, 895 
(3rd Cir) 1983. See Rosenblatt "lmmunised Testimony And Subsequent Tax Prosecutions : What's 
The Use Of Use Immunity" (69) Taxes (1991) 67, 72. 
204 United States v Byrd 765 F.2d 1524 (11th Cir) 1985. United States v Helmsley 941 F.2d 71 (2"d 
Cir) 1991. See Hoffman ibid note 169 at 450. Non-evidentiary use of immunized testimony includes 
the state's ability to re-plan its cross-examination strategy, a re-evaluation of which witnesses to call 
and a significant re-interpretation of the evidence. 
205 440 u.s 450 (1976). 
206 Ibid at 458. 
207 Ibid at 459-60. 
208 Ibid at 459. 
209 Ibid at 459. 
210 445 U.S 115 (1980). Portash may be distinguished from Apfelbaum on the facts. In Portash 
immunised testimony cannot be used against the defendant who perjures himself by offering 
inconsistent testimony at his later criminal trial. In Apfelbaum immunized testimony could be used to 
prove perjury against the defendant contemporaneously while giving testimony at the same trial. The 
inconsistency arises because Apfelbaum goes further and states that immunized testimony may be 
used against a defendant at a subsequent trial. 
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testimony to help prove that the witness perjured himself before the grand jury.211 Apfelbaum 
refused to follow either Kastigar's or Portash's wide interpretation of the immunity statute to 
mean "any criminal trial use against the defendant of his involuntary statement".212 Instead, 
Apfelbaum found that neither the Constitution nor the immunity statute (18 U.S.C sec 6002 
(1988)), requires that a witness compelled to testify be left in exactly the same position as if 
he had remained silent.213 Although the fifth amendment protects a witness against self-
incrimination,214 silence is only one means of achieving that goal. Kastigar and Portash are 
partially incorrect insofar as "they focus on the effect of the assertion of the privilege rather 
than on the protection the privilege is designed to confer".215 Immunity does not extend to a 
perjury prosecution because the witness does not possess a constitutional right or privilege 
to commit perjury. The witness is immunized only against the use of his truthful testimony. 
The grant of immunity and the exclusionary rule of coerced confessions : Kastigar 
suggests that in some ways the inability to use immunized testimony in trial may be 
compared to the pre-trial prohibition on the evidentiary use of a coerced confession.216 This 
kind of comparison recognizes that the fifth amendment provides a broad protection against 
the use of all compelled testimony in criminal trials.217 In essence, immunity means that no 
evidentiary use may be made by the state of the witness's compelled testimony, and its 
effect is to prohibit a subsequent criminal prosecution. The coerced confession rule has a 
similar evidentiary effect but a more limited application. It prevents the admission at trial of 
an involuntarily compelled confession, but it does not prohibit the prosecution from continuing 
with the trial. Both the immunity and the coerced confession rule serve to justify two 
fundamental aspects of the criminal process : (i) the deterrence of improper police and 
prosecutorial conduct, and (ii) the fifth amendment which prohibits compelling the individual 
to be a witness against himself. 
Voluntariness and involuntariness : Portash reasons that the legally compelled testimony 
which arises as a consequence of a grant of immunity may be likened to an involuntary 
statement (involuntary statements may not be put to any testimonial use). A state grant of 
immunity compels the witness's involuntary testimony, and like an involuntary coerced 
211 Ibid at 122-123. The immunity statute expressly excludes from its protection the use of compelled 
testimony in a prosecution against the witness for perjury (sec 6002). Such a prosecution is 
constitutional as long as the truthful part of the compelled testimony is used (at 121 ). 
212 Ibid at 120 n.6. The court dilutes the scope of the Kastigar definition. 
213 Ibid at 124-127 and 129-30. 
214 Ibid at 127. 
215 Ibid at 124, 126. 
216 See supra chapter 5 and the discussion on the Miranda safeguards. 
217 Kastigar ibid note 195 at 461-462. 
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confession, infringes the fifth amendment in its most pristine form. Consequently the court 
may not apply a balance of interest test and the prosecution is prohibited from impeaching 
the defendant with his prior compelled testimony. Portash cannot be meaningfully reconciled 
with earlier Supreme Court decisions such as Harris v New York,218 and Oregon v Hass,219 
which allow the evidentiary use of a coerced confession in certain limited circumstances. In 
terms of the Harris public safety exception, a confession taken in technical violation of the 
Miranda standard may be admitted to impeach trial testimony. A Harris type public safety 
exception is justified by balancing society's interest in preventing perjury against the Miranda 
interest in deterring unlawful police conduct. The Portash decision is incorrect in a number of 
fundamental respects. (i) It characterizes immunized testimony as untrustworthy, whereas 
logically speaking, untrustworthiness is simply not a characteristic of inculpatory immunized 
testimony,220 (ii) it refuses to apply a balance of interest analysis, after all if an immunized 
testimony rule is similar to a cerced confession rule, then a Harris type balancing test should 
equally apply to the immunized testimony rule, and (iii) there is a conceptual clash between 
Apfelbaum which allows the evidentiary use of immunized testimony against the witness in a 
perjury prosecution (the preferred position) and Portash which totally immunizes the witness 
even from a perjury charge (the incorrect position). 
Grants of informal immunity221 generally arise in two kinds of situations. First, where the 
state is involved in an ongoing investigation and uncovers the existence of a witness whose 
testimony would facilitate a successful conclusion to the investigation. Second, where an 
informant who has been involved in a completed crime decides to turn "state's evidence". 
The second situation differs from the first because the informant is giving the state 
information about a crime which the state would otherwise not know. 222 Informal immunity 
usually arises where the prosecution is trying to obtain much more than mere testimony. The 
218 401 U.S 222 (1971). See supra chapter 5 p.179 and p.189-191. 
219 402 U.S 717 (1975). See supra chapter 5 p.179. 
220 See Lushing "Testimonial Immunity And The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination : A Study In 
Isomorphism" (73) Grim. Land Criminology (1982) 1695. Portash holds that immunized testimony is 
the "essence of coerced testimony". But immunized testimony hardly seems coerced in the way it is 
defined in Harris. Harris speaks of coercion as the pressure to speak, to suffer a penalty, 
unlawfulness and overbearing behaviour. By contrast, an immunized witness may not like the idea of 
having to speak, but as he faces no instant reprisal or penalty, it is hardly coercive. When Harris 
speaks of a coerced confession, it is referring primarily to untrustworthiness but untrustworthiness is 
simply not a characteristic of immunized testimony. 
221 Informal immunity is made possible because the United States Attorney has a broad discretion in 
choosing whom to prosecute. On the other hand, formal immunity is made possible by a statute 
designed to supplant the fifth amendment (See Kastigar at 459-62). Informal immunity has been 
defined as "letter" or "hip-pockef' immunity, a product of prosecutorial discretion, and a contractual 
agreement not to prosecute. United States v Quartermain 613 F.2d 38 (3rd Cir) 1980. 
222 There is some confusion over the effectiveness of an informal immunity grant. These grants are 
often attached to agreements of non-prosecution or plea-bargains. The court will usually analyse the 
entire package without specifically concentrating on the value of the immunity. 
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prosecution is trying to obtain information and co-operation from the witness. Each immunity 
agreement could then be individually tailored to the particular witness needs. 
There are important procedural differences between an informal and a formal statutory grant 
of immunity. When the prosecutor confers informal immunity, no approval need be obtained 
from the Attorney-General, other state officials or from a supervising court.223 In effect 
informal immunity by-passes all the mandated procedures by which formal immunity is 
conferred on a witness. The great danger of informal immunity is that it cuts out the 
institutional safeguard mechanisms which protect both the witness and the state. The main 
advantage of informal immunity is its flexibility. It is dependent on the witness's willingness 
to testify and it may incorporate either elements of transactional or derivative use immunity. 
It applies to in-court, out of court testimony224 and to informal discussions with the state 
attorney's office. Informal immunity by its very nature is somewhat ambiguous. Sometimes 
it is unclear whether the prosecutor has the necessary power to grant immunity and whether 
it applies outside of the granting court's jurisdiction, across state lines and in federal 
jurisdictions. Informal immunity is likely to be negotiated by the witness without counsel and 
the language of the agreement struck may be vague. An unscrupulous prosecutor may 
promise more than he is practically prepared to concede. In the zeal to obtain a conviction 
the prosecutor may make certain promises and then ignore, withdraw or limit the initial 
promise. Nevertheless, informal immunity grants are quick fix solutions, which cut through 
beaurocratic red tape, are tailored to the immediate urgency of the circumstance and 
facilitate cost-effective convictions. Informal immunity should however be limited to minor 
crimes and not to serious offences. 
In theory, at least, it has been suggested that the accused should be entitled to demand 
immunization of defence witnesses who are likely to claim the fifth amendment when called 
by the defence to testify. The reasoning behind such a suggestion is that a defence grant of 
immunity would fairly counterbalance the prosecutorial power to grant immunity to state 
witnesses. The idea of a defence immunity has been rejected by most circuit courts,225 
although the Supreme Court is silent on the matter. The circuit courts agree that the power 
to confer immunity is a legislative power and a judicial ability to grant defence immunity 
223 A formal grant of immunity must follow the proper procedure. (i) The attorney seeking the grant 
must be satisfied that it is in the public interest (sec 6003). (ii) The approval of the Attorney-General 
must be obtained (sec 6003(b)). (iii) When a grant is ordered, the judge has no discretion to deny it. 
224 By contrast formal immunity is limited to grand jury, legislative and judicial proceedings (sec 6002}. 
225 United Sates v Turkish 623 F.2d 769, 772 (2"d Cir) 1980. United States v Praetorius 622 F.2d 
1 054 (2nd Cir) 1980). 
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would constitute an unacceptable infringement of the separation of powers principle.226 The 
argument in favour of a defence immunity is based on the notion of due process inherent in 
the fifth, sixth and fourteenth amendments. It suggests that a fair balance must be achieved 
between the powers granted to the state and the powers granted to the defence. 227 A 
defence immunity may offer a fair solution in two unique situations.228 First, where a refusal 
to grant a defence immunity results in a deliberate distortion of the judicial process.229 
Second, where a defence immunity is essential to an effective defence and will prevent the 
accused from being denied access to important evidence.230 Especially when the defence 
can demonstrate the relevant exculpatory nature of the testimony to be immunized. 
However, where the prosecution can rebut or show a substantial risk to the public interest, no 
order requesting defence immunization of witnesses may be granted. 
Two general philosophical concepts, the gratuity and the exchange theory, are advanced as 
justifications for the nature of immunity. The gratuity (or gift) theory is based on the idea that 
Congress, as the highest legislative body in the land, may enact immunity statutes in the 
national interest as an amnesty and for the purpose of facilitating truth-finding in the criminal 
process. The gratuity theorj31 permits immunity to be granted automatically, without an 
examination of the merits, as a gratuitous award to all those summoned/subpoenaed to give 
evidence, if it is in the state interest. Since Counce/man v Hitchcock,232 however, the 
exchange theory has been favoured. In terms of the exchange theory a statute should not 
automatically grant immunity. In order to obtain the testimony of a reluctant witness, the 
state has to make an exchange for the testimony which it would not otherwise have 
226 Earl v United States 361 F.2d 531, 534 (D.C. Cir) 1966. 
227 Some courts have raised the sixth amendment compulsory process clause as a justification for 
asserting a claim for defence witness immunity. United States v Herman 589 F.2d 1191 (3rd Cir) 1978, 
"due process may require court-ordered statutory immunity or judicially crafted immunity for defence 
witnesses. United States v LaDuca 447 F.Sup 779 (D.N.J.) 1979. Although United States v Turkish 
has rejected the sixth amendment justification (at 770-71 ). 
228 United States v Herman ibid at 1204, sets out two theoretical bases for granting an immunity to a 
defence witness. 
229 There is some support for the first situation in Government of the Virgin Islands v Smith 615 F .2d 
964, 968 (3rd Cir) 1980. 
230 The second situation finds no direct support in case law. 
231 Since self-incriminatory testimony cannot be compelled by the state, unless an immunity is 
granted, this kind of immunity may well be regarded as a "gratuity to crime", Heike v United States 227 
U.S 131, 142 (1913) and United States v Monia 317 U.S 424, 441, 424 (1943) Frankfurter J 
dissenting. 
232 The exchange theory is preferred because a valid immunity grant must be co-extensive with the 
privilege which it supplants. For example, in Pillsbury Co v Conboy 459 U.S 248 (1983}, the court 
attempts to define the scope of the immunity by examining the scope of the privilege on an isomorphic 
or one-to-one correspondence test. See Lushing ibid note 220 at 1694. 
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obtained.233 The state cannot give nothing for something. To facilitate the investigation or 
the trial process, immunity is exchanged for the witness's privilege against self-incrimination. 
It is argued that a grant of immunity favours the state more than it does the witness. But, in 
practice, an immunity grant often makes a subsequent prosecution extremely difficult. The 
heavy burden cast on the prosecution to show an independent source of evidence outside of 
the immunized testimony means that derivative use immunity is rarely awarded. For 
example, if the witness is under investigation for armed robbery, but his immunized testimony 
suggests an additional involvement in a drug offence, the state is precluded from launching a 
derivative prosecution on the drug offence. If the state subsequently wishes to charge the 
witness with a drug offence, it bears a heavy onus of showing that none of the evidence 
adduced is attributable to the immunized information. A burden which is extremely difficult to 
overcome in practice. However, where the prosecution does anticipate a future criminal 
action, it may select one of two alternative procedures. First, the state must meticulously 
identify and label all the evidence already in its possession. All evidence gathered prior to 
the immunity grant and all independent evidence received after the immunity grant must be 
carefully recorded and stored. This alternative is the preferred one when most of the 
evidence has already been collected prior to the immunity grant. The second alternative 
calls for the complete withdrawal of all the state attorneys concerned with the initial process 
of granting immunity to the witness. A subsequent prosecution is continued with an entirely 
new prosecution team. This alternative is disruptive, expensive and cannot be used on a 
regular basis. In theory, derivative use immunity (unlike transactional immunity) allows the 
state freedom to follow up future prosecutions, but in reality subsequent prosecutions are 
difficult and rare. In practice a grant of immunity tends to favour the witness and 
disadvantage the state. 
7.5 Foreign Prosecution 
In order to claim the privilege against self-incrimination, the witness must show a real or 
substantial danger of a future criminal prosecution. May the witness in a domestic forum 
refuse to give testimony on the ground that the testimony would subject him to the risk of 
foreign prosecution?234 The principal issue to be addressed is whether or not a danger of 
233 Since a witness may refuse to testify in terms of the fifth amendment, Congress in order to obtain 
the witness's testimony, must make an exchange (Frankfurter J in United States v Monia ibid at 432, 
433}. 
234 American courts are guided by English precedent in this respect. The result has been the 
formulation of a two part test : (i} a threshold inquiry into the reasonable risk of foreign prosecution, 
coupled with (ii} the question whether or not the fifth amendment privilege needs to be extended to 
265 
extra-territorial prosecution is sufficient to trigger the fifth amendment privilege within the 
domestic court. 235 While the privilege serves to protect the witness in the domestic forum, in 
practice it can have no effect within the foreign jurisdiction. Similarly, a grant of immunity 
within the domestic forum does not prevent a foreign sovereignty from using the immunized 
and compelled testimony to incriminate the witness. In the serninal decision Murphy v 
Waterfront Commission,236 per Goldberg J, it was held that the fifth amendment privilege had 
no internal jurisdictional limitation. The privilege protected both the state witness at the 
federal level and the federal witness at the state level. 237 The privilege could be triggered by 
the fear of a possible prosecution in another jurisdiction within the United States.238 While 
not directly addressing the issue of foreign prosecution, Murphy does refer with approval to 
the rule set out in the English case, United States v McRae.239 McRae involved a United 
States' government suit in an English court against the defendant for money deposited in 
English banks during the American Civil War. The defendant claimed that a law had been 
passed in the United States allowing for the confiscation of property belonging to ex-
Confederate representatives, like himself, and, if compelled to answer, he would be 
subjected to the confiscation proceedings in the United States.240 The English court upheld 
the privilege claim against fear of a foreign prosecution. The Murphy court also refers to a 
much earlier Chancery decision, King of Two Sicilies v Willcox which contradicts the McRae 
decision and notes the factual difference between the two cases. 241 In the King of Two 
Sicilies v Wi/cox,242 the right against self-incrimination was found to be part of British 
municipal law and could not be applied to protect a defendant when he feared prosecution in 
another country. At the same time the Murphy court cited with approval the substantial fear 
immunize against the risk. Extensive use has been made of King of Two Sici/ies v Willcox 61 Eng. 
Rep. 1126 (1851) "denying the privilege in the fact of foreign prosecution". United States v McRae 3 
Ch. App 79 (L.R. Ch. 1867) "awarding the privilege in the face of foreign prosecution" R v Boyes 121 
Eng. Rep. (K.B) 1861 "defining the meaning of a reasonable risk". See also Capra "The Fifth 
Amendment And The Risk Of Foreign Prosecution" Nw. York. L.J (1991) 3, Reimann "Fencing The 
Fifth Amendment In Our Own Backyard" (7} Pace. lnt'. L. Rev (1995) 177-193. 
235 See Bovino "A Systematic Approach To Privilege Against Self-Incrimination Claims When Foreign 
Prosecution Is Feared" (60) Un. Chi. L. Rev (1993) 903; Ciardiello "Note: Seeking Refuge In The Fifth 
Amendmenf' (15) Fordham Int. L. J (1992) 722. Fausett "Extending The Self-Incrimination Clause To 
Persons In Fear Of Foreign Prosecution" (20) Vanderbilt J. Transnat. L {1987) 699. Rotsztain "The 
Fifth Amendment Privilege Against Self-Incrimination And The Fear Of Foreign Prosecution" Co/. L. 
Rev (1996) 1940. 
236 378 u.s 52 (1964). 
237 Ibid at 78. 
238 Ibid at 60-63. 
239 3 Ch. App 79 (L.R. ch. 1867). Murphy refers to McRae as the real English rule at 63. 
240 Ibid at 83. 
241 McRae at 85. The King of Two Sicilies was distinguishable on the facts because the defendants 
had not shown a substantial risk of prosecution in Sicily. 
242 61 Eng. Rep. 116 (Ch 1851) at 128. See also East India v Campbe/127 Eng. Rep 1010 (Ex 1749) 
a privilege could be claimed in the face of a prosecution in British India. Brownswold V Edwards 28 
Eng. Rep. 157 (Ex 1750) privilege claimed in the face of a prosecution in another English court. 
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or risk of a future prosecution test as set out in R v Boyes.243 In Zicarelli v New Jersey State 
Commission,244 the Supreme Court was for the first time faced with the question of fifth 
amendment applicability within a foreign jurisdiction. The court found it unnecessary to 
decide the question because, on the facts, the danger of such a prosecution in the foreign 
jurisdiction was remote Instead, the court stated that the privilege protects against real 
dangers and not remote or speculative possibilities.245 The court concluded that as the 
defendant did not face a real danger of a foreign prosecution, it was unnecessary to decide 
the constitutionality and reach of the fifth amendment in this respect. 
As a result of Supreme Court ambivalence, the lower courts differ in their interpretation of the 
extra-territorial reach of the fifth amendment. Some lower courts have extended the fifth 
amendment by emphasizing the underlying policies of the privilege246 and relying on the 
precedent set by Murphy v Waterfront Commission. Other courts have refused to extend the 
privilege on the ground that it may erode the effectiveness of domestic law enforcement 
without really giving the witness a tangible protection within the foreign forum.247 Often the 
witness is unable to demonstrate how the foreign government might prosecute, obtain 
custody of, or gain access to their testimony in the domestic forum. Lower courts which 
refuse to extend the privilege rely on the immunity reasoning adopted by Kastigar v United 
States. 248 Kastigar explains derivative use immunity as a "rational accommodation between 
the imperatives of the privilege and the legitimate demand of a government to compel 
citizens to testify". Extending the ~rivilege to a fear of foreign prosecution, would in terms of 
the Kastigar reasoning, destabilize the rational accommodation between the witness's 
interest and the government's legitimate demand. lmmunising the witness against the mere 
fear of a foreign prosecution within the domestic forum would mean a loss of vital evidence, 
but would not simultaneously prevent a foreign sovereignty from using the compelled 
testimony against the witness. The resultant loss of relevant information within the domestic 
forum based on a factor outside of the domestic government's control would deal a heavy 
243 121 Eng. Rep. 730 (KB 1861). 
244 406 u.s 472 (1972). 
245 Ibid at 478. In United States v Flanagan 691 F.2d 116, 121 (2nd Cir) 1982 the test was 
strengthened by adding additional factors : (i) either an existing or potential foreign prosecution; (ii) 
the kind of foreign charge likely to be faced by the witness; (iii) will the compelled testimony trigger a 
prosecution; (iv) whether an extradition request is likely; (v) is the compelled testimony likely to come 
to the attention of the foreign government. The standard should be based on objective factors, not 
speculative belief. 
246 For example, Moses v Allard 779 F.Sup. 857, 882-883 (E.D. Mich.) 1991 In re Cardassi 351 F. 
Sup. 1081, 1086 (D. Conn) 1972. 
247 Phoenix Assurance Co. of Canada v Runck 317 N.W. 2d. 402, 413 (N.D.) 1982, United States v 
(Under Seal) Araneta 794 F.2d 920, 923-926 (4th Cir) 1986 United States v Gecas 120 F.3d 1419, 
1457 (11th Cir) 1997, United States v Lileikis 899 F. Supp 802, 809 (D. Mass) 1995. 
248 406 u.s 441 1 453 (1972). 
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blow to domestic law enforcement.249 In addition, a grant of immunity is only as co-extensive 
as the scope of the privilege within the domestic jurisdiction. Extending the scope of the 
privilege outside the domestic jurisdiction, without being able to similarly extend the scope of 
immunity would break down the spatial inter-relationship between privilege and immunity.250 
The privilege may only be extended to a foreign prosecution in the rare circumstance where 
the domestic government is using a foreign government as cover to institute a prosecution 
against its own nationals.251 
Adopting the Kastigar reasoning, the eleventh circuit in United States v Gecas 252 has held 
that the fifth amendment may not be invoked by a witness in a civil domestic court, even in 
the face of a substantive fear of foreign prosecution. On the facts, Gecas faced deportation 
to Lithuania as a Nazi war criminal and almost certain prosecution for war crimes. The court 
argued that the Constitution makes no mention of, nor places a restraint on a foreign 
government's treatment of U.S. citizens who have committed offences abroad.253 The fifth 
amendment privilege is therefore not a constitu!ional right enforceable against the whole 
world but only a limitation on the abuse of the domestic government's power.254 Foreign 
governments do not violate the fifth amendment when they prosecute a defendant based on 
compelled evidence produced in the United States.255 A legal proceeding only becomes a 
"criminal case" in the language of the constitution when there exists the possibility of a 
conviction in a jurisdiction subject to the fifth amendment.256 Basing its judgement on a 
review of the history of the fifth amendment the court also rejected the defendant's claim that 
the privilege was meant to protect individual privacy and dignity.257 Instead, the court 
concluded that the purpose of the privilege was to limit the investigative practices of an 
249 United States v (Under Seal) Araneta 794 F.2d 920 (4th Cir) 1986. 
250 Wigmore favours the co-extensive immunity argument. "[A] rule which recognizes incrimination 
under foreign law as a basis for the privilege, denies the forum sovereignty to grant immunity as broad 
as its privilege and therefore denies it the power by any means to compel such testimony'' para 2269 
McNaughton Ed (1961). 
251 Araneta Ibid at 923, "the privilege may be invoked if there is extensive American participation in the 
foreign prosecution". 
252 Gecas ibid note 247 at 1422. See Lindsay "Tied Up By A Gordian Knot : U.S v Gecas' Rejection 
Of The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination" (82) Minn. L. Rev (1998) 1297. Packer "U.S v Gecas" (6) 
Tulane J. Int. and Comp. L (1998) 651. Haygood "United States v Gecas" (21) N. Carolina J. Int. L. 
and Commercial Reg (1996) 467. 
253 Gecas ibid at 1430. 
254 Ibid at 1454, 1456. 
255 Ibid at 1430-1431. 
256 Ibid at 1463. See also Phoenix Assurance Co of Canada v Runk ibid note 247 at 411, "since the 
language of the fifth amendment is silent on the subject of non-U.S. criminal cases, the authors did not 
intend it to protect against fear of foreign prosecution". In contrast Moses v Allard ibid note 246 at 
874, "the language of the fifth amendment "any criminal case" supports extension of [the privilege] to 
fear of non-U.S. prosecution". 
257 Ibid at 1456. The authors viewed the privilege narrowly as a bulwark against arbitrary and intrusive 
criminal investigations. 
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overreaching government.258 The minority (per Birch J) strongly criticized the majority 
conclusion. Denying the privilege to a witness who has a reasonable fear of foreign 
prosecution defeats the policies underlying the privilege. 259 The dissent argued that Murphy 
v Waterfront Commission expressly identified two fundamental policies behind the privilege. 
The privilege is meant to ensure the integrity of the criminal justice system by placing the full 
burden upon the state and it also protects the accused's privacy and freedom.260 The dissent 
criticized the majority's assertion that the privilege only protects against the actual use of 
compelled testimony and not against potential or actual compulsion, arguing that a 
prohibition against use alone defeats the human rights reasoning underlying the fifth 
amendment.261 While recognizing that one of the primary rationales of the privilege is to 
protect against government abuse of process, the dissent argued that a human rights-
reasoning is consistent and complements the due process rationale.262 The majority 
therefore ignore one of the key elements of the privilege, namely its origin in natural law. 
The clash between the majority decision and the minority dissent is another illustration of the 
philosophical divide between a utilitarian and a libertarian based privilege. 
An alternative reason for not extending the privilege to a fear of foreign prosecution is drawn 
from an interpretation of the federal rules of criminal procedure. Federal rule 6(e) "the 
sealing rule" prohibits the disclosure of grand jury testimony. The secrecy of a grand jury 
sealing order would then provide a sufficient protection against the witness's fear of foreign 
prosecution as the foreign court could not gain access to the domestic forum's testimony. 
Since access to sealed testimony requires a court order, it is highly unlikely that a foreign 
sovereignty would succeed in acquiring the witness testimony. Extending the privilege is 
unnecessary as rule 6(e) provides an adequate immunity against the fear of a foreign 
prosecution. However, criticism of rule 6(e) suggests that the protective shield it offers may 
not be leak proof. In a practical sense there is always the possibility of an inadvertent 
leaking of confidential information by grand jurors. Once an unauthorized disclosure has 
been made there is no expost facto mechanism in rule 6(e) by which to restore secrecy. 
Also, the numerous statutory exceptions which allow disclosure of sealed testimony suggests 
that rule 6(e) is not really a strong enough shield against the fear of a foreign prosecution. 
Rule 6(e) might reduce the risk of foreign prosecution, just as it may reduce the danger of 
258 Ibid at 1456. The court suggests that individual dignity is indirectly secured by limiting the nature of 
the federal government's prosecutorial techniques. In any event, the domestic court cannot secure 
the dignity of the witness in a foreign court. 
259 Ibid at 1458-1459. 
260 Ibid at 1460-1461. 
261 Ibid at 1461. The majority argue that "the [privilege] protects against conviction based on self-
incrimination, it does not protect against the mere compulsion of testimony by a court'' (at 1429 n13). 
262 Ibid at 1472-73. 
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domestic prosecution, but because of the high potential for authorized and unauthorized 
disclosure, the rule is not an adequate substitute for the fifth amendment privilege. 
Moreover, it is limited to grand jury proceedings only. A more comprehensive substitute for a 
witness immunity against foreign prosecution is desirable. 
The question of whether the privilege should have extra-territorial application must turn on 
the purpose of the policies underlying the fifth amendment. Support for the extra-territorial 
application of the privilege has been sought in the protection which it offers to the individual. 
The privilege is said to be a shield against interference with the individual's human rights by 
both the domestic and the foreign sovereignty (a personality rationale).263 It also protects the 
individual by regulating the overreach of government (an instrumental rationale). However, 
the personality or human rights based rationale contains a number of fundamental flaws in 
the context of a foreign prosecution. In terms of a human rights privilege, the domestic court 
would be constitutionally obliged to extend the fifth amendment protection to the witness who 
can prove a substantial and reasonable risk of foreign prosecution. A privilege defined in 
terms of human rights would always place the individual interest above the government 
interest. The government's ability to enforce domestic law would then be dependent on an 
issue of foreign law outside of its control. Defining the privilege in human rights terminology 
also undermines the fifth amendment's purpose in maintaining a fair state individual balance. 
If the privilege is extended to a fear of foreign prosecution, no domestic court could possibly 
guarantee or grant to the witness an immunity against prosecution within the foreign 
jurisdiction. The government could not grant an immunity co-extensive with the extended 
privilege and the state-individual balance would be seriously impaired. Dressing the privilege 
up as a human right might protect the individual in the domestic forum but it does not give the 
witness a stronger or additional protection in a foreign court. A foreign court has no legal 
obligation to respect the domestic witness's claim to silence. The effect would be to give the 
witness an unfair advantage in the domestic court but no benefit in the foreign court. 
263 Libertarian commentators suggest that the fifth amendment is permeated by a natural rights and/or 
a social contract theory, Hunter "The Extraterritorial Application Of The Constitution - Unalienable 
Rights" (72) Va. L. Rev (1986) 649. In terms of the natural rights theory, the higher law of the 
constitution should apply to all government actions, regardless of the location in which they occur, 
Lobel "The Constitution Abroad" (83) Am. J. Int. L (1989) 871, 875. The natural rights theory supports 
the extension of the privilege to the risk of non-U.S. prosecution. The rights of the Constitution should 
apply in both domestic and foreign jurisdictions. In re Cardassi 351 F. Supp. 1080, 1086 (D. Conn) 
1972. In terms of the social contract theory, the Constitution is a contract which binds the government 
and the U.S. citizen. Accordingly, when a U.S. citizen is faced with a foreign prosecution, the 
Constitution should protect him by extending the privilege. Nicholas "Comment : U.S v Verdugo-
Urquidez'' (14) Fordham Int. L. J (1990) 267, 270. 
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Several practical procedural problems mitigate against extending the privilege to a foreign 
prosecution. The domestic court has no realistic test by which to assess the witness's claim. 
The "real and substantial danger'' test developed in the domestic forum has no suitable 
application in the international context. How is a domestic court to assess the risk of danger, 
if the court is unable to identify or even understand the applicable foreign laws. The 
domestic court is unlikely to develop a functional understanding of the foreign law, especially 
when the foreign law is complex and derives from principles alien to the Anglo-American 
accusatorial system. The domestic court is also unlikely to predict a foreign government's 
behaviour. Is the foreign government particularly interested in prosecuting the witness? Has 
it previously prosecuted individuals for the same crime? Attempting to predict a foreign 
government's behaviour by examining its past, present and future actions is likely to be 
highly suspect. Therefore the mistake of construing the privilege in terms of a human rights 
rationale, one which takes precedence over the government's interest, is likely to have a 
severe impact on domestic criminal enforcement procedures. It would permit a foreign 
sovereignty to infringe on the domestic law and disturb the proper state-individual balance 
without providing an additional protection for the witness. The human rights definition of a 
privilege against self-incrimination should be rejected. A narrow interpretation of the privilege 
as a proper restraint to overreach by the domestic government within its own jurisdiction is 
thus by far the preferred alternative. 
Immunity from extradition may possibly serve as a substitute for a refusal to extend the 
privilege to a fear of a foreign prosecution.264 Immunity from extradition would prevent the 
seizure of a witness and his delivery to a foreign country for trial. It does not however protect 
the witness against seizure of his foreign assets, nor would it protect against a trial and 
conviction in absentia, a common practice in many foreign jurisdictions. Extradition is usually 
an executive-political decision and it is unlikely that the courts would have the constitutional 
authority to prevent the government from responding to extradition requests.265 Immunity 
from extradition is not sufficiently protective. An appropriate and flexible solution to the 
question of foreign prosecutions is suggested by the balance of interest test. When the 
witness has demonstrated a real and substantial fear of foreign prosecution, his claim to the 
264 Most U.S. extradition treaties only allow extraditions if the crime is punishable under the laws of 
both signatories. It is argued that extending the privilege to foreign prosecutions would not cause the 
privilege to protect acts that do not constitute U.S. crimes. See Sukenik "Note : Testimonial 
Incrimination Under The Law Of A Foreign Country'' (11) N. Y.U.J. and Pol (1978) 369-70. 
265 Phoenix Assurance Co of Canada v Runck ibid note 247 at 414, "the extradition process is 
basically an executive function and we doubt if the judiciary could unilaterally command the executive 
not to honour a request for extradition". 
271 
privilege· would not be automatic. His claim to the privilege would be determined by a 
weighing of the individual right against the societal interest. If the interests of society or the 
government's need for information are found to outweigh the individual interest, then the 
witness's claim of privilege is defeated. If the legal issue is highly technical and the foreign 
law difficult to analyse, no privilege should lie. However, in the circumstance in which the 
foreign law is clear, predictable and the risk of prosecution substantial, there should be no 
reason for disallowing the privilege. In the balancing of the individual's fear of foreign 
prosecutions against the government's need for information, several other factors should 
also be considered. A balanced assessment should include : (i) the nature and type of the 
foreign proceeding, the role of the witness and the importance of his testimony; (ii) the 
severity of the punishment facing the witness in the foreign jurisdiction. 
The Supreme Court, in United States v Balsys,266 has finally resolved the question, by 
holding that a witness may not invoke the fifth amendment privilege with regard to a 
prosecution taking place outside of the United States.267 The court commences by 
recognizing the fifth amendment as a wide protection offering a guarantee with regard to 
grand jury proceedings, a defence against double jeopardy, a due process guarantee, and 
compensation for governmental taking.268 The court notes that none of these guarantees 
has ever been interpreted to bind a government other than the United States. It would now 
be inconsistent to take a broader view of the fifth amendment protection absent a legislative 
direction to do so. Because there is no legislative history and no common law principle to the 
contrary, it cannot remove the privilege from the "same-sovereign" context of the 
amendment's language. 269 The Constitution applies only to the government which created it 
and cannot be used to bind those sovereigns that do not fall under its command.270 The 
Balsys judgement is redolent with utilitarian meaning, reflecting a utilitarian philosophy rather 
than a libertarian human rights rationale. While the United States Supreme Court has finally 
resolved the question of the privilege and foreign prosecution, case precedent in other Anglo-
American jurisdictions, Australia, South Africa, New Zealand and Canada is still hesitant and 
266 118 S. Ct. 2218 (1998) cert granted 524 U.S 666 (1998). On the facts, similar to Gecas, accused 
of Nazi war crimes in Lithuania. The court recognized that the fifth amendment domestically applied to 
Balsys because its language applies to "persons" not citizens. Balsys being only a resident alien and 
not a naturalized citizen (at 2222). See also Belisle "Note : U.S v Balsys" (77) Un. Detroit. Mercy. L. 
Rev (2000) 341. Blackman "U.S v Balsys" (53) Oklahoma. L. Rev(2000) 127. Lloyd "Fifth Amendment 
Rights Of A Resident Alien After Balsys" (6) Tulsa. J. Camp. lt. L. (1999) 163. Regan "U.S v Balsys" 
(73) St. John's L. Rev (1999) 589. 
267 Ibid S. Ct. at 2222. The court also referred to the misinterpretation of the Murphy decision, holding 
that Murphy was intended to apply only to different jurisdictions under the same sovereign government 
(at 2227). 
268 Ibid S. Ct. at 2223. 
269 Ibid S. Ct. at 2223-24. 
270 Ibid S. Ct. at 2223-24. 
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ambiguous. England has settled the issue by statutory means. Sec 14 of the Civil Evidence 
Act (1968) limits the privilege against self-incrimination to domestic court proceedings. 
6.6 The Civil Litigation Process 
The privilege may be used in a wide range of civil matters. 271 It may be used whenever 
information sufficiently relevant to civil liability and discoverable by the other party provides a 
causal link which points towards evidence of criminal conduct. Most commonly the privilege 
is used in those civil actions where the conduct giving rise to the civil liability also constitutes 
an element of a crime. A party in a civil litigation may limit the extent of his depositions and 
pleadings in accordance with the privilege. The application for discovery, on paper or during 
an interrogatory, may be countered with a fifth amendment privilege plea. The privilege 
claim must be clearly expressed and the documents which fall within the privilege must be 
described with sufficient particularity in order to allow the party seeking discovery to 
reasonably evaluate the merits of the claimed privilege.272 The privilege may only be invoked 
where the information tends to incriminate, as long as it constitutes a link in a chain of 
circumstantial evidence proving criminal conduct. The privilege prohibits the court from 
requiring a revealing response. In practice, the claimant need only sketch a scenario of how 
a possible but still unknown response might provide direct or circumstantial evidence of 
criminal conduct or clues leading to evidence of criminal conduct. The court may refuse 
privilege "when it is perfectly clear, from a careful consideration of all the circumstances in 
the case, that the witness is mistaken and that the answer cannot possibly have such a 
tendency to incriminate. 273 The privilege cannot be invoked when the claimant has already 
been criminally prosecuted (double jeopardy), or the criminal danger is extinguished by 
prescription or a statute of limitations. A reasonable claim of privilege and a reasonable 
refusal to depose completely to the plaintiff's pleading will not cause the court to strike out 
the defendant's plea or result in judgement against him. However, the court will not permit 
the defendant to improperly misuse the privilege as a weapon for unfairly prejudicing the 
plaintiff. In such a circumstance the court may allow adverse inferences to be drawn from a 
271 Heidt "The Conjurer's Circle: The Fifth Amendment Privilege In Civil Cases" (91} Yale L. J (1982} 
1 062. Kaminsky "Preventing Unfair Use Of The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination In Private 
Litigation" (39} Brooklyn L. Rev (1972} 121. 
272 Discovery of privileged documents is now incorporated in the Federal rules on civil litigation; FED. 
R. CIV 26(a} (1}, 26(b}(1} and 26(e}. Also in the Federal rules of evidence; FED. R. EVID 501 (1993}. 
See also Cochrain "Evaluating Federal Rule Of Civil Procedure (26) As A Response To Silence And 
Functionally Silent Claims" (13} Rev. Litigation (1994} 219. Wehling v Columbia Broadcast Systems 
608 F.2d 1084 (51h Cir} 1979, "a party has no right to discover evidence protected by the privilege, 
regardless of whether it is asserted by a party or witness or serves to impair the litigant's ability to 
~rove or defend its case". 
73 Hoffman v United States 341 U.S 479,486 (1951}. 
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prejudicial claim of privilege and may strike the pleading entirely or enter judgement against 
the irregular defendant.274 On the other hand, the court will not permit the plaintiff seeking 
affirmative relief (or the defendant in reconvention) to hide behind the privilege as to matters 
which he himself has placed in issue. The defendant's strategy of invoking privilege has 
several advantages. By forcing the plaintiff to seek evidence from other sources, it increases 
the plaintiff's expenses and delays his progress. Such delay enables the defendant to buy 
time in which to decide whether or not to waive the privilege, to testify and submit to a 
deposition. The delay will allow the defendant to see what other evidence the plaintiff has 
gathered and to tailor his version accordingly. The delay will also put the plaintiff in a poor 
position to negotiate a favourable settlement or prepare for trial. 
In Baxter v Palmigiano,275 the court held that the fifth amendment does not forbid, "adverse 
inferences against parties to civil actions when they refuse to testify in response to probative 
evidence offered against them.276 This constitutional licence, known as the Baxter principle, 
has been applied widely.277 The reasoning behind the Baxter principle is due largely to a 
irrelevance of the privilege in civil proceedings. The privilege in civil proceedings does not 
engage the policy justifications which are said to underlie the privilege in a criminal 
proceeding. Government abuse of process and the compulsion of incriminating testimony 
has no application in a civil process between private litigants. The "foxhunter''278 policy of 
maintaining a proper state-individual balance in which the state must bear the entire burden 
of proof has no relevance in the civil context. The policy that applies with the most force in 
private cases is the "old woman's reasoning".279 A civil defendant may face the cruel 
trilemma of exposing himself to a possible criminal sanction, of perjury or of contempt. 
Accordingly, the cruel trilemma may apply with as much force in a civil as in a criminal case. 
It does not apply when the plaintiff is able to establish that the defendant does not face a 
practical danger of criminal prosecution. 
A civil proceeding does not place an innocent defendant in danger of a criminal conviction. 
The harm which the privilege guards against does not exist in a civil or other non-criminal 
proceeding. Where a civil party claims the privilege and declines to testify, the failure to 
274 Ikeda v Curtiss 43 Wash 2d 449, 261 P.2d 684 (1953), "the court may allow the plaintiff to call the 
defendant to the stand and compel him to repeat his refusal in front of the jury. This is done only 
exceptionally. See also FED. R. CIV 32. 
275 425 u.s 308 (1976). 
276 Ibid at 318. 
277 LiButti v United States 107 F.3d 110, 124 (2nd Cir) 1997, FDIC v Fid. and Deposit Co of Md 45 F.3d 
969, 977 (5th Cir) 1995, Koester v Am. Republic Investment Inc 11 F.3d 818, 823-24 (8th Cir) 1993. 
278 See supra chapter 3 p.102-103. 
279 See supra chapter 3 p.101-102. 
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come forward is a proper subject for comment and may provide the basis for an adverse 
inference.280 An adverse inference is not a reaction to the privilege itself, but to the 
defendant's silence about the civil accusation which he would normally be expected to 
refute.281 It would be unfair to allow the private civil defendant to plead the privilege on paper 
or at deposition without paying some price.282 Especially since the plaintiff's only source of 
evidence in civil proceedings is usually the defendant himself.283 However, under the Baxter 
principle, civil liability cannot rest solely on adverse inferences drawn from the defendant's 
fifth amendment silence. Adverse inferences do not constitute independent evidence. They 
can merely corroborate other evidence that already implicates the defendant.284 The Baxter 
principle also settles the converse issue, whether or not the defendant who waives the 
privilege in order to avoid a non-criminal sanction may later prevent the use of his response 
at a criminal trial. The defendant would argue that the non-criminal sanction and the drawing 
of adverse inferences in the civil proceedings are so severe as to compel a waiver of the 
privilege (in violation of his fifth amendment right). However, a long line of cases has held 
that no testimony given in a civil proceeding by a party who may have invoked the privilege, 
will be considered compelled, even though the invoking would have led to an adverse 
inference in the civil case.285 It should also be noted that a grant of immunity is valid only in 
the criminal and not in the civil context.286 The immunized witness who voluntarily repeats 
his testimony in a civil proceeding cannot use prior criminal immunization to protect the civil 
revelation. Regardless of the conditions surrounding the original testimony, a witness who is 
asked to repeat a statement must either invoke the fifth amendment privilege or waive it. 
Once a witness has voluntarily waived the privilege by repeating the testimony in a civil 
proceeding, the state may use that testimony in a subsequent criminal proceeding without 
280 The Baxter principle does not apply in those states which have adopted uniform rule of evidence 
512 (the claim or assertion of a privilege is not a proper subject of comment by judge or counsel. No 
inference may be drawn therefrom). See Bartel "Drawing Negative Inferences Upon A Claim Of 
Attorney-Client Privilege" (60) Brooklyn L. Rev (1995) 1355. Mansfield "Evidential Use Of Litigation 
Activity Of The Parties" ( 43) Syracuse L. Rev ( 1992) 695. 
281 Ratner "Consequences Of Exercising The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination" (24) Un. Ch. L. Rev 
(1957) 472. 
282 Molloy v Molloy46 Wis. 2d 683, 176 N.W. 2d 292 (1972) "[we] do not believe it is unjust to draw a 
prejudicial inference against one asserting the fifth amendment in a civil action, whether as a shield or 
as a sword. In a civil action the defendant usually does not invoke the privilege unless he has 
something to hide". 
283 According to Wigmore, "the inference seems to be allowed with the least reluctance in cases 
where the party claiming the privilege has an affirmative burden, where he has exclusive access to 
information". Sec 2272 McNaughton 1961. 
284 S.E.C. v Colello 139 F.3d 674, 678 (9th Cir) 1998. Lasalle Bank Lake View v Seguban 54 F.3d, 
387, 390 (ih Cir) 1995. 
285 See McGautha v California 402 U.S 183, 213 (1971) per Harlan J, "it is not contended, nor could it 
be successfully, that a mere force of evidence is compulsion of the sort forbidden by the privilege". 
Lefkowitz v Cunningham 431 U.S 801, 808 n5 (1977) "similar reasoning". 
286 Swartz "Recent Developments: Disclosure And Civil Use Of lmmunised Testimony" (35) Vanderbilt 
L. Rev (1982) 1211. 
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fear of taint. 287 An immunized witness seeking to preserve his fifth amendment protection is 
well advised to refuse to repeat the contents of his immunized testimony. A civil plaintiff has 
no power to confer a second grant of immunity upon the witness. The presiding civil court 
cannot initiate an immunity grant since the immunity statute (sec 6003) expressly reserves 
the right for the federal prosecutor. Therefore, the witness or the defendant may evoke his 
right and refuse to be deposed or to testify. Commenting upon the effect of a witness's 
invocation of the privilege in the civil discovery process, Stapelton J in In re Corrugated 
Container Antitrust litigation 288 declared, "I find the whole defence tactic of trying to hide in a 
civil case behind a non-existent threat of criminal prosecution, to be one of the most 
nauseous developments in .... complex litigation cases . . . And I don't find any derogation of 
the fifth amendment in saying that the fifth amendment wasn't devised to permit people .to 
hide information in civil lawsuits". 
6.7 Formal Restrictions On The Witness Privilege 
The scope of the fifth amendment has waxed and waned according to prevailing societal 
interests. Traditionally the fifth amendment has always been interpreted broadly and flexibly. 
Unfortunately, case precedent is inconsistent and fifth amendment jurisprudence cannot be 
reduced to any single purpose or policy. In the twentieth century the Supreme Court has 
remade the witness privilege into a wide but ephemeral concept which eludes a clear 
summation. Although limited only to criminal matters, the privilege against self-incrimination 
may be invoked by a witness against a government induced compulsion in any legal, 
investigatory or adjudicatory proceeding. In the words of Councelman·v Hitchock,289 the fifth 
amendment privilege is "as broad as the mischief against which it seeks to guard". The 
witness may invoke the fifth amendment in all kinds of interrogatories before a court, grand 
jury, coroners inquest, administrative agency or legislative body. In the early part of the 
twentieth century the fifth amendment (the Federal Bill of Rights) applied only to federal 
proceedings but was subsequently extended internally to all state proceedings through the 
mechanism of the fourteenth amendment due process clause (Malloy v Hogan).290 The high 
water mark of the witness fifth amendment protection is the judgement in Boyd v United 
287 United States v Kuehn 562 F.2d 427, 430 (ih Cir) 1977, holds that the immunized witness who 
voluntarily repeats his testimony cannot use prior immunization to protect the subsequent civil 
revelation. 
288 1981-2 Trade Cas (C.C.H) 64, 339 {51h Cir) 1981 at 74, 300. 
289 142 u.s 547, 562 {1892). 
290 378 u.s 1 (1964). 
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States,291 which affords an absolute protection to the individual's private papers. The Boyd 
decision, basing its judgement on both the fourth and fifth amendments, establishes a solid 
sphere of privacy around the individual. Boyd's privacy interest privilege is founded on the 
idea that a witness's oral and written thoughts are an extension of the innermost personality 
core of the individual and creates a sanctum which the state cannot infringe. 
Although Boyd has been cited as one of the greatest constitutional decisions of the Supreme 
Court,292 Hale v Henkel 293 begins a deliberate policy of limiting the scope and nature of the 
Boyd protection. Hale distinguishes between the natural and juristic corporate nature of 
private papers. Corporate and other organizational documents cannot be defined as private 
papers and fall outside the protective sphere of the fifth amendment. Furthermore, a 
corporate officer is not protected by the fifth amendment against the compulsory production 
of corporate papers even if the documents are personally incriminating (Wilson v United 
States).294 The corporate entity doctrine developed in United States v White, 295 Wilson v 
United States and Bellis v United States,296 denies the fifth amendment not only to 
corporations, but also to other juristic entities including non-profit organizations, charities, 
churches, political parties, social clubs, etc. The next significant erosion of the scope of the 
fifth amendment begins with the required records doctrine first mooted in Shapiro v United 
States.297 The privilege is denied to the witness's private papers where such papers are 
required in terms of governmental regulatory statutes. The aim of these regulatory statutes is 
to provide the government with essential information necessary for the running of a modern 
and efficient state. The state interest in compelling such records, takes precedent over the 
individual's constitutional right. 
Couch v United States,298 and Andresen v Maryland,299 illustrate the personal nature of the 
privilege. A witness must personally claim the privilege and cannot do so on behalf of an 
agent or a third party. Private papers may well be stripped of their fifth amendment 
protection when not in the actual possession of the witness/owner. The fifth amendment 
remains a protection only against a state compulsion of oral testimonial communications and 
291 116U.S616(1886). 
292 In Schmerber v California 384 U.S 757, 776 (1966). 
293 201 U.S 43, 69-70 (1906). 
294 221 u.s 361' 384 (1911 ). 
295 322 u.s 694 (1944). 
296 417 U.S 85 (1974). 
297 335 u.s 1 (1948). 
298 409 U.S 322 (1973). 
299 427 u.s 463 (1976). 
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personal written papers. In Holt v United States300 and Schmerber v California,301 the 
Supreme Court reinforces the idea of a mind-body duality and the functional distinction 
between non-testimonial passive forms of physical evidence (to which the privilege does not 
attach) and testimonial communicative evidence (to which the privilege does attach). In 
California v Byers,302 the Supreme Court for the first time expressly applies a balance of 
interest test measuring the public-state interest against the private-individual constitutional 
protection. In theory the Supreme Court pays lip service to the idea of an absolute fifth 
amendment right, while in practice it tacitly applies a balance of interest test. An 
authoritarian and absolute right to silence is rigidly described in New Jersey v Portash,303 but 
Byers begins the process of hedging and ameliorating the absolute nature of the fifth 
amendment. At present, the position is as follows; A regulatory statute (in the public 
interest) which demands the compulsion of incriminatory information from a witness does not 
violate the fifth amendment where the statute is a civil regulatory scheme designed to 
promote a civil process and not to facilitate a criminal conviction. A compulsory regulatory 
system directed only at enhancing the state's criminal investigatory powers is a direct 
infringement of the fifth amendment (Albertson v Subversive Activities Control Board). 304 
The decision in United States v Fisher05 is a radical reappraisal of fifth amendment 
methodology and the witness privilege. In respect to written self-incriminatory documents it 
is a shift from a privacy standard (and thus a tacit but not express rejection of the Boyd 
doctrine) to a compelled act of production standard. The Fisher doctrine is a contents-
neutral principle which ignores the conventional distinction between private and public 
papers. The "act of production" doctrine concentrates on the testimonial or communicative 
nature of the state compelled act, usually a subpoena, which seeks to induce private 
documents from the individual. Both Fisher and Doe v United States 306 set out a modern 
testimonial standard which limits the scope of the fifth amendment. A compelled "state of 
production" is sufficiently testimonial to trigger the fifth amendment when the witness is 
compelled to concede the existence, possession or authenticity of documents thereby 
relaying information to the state which it could not have obtained independently through its 
own resources. In turn, Braswell v United States 307 holds that an individual acting in the 
capacity of a custodian of corporate documents cannot invoke the privilege and refuse the 
300 218 u.s 245,252 (1910). 
301 384 u.s 767 (1966). 
302 402 u.s 424 (1971). 
303 440 u.s 450, 459 (1979). 
304 382 U.S 70 (1965) and Marchetti v United States 390 U.S 39 (1968). 
305 425 u.s 391 (1976). 
306 465 u.s 605 (1983). 
307 487 u.s 96 (1988). 
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production of the documents even if his "act of production" is personally incriminating. The 
act of production doctrine does not only apply to documents, but it may also apply to the 
production of certain human beings. In Baltimore City Department Of Social Services v 
Bouknight,308 the Supreme Court in a rather artificial judgement, extends the required records 
and the act of production doctrines to the production of a minor child by the custodial parent. 
The regulatory power of the state over officially appointed custodians of children in need of 
care renders the compelled act of producing such children no more privileged than the 
production of public records or documents. Where the witness/custodian assumes control 
over items/children within the legislative scope of the state's non-criminal regulatory powers, 
the ability of the witness/custodian to invoke the privilege is greatly diminished. 
Traditionally different kinds of informal common law and formal statutory immunities have 
developed as a constitutional substitute in the circumstance where the witness privilege is 
forcibly taken away. Early immunity grants in Brown v Walker, 309 reaffirmed some sixty years 
later in Ullmann v United States,310 were always interpreted in the broad expansive terms of 
a transactional immunity. The first indication that a transactional immunity was wastefully 
expansive and broader than the fifth amendment itself, because the privilege protects only 
against compelled testimony while transactional immunity prohibits prosecution altogether, 
comes in Murphy v Waterfront Commission.311 In Kastigar v United States,312 the Supreme 
Court abandons a broad based transactional immunity in favour of a narrowly defined use 
and derivative immunity. Transactional immunity previously considered the bare minimum, is 
now replaced by an immunity whose scope must be co-extensive with the scope of the fifth 
amendment. The ambit of the fifth amendment or its substitute derivative immunity is limited 
to the domestic jurisdiction. A grant of immunity protects the witness from domestic 
prosecution only. No domestic court has the legal power to bar prosecution of the witness in 
a foreign forum. Consequently, the fifth amendment in the domestic forum cannot be 
invoked even when there is a reasonable risk of a foreign criminal prosecution (United States 
v Balsys).313 
When analysed together these formal restrictions on the scope of the fifth amendment reflect 
the Supreme Court's concern with practical reality. The Supreme Court pays mere lip 
service to the ideal of the fifth amendment as a fundamental right entrenched within a 
308 493 u.s 96 (1988). 
309 161 u.s 591 (1896). 
310 350 u.s 422 (1955). 
311 378 U.S 52 (1963). 
312 406 u.s 441 (1972). 
313 524 u.s 666 (1998). 
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supreme constitution. Most of its decisions reflect a pragmatic understanding of the real 
nature of the witness privilege against self-incrimination. Far from being a fundamental right, 
the fifth amendment witness privilege may be bypassed or curtailed whenever the public or 
government interest demands such a limitation. Although never directly approving of a 
balance of interest analysis (except significantly in Byers), the Supreme Court has 
nevertheless applied a tacit balance of interests rationale in most of its seminal decisions 
concerning the fifth amendment. But, because of its tacit nature, the balancing is done on an 
ad hoc basis which varies from case to case. In the many instances in which the fifth 
amendment privilege has been limited, the state interest has always been rampantly 
dominant over the witness's constitutional right. The Supreme Court's pragmatism begs the 
question. Is the fifth amendment a fundamental right, or is it merely a convenient device 
shrouded in the most bombastic rhetoric, to be shrugged aside whenever practical 
convenience demands it?. Why is the fifth amendment sometimes construed as an absolute 
right and at other times as a relative right?. Why is the Supreme Court unable to develop a 
consistent, uniform umbrella of policies which justify the jurisprudential meaning of the fifth 
amendment? Could it be because there is no rational, logical or moral reason for the 
existence of a privilege against self-incrimination, especially a privilege which has been 
elevated to the status of an absolute constitutional right. The words of two respected 
commentators bear repeating,314 "the self-incriminatory clause of the fifth amendment is an 
unsolved riddle of vast proportions, a Gordian knot in the middle of our Bill of Rights. From 
the beginning it lacked an easily identifiable rationale. Today things are no better, the clause 
continues to confound and confuse." 




THE ENGLISH TRADITION 
8.1 The Unwritten Constitution 
Unlike the United States where silence is constitutionally entrenched, English jurisprudence 
has no single foundation for the silence principle and depends on common law, judicial 
precedent and statute for its various definitions. These sources, often contradictory, make 
up a bundle of rules and guidelines which English jurisprudence categorises as the "right" to 
silence including its corollary the "privilege" against self-incrimination. Lord Mustill in Smith v 
Director of the Serious Fraud Squad,1 gives the following seminal explanation, "[the right to 
silence] raises strong but unfocused feelings. In truth it does not denote any single right but 
rather refers to a disparate group of immunities which differ in nature, origin, incidence and 
importance". In American jurisprudence the silence principle is an absolute constitutional 
entrenchment. Quite a different legal environment prevails in England which is presently 
engaged in a fundamental reappraisal of the silence ·principle? Fundamental reform is 
possible because the English silence principle is ambiguous, its meaning and scope is 
uncertain and it has always been subject to inherent limitation which would be unacceptable 
to American jurisprudence. English silence is sometimes defined as a fundamental right 
rooted in tradition and at other times as a mere procedural or evidentiary device susceptible 
to substantial erosion.3 The ambiguity surrounding the English silence principle is due to a 
number of unique institutional influences. First, the silence principle is a relatively modern 
manifestation. The modern definition and scope of the silence principle has little or no 
connection to the definition and purpose of its historical ancestor. It does not possess, as 
Lord Devlin would put it, "the hoary antiquity and unbreakable crust of tradition which 
bedevils the British criminal justice system". Despite attempts by human rights proponents of 
the silence principle to disguise it as a fundamental tenet of medieval and renaissance 
1 (1992) 3 ALL E.R 456, at 463-64. 
2 See Zander ''You Have No Right To Remain Silent : Abolition Of The Privilege Against Self-
Incrimination In England" (40) Saint-Louis Un. L. J. (1996), 659; Dennis "Instrumental Protection, 
Human Right Or Functional Necessity? Reassessing The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination" (54) 
Cambridge L.J (1995) 342; Berger "Of Policy, Politics, And Parliament: The Legislative Rewriting Of 
The British Right To Silence" (22) Am. J. Grim. Law (1995) 391. Dixon "Common Sense, Legal Advice 
And The Right Of Silence" Public Law (1991) 233. Williams "The Right Of Silence And The Mental 
Elemenr Grim. L. Rev (1988) 97. 
3 See also May Criminal Evidence Sweet and Maxwell {1999), Uglow Evidence Sweet and Maxwell 
London (1997); Easton The Case For The Right To Silence Aldershot Avesbury 2nd ed {1996); 
Tapper Cross and Tapper On Evidence Butterworth 8th ed {1995); Morgan and Stephenson 
Introduction, The Right To Silence In Crimina/Investigations, Suspicion And Silence Blackstone Press 
(1994); Zuckerman The Principles Of Criminal Evidence Clarendon Press (1989). 
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common law, it has but shallow attachments to the common law. It gained its modern format 
with the passing of the Criminal Evidence Act of 1898. Before 1898 the accused was neither 
a competent nor a compellable witness in his own defence. Second, the British legal 
establishment has always been heavily influenced by a utilitarian philosophy. English reform 
of criminal evidentiary law has always been predicated on the essential Benthamite 
requirement that rectitude in the judicial trial may only be achieved through a flexible system 
of guidelines and rules which do not inhibit the search for legal truth. Rectitude or accuracy 
of outcome should only be diminished in exceptional circumstances and a process of reform 
should be hesitant in protecting values such as the silence principle which fall outside the 
parameters of relevant proof. 4 The silence principle has always been regarded with 
suspicion ever since Bentham's famous attack on it as a misguided concession to the guilty, 
"If all criminals of every class had assembled and framed a system after their own wishes, is 
not this rule the very first they would have established for their security? Innocence never 
takes advantage of it. Innocence claims the right of speaking as guilt invokes the privilege of 
silence".5 In the words of the prominent jurist Glanville Williams, "the so-called right of 
silence . . . is contrary to common sense. It runs counter to our realization of how we 
ourselves would behave if we were faced with a criminal charge".6 Prevailing opinion within 
the English legal fraternity holds that the silence principle should be negotiable because it is 
only one amongst a number of other possible and more effective protective devices. Many of 
these other protective devices do not carry the heavy costs associated with the silence 
principle. The cost in losing reliable evidence of guilf and the difficulty of proving 
commercial fraud may legitimately permit the removal of the silence principle. The passage 
of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994, despite fierce criticism, is a manifest 
symbol of the prevailing Benthamite atmosphere and the heavy emphasis placed on crime 
control techniques within the English legal environment. 
4 Twining Bentham And Wigmore: Theories Of Evidence London (1985). See also supra chapter 3 
p.96-102. 
This passage is commonly attributable to Bentham, but may also be from an English translation of 
Dumont's Traite Des Preuves Judiciaires Paris (1823). 
6 Williams "The Tactics Of Silence" (137) N.L.J. (1987) 1107. 
7 See A. T and T.lstel v Tully (1993) A.C 45 at 53 (per Lord Templeman), and sec 2(8) of the Criminal 
Justice Act 1987. 
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Third, until fairly recently, the English judge has had to work within the loosely defined and 
sometimes contrary common law when interpreting basic civil rights. The English judge does 
not, unlike his American cousin, have the luxury of a written constitution. For this reason the 
English process has always been to give immediate relief to specific individual grievances on 
an ad hoc basis, whereas the American judge has had the benefit of building a broad and 
consistent framework of consensus around formally entrenched rights. In the past there has 
never been a comprehensive English constitutional code on which the courts could rely in 
order to protect basic individual civil liberties. The civil rights of the English citizen has 
traditionally been derived from the historical and almost deified concept of an unwritten 
constitution. In such an unwritten constitution the rights of the citizen are residual and there 
are no guarantees or absolutes. What civil safeguards exist are to be found in the 
mechanism of a Westminister type system of government in which parliament, as the 
representative of the people, is a supreme governor and protector of civil liberties, and to 
which the common law definition of civil rights is subordinate. English constitutional law 
embodies a number of disparate statutes, born during periods of social upheaval but without 
any consistency of purpose. The history and development of English constitutional law is the 
infrequent production of unconnected statutes such as Magna Carta (1215), the Petition of 
Rights (1629), the Bill of Rights (1689 and promptly forgotten), the Act of Settlement (1701) 
and the European Communities Act of 1972. English law gives the impression that the 
unwritten constitution of the common law only peripherally protects basic human rights.8 It is 
within this context that the criticism and limitation of the silence principle must be viewed. 
Fourth, the introduction in August 2000 of a British Human Rights Act (1998) which 
incorporates the European Convention on Human Rights into domestic English law, will have 
a substantial impact on the rules of evidence and criminal procedure. The utilitarian 
substructure of current statutory enactments is likely to be eroded. A universally popular 
Human Rights philosophy will gradually supercede the present utilitarian doctrine. The three 
main justifications usually advanced in support of the silence principle, the presumption of 
innocence and the burden of proof, the right to privacy and the right to a fair trial are now 
domestically incorporated fundamental human rights and are likely to influence future 
attempts to limit silence. The Convention on Human Rights does not define the silence 
principle in absolute terms, but it does regard it as one that lies at the heart of a fair trial. 
Due caution will now have to be exercised by English courts in limiting the accused's right to 
silence and in the drawing of unnecessary adverse inferences. Once the silence principle is 
elevated above its present utilitarian and instrumental function, it gains an immense legal 
8 Despite the unwritten nature of English constitutional law, some foreign cases do sometimes refer to 
the English experience. Miranda v Arizona, per Warren C J refers to John Lilbume and his struggle 
for civil liberty. 
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force. It begins to influence a wide range of other criminal procedural rules and there are 
very few circumstances in which it can be overridden by legislation or judicial decision. 
In the common law tradition the silence principle has benefited the suspect by providing him 
with the ability to withstand coercive interrogation at the pre-trial. stage and it has protected 
the accused against the rigours of prosecutorial comment and cross-examination at trial. 
The English common law identifies six immunities which protect the defendant within the 
criminal justice system. These immunities are9 : 
a) A general immunity, possessed by both natural and juristic persons, from being 
compelled on pain of punishment to answer questions posed by other persons or 
bodies. 
b) A general immunity, possessed by all persons and bodies, from being compelled 
on pain of punishment to answer questions, the answers to which may incriminate 
them. 
c) A specific immunity, possessed by all persons under suspicion of criminal 
responsibility whilst being interviewed by police officers or others in similar 
positions of authority, from being compelled on pain of punishment to answer 
questions of any kind. 
d) A specific immunity, possessed by criminal defendants undergoing trial, from 
being compelled to give evidence, and from being compelled to answer questions 
put to them in the dock. 
e) A specific immunity, possessed by persons who are charged with a criminal 
offence, from having questions material to the offence addressed to them by 
police officers or persons in a similar position of authority. 
f) A specific immunity, possessed by criminal defendants undergoing trial from 
having adverse inferences made on any failure (i) to answer questions before 
trial, or (ii) to give evidence at trial. 
The modern common law silence principle is a substantially reworked combination of the 
specific immunity against answering questions during the investigatory interview (immunity 
(c)) and the specific immunity against giving evidence, testifying or answering questions at 
trial (immunity (d)). Interlinked to these two specific immunities is the immunity against the 
drawing of adverse inferences (immunity (f)). The silence principle as embodied by immunity 
9 Smith v Director Of The Serious Fraud Squad, ibid note 1. 
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(c) and immunity (d) may be historically justified10 and has been traditionally underpinned by 
the need to protect the individual from "oppressive state inspired methods of obtaining 
evidence"11 and to protect the truth-finding process from "the unreliability of a coerced 
confession".12 Immunity (f) is a recent twentieth century development13 which has no 
underpinning historical rationale to justify it. In order to justify an immunity from adverse 
inferences, the silence principle has had to be elevated from a mere protective procedural 
and evidentiary rule into a broad procedural right. At the beginning of the twentieth century 
the silence principle consisted of a bare procedural rule against the answering of questions 
and the giving of evidence. Adverse inferences could logically and were properly drawn from 
this procedural rule. 14 However, once the silence principle is elevated to the rank of a 
constitutional right, it becomes morally improper to draw adverse inferences. To draw an 
adverse inference would infringe and diminish the value of a human right. The modem 
common law silence principle consists of a right to silence of which the prohibition against 
the drawing of an adverse inference is an incidental but essential component. 15 The present 
debate in English jurisprudence centers around the question of whether or not to abolish or 
to limit the state prosecutorial ability to draw adverse inferences from the 
suspect's/accused's invocation of silence. 
Once silence has been invoked by the suspect or the accused, it has the following 
evidentiary consequences.16 First, silence may constitute an implied admission. In R v 
Christie, 17 a denial of an allegation made to the face of the accused in certain circumstances 
is capable of being interpreted as an implied acceptance of the allegation. Adverse 
inferences may also be drawn where the suspect exhibits a guilty reaction either as an act of 
violence or an act of flight. In theory he remains silent but his action may constitute a silent 
confession. Second, silence in the face of a direct accusation may be treated as direct 
evidence of guilt predicated on the common sense notion that an innocent person would 
10 Supra chapter 2. 
11 This rationale no longer justifies immunity (d) as the courts will never condone the use of 
oppressively obtained evidence. Nevertheless, the immunity and rationale is preserved in Sec 1 of the 
Criminal Evidence Act, 1898. 
12 Pyneboard (pty) Ltd v Trade Practices Commission (1983} 152 CLR 328, 335 and Environmental 
Protection Authority v Ca/tex Refinery Co (Pty) Ltd (1973} 178 CLR, 427, 508 and 544. lstel Ltd v 
Tully at 45, per Templeman at 53, ibid note 7. 
13 See supra chapter 2. 
14 It is illogical to waive an immunity from compulsion but it is sensible to speak of waiving a right to 
silence. 
15 Hall v R (the Queen} (1971} 1 WLR 298 at 301. 
16 Heydon "Silence As Evidence" ( 1} Monash L. Rev ( 197 4} 53, 55. 
17 (1914}, A.C. 545, subject to the limitation that post-caution silence can never amount to an implied 
admission. See also Hall v R (1971} 1 WLR 298, but see the contradiction in R v Chandler (1976} 1 
WLR 585. The common law position appears to have been adopted unaltered by the Criminal Justice 
and Public Order Act 1994. See also R v Norton (1910} 2 KB 496 .. 
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speak up and rebut the accusation. His failure to do so adversely infers a consciousness of 
guilt. This consequence is distinct from an implied admission because it does not amount to 
an agreement but rather to an unintended display of consciousness of the correctness of the 
case against him.18 This consequence is also sometimes referred to as the extended force 
theory. Third, silence may be used to evaluate other extraneous evidence. Silence may be 
taken into account to determine whether to accept extraneous evidence or to draw 
appropriate inferences from an already established prima facie case. This consequence is 
also sometimes referred to as the limited force theory. In some circumstances the 
accused's silence or failure to mention a relevant fact (particularly an alibi-defence} during 
the initial police interview and the unexpected subsequent introduction of such a fact during 
trial may be taken as an adverse inference on the accused's credibility. These are all the 
common sense consequences and inferences which may but not necessarily must be drawn 
from silence. Furthermore, none of these consequences or inferences may be drawn unless 
a denial, explanation or answer is reasonably to be expected in a particular circumstance. 
Regard must be had to the nature of the question or accusation and the reasons for the 
absence of a denial or explanation. 
An analysis of English case precedent will reveal : (i} none of the adverse inference 
consequences (1), (2) and (3)} may be drawn from pre-trial silence, except in the even term 
circumstance; (ii} an adverse inference from consequence (1) or (2) may not be drawn from 
silence at trial. But consequence (3) is proper and readily admissible at trial. 
The evidentiary consequences of an invocation of silence are generally dependent upon a 
number of factors. Primarily, no adverse inference may be drawn once the suspect has been 
cautioned and his silence is conditioned by that caution. Most important is the strength of the 
state case against the accused. The stronger the case the more readily an adverse 
inference may be drawn from the accused's silence. The desirability of drawing an adverse 
inference from an implied admission (consequence (1)} or an inference of guilt (consequence 
(2)} is allowed in civil law but only exceptionally in criminal law and only when the accuser 
and the accused are on even terms. 19 A guilty inference (consequence (2)} is also 
conditional on the extent to which the facts (which call for a denial, explanation or answer} 
are within the personal knowledge of the accused. 20 Do the facts reasonably call for an 
18 R v Christie ibid at 554, 565-566 per Atkinson and Reading J. R v Marlinez-Tobon (1994) 2 ALL 
E.R 90 at98. 
19 R v Mitchell (1892) 17 Cox C.C 503 at 508, Parkes v R (1976) 64 Cr App Rep. 25, Hall v R (1971) 1 
WLR298. 
20 R v Voisin (1918) 1 KB 531 at 537. 
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explanation if the accused is innocent?21 The drawing of an inference which corroborates 
other extraneous evidence (consequence (3)) is allowed without limitation in both civil and 
criminal cases. At trial none of the above adverse inferences may be drawn until the 
prosecution has established a prima facie case calling for a reply. At pre-trial the silence of 
the accused is dependent upon the reasonable opportunity given to the suspect to deny, 
explain or answer the interrogator's questions. The case against the suspect must have 
been succinctly outlined before he is expected to answer.22 Did the suspect rely on legal 
advice, was he afforded the opportunity to obtain legal advice and the nature of the legal 
advice advanced. 23 
A number of inconsistencies surround the modern interpretation of the silence principle. 
First, while the immunity against interrogatory questioning by a person in authority (immunity 
(c)) is logically defensible, there appears to be no modern justification for maintaining an 
immunity against the answering of questions or the giving of evidence at trial (immunity (d)). 
Second, there is no historical reason (see chapter 2), no moral or logical reason (see 
chapter 3) for the elevation of a bare procedural immunity rule into a fundamental human 
right. There is also no independent historical or logical reason for an immunity against the 
drawing of reasonable adverse inferences (immunity (f)). Third, both immunity (c) and (d) 
are based on the protection they offer against state inspired compulsion, inducement and 
coercion. Yet the drawing of an adverse inference (immunity (f)) from an invocation of 
silence does not logically amount to a compulsion and cannot be sustained on that basis 
alone. Nevertheless, English case law often prohibits the drawing of adverse inferences 
even in the absence of a compulsion, without suggesting alternative grounds for the 
prohibition. Fourth, the argument has been advanced that no reasonable adverse inferences 
may be drawn until the prosecution has established a case capable of supporting an 
inference of guilt. 24 However, if the prosecution's case is incapable of supporting an 
inference of guilt, it is unlikely to proceed to the stage where the accused is called upon to 
answer. In such a situation no adverse inference can be drawn. Conversely if the 
prosecution's case is cap·able of supporting an inference of guilt, then the additional adverse 
inference from silence simply becomes superfluous. Fifth, case precedent reveals an 
absolute prohibition against the admission of evidence based on pre-trial silence, whereas 
21 There are a significant number of innocent explanations, ignorance, confusion, hostility to police, 
etc., but these should be stated by the accused if he wishes to rebut an adverse inference. 
22 A minimum of procedural fairness must be allowed for. The extent and nature of pre-trial 
procedural fairness is a significant factor in determining a reasonable adverse inference, but its 
absence must not always preclude the drawing of an adverse inference. 
23 The basis of the legal advice received is important. The mere fact that it is not in the accused's 
interest to answer questions is not sufficient to prevent the drawing of adverse inferences. 
24 Murray v D.P.P. (1994) 1 WLR 1 at 11. 
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adverse inferences from silence at trial are readily admissible (except when based on guilt or 
a consciousness of guilt). Sixth, an artificial distinction has been created between ordinary or 
mere silence, the silence induced by some kinds of questions, and credibility, conduct or 
demeanour as a result of silence. Seventh, there is also an artificial distinction between 
silence which calls for an answer, explanation or denial and silence when in the possession 
of stolen goods.25 Finally, no reasonable explanation has been advanced on how to prevent 
the ordinary layperson juror from consciously or subconsciously drawing an adverse 
inference from the accused's failure to testify. 
Apart from the common law, the English silence principle is indirectly described in the judges' 
rules (now superceded)26 and the police code of conduct (the caution- revised in 1995 and 
1998). The common law rule has also been extensively codified by a number of recent 
statutes. Amongst these are the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (amended 1991) 
·(PACE), the Criminal Justice Act 1987 (amended 1991 ), the Criminal Justice and Public 
Order Act 1994 (CRIMPO) and the Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act 1996. The 
Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999 proposes to prohibit inferences from silence 
where a suspect has been denied a reasonable opportunity to obtain legal advice. The 
cumulative effect of these statutes is to accelerate the trend towards formal limitation of the 
right to silence. As mentioned previously, English reform is conceived of in terms of 
utilitarian principles or on the notion that the silence principle may be supplemented or 
supplanted by any number of equally cost-effective alternative protective mechanisms. The 
Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 is based on the pure utilitarian view that silence 
is simply an instrumental protection which, in certain defined circumstances, is an 
unwarranted obstruction to the efficient investigation and prosecution of crime.27 Similarly, 
the Criminal Procedure and Investigation Act 1996 provides a comprehensive statutory 
scheme for the disclosure of relevant evidence by both the prosecution and the defence. 
The Criminal Justice Act 1987 supplements silence with other alternative protection 
mechanisms which are more cosfefficient than the silence principle.28 These supplementary 
mechanisms are particularly effective in the context of highly complicated and technical 
crimes such as commercial fraud, corruption, and the recovery of company assets. 
Ultimately, the statutory definitions of the silence principle will have to be judged against the 
25 R v Raviraj ( 1987) 55 Cr App Rep 93 at 103. 
26 In particular rule 3, 5 and rule 8. 
27 A. T and T. /stet v Tully (1993) AC 45 at 51-53 (per Lord Templeman). 
28 R v Alladice (1988) 87 Cr. App. Rep. 380 at 385 (per Lord Lane}. 
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principles inherent in the European Convention on Human Rights. 
8.2 The Caution, The Code and PACE 
English jurisprudence, as a result of the unwritten nature of its civil liberties code (and unlike 
the constitutionally derived Miranda-type safeguards of American jurisprudence) has taken a 
somewhat disjointed approach to the administration of its police service and the protection of 
the suspect within the pre-trial investigatory process. For most of the twentieth century, the 
Judges Rules (first formulated in 1912, revised in 1930, 1957 and 1964) were the only set of 
reference guidelines applicable to police during the investigatory procedure.29 The Judges 
Rules were administrative in nature, without legal force, intended to separate voluntary from 
involuntary statements30 and designed as a protection for the suspect against the use of 
inducements by the police investigator. The rules provided for the administration of a caution 
on arrest, required a warning to the arrestee that he need not say anything and advised him 
of his right to silence. The caution did not create the right to silence but merely reminded the 
arrestee of the right. 31 These guidelines were difficult to implement and were often ignored 
by the police. A violation of the rules did not automatically make a subsequent statement 
inadmissible as evidence. 32 The arbitrary application of the Judges Rules resulted in 
pressure for structural reform of the pre-trial procedure. One of the key issues addressed 
was the importance, place and scope of the silence principle within the criminal justice 
system. The nature of the silence principle is somewhat equivocal because it exists in an 
uneasy symbiotic relationship with other often mutually exclusive interests. On the one hand 
a strong right to silence, while protecting the individual, is sometimes an obstacle to efficient 
policing. The stronger the right, the least willing the suspect will be to submit himself to 
police interrogation. On the other hand, the interests of society requires an effective 
administration of justice which necessitates a weakening of the suspect's procedural rights. 
The focus of English reform has always been on how to maintain a reasonable balance 
between these conflicting interests. One of the results of the reform process was the 
29 The rules are judicial guidelines issued to the police by the Home Office in terms of Circular no. 
31/1964 (revised). 
30 The common law definition of a voluntary confession as stated in Ibrahim v R (1914) A.C 599 is 
incorporated into the rules as, "a voluntary statement ... has not been obtained by fear of prejudice or 
hope of advantage held out by a person in authority or by oppression"; See also D.P.P. v Ping Ling 
(1976) A.C 574. 
31 R v Hall ( 1977) 1 ALL ER 322, 324. 
32 R v Prager (1971) 56 Cr. App. Rep. 151, 160, "if the judges rules were applied strictly, they would 
have the effect of rendering inadmissible all statements made by the accused after his arrest, unless 
voluntarily given without pressure. Guilty men do not usually do this, left to themselves, they prefer 
silence". See Gudjonsson The Psychology Of Interrogations, Confessions And Testimony (1992) 323. 
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introduction of the Police And Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (hereinafter referred to as 
PACE).33 
PACE is simply an acknowledgement that on a practical level the right to silence by itself 
does not provide an adequate protection for the suspect during the police interview. In 
reality, silence presents the interrogator with the challenge of breaking down the suspect's 
initial reluctance to co-operate. In the majority of cases, the police do succeed in coercing 
statements from the suspect. PACE provides supplementary protection by mandating the 
presence of a solicitor during interrogation. PACE has sharpened the debate around the 
silence principle. Pre-PACE police were able to brush aside the suspect's right to silence. 
Post-PACE it is more difficult to do so when the suspect has a solicitor by his side. PACE 
has added a new dimension to the question of procedural fairness. This ·aspect of a fair trial 
procedure has been further enhanced by the Human Rights Act (1998) which now makes 
fairness at trial into a fundamental civil right.34 In terms of sec. 66 and as an adjunct to the 
statute, a new Code Of Police Practice35 replaces the now defunct Judges Rules. The new 
code does not change the substance of the Judges Rules, but it does set out more detailed 
procedures to be followed in the police station. The code is not law and a breach cannot 
technically be made the basis of either criminal or civil proceedings (sec. 67(1 0)). Code C, in 
particular, sets out a detailed rule of caution, provides for reasonable interrogation practices, 
reasonable interview time limits and reasonable conditions of treatment.36 Code E provides 
for the keeping of detailed records, including the tape-recording of interviews. Sec. 67(1) 
empowers the court to take the codes of practice into account in assessing the admissibility 
of evidence. Evidence taken in breach of the Code may be excluded in terms of a judicial 
discretion set out in Sec. 78(1 ). In addition, Sec. 82(3) preserves the narrow common law 
judicial discretion to exclude involuntary statements, which now operates in tandem with the 
much wider statutory discretion. 37 
33 PACE is described in R v Bailey and Smith (1993) 97 Crim. App. Rep. 365, 375 as a rigorously 
controlled legislative regime. · 
34 The connection between fairness in the police station and fairness at trial is recognised in R v 
Keenan (1989) 3 ALL ER 598, 609 and in R v Delaney (1989) 88 Cr. App. Rep. 338, 341-42. See also 
Zuckerman "Procedural Fairness During Police Interrogations And The Right To Silence" J. Crim. L. 
(1990) 499. 0 
35 
. The code deals with (a) the exercise of police powers of search, (b) the seizure of property, (c) 
detention, treatment and questioning of suspects, (d) identification of individuals, (e) tape-recording of 
interviews. 
36 PACE recognises that juveniles and the mentally handicapped are especially vulnerable to coercive 
police tactics, and therefore makes provision for an appropriate social worker to be present during the 
interview. 
37 The common law discretion is cogently described in R v Sang (1980) A.C 402. 
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Historically, the common law voluntariness rule governing confessions and admissions has 
always been regarded as one of the most important bulwarks of the right to silence. The last 
quarter of the twentieth century has seen significant changes to the law of confession. The 
United States (Miranda safeguards),38 England (PACE) and Australia (Evidence Acts (1995) 
Cth and NSW) have discarded the old common law voluntariness standard and replaced it 
with new rules of admissibility based on the conduct of the enforcing authority.39 The 
requirement that the suspect's admission be voluntary, in the sense that it is a conscious and 
free choice, no longer finds a place in the new English and Australian confessional regimes. 
Instead, new rules are created based on the exclusion of admissions obtained by oppressive, 
inhuman, degrading or unreliable conduct on the part of the investigating authority. One of 
the more important developments is that in terms of PACE, it makes no difference whether 
the confession is true or not. Sec. 76(2) states [in parentheses] that a confession procured 
by prohibited means is always inadmissible, "notwithstanding that it may be true". Even if the 
suspect admits in a later police interview that the earlier coerced confession was true, the 
first confession remains inadmissible. The new confessional regime is focused on the 
methods used to obtain the admission (a legitimacy issue) and not on the truth of the 
admission. In terms of PACE, the question of truth is an issue of weight to be determined by 
the jury. In essence, the message which the PACE statutory scheme conveys is that police 
should not abuse their powers to oppress a suspect into making a confession, nor adopt 
questioning techniques which result in unreliable confessions. PACE is intended to defend 
the legitimacy of the criminal court judgement. The "oppression rule" (Sec. 76(2)(a)) is 
intended to safeguard the moral authority of the court's verdict and the "reliability rule" (Sec. 
76(2)(b)) is intended to promote the factual accuracy of the court's verdict. While rejecting 
the old voluntariness standard, both the English and Australian regulatory regimes expressly 
preserve the common law judicial discretion which may be· used to exclude evidence of 
improper confessions.40 The judge is empowered to exclude a confession if it is unfair to the 
accused, improperly or illegally obtained, unless the desirability of admitting the confession 
outweighs its undesirability (Sec. 82(3) PACE and Sec. 90 Evidence Act 1995 Cth). 
Sec. 76(2)(a) "oppression" : The common law meaning of oppression has not survived the 
enactment of PACE.41 PACE gives the term "oppression" a new statutory definition which 
38 See supra chapter 5 p.163-193. 
39 South Africa has persisted with the common law voluntariness standard which is codified in Sec. 
217(1) of the C.P.A. . 
40 SeeR v Voisin (1918) 1 KB 531; Wong Kam-ming v R (1980) AC 247, 261; R v Hudson (1980) 72 
Cr. App. Rep. 163, 170. 
41 R v Prager ibid 32, "Oppressive questioning which by its nature, duration excites hopes and fears, 
or so affects the mind of the suspect that his will crumbles and he speaks when otherwise he would 
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includes the use of violence, inhuman or degrading treatment. The authoritative definition of 
oppression is given in R v Fulling 42 as the "exercise of authority in a burdensome, harsh, 
wrongful manner, involving cruel treatment or the imposition of unjust or unreasonable 
burdens". The oppressive conduct must go above and beyond the standard generally 
inherent within police custody and must amount to a significant harshness and intimidation.43 
In assessing oppression, the court must take into account police impropriety in the wrongful 
exercise of their authority.44 Police impropriety is defined as the deliberate and frequent 
infringement of both PACE and the associated police practice codes.45 Oppression is also 
assessed by weighing the physical and other transient circumstances in which the 
interrogation is conducted.46 The suspect's physical characteristics, youth, age, intellect, 
criminal inexperience may be potentially aggravating factors.47 Sec. 76 oppression also 
contains the usual definition of torture and the infliction of severe physical or mental pain.48 
Nevertheless, the new statutory definition of oppression is a fairly narrow one, and any 
broader inquiry into police conduct during the interrogation must be undertaken in terms of 
Sec. 76(2)(b). Lord Lane stated in R v Fulling that paragraph (b) now covers some of the 
ground which was formerly covered by the much wider definition of oppression at common 
law. 
Sec. 76(2)(b) "unreliability" : The state prosecution must prove that the confession was not 
obtained as a result of anything "said" or "done" by the police during the interrogation which 
is likely to render a confession unreliable. The new rule dispenses with the old common law 
principle that the source of the unreliability must be either a threat or an inducement (note the 
difference with the American Miranda standard which depends on the element of state 
have remained silent. See also McDermott, ''The Interrogation Of Suspects In Custody'' (21) Current 
Legal Problems (1968) 1, 10. 
42 (1987) 2 ALL ER 65 and QB 427. The artificially wide interpretation of the common law definition in 
Prager is specifically rejected. 
43 R v Emmerson (1990) 92 Cr. App. Rep. 284, "an interview of 25 minutes involving raised voices 
and bad language could not be construed as oppressive". In comparison, in R v Paris, Abdullahi and 
Miller (1992) 97 Cr. App. Rep. 99, "the interviewing officers adopted menacing, hostile and intimidating 
techniques". R v Beales (1991) Crim. L. Rev. 492, "the police officer bullied the suspect and then 
fabricated his statemenf'. 
44 R v Parker (1995) Crim. L. Rev. 233, ''wrongfulness must be interpreted by taking into account the 
words 'burdensome', 'harsh', 'unjust' and 'cruel"'. · 
45 R v Heron (1992) Crim. L. Rev. 104, Mitchell J, excluded a confession because the initial and 
repetitive questioning of the suspect was designed to break his resolve. 
46 R v L (1994) Crim. L. Rev. 839, the manner and content of the questioning was so oppressive as to 
brainwash the suspect. 
47 R v Seelig and Spens (1992) 1 WLR 148, "a mature professional criminal (as opposed to an 
inexperienced first timer) must expect vigorous, long, repeated questioning without the interview 
becoming oppressive". 
48 The specific crime of torture is defined in Sec. 134 Criminal Justice Act (1988). See also Art. 3 
European Convention on Human Rights and Denmark v Greece (1969) 12 Yearbook E. Conv. H.R 
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compulsion or coercion). The judge must place himself in the position of a fly on the wall. 
He must observe th~ progress of the interview and determine whether the suspect's 
confession is likely to be unreliable as a result of something "said" or "done" by the police 
interrogator. According to R v Crampton,49 the interrogator's ''words" or "acts" should have 
the tendency, at the time the confession was voiced, to lead to an unreliable confession.50 
Sec 76 and the police codes are infringed not only by clear acts of commission, but also by 
police acts of omission.51 Unlike the statutory definition of oppression in paragraph (a), 
police impropriety plays a very limited role in the analysis of paragraph (b) unreliability.52 A 
confession may still be excluded in terms of paragraph (b), even when there is no evidence 
of impropriety. While deliberate impropriety is a key element of oppression, it does not 
necessarily invalidate a confession in terms of paragraph (b). This follows from the purpose 
of paragraph (b) which is designed to promote the factual accuracy of the court's verdict. A 
confession may still be rendered unreliable, even in the face of police good faith. The 
determination of unreliability is dependent on the accuracy of the interview record. 53 Code C 
and E of the practice manual are carefully designed to ensure the reliability of the interview 
proceeding. Unreliability usually occurs when the police interrogator intentionally or 
negligently makes no contemporaneous record of the interview. A failure to rectify the 
omission at the earliest practical opportunity or a refusal to give the suspect access to the 
interview record are also possible indications of unreliability. In R v Canale54 it was stated, 
"the importance of rules relating to contemporaneous noting of interviews can scarcely be 
over-emphasised. The object is twofold, it ensures that the suspect's remarks are 
accurately recorded and allows him the opportunity of checking his answers. Likewise, it is a 
protection for the police against suggestions of improper approaches or promises". 
Causation : Both paragraph (a) and (b) of Sec. 76 require evidence of causation. A 
confession is either "obtained", "caused" by oppression or it is made in "consequence" or as 
a "result or a thing said or done. The exclusion of a confession therefore depends on the 
establishment of a causal nexus between the police act of infringement and the making of 
186, Rep. Of Ireland v U.K (1978) 2 EHRR 25, "torture includes intense and cruel forms of inhuman or 
degrading treatmenf'. 
49 (1990) 92 Cr. App. Rep. 369, "in principle not only the police but any third party words or acts fall 
within the provision. 
50 In R v Trussler (1988) Crim. L. Rev. 446, a drug addict's statement induced after long periods of 
~uestioning without adequate rest periods or medication was held to be unreliable. 
5 R v Delaney (1988) 88 Cr. App. Rep. 388; R v Joseph (1993) Crim. L. Rev. 206 suggest that an act 
of omission in complying with code C provisions is a significant factor. 
52 D.P.P. v Blake (1988) 89 Cr. App. Rep. 179, the practice codes are imported but not conclusive, 
other facts and matters may be taken into account. 
53 R v Delaney ibid note 51, at 341, "by failing to make a contemporaneous note ... the officers 
deprived the court of what is the most cogent evidence as to what happened during these interviews". 
54 (1989) 91 Cr. App. R 1, 5. 
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the confession. R v Rennie, 55 per Lord Lane C.J, defines the general test of causation as a 
simple application of common sense and not a refined pseudo-scientific exposition. 
Causation is a question of fact to be approached in a no-nonsense fashion. 
Sec. 60(1)(b) "tape-recordings" : One of the major advantages of PACE is the procedure 
which mandates the tape-recording of all police interviews. The possibility of including video-
taping has also been mooted. Sec. 60 and the complementing Code E rule provides the 
court with a reliable means of analysing statements recorded during the police interrogation. 
Incriminating statements made during unrecorded interviews are suspicious but not 
automatically excluded. Untaped admissions may still be admissible if made 
spontaneously.56 Generally, untaped admissions are not admissible unless reduced to 
writing at the earliest opportunity and verified by the suspect. 57 The statutory requirement 
may be waived altogether in a number of exceptional circumstances. In terms of the 
Prevention Of Terrorism Act and the Official Secrets Act, tape-recordings of interviews are 
specifically excluded. Unrecorded admissions are also excusable when made as a result of 
unavoidable equipment failure and interview room unavailability. The court must also assess 
the flaws inherent in the tape-recording of an interview. Tampering, cutting, splicing and 
other covert fabrications of the tape are easily possible. 
Sec. 78(1) "judicial discretion". The court may exclude evidence which has an adverse 
effect on the "fairness" of the proceeding. The statutory discretion does not supplant the 
common law discretion which is expressly preserved in Sec. 82(3). 58 However, the statutory 
discretion has a significantly wider ambit. 59 Sec. 78(1) encompasses ,a discretion based on 
"unreliability'' and "unfairness" which mirrors the distinction between the paragraph (a) 
oppression and paragraph (b) unreliability of Sec. 76(1). It was previously noted that police 
impropriety plays a central role in the definition of oppression, but only a minor role in the 
definition of reliability. Similarly, police impropriety plays a significant role in the definition of 
Sec. 78(1) ''fairness" but only a peripheral role in the definition of Sec. 78(1) "unreliability". 
To trigger the discretion it is necessary to establish a causal nexus between the admissibility 
of the confession. and the resultant unfairness at trial. A necessary pre-condition for the 
exercise of the discretion is the existence of a casual relationship between the confession, 
55 (1995) 2 A.C 579, and R v Barry (1991) 95 Cr. App. Rep. 384. 
56 R v Cox(1992) 96 Crim. App. Rep. 464; R v Weekes (1992) 97 Cr. App. Rep. 222. See also 
Fenwick "Legal Advice, Videotaping And The Right To Silence" J. Crim. Law(1993) 385. 
57 Code C para 11.5-13. See also R v Chung(1990) 92 Cr. App. Rep. 314. 
58 See R v Sang (1980) A.C 402 and ibid note 40. 
59 The main problem with the common law definition of discretion was that at the time the judge was 
supposed to exercise the discretion, he did not necessarily know how the trial would develop and was 
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the improper police conduct and the consequential unfair trial.60 The court has preferred to 
concentrate not on the trial proceeding itself, but on the improper police conduct during the 
investigatory interview proceeding. How improper police conduct adversely and unfairly 
effects the trial proceeding is an issue as yet imprecisely understood. Hodgon J in R v 
Keenan 61 notes, "exclusionary discretion is justified where a breach [of the statute or the 
code] would have a serious effect on the criminal process as a whole". The question of 
"seriousness" is further qualified in R v Walsh, 62 which holds that the breach must be prima 
facie significant and substantial, clearly indicating an infringement of the fairness standard. 63 
A breach does not automatically result in an exclusion of a confession. The breach must be 
shown to infringe the fairness trial standard to q degree which justly demands exclusion. R v 
Samuels 64 adopts a breach of rights approach. The suspect's rights are protected in a fair 
trial by placing him in the position he would have been in had his rights been properly 
observed. Reference is also made to deliberate and bad faith infringements. 55 In evaluating 
fairness, the court must take into account both the interests of the state and the defence. A 
trial proceeding can only be fair when both adversarial parties have equal access to 
evidence. Unfairness results when the one side is allowed to adduce evidence which the 
other side cannot properly challenge. A deliberate breach of police procedure or abuse of 
the practice code may well result in this kind of unequal access to evidence. 56 It should also 
be noted that the court's judicial discretion is not an appropriate tool for disciplining or 
punishing the police. The courtroom is not the proper venue for police disciplinary actions 
and neither should Sec. 78(1) be interpreted to include a disciplinary purpose.67 (By contrast, 
the U.S. Supreme Court has interpreted the Miranda pre-trial prophylactic rule as including a 
disciplinary police code of practice). 
unable to assess the impact of the disputed evidence on the fairness of the trial. PACE has solved 
this problem. 
60 The establishment of a causal element is a necessary but by itself not a sufficient precondition for 
the exclusion of a confession in terms of Sec. 78(1 ). 
61 (1989) 90 Cr. App. Rep. 1. 
62 (1989) 91 Cr. App. Rep. 161, 163. 
63 The notion of "significant" and "substantial" are key concepts heavily relied upon by the seminal 
cases. See R v Dunford (1990) 91 Cr. App. Rep. 150; R v Quinn (1990) Crim. L. Rev. 581; R v 
Oliphant (1992) Crim. L. Rev. 40. 
64 (1988) 2 ALLER 135. 
65 
"Bad faith" or "deliberate breach" is often the central question when unfairness is analysed. See 
Matto v Wolverhampton Crown Court(1987)'R.T.C. 337; R v Alladice (1988) 87 Cr. App. Rep. 386. 
66 When the police are allowed to refresh their memories from a defective record, the suspect is 
unfairly disadvantaged, having made no personal record himself, he cannot disprove the defective 
record. See R v Quinn ibid note 63. · 
67 In terms of the Police and Magistrate's Court Act 1994, a police breach of the code is no longer 
automatically a disciplinary offence. See R v Oliphant ibid note 63, ''the judge's job is not to educate 
or discipline police officers". R v Hughes (1994) 1 WLR 876, 879. 
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An all too overlooked problem is that PACE does. not provide the aggrieved suspect with 
sufficient remedies once the police have been proved to have misused their powers. The 
existing complaint procedure is unsatisfactory and does not provide an adequate criminal 
sanction or civil compensation. The alternative common law remedies of wrongful arrest and 
illegal detention are time-consuming and expensive. When compensatory remedies are 
unsatisfactory, the rights embodied in PACE may simply become empty rhetoric.68 
Nevertheless, despite this flaw and a compulsive focus on police discipline, the PACE 
provisions do provide a comprehensive protective shield for the suspect exposed to the 
harsh disorientating environment of the police station. 
The Police Practice Code : The police administered cautionary warning and the right to 
legal advice are statutorily defined in Sec. 58,69 and are given a practical dimension in the 
police code manual. In terms of Code C (para 3.1) the arrested and detained suspect must 
be clearly informed of his rights, 70 given the opportunity of consulting the Code and a copy of 
the police custody record must be made available to him. The suspect must be informed of 
his right to remain silent (para 1 0.4) and his right to consult with a solicitor (para 6). A police 
infringement or abuse of the Code C and Sec. 58 procedural rights invariably triggers the 
unfairness element of the Sec. 78(1) discretion. Statements made by the suspect in the 
absence of a solicitor or on the failure to warn the suspect of his right to silence are not 
automatically excluded as these may be mere technical infringements. The plea for 
exclusion should be supported by further materiality in the form of unreliability, bad faith or 
substantial infringement resulting in procedural unfairness. In R v Walsh, 71 a police cell 
interview had not been contemporaneously recorded nor was legal advice offered to the 
detainee. The detainee's statement was excluded because the breach was significant and 
substantial despite the good faith conduct of the police officers. However, in R v Dunford,72 a 
confession was admitted on the ground that the absent solicitor would not have added to the 
suspect's understanding of his legal rights. Absence of a solicitor was not held to be 
significant in R v Chahal, 73 . where the suspect was a mature businessman who knew his 
68
. Sanders "Rights, Remedies and PACE" Crim. L. Rev. (1988) 802, "the balance between police and 
suspect has changed since the implementation of PACE. What is required is a strengthening of 
punitive and compensatory remedies on behalf of the wronged suspecr. 
69 The most important bundle of statutory safeguards are (a) Sec. 56, "the right to be informed of the 
fact of arresr, (b) Sec. 58 "the right to legal advice", (c) Sec. 59 "establishes the right to a duty 
solicitor". 
70 The right to legal advice (code C para 6) has also been acknowledged in the common law, R v 
Chief Constable South Wales (1994) 2 ALLER 560. 
71 Ibid note 62. 
72 Ibid note 63. 
73 (1992) Crim. L. Rev 124. 
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rights and suffered no prejudice. But in R v Franklin,74 a failure to provide legal advice was 
held to be significant where the suspect was a young unemployed man who had never been 
in a police station. In R v A//adice/5 the suspect was accustomed to police interviews and 
the court felt that a solicitor's presence would not have made a substantial difference. In R v 
Samue/s,76 although the initial police refusal of access to a solicitor was acceptable, the 
refusal could not be justified after charging the suspect, as legal advice is· a fundamental 
right. In R v Oliphant,77 Woolf J said, "It is clear that the failure of the defendant to receive 
legal advice[ .... ] amounts to a serious inroad on his rights". Where the suspect's rights are 
flouted materially, deliberately or in bad faith, the significant and substantial test is easily met. 
Police interrogatory techniques are sometimes based on trickery in order to discourage the 
suspect from seeking legal advice.78 In R v Beycan/9 the court rejected an attempt by the 
police to sidestep its duty to notify the suspect of his right to legal advice. The police 
obliquely asked the suspect, "are you happy to be interviewed in the normal way we conduct 
interviews, without a solicitor, friend or representative?". Unethical police behaviour does not 
always lead to exclusion. In R v Fulling,80 the police informed the suspect of her lover's 
infidelity with another woman which induced the suspect to make an incriminating statement. 
The statement was not excluded since it could not be defined as either oppressive in terms 
of Sec. 76(1)(a), nor as unreliable in terms of Sec. 76(1)(b). The deliberate undermining of 
the suspect's willpower in this manner did not also adversely affect the fairness of the trial 
proceedings as defined in Sec. 78(1 ). It would appear that when the police employ trickery 
or unethical behaviour, the court needs to balance the seriousness of the offence, the public 
interest, the suspect" circumstance and the nature of the police illegality. The police may 
refuse access to legal advice on the ground that the suspect's solicitor might warn others 
involved in the crime. Failure to provide legal advice may be based on oversight, negligence 
or lack of communication between investigating officers. All these factors need to be 
analysed to determine whether to exclude evidence either in terms of Sec. 76 or more 
commonly, in terms of Sec. 78. In real terms, however, access to a solicitor is still the 
74 (1993) Crim. L. Rev 36. 
75 Ibid note 65. 
76 Ibid note 64. 
77 Ibid note 63. 
78 Sec. 78 may be criticised because it punishes police trickery and police deception only after the 
suspect has been arrested. The definition of trickery is narrowly confined to express acts of trickery. It 
ignores tacit acts of trickery and excludes modem acts of covert eavesdropping, covert undercover 
~olice tactics and other modem pre-trial investigatory techniques. · 
9 (1990) Crim. L. Rev 185. R v Mason (1987) 3 ALLER 451, "false fingerprint information was given 
to both the suspect and his solicitor in an attempt to deceive the suspect into confessing. A significant 
breach 
80 Ibid note 42. 
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exception rather than the rule.81 The police remain hostile to the solicitor's intervention which 
is regarded as increasing the suspect's resistance to questioning and reducing the police 
ability to control the suspect.82 Often the quality of advice given by the solicitor or legal 
representative is inferior. The police are not obliged to reveal the nature of the case against 
the suspect and the solicitor sometimes bases his advice on an incomplete understanding of 
the issues. 
The police room interview forms only a part of the investigatory process. Suspects are often 
questioned prior to arrest at the crime scene or at home. The initial Code C and E rules were 
held to apply only to the limited circumstance of the interview room. The police were under a 
strong temptation to coerce incriminating statements prior to the formal interview and 
untaped and unwritten exchanges outside the police station were fairly common.83 Once 
the court allows statements made outside the interview room to be admitted, the Code and 
statutory safeguards are easily by-passed. In the past, a verbal or informal statement made 
to the police prior to caution and then subsequently denied during the formal recorded 
interview was a time-consuming problem unnecessarily complicating the trial process. This 
problem has now been partially addressed in the revised 1995 Code of Practice. The new 
Code C applies not only to the formal interview, but also to all other exchanges between the 
suspect and the police. The term "interview'' is now defined as the process of questioning a 
suspect regarding his involvement in a criminal offence.84 Exploratory questioning during 
the early stages of the inquiry, or questions directed at obtaining information or explanations 
do not constitute an interview. The revised Code C (para 11.2(a)) mandates the police 
officer to inform the suspect at the beginning of the formal interview, of any incriminating 
statements or silences which were made prior to the suspect's arrival at the police station. 
The outside exchanges must be formally confirmed or denied by the suspect (para 11.1 0). 
The suspect is therefore given an early warning of incriminating remarks (or silences) and his 
response will form part of the contemporaneously taped record.85 The revised 1995 practice 
code now allow for a private consultation with a solicitor. A free legal service and the 
81 Maquire "Effect Of The PACE Provisions On Detentions" Brit. J. Crime (1988), "at least 80% of 
suspects do not exercise their right to legal advice". 
82 McConville, Hodgson, "Custodial Legal Advice And The Right To Silence" Royal Commission on 
Criminal Justice Research Study No. 16 (1993); Baldwin, McConville "Police Interrogation And The 
Right To See A Solicitor" Crim. L. Rev (1979) 145. 
83 R v Maguire(1989) Crim. L. Rev 125 "the police are not prohibited by PACE from asking questions 
at the crime scene. PACE applies only in the station and not at the crime scene". See also R v 
Brezeau and Francis (1989) Crim. L. Rev 650. 
84 R v Goddard (1994) Crim. L. Rev 46; R v Chung (1991) Crim. L. Rev 622; R v Park (1994) Crim. 
L. Rev 285; R v Menard (1995) 1 Cr. App. Rep. 306, 315, "the code defines the interview as one 
necessarily involving a form of questioning". 
85 Spontaneous statements made outside the police station are admissible but subject to para 11.2(b ), 
para 11.10 of the Code C rule. See also R v Parchment (1989) Crim. L. Rev 290. 
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establishment of an on-duty solicitor scheme. The police charge office must prominently 
display a poster advertising the right to legal advice. Future revisions of the code will build 
upon these levels of protection. Measures have also been instituted to improve the 
complaint procedure against improper police arrest, including the provis,ion of adequate 
compensatory remedies. The suggestion has been made that evidence obtained in breach 
of the code or statute should be automatically inadmissible, thus replacing the present Sec. 
78(1) judicially-driven discretionary power. Enhanced police interrogation skills, ethical 
awareness lessons, and some form of psychological training has also been mooted as part 
of a future police training schedule.86 In many of its aspects, PACE is designed to protect the 
suspect against the intimidating environment of the police station. It is designed to dissipate 
the coercive atmosphere and the psychological pressures to speak inherent in the formal 
police interview. PACE, to some degree, neutralises the anxiety, fear, stress and other 
contributory factors which erode the suspect's ability to make informed choices.87 In this 
regard, PACE is similar to the Miranda type safeguards (Miranda v Arizona) developed by 
the Warren Supreme Court to protect the custodial interests of the American suspect.88 
PACE may well be said to go beyond the level of protection offered by Miranda. Opponents 
of the silence principle, in particular the substitution abolitionists, have argued for the 
abolition of a right to silence on the grounds that the PACE requirements and other 
associated statutes (for example Sec. 2(8) of the Criminal Justice Act 1987) provide 
adequate safeguards for the suspect during the pre-trial stage of the criminal process. 
Sufficient procedural protections are now available which do not carry the costs associated 
with the silence principle, especially the potential loss of reliable evidence and the ability of 
professional criminals to frustrate the investigatory process by hiding behind the right to 
silence.89 
Zuckerman, 90 one of the chief protagonists of substitution abolition theory suggests that a 
properly regulated system of "procedural fairness" provides a sufficient justification for 
dispensing with the silence principle. Procedural fairness should include : a compulsion to 
86 Wolchover, Heaton-Armstrong "The Questioning Code Revamped" Crim. L. Rev (1991) 232. 
87 Softley Police Interrogation Royal Commission On Criminal Procedure Research Study No. 4 
~1980). 
8 See supra chapter 5. 
89 In the civil context, A. T and T. lstel v Tully (1993) AC 45, where the House of Lords accepted a 
contractual undertaking by the Crown Prosecution Service not to make criminal use of material 
compulsorily obtained from the suspect in terms of a corporate fraud immunity statute. 
90 Zuckerman The Principles Of Criminal Procedure Clarendon Press, Oxford (1989) chp. 4; "The 
Right Against Self-Incrimination, An Obstacle To The Supervision Of Interrogation" (102) L.Q.R (1986) 
56-68; Bias And Suggestibility, Is There An Alternative To The Right To Silence" in Suspicion And 
Silence, Blackstone Press (1994) chp. 8, 117. Greer ''The Right To Silence, Defence Disclosure" J. 
Law. Society (1994) 103. Galligan "The Right To Silence Reconsidered" (41) Cu"ent Legal Problems 
(1988) 69. 
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attend a police interview only once the evidence points to the suspect having committed the 
offence; minimum standards of police conduct in the treatment of suspects; an adequate 
opportunity for the suspect to answer the case against him; and free access to legal advice. 
Zuckerman claims that since the introduction of PACE, the courts have strengthened the 
suspect's procedural rights and therefore as a quid pro quo should be allowed a greater 
freedom to draw adverse inferences from the suspect's refusal to answer police questions. 
8.3 The Essential Codes of Practice 
The paragraphs of the code which are relevant to the silence principle and which give the 
suspect a complete understanding of his pre-trial rights and the legal effect of the strategic 
choices he makes, including the choice of silence, are as follows : 
Code C para 10.4 (the new caution): You do not have to say anything. But it may harm 
your defence if you do not mention when questioned something which you later rely on in 
court. Anything you do say may be given in evidence. 91 
Code C para 2.4 (custody record) : The suspect's solicitor must be shown the custody 
record on arrival at the police station. 
Code C para 3.4 (comments) :The custodial officer must note on the custody record any 
comment the suspect makes in relation to the police account and decision to detain. 
Code C para 6 (legal advice) : The police must inform the suspect of his right to legal 
advice and are under a duty to alert the suspect to the solicitor's arrival. 
Code C para 11.1 (a) (interview) : An interview is defined as the questioning of a person 
regarding his involvement or suspected involvement in a crime. 
Code C para 11.2A (significant statement) : At the beginning of the taped interview, the 
interrogating officer must put to the suspect any significant statement or silence which 
·occurred before arrival at the police station. The suspect must confirm or deny the statement 
or silence. A significant statement is one capable of being used in evidence. 
Code C para 11.4 (sufficient evidence) : As soon as there is sufficient evidence to lay a 
charge, the police should cease questioning unless the suspect has anything further to say. 
91 Although the English caution is similar to the American Miranda caution, there is a significant 
difference. The Miranda caution is given immediately on arrest and specifically refers to legal advice. 
The American suspect has notice of his rights, even before reaching the police station. In England the 
suspect is only informed of his right to silence, and the possible inferences to be drawn from his 
silence, on arrest. His other rights must await explanation on his arrival at the police station. A 
significant time interval. See Zander "You Have The Right To Remain Silenf' St. Louis. Un. Law. J. 
(1996) 661. The wording of the caution may also amount to an infringement of Article 6(1 ), 6(3) and 7 
of the European Convention on Human Rights. 
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Code C para 11.5(a)(c) (accurate and contemporaneous) : The police have a duty to 
make an accurate record which is also contemporaneous, unless this is unpractical or would 
interfere in the conduct of the interview. 
Code C para 11.7 and 11.9 (non-contemporaneous): If not contemporaneous, the record 
must be made as soon as is practical after the completion of the interview and the reasons 
for doing so recorded in the police officer's pocketbook. 
Code E para 11 (tape-recording): A tape-recording must be made of every formal interview 
undertaken, the date, time, and length of the interview must be recorded. 
8.4 The Common Law Position 
The 1898 Act, 92 which established the accused's right to testify at his own trial, also made it 
clear that he could not be compelled to do so. The accused may be a competent witness for 
the defence but never one for the Crown.93 An important element of the 1898 Act was the 
restriction placed on the prosecutor's ability to draw an adverse inference from the accused's 
silence or failure to testify.94 Sec. 35 of the Criminal Justice And Public Order Act 1994 has 
now largely removed this historic curb and the accused who elects to exercise the right to 
silence is now faced with a pointed state attack in which adverse inferences from silence 
may be drawn in specific circumstances. Unlike the restriction placed on prosecutorial 
comment, the judiciary has historically reserved for itself the right to comment and to instruct 
the jury on the accused's silence. 95 The reach of judicial comment and the extent to which 
·the accused's silence may be used against him has never been clearly articulated and is 
subject to some confusion at the Appellate level. Nevertheless, over the years a number of 
guidelines (one can hardly call them specific rules) have developed which determine the 
parameters of judicial commentary and the limits of judicial adverse inference usage. These 
are as follows : 
92 Criminal Evidence Act, Sec. 1, 61, 62, Viet. C. 36, 9 Statutes 613 (1 898). Prior to this act, the 
maxim nemo debit esse testis in propria causa (no man shall be a witness in his own cause) had 
applied for at least 600 years. 
93 Sec. 1 reads, "Every person charged with an offence shall be a competent witness for the defence 
[ .... ]provided: 
a) A person so charged shall not be called [ .... ] except on his own application. 
b) The failure of any person charged to give evidence shall not be made the subject of prosecutorial 
comment. 
Article 14(3)(a) of the International Covenant on Civil Political Rights is similarly worded. 
94 Exceptionally only the counsel for the co-accused could comment on the other co-accused's failure 
to testify, R v Wickham (1971) Cr. App. Rep 199. 
95 SeeR v Rhodes (1899) 1 QB 77, 83 and R v Littleboy (1934) 2 KB 408, 413-414, "we do not think 
that it was ever intended to lay down the proposition that a judge may not, in a proper case, 
commenf'. 
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(a) Did the investigating officer caution and inform the accused of his right to silence? A 
distinction is drawn between pre-caution silence and post-caution silence. 
(b) The even term principle. Was the accuser a person in authority? 
(c) The presence of a solicitor during the pre-trial police interrogation. 
(d) The stage at which the accused invokes the right to silence, either at the pre-trial or 
the trial stage. Judicial precedent has clearly established that no adverse inferences 
may be drawn from pre-trial silence. At trial no direct adverse inference of guilt may 
be drawn from the accused's failure to testify. 
(e) Has the prosecution established a prima facie case which necessitates rebuttal? 
These five guidelines have over most of the twentieth century determined the extent and kind 
of adverse inference commentary which an English judge is permitted to draw. The 
unalterable rule has always been that no adverse inference may be drawn when the accused 
is properly cautioned. It is a clear misdirection when judicial commentary draws a direct 
adverse inference between the accused's silence and an acknowledgement of guilt,96 or 
suggests that the only way in which the accused may give his interpretation of the facts-in-
issue is by testifying. 97 The more direct the adverse inference, the more likely the ground for 
a misdirection.98 Where the nature of the adverse inference is more remote, the ambit for a 
proper judicial comment is somewhat wider.99 There are a number of exceptions to this 
general rule which allow a direct comment as both reasonable and proper. For example, 
where the accused fails to give a legitimate explanation for his suspicious behaviour in the 
appropriate circumstance, the judge may instruct the jury to draw an adverse inference. An 
adverse inference may properly be drawn from the silence of the accused who is unable to 
explain the possession of stolen property.100 The accused's inability to explain his presence 
on someone else's property may be used to reinforce an inference of breaking and 
entering.101 These distinctions are somewhat. artificial and the English courts have been 
unable to explain logically why commentary is permitted in some circumstances but not in 
others. The common law has generally waxed and waned between the extensive force 
theory and the limited force application of silence. In the first quarter of the twentieth century 
the courts regularly drew direct adverse inferences of guilt.102 It was only in 1934 that the 
96 R v Sparrow(1973) 1 WLR 488, 492-93 and R v Gilbert (1977) 66 Cr. App. Rep 237. 
97 R v Bathut5t (1968) 2 QB 99, 106-8. 
98 R v Sullivan (1966) 51 Cr. App. Rep 102, 105. R v Davis (1959) 43 Crim. App. Rep 212, 215-6 and 
R v Naylor (1933) 1 KB 685. · 
99 R v Raviraj(1987) 85 Crim. App. Rep 93, 103. 
1110 R v Seymour (1954) 1 ALL ER 1006, "A refusal to offer a credible explanation for the possession of 
stolen property remains a permissible inference specifically based on a particular type of 
circumstantial evidence. The only burden on the defence is a forensic one". 
101 R v Wood (1911) 7 Crim. App. Rep 93, 103. 
102 R v Cramp (1880) 14 Cox C C 390, and R v Tate (1908) 2 KB 680. 
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extensive force theory was authoritatively rejected in R v Littleboy.103 Several attempts were 
made to draw direct adverse inferences going to credibility,104 rather than directly to guilt but 
this application was rejected in R v Gilbert, 105 on the ground that no clear dividing line existed 
between a guilty adverse inference and a credibility adverse inference. The one being no 
more than an oblique version of the other. By contrast, while the common law permits no 
adverse inferences to be drawn from the accused's exercise of pre-trial silence, the 
American courts are not so inflexible. An adverse inference going to credibility may be 
drawn in certain circumstances. According to Jenkins v Anderson, 106 an adverse inference 
from pre-trial silence is admissible for the narrow purpose of impeaching the accused's 
credibility once he has voluntarily elected to testify. 
The general consensus amongst Appellate cases appears to favour a limited use of trial 
silence dependent upon whether the prosecution has established a prima facie case. Trial 
silence may never amount to probative evidence of guilt, 107 neither may an adverse inference 
from silence be used to convert a weak prosecutorial case into a strong one. Where the 
prosecution's case is weak, no adverse inference may logically be drawn from the accused's 
silence. Where the prosecution's case is strong an adverse inference is far more likely.108 
An adverse inference is a common sense deduction predicated on the notion that in certain 
circumstances an innocent person, if falsely accused, would welcome the opportunity of 
expressing his innocence.109 It is also predicated on the notion that where the facts in issue 
are within the innocent accused's personal knowledge, he or she would have denied, 
explained or answered the evidence. While the nature of the silence principle in American 
jurisprudence is inflexibly conditioned by the idea of state compulsion, the English common 
law silence principle is flexible and influenced by other factors, apart from state compulsion. 
The English common law definitions of silence have now been codified and replaced by the 
seminal Criminal Justice And Public Order Act 1994. A difference now prevails between 
England and the rest of the Commonwealth. The common law definition of silence remains 
· unaltered in Australia, as the Australian Federal Constitution makes no mention of a right to 
silence. The New Zealand Bill of Rights Act (1990) merely codifies the common law without 
altering it. 
103 (1934) 2 KB 408, 414. Although in R v Ryan (1964) 50 Cr. App. Rep 144, 148, "it was held 
permissible to allow silence to be taken into account when assessing the weight to be attached to the 
accused's failure to advance a reasonable explanation during pre-trial interrogation". 
104 Ibid R v Ryan at 144. 
105 (1977) 66 Crim. App. Rep 237, 244. 
106 447 U.S 231 (1980). See supra chapter 6 p.210-212. 
107 R v Bathurst (1968) 2 QB 99; R v Sparrow (1973) 1 WLR 489. 
108 Ibid R v Sparrow at 499; R v Voisin (1918) 1 KB 531. 
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The common law principle has travelled a convoluted evolutionary path. At the beginning of 
the twentieth century, silence is a bare combination of two immunities which protect the 
defendant against pre-trial and trial questioning. Adverse inferences may be drawn from the 
accused's silence whenever it is reasonably appropriate to do so. The initial unlimited nature 
of judicial commentary on silence is illustrated in R v Rhodes,110 where it is stated that in 
terms of the 1898 Act, "judges have a right to comment. The nature and degree of which 
rests entirely within the judicial discretion". Similarly in America, the fifth amendment is 
judged to be amongst a decidedly second-class -group of constitutional rights (Polkov v 
Connecticut).111 In the first half of the twentieth century the silence principle is interpreted in 
pure utilitarian terms. The so-called right to silence is derivative, dependent on the likelihood 
of a maximising net utility. It is a relative utilitarian right subject to limitation and the drawing 
of adverse inferences. In the balance between the state and the individual interest, 
sometimes the state interest prevails and at other times, the individual interest. In the last 
half of the twentieth century, as a reaction to the Second World War, the silence principle 
undergoes a metamorphosis. In the post-war common law, there is an increasing tendency 
to advance moral and legal arguments in the form of deontological rights. A deontological 
interpretation means that common law rights become foundational and apply with a large 
degree of absoluteness. It then becomes illogical to state that a right to silence may be 
infringed in order to achieve more important goals. The mere prospect of a utilitarian gain or 
the general good cannot justify or prevent, "a man from doing what he has a right to do".112 
The general good is never an adequate basis for limiting rights. In a long line of cases 
beginning with R v Nay/or,113 and R v Leckey,114 there is a gradual tightening of the 
constraints on judicial comment, and a gradual limitation on the drawing of adverse 
inferences. Lord Oaksey in Waugh v R115 notes, "the very fact that the prosecution are not 
permitted to comment on the fact that the accused did not give evidence, shows how careful 
a judge should be in making such comment". By the late 1960s judges have become 
reluctant to comment on the absence of the accused from the witness stand. In R v 
109 Ibid R v Bathurst at 1 07; R v Sparrow at 496; R v Gilbert at 238. 
110 (1899} 1 QB 77, 83 and R v Sparrow (1973} 1 WLR 488, 494, "it was the practice of judges, when 
justice required them to do so, to comment in robust terms on a defendant's absence from the witness 
box''. 
111 302 U.S 319,325-26 (1937} per Cardozo J. See supra chapter 5 p.154, and Twining v New Jersey 
211 US 78, 79 (1908}, "[ .... ] it has been the opinion of constitution makers that the privilege [of 
silence], if fundamental in any sense, is not fundamental in the due process of law, nor an essential 
part of ir. "It would be going too far to rate [the privilege] as an immutable principle of justice. [There 
is no reason] for straining the meaning of due process to include this privilege within ir. 
112 Dworkin ''Taking Rights Seriously" in Simpson ed, Oxford Essays In Jurisprudence (1973} 202, 
213. See supra chapter 3 p.87. 
113 (1933} 1 KB 685, 687. 
114 (1944} 1 KB 80, 86. 
115 (1950} AC 203, 211. 
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Bathurst,116 Lord Parker recommends, ''the accepted form of comment is to inform the jury 
that the accused is not bound to give evidence ... and that while the jury has been deprived 
of the opportunity of hearing his side of the story tested in cross-examination, the one thing 
they must not do is to assume that he is guilty because he has not gone into the witness 
box''. A similar trend is noticeable in America, as a social human rights reaction to the 
Vietnam War. In 1965 the Warren Court in Griffin v California, 117 holds that ''the accused 
cannot be compelled to take the witness stand, neither may the judge or prosecution 
comment on the failure to testify'', and in New Jersey v Portash, 118 a balancing of interests is 
thought of as unnecessary. According to the Supreme Court, the fifth amendment right to 
silence is absolute and in the courtroom where the constitutional privilege operates in its 
most pristine form, no comment limiting the accused's right is permissible. The deontological 
influence on the Australian common law is equally profound. The Australian High Court in 
Environment Protection Authority v Caltex Refining Co Pty Ltd119 has redefined the old 
common law silence principle in terms of a foundational right. The right to silence is now a 
fundamental human right protecting the dignity of the accused. The nature and scope of the 
deontological conceptualisation of the silence principle is succinctly illustrated by the 
Australian High Court in Petty and Maiden v The Queen, 120 "an incidence of the right to 
silence [pre-trial silence] is that no adverse inference can be drawn against an accused 
person by reason of his or her failure to answer questions or provide information. To draw 
such an inference would be to erode the right of silence or to render it valuelesS' [emphasis 
added]. 
Pre-trial interrogatory silence : Until 1994 it was a well-established common law doctrine 
that a suspect enjoyed a substantive right to silence while under interrogation by the state 
authority. The police were obliged to caution the suspect and to warn him of his right to 
silence. Once cautioned, no inference based on the suspect's silence could be lawfully 
drawn. The Royal Commission on Criminal Procedure 1981 noted, "once the accused has 
116 (1968) 2 QB 99, 107-108. 
117 380 us 609, 614 (1965). 
118 440 us 450, 459 (1979). 
119 (1933) 178 CLR 477, per Mason CJ and Toohey J at 404-405, per Deane, Dawson and Gaudron 
JJ at 430-431. The silence principle is also regarded as an essential element of the accusatorial 
system and a fundamental bulwark of liberty and privacy in Pyneboard Pty Ltd v Trade Practices 
Commission (1983) 57 ALJR 236, 240. 
120 (1991) 173 CLR 95, 99 per Mason CJ, Deane and Toohey JJ. At 101 the judges noted, "and what 
is of more importance, the denial of the credibility of the late defence or explanation ... is just another 
way of drawing an adverse inference. Such an erosion of a fundamental right should not be 
permitted." See also R v Beljajev (1984) VR 657, 662; Glennon v R(1994) 179 CLR 1, 8 "the right to 
silence is a fundamental principle of the criminal law and not to be overridden .... ". Sorby v 
Commonwealth (1983) 57 ALJR 248, 261, per Murphy J, "the privilege against self-incrimination is part 
of the common law of human rights". 
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been cautioned, it is unsafe to use his silence against him". In R v Gilbert, 121 the Appeal 
Court explained further, "the words of the caution make it clear that the [suspect] was entitled 
to keep silent ... [the jury] must be told that they may not draw the inference of guilt from his 
silence". Although, in theory, the judge is obliged to instruct the jury not to make any adverse 
inferences from post-caution silence, in practice there is no method by which to prevent a lay 
person jury from drawing common sense adverse inferences.122 The Royal Commission 
specifically observed, "whatever instruction a judge may issue to a jury about post-caution 
silence, it does not, indeed cannot, prevent a jury or bench of magistrates from consciously 
drawing an adverse inference".123 An important element of the common law doctrine is that 
the suspect is empowered to refuse all co-operation with the police.124 The duty to aid the 
police is a moral, but not a legal one.125 Silence cannot therefore be construed as a willful 
obstruction of justice, but when the suspect does remain stubbornly unco-operative, the 
police are entitled to continue the interrogation within reasonable time constraints.126 The 
legal position in respect to pre-caution silence is less than certain. In R v Feigenbaum, 127 the 
accused's silence, where no caution had been administered, was held to be capable of 
corroborating evidence against him. However, in R v Ha/1,128 Lord Diplock pointed out that, 
''the right to silence is a clear and widely known principle of the common law which exists 
independently of the caution and serves to protect the accused except in certain limited 
circumstances" .129 The judicial construction of silence and its relationship to the caution 
administered in the station house obviously reflects a precarious balancing which seeks to 
protect the procedural rights of the individual while also attempting to further the societal 
interest in securing efficient, legitimate and low-cost convictions. 
The Even Term Principle and the presence of a Solicitor during the police 
interrogation : Exceptionally, an invocation of silence by the suspect may be subject to 
judicial comment when the accuser and the accused are speaking on even terms. An 
121 (1977) 66 Crim. App. Rep 237, 243. 
122 Van Kessei''The Suspect As A Source Of Testimonial Evidence" (38) Hastings L. Rev (1986) 1, 
11. 
123 The Royal Commission on Criminal Procedure 1981, Cmnd 8092 also suggested that rather than 
barring judicial comment, the judge should be allowed to explain to the jury why silence in certain 
circumstances is consistent with innocence. See Greer ''The Right To Silence" (53) M. L. Rev (1990) 
709, 729-30. 
124 Benyon "Powers And Propriety In The Police Station" in Police Powers and Procedures (1989) 
118. 
125 Rice v Connolly (1966) 2 QB 414. 
126 Ibid Van Kessel at 419. 
127 (1919) 1 KB 431. 
128 (1971) 1 WLR 298, 301. 
129 Lord Diplock at 301 , "it may be that in exceptional circumstances an inference may be drawn from 
a failure to give an explanation [ ... ] bl:.lt silence alone on being informed by a police officer that 
someone has made an accusation against him cannot give rise to an inference". 
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accusation made to the face of the accused and which reasonably calls for a denial may 
draw an adverse inference. However, before an inference may be drawn from the failure to 
deny an accusation, the natural advantage of the accuser over the accused must have been 
neutralized. Case precedent does not make clear why this should be so. It must be 
assumed that where the questioner is a person in authority, there is a risk of the suspect's 
willpower being weakened and a confession may be induced by some form of authoritarian 
conduct. But it seems more likely that speaking, rather than silence, would be the product of 
officious conduct. Silence is more likely to be in defiance of such conduct and the suspect is 
logically more likely to refute an accusation by a person in authority rather than one by an 
ordinary bystander. In R v Cramp, 130 the father of a young woman accused the suspect of 
giving his pregnant daughter a poisonous liquid in order to induce a miscarriage. The 
suspect remained silent and the absence of a denial when one would reasonably be 
expected was properly commented upon by the trial judge. In R v Mitchell, 131 Cave J 
remarked, "if a charge is made against a person in the person's presence, it is reasonable to 
expect that he will immediately deny it and that an absence of such a denial is some 
evidence of an admission". When private persons are speaking on even terms and an 
accusation is made, to which the accused says nothing, expresses no indignation nor does 
anything to deny the accusation, the judge may comment and draw a reasonable adverse 
inference.132 Mitchell was approved of in R v Parkes, 133 where a young girl's mother, 
observing a knife in the hands of the suspect, twice accused him of stabbing her daughter. 
To these accusations the suspect said nothing and attempted to stab the mother when she 
moved to detain him. The trial judge properly directed the jury to take account of the 
suspect's silence and to infer an acceptance of the truth of the accusation. The common 
factor in these dicta is that the accuser and the accused are on even terms as defined by the 
surrounding circumstances. It must be reasonable to expect some reaction in the way of 
indignation or refutation 134 before the jury may properly consider the accused's silence. 
Clearly, the drawing of an adverse inference is also conditional upon other factors such as 
anxiety, embarrassment, surprise, status, intelligence, mental integrity and the information 
available to the accused at the relevant time. In R v Chandler, 135 the suspect was confronted 
by a police officer in the usual interview and in the presence of his solicitor. According to the 
court, the presence of the legal advisor at the interrogation places the suspect and the police 
130 (1880) 14 Cox CC 390. See also R v Tate (1908) 2 KB 680, and R v Feigenbaum(1919) 1 KB 431. 
These early attempts to use the accused's silence as a corroboration of the witness's statement was 
rejected in R v Littleboy (1934) 2 KB 404, 414. 
131 (1892) 11 Cox CC 503, 508. 
132 Ibid at 509. 
133 (1976) 1 WLR 1251. 
134 Rv Chandler(1976) 1 WLR 583 and Bessela v Stein (CA) 1877.2.CPD 265. 
135 Ibid, but see Lord Atkinsons' dictum in R v Christie (1914) AC 545, 554-555. 
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on even terms. The suspect's silence in this circumstance may readily be the subject of 
judicial comment. Lawton J argued, "we do not accept that a police officer always has an 
advantage over someone he is questioning. A young detective questioning a local dignitary 
on alleged local government corruption may be very much at a disadvantage. This must be 
contrasted with that of a tearful housewife accused of shoplifting or a parent questioned 
about his delinquent son".136 Chandler was followed by R v Horne,137 where the suspect 
remained silent when directly confronted by his victim in the presence of a police officer. The 
Appeal Court held that notwithstanding the authority of the police officer, both parties were 
on equal terms. With the introduction of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (PACE), 
Sec. 58 codifies the right to legal advice. The even term circumstance defined in Chandler 
between the suspect, the police and a solicitor has now become the statutory norm. The 
effect of Sec. 58 is to prevent the drawing of adverse inferences from the accused's silence 
in the presence of his solicitor. Lord Lane in R v Alladice,138 has argued that Sec. 58 
unbalances the relationship between prosecution and defence in favour of the defence. It 
was partly on the basis of such judicial pressure that the Criminal Justice and Public Order 
Act 1994 amending the accused's right to silence was enacted. 
Judicial Commentary : At the turn of the twentieth century in R v Rhodes, 139 it is noted 
unius est exclusio alterius "there are some cases in which it would be unwise to make any 
comment at all, there are others in which it would be absolutely necessary in the interests of 
justice that such commentary should be made. That is a question entirely for the discretion 
of the judge". However, with the passage of time, the parameters of judicial commentary 
has narrowed and the nature of such commentary has become inflexible. The Court of 
Appeals in R v Lewis140 recently suggested, "that the limits on proper commentary are so 
unclear, trial judges should be advised not to make any comment at all". The general but 
vague common law guideline appears to be that a trial judge may not comment on the 
accused's pre-trial silence at all. He may not encourage or persuade the jury to link the 
136 Easton The Right To Silence Avesbury Ed, at 14 criticises the Chandler decision. It is incorrect to 
assume that the inequalities between the suspect and the police are eradicated simply by the 
presence of a solicitor, given the psychological effects of detention and the surrounds of the police 
station. Moreover the right to silence as a fundamental right should not be varied by the presence or 
absence of a solicitor. Easton's criticism reflects an increasingly deontological and human rights 
explanation for the silence principle popular amongst some English academics. See also Dennis 
"Reconstructing The Law Of Criminal Evidence" Current Legal Problems (1989) 21. 
137 (1990) Crim. L. Rev 188. 
138 (1988) 87 Crim. App. Rep 380, 384-85. See Zuckerman "Evidence in 1988" in Annual Review, 
English Law Reports (1988) 146-147. 
139 (1898) 1 QB 77, 83. 
140 (1973) 57 Crim. App. Rep 860, 869. 
308 
accused's trial silence directly to guilt.141 If the accused has answered certain questions 
during the police interrogation but refused to answer others, the judge is not entitled to draw 
an adverse inference from such a lapse.142 In R v Leckey143 and R v Hoare, 144 both trial 
judges drew the jury's attention to the accused's failure to deny the charge on being 
cautioned. In Leckey the judge used the pointed language "if he was innocent he should 
have denied the charge" and in Hoare the equally direct "members of the jury, what would 
you have done if you were innocent?". On appeal, Their Lordships held that any judicial 
comment which pointedly made silence conclusive of guilt was improper and prejudicial to 
the fair trial interests of the accused. Similarly, in R v Sullivan, 145 the Court of Appeals held 
the following trial commentary to be improper, "bear in mind that he [the accused] was fully 
entitled to refuse to answer questions, he has an absolute right to refuse .... But you might 
well think that if a man is innocent he will be anxious to answer questions". Realistically, this 
is exactly the kind of inference that a common sense jury person would draw. Solomon L J 
(dissenting)146 notes, "it seems pretty plain that all the members of the jury, if they had any 
. common sense at all, must have been saying to themselves precisely what the learned [trial] 
judge said to them". In the American case, Griffin v Califomia,147 Stewart J (dissenting) 
states, "how can it be said that the inference drawn by the jury will be more detrimental to the 
defendant under the limiting and controlled language of judicial instruction than would result if 
the jury were left to roam at large with only its untutored instinct to guide it". Nevertheless, it 
is established judicial precedent that a trial comment which so obviously links the accused's 
silence to normal innocent behaviour and then draws an inference of guilt, will always be a 
ground for a misjudgement. 
The nature of the ambush defence and the unsatisfactory solutions adopted by the common 
law precedents in respect to this vexing question has solicited much argument. The 
advantage given to the accused by the use of the ambush tactic is one of the primary 
reasons for the enactment of the Criminal Justice And Public Order Act 1994. The ambush 
defence is a calculated manipulation of the right to silence by the accused during the pre-trial 
investigatory interview, whereby the accused refuses to disclose a defence or alibi. Later at 
trial, the accused deliberately adduces evidence of a detailed defence which catches the 
141 R v Littleboy (1934) 2 KB 408, 414; R v Whitehead (1929) 1 KB 99; R v Keeling (1942) 1 ALLER 
507. See also the British Law Society Memorandum (1973) at 14 and the Bar Council Memorandum 
(1973) at 25-26. 
142 RvHemy(1990)Crim. L. Rev574. 
143 (1994) 1 KB 80. 
144 (1965) 50 Cr. App. Rep 50. 
145 (1966) 51 Cr. App. Rep 102, 104-105. See also R v Davis (1959) 43 Crim. App. Rep 215. 
146 Ibid Sullivan per Solomon J at 105. 
147 380 US 609 (1965) particularly at 621. See also Greer "The Right To Silence" (53) M.L.R. (1990) 
709, 729. 
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prosecution by surprise and effectively prevents the state from investigating the defence and 
developing arguments against it.148 In these ambush situations, judicial commentary which 
draws an adverse inference of fabrication or invented defence after the fact, is usually a 
common sense inference. In R v Littleboy,149 judicial comment which invited the jury to 
evaluate the accused's previous silence and his failure to reveal a defence to the police on 
the basis that it prevented the police from investigating the merits of the defence, was held to 
be proper. In R v Ryan, 150 the trial judge goes further and expressly holds that if the accused 
remains silent during interrogation and subsequently uses a new defence to surprise the 
prosecution during trial, the prosecution is entitled to undermine the credibility of the accused 
by making evidentiary use of the accused's prior sentence. However, in R v Gilbert, 151 Lord 
Dilhorne critically states, "it may not be a misdirection to say simply, 'this defence was first 
put at trial' ... but if more is said, it may give rise to an inference that a jury is being invited to 
disregard the defence being put forward because the.accused exercised his right of silence". 
His Lordship's opinion illustrates the contradictory and confused nature of the common law 
interpretations of the silence principle. On the one hand his opinion serves as an indirect 
invitation to the jury to take the accused's silence into account in assessing credibility. On 
the other hand, his Lordship's words suggest that no inferences may be drawn from the 
accused's silence. The dictum encourages an underhand kind of adverse inference 
commentary shrouded in the half-light of innuendo and ambiguity. In an attempt to combat 
ambush defences and to cut through judicial confusion, Sec. 11 of the Criminal Justice Act 
1967 disallowed surprise alibi defences at trial.152 In terms of the act, the defence had to 
give reasonable time prescribed notice to the prosecution of the intention to adduce alibi 
evidence at trial. The Criminal Justice Act 1967 (Sec. 11) is now replaced by the evidentiary 
disclosure requirements of Part I of the Criminal Procedure And Investigations Act 1996.153 
148 An ambush defence may be characterised as follows : 
a) the accused unexpectedly raises the defence at trial; 
b) the prosecution is taken by surprise; 
c) the defence should have been raised at the police interview; 
d) the prosecution is prejudiced because it is unable to rebut the defence due to its late submission; 
e) the accused is unfairly advantaged; 
f) the defence is usually false. 
149 R v Littleboy (1934) 2 KB 408, 413-414; Hinton v Trotter (1931) SASR 123, 124 (per Napier J). 
150 (1966) 50 Cr. App. Rep 144. 
151 (1977) 66 Cr. App. Rep 237, 244. R v Raviraj (1986) 85 Crim. App. Rep 93; R v Gerard (1948) 1 
ALL ER 205, 206. 
152 Criminal Justice Act (1967), Sec. 11. An obligation is placed on the accused to give notice of the 
particulars of his alibi before the trial, if he.does not he cannot adduce the alibi into court save with the 
permission of the judge. Sec. 11 allows the court to draw a number of inferences from the absence of 
key facts from the accused's disclosure : (a) the judge may make such comment as appears 
reasonable on the failure to disclose; (b) the jury may draw such inferences as appear reasonable. 
(Sec. 11 repealed by schedule 5 of the new 1996 Act). 
153 Criminal Procedure And Investigations Act (1996) Part I, Sec. 3(1). Compulsory disclosure by the 
prosecution of all the prosecutorial evidentiary material. Once the prosecution has complied, the 
accused also has the duty of disclosure in terms of Sec. 1 (2) and Sec. 5(1 )(a). The accused must 
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Chief Justice Lord Lane in R v Alladice 154 noted that a change in the permitted parameters of 
judicial commentary was necessary to combat the frequency of alibi defences. It was such 
influential pressure which was to lead to the enactment of the Criminal Justice And Public 
Order Act 1994. 
In R v Rhodes,155 R v Waugh 156 and R v Jackson 157 a distinction is drawn between a "fair'' 
judicial comment and one which is "excessive" or "unjustified". A problem with this kind of 
distinction is that it is very difficult to define the exact boundaries of the word "fair" as well as 
the word "excessive". It is also difficult to determine whether a strong comment or only an 
indirect mention is called for. Two factors guide the ability of the trial judge to comment. 
First, a judge is given no discretion to comment on pre-trial silence but a much wider latitude 
to comment on the accused's failure to testify.158 This is so because the accused's trial 
silence is less open to misunderstanding by the jury. The accused is also supported by 
defence counsel, properly informed, adequately prepared and less likely to make the wrong 
choice under pressure. Second, judicial comment is usually triggered when the facts-in-
issue are peculiarly within the accused's personal knowledge or where the accused's state of 
mind159 is a vital fact-in-issue and the accused fails to testify. Third, judicial commentary is 
dependent on whether or not the prosecution has established a prima facie case which calls 
for rebuttal by the accused, and the accused fails to rebut the prima facie case against him. 
The authoritative guideline in this regard is laid out in R v Bathurst, 160 per Lord Parker, and in 
R v Mutch,161 "the judge cannot direct that silence in court be used as corroboration or to 
reinforce a weak prosecutorial case, or to suggest that the defence may not succeed without 
the accused's testimony". In the interests of justice a stronger comment may be warranted in 
exceptional circumstances. Lawton J in R v Sparrow 162 notes, "a colourless reading out of 
the evidence as recorded by the judge in his notebook, is often of no aid to the jury''. 
within a prescribed period provide the prosecution with a defence statement setting out the general 
nature of his defence and the facts-in-issue. See Card and Ward The Criminal Procedure And 
Investigations Act 1996 chapters 2 and 6. 
154 (1988) 57 Crim. App. Rep 380. 
155 (1899) 1 QB 177, 178. 
156 (1950) A.C 203. 
157 (1955) 1 WLR 591. 
158 The Criminal Law Revision Committee, Eleventh Report (1972) Cmnd 4991. See also Haw Tau 
Tau v Public Prosecutor (1982) 3 ALL ER 14, 18, per Lord Diplock, "English law has always 
recognised the right of the Dury] in a criminal case to draw inferences from a failure of a defendant to 
exercise his right to give evidence and thereby submit himself to cross-examination". 
159 Williams "The Right To Silence And The Mental Elemenf' Crim. L. Rev(1988) 97-102, but seeR v 
Kanaveilomani (1994) 72 Crim. App Rep 492, 509 where it was held incorrectly that the accused's 
state of mind is not peculiarly within his own knowledge. 
160 (1968) 2 QB 107, 108. 
161 (1973) 1 ALLER 178. 
162 (1973) 1 WLR 488, at 495. 
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According to Lawton, the judge's duty to the jury requires "the benefit of his knowledge of the 
law and advice in the light of his experience and the significance of the evidence before 
them. The judge should explain to the jury what the consequence of the accused's absence 
from the witness stand signifies". The judge may not bolster a weak prosecution case . by 
making repeated comments on the accused's failure to testify. In R v Martinez-Tobon, 163 
judicial comment was reserved only for the exceptional circumstance in which the accused's 
silence appears remarkable and the nature of the case against him overwhelmingly strong. 
Although the right to silence is firmly rooted in the common law, it does not come with a cost-
free guarantee and is sometimes evoked to the accused's peril. In the words of Lord Devlin, 
"while the English common law undoubtedly does give the accused man the right to be silent, 
it does nothing to urge him to take advantage of his right or even to make the course 
invariably the attractive one . . . This dilemma in which the law puts the suspect ... seems a 
perfectly fair one".164 Lord Devlin's words echo a utilitarian logic which unfortunately has all 
but been eroded by the influence of a fashionable human rights "sentimentality". 
8.5 Common Law Silence in the Commonwealth 
The English common law silence principle has been exported to all foreign jurisdictions 
previously under British colonial administration. It is to be found, in one form or another, in 
the procedural law of Scotland,165 Northern Ireland, Ireland, Australia, New Zealand, South 
Africa, Canada, India, Israel, 166 Sri-Lanka, Burma, Nigeria, Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda, 
Malawi, Zambia, Zimbabwe, Botswana, Swaziland, Lesotho, Gambia, Ghana, Sierra-Leone, 
Guinea, Guyana, and the West Indies. It co-exists and competes in an attenuated degree 
with Sharia law in Egypt, Pakistan, Bangladesh and is statutorily modified along the lines of 
the English Criminal Justice And Public Order Act 1994 in Singapore and Malaysia. In the 
majority of Commonwealth jurisdictions, the silence principle is mostly defined in terms of the 
common law. For example, all Anglophone African jurisdictions, with the exception of South 
163 (1994) 98 Cr. App. Rep 375, per Lord Taylor, "silence does nothing to establish guilt. On the other 
hand, it means that there is no evidence from the defendant which explains the· evidence by the 
prosecution". See also R v Hubbard (1991) Crim. L. Rev 449; R v Hook (1994) T.L.R. 375. 
164 See Maloney "The Criminal Evidence (N.I.) Order 1988" Boston College Int. Camp. L. Rev(1993) 
425-429. Van Kessel ibid note 122 at 31. 
165 Scotland possesses a unique and hybrid inquisitorial legal system with accusatorial elements, one 
of which is a common law silence principle. See further infra chapter 11. 
166 The Israeli silence principle is based on English common law precedents and not on Talmudic 
religious law. 
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Africa, depend on a common law interpretation of silence.167 A significant minority rely on 
statutory codifications; Northern Ireland (Criminal Evidence : Northern Ireland Order 1988); 
Singapore (Criminal Procedure Code (revised) 1985); Malaysia (Criminal Procedure Act 
1996); Ireland (Criminal Justice Act 1984); Sri-Lanka (Criminal Procedure Act 1979) and 
New Zealand (Bill of Rights Act 1990).168 Both the Irish Bunreacht na hEreann (1936)169 and 
the recent Australian Federal Constitution make no mention of a silence principle. The South 
African silence principle is a relative right defined in sec 35(1 )(a) and Sec 35(1 )(b). A right 
against self-incrimination Is set out in Sec 35(3)(i). Canada has only partly entrenched the 
privilege against self-incrimination in the Charter of Rights and Freedoms (Constitution Act 
1982, Part 1).170 
A number of general principles which define the international character of the common law 
silence principle are isolated and encapsulated in the following brief summary. In the 
Commonwealth trial process the accused has three basic choices 171 : 
(a) He may refuse to answer any questions by claiming the right to silence; 
(b) He may elect to give sworn evidence. The right to silence falls away and the accused 
is subject to cross-examination in which incriminating questions may be put to him. 
(c) A third choice, now statutorily repealed172 in most Commonwealth jurisdictions, is the 
entitlement to give an unsworn statement which does not expose the accused to 
cross-examination and indirectly preserves the right to silence. 
167 The Nigerian, Kenyan, Ugandan and Malawian Constitutions make no reference to a silence 
principle. Namibia possesses a fairly detailed constitutional silence principle similar to the South 
African constitutional right to silence. (Namibia, although administered by South Africa as a Trust 
territory was never a member of the Commonwealth). 
168 The wording of the American fifth amendment is almost identically repeated in Sec. 25(d) of the 
New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990. See also Sec. 23(4) of the same Act and Sec. 366(1) Crimes Act 
1961. 
169 The Irish Constitution (1936) and various amendments (1984) only indirectly and by implication 
refer to a silence principle in Art 38.1 and Art 40.3 and 4. See D.P.P v Quilligan (1992) S.C. 21-22, 
"there is no Irish constitutional privilege" and no "constitutional pre-trial right to silence", D.P.P v 
Pringle (1982) 2 Frewen 57; D.P.P v Farrel (1978)1.R. 13. 
17° Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Sec. 11(c), Sec. 13 and Sec. 7. See also the Canadian Bill of 
Rights (1960) Sec. 2(a). The Canadian constitutional right is heavily influenced by the jurisprudence 
of the American fifth amendment. See further infra chapter 11 note 3-7 and accompanying text. 
171 McNicol Evidence Butterworths (1998); Henchliffe "The Silent Accused At Trial" Un. Queensland 
L.J (1996) 137; Harvey "The Right To Silence And The Presumption Of Innocence" New Zealand L.J 
(1995) 181; Palmer "Silence In Court- The Evidential Significance Of An Accused Person's Failure 
To Testify'' N.S.W. L.J (1995) 131; Williams "Silence In Australia" L.Q.R. (1994) 629; Cato "Petty And 
Maiden : The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination And Its Progeny" Crim. L.J (1992) 311; Pereis "An 
Accused Person's Privilege Against Self-Incrimination : A Comparative Analysis Of The English, New 
Zealand And South Asian Legal Systems" LAWASIA.N.S (1982) 50. 
172 Statutorily repealed in England by Sec. 2 Criminal Justice Act (1982). In South Africa by Sec. 
196(3) Criminal Procedure Act 1977. 
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Where the accused elects to exercise his right to silence, the court is faced with a number of 
evidentiary alternatives : 
(a) Silence may be used as evidence in its own right. 
(b) Silence may be used as part of the total evidentiary material. 
(c) Silence may be used in a limited manner to evaluate other types of evidentiary 
material. 
Conditioned upon the evidentiary usage of silence, four kinds of inferences (usually adverse, 
but sometimes positive) based on logic and common sense may be derived from the 
accused's invocation of silence. These have been mentioned previously, but bear 
repeating: 
(a) Silence may be used to infer an implied consent. The accused's silence or failure to 
deny an accusation put to him is capable of amounting in law to an acceptance of the 
terms of the accusation. It must be a reasonable inference in the circumstance, that 
the accused accepted the accusation, making it wholly or partially his own. This type 
of adverse inference is subject to the administration of a caution (in which case it can 
never be drawn) and to the even term principle (it may only be drawn if both the 
accusor and accused are on an equal footing). 
(b) Silence may be used as evidence to infer a general consciousness or knowledge of 
guilt. This possibility is without exception rejected in all Commonwealth jurisdictions. 
(c) Silence may be used to evaluate other evidence. Silence is taken into account to 
determine whether or not to accept other evidence or to draw inferences arising from 
other evidence. The effect of the accused's silence is that it adds weight or 
strengthens the prosecution's evidence or any inferences arising from the 
prosecution's evidence. This is the preferred evidentiary usage of silence in the 
Commonwealth. 
(d) Following logically from point (c), silence by itself cannot convert an insufficient state 
case into a sufficient state case.173 Before silence may have any probative value, the 
state must by means of other evidence establish a prima facie case against the 
173 For an uncompromising perspective on the trial silence principle in South Africa, see Geldenhuys 
and Joubert Criminal Procedural Handbook (1994) 6, "~he 'nothingness' of the accused's silence 
cannot logically fill the gap in the state case". For the Australian perspective, see Weissensteiner v R 
(1993) 178 CLR 217 per Mason CJ, Deane, Dawson JJ at 227-229 and Brennan, Toohey JJ at 235-6. 
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accused.174 An inference from silence means that an evidentiary burden has been 
cast upon the accused to rebut the state's prima facie case and the accused through 
his silence has failed to do so. 
Pre-trial Silence : In Commonwealth jurisprudence a suspect is empowered not to answer 
questions during the police interrogation nor may the suspect's silence be used as evidence 
in any subsequent criminal proceeding. Pre-trial silence in the face of authoritative 
questioning has no probative value.175 In most, but not all, Commonwealth jurisdictions 
cautionary guidelines oblige the police to inform the suspect of his rights.176 The right to 
silence is further reinforced by the rules governing the admissibility of confessions and 
admissions. In most jurisdictions confessions are regulated by the usual common law 
voluntariness rule but in some jurisdictions, particularly in England, Singapore and Australia, 
new statutory rules have been developed.177 Where the suspect has been confronted and 
questioned by someone other than a person in authority, silence in the face of the accusation 
may give rise to an adverse inference.178 Especially when the suspect adopts or 
acknowledges the truth of the statement or allegation.179 Silence may also have probative 
value when the suspect answers questions in a selective or evasive manner. The adverse 
inference is derived not only from silence, but also from the manner in which the questions 
are evaded.180 The possession of stolen goods for which no reasonable explanation is 
forthcoming may infer a guilty knowledge. 181 In some jurisdictions, ambush defences or the 
failure to reveal alibi evidence during police interrogation may give rise to adverse inferences 
which strengthen the state's case. England has statutorily amended the common law rules 
174 (Australia) Weissensteiner ibid; Petty and Maiden (1991) 173 CLR 95. (New Zealand) Nicolls 
(1951) NZLR 91. (Canada) Boss (1988) 46 C.C.C. (3d) 523 (Ont C.A). (South Africa) Letsoko 1964 
(4) SA 768 (A), Theron 1968 (4) SA 61 (T). 
175 (Australia) Bruce (1987) 61 ALJR 603. (New Zealand) Duffy (1979) 2 NZLR 432. (Canada) 
Herbert (1990) 2 SCR 151, 157 C.C.C. (3d) 145. (South Africa) Patel1946 AD 903, Maritz 1974 (1) 
SA266 (NC). 
176 (Australia) the caution is statutorily defined in all Federal States, ie Sec. 464(A)(3) Crimes Act 
(1988). (Canada) ltwaru (1970) 4 C.C.C. 206, 10 CRNS 184, Robertson (1975) 21 C.C.C. (2d) 385, 
29 CRNS 141. (New Zealand) Convery (1968) NZLR 426, Kirifi (1992) 2 NZLR 8. (South Africa) the 
caution is constitutionally defined in Sec. 35 of the 1996 Constitution. 
177 (Australia) The Evidence Act (1995) Cth and NSW. (Singapore) Criminal Procedure Code (Rev) 
1985. (Malaysia) Criminal Procedure Act (Rev) 1996. (Canada) the common law voluntariness 
standard applies, Proskov (1922) 32. C.C.C. 199, 66, DLR 346, Pitcher (1970) 4 C.C.C. 27, 12 CRNS 
222. (South Africa) the voluntariness standard is statutorily defined in the Criminal Procedure Act 
1977, Yolelo 1981 1 SA 1002 (A), Mpetha 1983 (1) SA 576 (C), Blom 1992 (1) SACR 649 (E) 
178 (Australia) Salahattin (1983) 1 VR 521. (New Zealand) Duffy (1979) 2 NZLR 432-435, Reddy 
(1994) NZLR 457, 460. (South Africa) Patel1946 AD 903, 907. 
179 (Australia) Ireland (1970) 126 CLR 321, Salahattin ibid. (South Africa) Mogotsi 1982 (1) SA 190 
(B). 
180 (Australia) Woon (1964) 109 C.L.R. 529, McNamara (1987) 1 VR 855, Bey (1994) (1) WLR39, 
Sharpe (1994) 2 WLR 84. (Canada) Mannion (1986) 53 CR (3d) 193 C.C.C. 
181 (Australia) Beljajev (1984) VR 657, Bruce (1987) 74 ALR 219. (South Africa) Osman 1998 (11) 
BCLR 1362 (C.C), Skweyiya 1984 (4) SA 712 (A). 
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governing admissibility of ambush defences and both prosecutorial and judicial commentary 
is now freely allowed. The Canadian Supreme Court has held the alibi defence to be an 
exception to the right to silence. When the Canadian accused springs a surprise alibi 
defence at trial, the state may draw an adverse inference from the accused's failure to admit 
the alibi timeously and in a manner sufficient to permit a full investigation into its merits.182 In 
South Africa, the failure to disclose an alibi defence timeously weakens the defence case 
and strengthens the state's prima facie case. 183 In Australia and New Zealand an alibi 
defence may be disclosed at any stage of the proceeding and no direct or indirect inference 
going to the suspect's credibility may be drawn.184 
Silence at trial : In all Commonwealth jurisdictions the accused is a competent but not a 
compellable witness.185 The accused's silence cannot be used to draw a direct inference of 
guilt. If the accused's silence could be used as evidence of guilt, then the accused would 
have no real choice but to give evidence. He would then become compeUable and open to 
compulsory interrogation.186 Silence has only a limited evidentiary value and is dependent 
on whether or not the state has established a case which requires an answer.187 A failure to 
testify adversely affects the accused by strengthening the state's case, leaving it 
uncontradicted or unexplained on vital facts-in-issue. 188 The state must first establish a 
prima facie case based on other sources of evidence. If the state case standing alone is 
unable to raise an inference of guilt, then the accused's silence is irrel.evant. Only once the 
state case has reached a certain threshold of sufficiency may silence be used to strengthen 
other inferences arising from the prima facie case. 189 A threshold of sufficiency means a 
case which is sufficient to support a finding of guilt according to the standard of proof beyond 
182 Parrington (1985) 20 C.C.C. 2d, 194, Chambers (1990) 59 C.C.C. (3d) 321 (S.C.C.), Cleghorn 
(1995) 35 C.R. 175, 100 C.C.C. (3d) 393. This rule is unique to Canada. It has been suggested that 
the rule is an infringement of Sec. 7 of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Craig "The Alibi 
Exceptions To The Right Of Silence" Crim. L. Q. (1996) 227-49. See alsoP. (M.B.) (1994) 29 C.R 
(4th) 209 (S.C.C.). 
183 Mashelele 1944 AD 571,585. 
184 The "artificial" distinction between an inference of guilt and an inference against credibility was 
rejected in Petty and Maiden (1991) 173 CLR 95 and in Coombs (1983) NZLR 748. 
185 (Australia) A.C.T, Sec. 66 Evidence Ordinance Act 1971, N.S.W., Sec. 405 Crime Act 1900 (New 
Zealand) Indictable Offences Summary Jurisdiction Act 1894. (Canada) Sec. 4 Canada Evidence Act 
1893, Sec. 11(c) Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Curr (1972) 7 C.C.C. (2d) 181 (S.C.C.). (South 
Africa) Sec. 196(1) C.P.A., and Sec. 35 Constitution 1996. 
186 (Australia) Tumhole Bereng (1949) AC 235, 270, Weissensteiner ibid. (Canada) Noble (1997) 14 
DLR (4th) 385,43 C.R.R. (2nd) 233. (South Africa) Letsoko 1964 (4) SA 768 A.D. 
187 (Australia) Weissensteiner(1993) 178 CLR 217. (Canada) Noble ibid. 
188 (Australia) Weissensteiner ibid. (New Zealand) McCarthy (1992) 8 CRNZ 58. (Canada) 
McConne/(1968) 4 C.C.C. 257, 263 (S.C.C.), Corbett (1973) 42 DLR (3d) 142 (S.C.C.). (South 
Africa) Nkombani 1963 (4) SA 877 (AD), Lesoko 1964 (4) SA 768 (AD), Theron 1968 (4) SA 61 (T). 
189 (Australia) Corrie and Watson (1904) 20 TLR 365, Kops (1893) 14 NSWLR 150, 178. (New 
Zealand) Dolling v Bird (1924) 43 NZLR 545, Trompert(1985) 1 NZLR 359. (Canada) Lepage (1995) 
1 SCR 654, 36 CR (4th) 145 (S.C.C.), Johnson (1993) 120 R (3d) 340 21 CR (4th) 336 (CA). 
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a reasonable doubt. If the state case falls below the threshold, there is a danger that the 
trier-of-fact may use the accused's silence to add weight to the state case rather than using 
silence simply to resolve an already existing doubt. The probative weight of a silence 
inference is therefore dependent on the strength of the state prima facie case. The accused 
is less likely to invoke silence when the prima facie case is strong and more likely to do so 
when the case is weak. The state ability to build a prima facie case on either direct or 
circumstantial evidence will also influence the probative value of the accused's silence.190 
Silence in the face of a prima facie case built on direct evidence serves to strengthen the 
state case when there is nothing to contradict it. When the state case is built on 
circumstantial evidence, the probative value of the accused's silence is dependent on 
whether there is a reasonable possibility of an innocent explanation, 191 or whether the facts-
in-issue are peculiarly within the accused's knowledge. When the accused alone is in 
possession of knowledge peculiar to the facts-in-issue, then silence will have a high 
probative value. 192 It must also be reasonable, in the circumstance, to expect the accused to 
speak up. It must be reasonable to expect that if the truth is consistent with innocence, then 
a denial or explanation would be forthcoming from the accused. 
Most Commonwealth jurisdictions allow the judge a limited ability to comment on the 
accused's silence.193 (Except in South Africa, a no-trial jury system, judicial comment is a 
moot point. The South African judge is expected to explain his evidentiary use of silence in 
his judgement). Judicial commentary has the inherent danger of focusing the jury's attention 
on the accused's silence. The jury may then draw an unreasonable adverse inference from 
the accused's failure to testify. However, the opposite is not always true and it cannot be 
said that a total ban on judicial commentary will automatically serve to prevent the jury from 
drawing unreasonable adverse .inferences. A legal rule can do little to prevent the juror who 
deliberately, negligently, ignorantly or subconsciously draws an adverse inference from the 
190 (Australia) Kanavei/omani(1994) 72 A. Crim. R 492, Khoosa/ and Singh (1994) 71 A. Crim. R 127, 
123. (Canada) Jenkins (1908) 14 C.C.C. 221, 230. (South Africa) Mthetwa 1972 (3) SA 766 (A); 
Francis 1991 (1) SACR 198 (A). 
191 (Australia) Gordon (1991) 57 A. Crim. R 413. (New Zealand) Accused (1988) 2 NZLR 385, 
Nicolls (1951) NZLR 91. (Canada) Robertson (1975) 21 C.C.C. (2d) 385, 29 CNRS 141 (148) 
(C.C.C.). 
192 (Australia) Nielan (1992) 1 VR 57, Weissensteiner ibid. (South Africa) Union Gov v Sykes 1913 
AD 156, Kola 1966 (4) SA 322 (A). 
193 (Australia) most states, except NSW, Victoria and the Northern Territories, allow judicial comment, 
Lander (1989) 52 SASR 424. No prosecutorial comment is allowed in all states except Queensland, 
Waugh (1950) AC 203. (New Zealand) judicial comment is allowed, Butcher (1992) 2 NZLR 257, 258, 
Prosecutorial comment is not permitted, Sec. 366 Crimes Act 1961, McRae (993) CRN 261. (Canada) 
judicial and prosecutorial comment at jury trial is barred, Sec. 4(6) Canada Evidence Act, Bindet(1948) 
92 C.C.C. 20 (Ont. C.A), Creighton (1995) 1 SCR 858. A distinction is drawn between a comment and 
a statement, Avon (1971) 21 DLR (3d) 422 (S.C.C.). (South Africa) judicial commentary is a moot 
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accused's silence.194 Commonwealth jurisdictions mostly adopt a compromise position. One 
where the judge in a carefully worded controlled and objective commentary, which neither 
over or under-emphasises silence, explains to the jury the permissible inferences which may 
be drawn in the particular circumstances. By contrast, the United States Supreme Court has 
developed a rigid no-comment rule which basically leaves the jury to make its own 
unsupervised choices. 195 The Commonwealth judge must make it clear to the jury that the 
accused is not obliged to give evidence. The accused's silence may not amount to an 
admission of guilt nor may it constitute a corroboration of guilt. Judicial commentary is 
susceptible to the following guidelines. Where the accused is suffering from a physical or 
mental disability, no comment may be made. Where the accused has given an innocent 
explanation before trial, the explanation is adduced into evidence and the accused 
subsequently fails to testify, no judicial comment may be made. Where the defence has 
adequately prepared and presented its case through other witness evidence, no comment 
may be made. Where the state case is weak, the accused is justified in remaining silent. 
Where the state case has not clearly established the accused's participation in a crime or 
one which calls for an innocent explanation, no comment may be made. On the other hand, 
a strong judicial comment is warranted where the accused alleges an innocent explanation 
and then fails to testify. 196 On the whole, judicial commentary is an exercise in balance. It 
should not be repetitive or unnecessarily disparaging. The judge should never over-
emphasise the accused's silence in a way which gives it an undue importance not warranted 
on the facts. 
The distinction between pre-trial and trial silence : The inference drawn from the 
· suspect's silence during a police interrogation is not logically different from the inference 
drawn from the accused's silence at trial. Yet, in all Commonwealth jurisdictions, pre-trial 
silence is afforded a greater degree of protection than trial silence. It is also assumed that 
both pre-trial and trial silence are equal manifestations of the core fundamental privilege 
point, prosecutorial commentary is allowed on close of trial and at appeal, Letsoko1964 (4) SA 768 
(AD), 776 C-E. See also Vander Merwe "The Constitutional Passive Defence" Obiter(1994) 1-21. 
194 R v Steinberg (1931) QR 222, 236, (C.A) Canada, although no judicial comment may be made in a 
jury trial, "the law does not forbid jurors from using their own intelligence and considering the absence 
of the accused's explanation". 
195 Griffin v California 380 US 609 (1965) per Stewart J (dissenting) at 623. The judge may make no 
adverse inference comment, Lakeside v Oregon 43 US 333 (1978). The judge is obliged to make a no 
adverse inference comment on request by the accused, Carter v Kennedy 450 US 288 (1981). See 
supra chapter 6. 
196 
"Although the burden is on the prosecution to prove mens rea, the accused is usually the best 
source of evidence on this issue. Yet, by claiming silence, he can avoid giving an explanation and 
prevent cross-examination as to state-of-mind. By not testifying and denying the mental element, the 
accused presents the state with an insoluble problem, just how to prove the accused's state of mind. 
Comment by the judge in this circumstance is surely appropriate, Williams (1988) Grim. L. Rev 97. 
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against self-incrimination, but this is not strictly true. As has been noted in Chapter Two, pre-
trial silence has its historical origin in the ius commune and the common law reaction to the 
oppressive inquisitorial procedure of the seventeenth century prerogative courts. The trial 
silence principle or the right not to testify has its origin in the rise of defence counsel and in 
the nineteenth century procedural reforms which made the accused for the first time a 
competent but not compellable witness at his own trial. Apart from the historical reason, 
there are a number of other considerations which explain why pre-trial and trial silence are 
treated so differently. These considerations are based on the view that the suspect is at a 
procedural and substantive disadvantage during the pre-trial investigation stage, but the 
accused is at a procedural advantage during the trial. Fairness is recognised as a critical 
adjunct to the drawing of an adverse inference from silence. During the pre-trial interrogation 
stage, the suspect is confronted by coercive and intimidating. influences which make it unfair 
to ascribe a particular voluntary action to the accused or to draw an adverse inference from 
his silence. However, at trial, fairness is an integral safeguard and any interpretation of 
silence is bound to be fair. It may be fair to draw adverse inferences from the accused's 
silence at trial, because by this stage the accused is aware of the case to be answered, is 
provided with legal counsel, and there is no danger of state induced compulsion· or 
oppression. The perceived unfairness of the suspect's pre-trial circumstance is behind 
statutory reform of the silence principle in England (Police And Criminal Evidence Act 1984 
PACE), in Australia (Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) and (NSW)), in Singapore (Criminal Procedure 
Code (Chapter 68) 1985) and Malaysia (Criminal Procedure Act 1996). Common sense is 
sometimes advanced as an underlying rationale for the differing degree of protection 
afforded by the silence principle at pre-trial and at trial. Common sense dictates that an 
innocent accused would at the very least assert his innocence before a jury of his peers but 
may understandably refrain from speaking during intimidating and authoritative police 
questioning. 
A third reason advanced for the differential treatment of the silence principle is based on the 
practical consideration of unavoidability. At trial it is practically impossible to prevent the jury 
from taking cognisance of the accused's failure to testify, especially when he ought to be 
expected to deny, explain or answer the case against him. At a very practical level, lay jurors 
may be tempted to draw adverse inferences from the accused's silence. One of the reasons 
for the existence of a judicial comment is to prevent misunderstanding and to instruct the jury 
as to the permissible or impermissible usage of silence. It is assumed that it is easier to 
protect the accused from the consequences of his pre-trial silence by the simple expediency 
of barring the jury from ever finding out about it. A number of variables based on the 
purpose and time of the criminal proceeding may justify the drawing of adverse inferences 
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from silence at trial but not at pre-trial. The pre-trial investigatory stage of the criminal 
proceeding (an executive function) is uniquely different from the trial adjudicatory stage (a 
judicial function). During the investigatory inquisitorial process the police are still building the 
evidentiary case against the suspect. The police need not reveal any information and may 
easily manipulate the ignorant suspect, trick him into lying or persuade him of a particular 
version of the facts. In short, anything which the suspect does or says (or does not do or 
say) may form part of the prosecution's case against him. The silence principle is regarded 
as a crucial protection in this circumstance. In the adjudicatory adversarial stage, the 
prosecution case is well known to the accused. There is little possibility of the accused being 
tricked or caught out in a lie. Adverse inferences from silence are also dependent on the 
time element which assumes a gradually increasing importance as the criminal process 
matures. Initially, when the state case is as yet unformed, there is nothing for the suspect to 
rebut and no legal duty (except a moral one) on the suspect to co-operate in building the 
case against him. However, once the prosecution's case has reached the critical threshold 
level of a prima facie case at trial, silence inferences may add to the probative strength of the 
case against the accused. There is also an imperative evidentiary duty to answer. Unless 
rebutted, the prima facie proof may well harden into conclusive proof and a possible guilty 
verdict. A fairly consistent principle of Commonwealth jurisprudence therefore is that no 
adverse inferences may be drawn from pre-trial silence, but a number of limited adverse 




9.1 Codification Of The Silence Principle 
The Criminal Justice And Public Order Act 1994 (CRIMPO) is a unique and controversial 
piece of legislation.1 Its goal is to modify the common law silence principle by codifying the 
types of adverse inferences which may be drawn from the criminal defendant's invocation of 
silence at both the pre-trial and the trial stage.2 It is born an orphan, with the exception of 
Singapore, 3 no other Commonwealth jurisdiction has seen fit to follow its example. It is also 
an unfashionable legislative act, for it seeks to curtail the right to silence at a time when the 
international legal cultural trend is towards the upgrading and the constitutionalisation of the 
right. (In 1990, New Zealand entrenched a silence principle in its Bill of Rights Act, in 1993 
and 1996 the South African Constitution elevated silence into a fundamental human right, in 
1993 the European Court in Funke v France re-interpreted Sec. 6(1) of the European 
Convention on Human Rights to include a right to silence). Even in England the enactment 
of CRIMPO, almost by an arbitrary governmental fiat,4 is the cause of a polarization within 
the ranks of the legal fraternity. Opponents who favour the statutory curtailment of the 
silence principle suggest that it has become a refuge for the hardened criminal. The 
invocation of silence hampers police investigations and is the perfect foil in the hands of 
1 Birch "Suffering In Silence : A Cost-Benefit Analysis Of Sec. 34 Criminal Justice And Public Order 
Act 1994" Crim. L. Rev (1999) 769; Branston "The Drawing Of An Adverse Committal From Silence" 
Crim. L. Rev (1998) 189; Dennis ''The Criminal Justice And Public Order Act 1994" Crim. L. Rev 
(1995) 4; Pattenden "Inferences From Silence" Crim. L. Rev (1995) 602; Jennings "Resounding 
Silence" New. L. J (1996) 725; Mirfield "Two Side-Effects Of Sec. 34 to 37 Of The Criminal Justice 
And Public Order Act 1994" Crim. L. Rev (1995) 612; O'May ''The Criminal Justice And Public Order 
act 1994" Legal Action (1995) 10. 
2 Keane The Modem Law Of Evidence Butterworths (2000); Phipson On Evidence Sweet and 
Maxwell 2000; Jason-Lloyd The Criminal Justice And Public Order Act 1994 Frank Cass and Co, 
(1996); Mirfield Silence, Confessions And Improperly Obtained Evidence Clarendon Press, (1997). 
3 Khee-Jin Tan "Adverse Inferences And The Right To Silence : Re-examining The Singapore 
Experience" Crim. L. Rev (1997) 471; Hor "The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination And Fairness To 
The Accused" Singapore J. Legal. Studies (1993) 35; Meng Heong Yeo "Diminishing The Right To 
Silence : The Singapore Experience" Crim. L. Rev (1983) 89. The Singapore Criminal Procedure 
Code (amendment) Act of 1976 is the direct result of the recommendations of the English Criminal 
Law Revision Committee, 11th Report 1972, Cmnd 4991 (para 28-45). See in particular Sec. 122(b), 
123(1), 189(2) and 196(2) of the Criminal Procedure Code. In Singapore the constitutionality of the 
pre-trial and trial silence was upheld by the Privy Council in Haw Tau Tau v P.P (1981) 3 ALLER 14, 
20, per Lord Diplock, "the provision for adverse inferences in sec. 196(2) makes no change to the 
existing law of Singapore", and in Sundran Jaykumal v P.P (1981) 2 Malayan L.J. 297. Although Haw 
Tau Tau was recently criticised by the Malaysian Federal Court in Arulpragasan Sandaraju. S.C.Cr.A. 
No. 05-237-92. 
4 The Royal Commission On Criminal Justice (1993) strongly recommended the retention of the 
common law right to silence and rejected the limiting amendments proposed by the CLRC report 
(1972). The government's arbitrary disregard for the findings of the Royal Commission was one of the 
controversial aspects of the 1994 legislation. 
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obstructive defence solicitors. Proponents argue the exact opposite. The silence principle 
provides a natural protection for the vulnerable and the weak in police detention. Curtailing 
the silence principle would result in a serious miscarriage of justice and weaken the ability of 
defence solicitors to aid their clients. It would also constitute an infringement of England's 
obligations under the European Convention 0(1 Human Rights as defined in the Human 
Rights Act of 1998. 
The most important and controversial clause in CRIMP05 are Sec. 34, 35, 36, 37 and Sec. 
38. These clauses are grouped into three distinct categories.6 Sec. 34, Sec. 36 and Sec. 37 
are designed to account for the use of pre-trial silence by a suspect during the police 
interrogatory phase. (Note, at the pre-trial stage PACE provides the suspect with certain 
procedural safeguards,7 and CRIMPO is specifically designed to limit the effect of these 
safeguards). Sec. 35 covers silence usage during the actual trial proceeding and Sec. 38 
supports the other sections by defining the nature of the adverse inferences which may be 
drawn from the accused's silence. In particular, Sec. 34 seeks to limit the intentional 
withholding of exculpatory facts by the accused during the initial police interview (on being 
cautioned in terms of Code C para 10.4) and the belated introduction of these exculpatory 
facts during the trial proceeding (the so-called ambush defence). Sec. 34 permits the 
prosecution to draw two adverse inferences from the accused's failure to mention defensive 
facts during the police interrogation, namely that the defensive fact was withheld because it 
would not withstand police scrutiny, or it is a subsequent fabrication made during the course 
of the trial, either by the accused or his witnesses. Sec. 36 permits adverse inferences to be 
drawn from the accused's failure (after arrest and a caution in terms of Code C para 1 0.5) to 
account for objects, substances or marks on his person, clothing or in his premises which the 
arresting officer reasonably believes may be attributable to a specific offence (the officer 
must specify the offence and Sec. 36 applies only to that limited instance). Sec. 37 is similar 
to Sec. 36 and allows for an adverse inference to be drawn from the accused's presence in a 
particular case, at or about the time of the offence and the accused is unable to explain his 
presence. The arresting officer must reasonably believe that the accused's presence at or 
about the place where the offence occurred is reasonably attributable to the accused's 
participation therein. Sec. 35 applies to the accused who fails or refuses to testify during the 
5 CRIMPO is entirely derived from the CLRC (1972) Cmnd 4991 report, partly from Sec. 18 and 19 of 
the Irish Justice Act 1984 and is almost identical to articles 3 and 6 of the Northern Ireland Order 
peas) Act. 
See in particular Birch "Suffering In Silence : A Cost-Benefit Analysis Of Sec. ·34" Crim. L. Rev 
(1999) 769; Pattenden "Inferences From Silence" Crim. L. Rev (1995) 602; Mirfield "Two Side Effects 
Of Sec. 34 to 37" Crim. L. Rev (1995) 612. 
7 Supra chapter 8 p.289-290. 
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trial. Both the judge and the prosecution, depending on the factual circumstance, may draw 
reasonable adverse inferences from the failure to testify.. Sec. 38(3) underpins the 
abovementioned clauses by giving substance and definition to the meaning of a permitted 
and reasonable adverse inference. All the clauses, Sec. 34 through to Sec. 37, apply either 
separately or collectively, depending on the factual circumstance. In theory it is possible for 
a collective adverse inference to be drawn simultaneously from all four sections. For 
example, if the accused fails to account for his presence at the scene of the crime, or for the 
bloodstains on his clothing, raises defensive facts at trial never previously mentioned and 
subsequently declines to testify, it is possible for a collective inference to be drawn ·from all 
four sections by both the judge and the prosecution. However, a cardinal rule, as defined in 
Sec. 38, is that no prima facie case may be established against the accused on the basis of 
silence inferences alone. Silence by itself cannot be evidence of guilt. There must exist a 
threshold minimum of other extraneous evidence. In summary, the overall effect of the 
CRIMPO provisions will be to place pressure on the suspect to co-operate with the police 
investigation, to disclose alibi-defences at the earliest opportunity, and at trial, to respond 
urgently to a prima facie case by taking the stand. It will not become an offence or a 
contempt of court to fail to do any of these things, because CRIMPO has not eroded the 
basic common law purpose of the silence principle. There is no direct statutory duty on the 
accused to make an incriminating disclosure. However, CRIMPO does generate an indirect 
obligation or pressure on the accused through the threat that his evidentiary use of silence is 
likely to make his conviction more probable rather than less probable. 
A number of unique and salient evidentiary principles may be derived from CRIMPO. First, 
Sec. 34 applies only to evidentiary facts which the accused fails to mention during the pre-
trial interrogation and subsequently relies on as part of his defence at trial. If the accused 
does not rely on the defensive fact at trial, no adverse inference may be drawn by the 
prosecution. The mere contention by the accused that the prosecution has not established a 
prima facie case, a failure to rely on any defensive evidence at all or a reliance on an 
evidentiary fact which would not reasonably be expected to be mentioned at the police 
interrogation will not draw a Sec. 34 adverse inference. Second, the evidentiary fact must be 
reasonable. An adverse inference may only be drawn from an evidentiary fact, which in the 
circumstance, the accused should reasonably have been expected to mention. Sec. 34 
obliges the court to draw only such inferences as appear "proper''. The natural and proper 
inference to be drawn from a failure to mention defensive facts at the pre-trial stage is that 
the defence is fabricated. This inference is weakened or extinguished when there are other 
credible explanations for the accused's failure to mention the defensive fact. Third, a Sec. 34 
pre-trial silence cannot logically on its own establish a prima facie case. However, a Sec. 34 
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pre-trial adverse inference may contribute to the establishment of a prima facie case. By 
contrast, a Sec. 35 trial inference may only be drawn once a prima facie case has already 
been established and cannot contribute to its establishment. Fourth, the inferences 
permissible in terms of Sec. 34 are in addition to any other reasonable inferences which may 
be drawn from the accused's silence. Sec. 34 does not prejudice the admissibility of any 
other evidence. Fifth, Sec. 34 through to Sec. 37 only apply once the accused has been 
cautioned in terms of Code C para 1 0.4 and para 1 0.5. Sixth, Sec. 36 and Sec. 37 are 
similar to Sec. 34 in that they permit reasonable inferences to be drawn from the accused's 
silence out of court. Unlike Sec. 34, they are more specific and narrow in their application. 
Sec. 36 and 37 are concerned with facts which point to the accused's involvement with the 
offence rather than the defence. It is not a failure to mention defensive facts which are in 
issue, but the failure to explain facts already known to the police. However, Sec. 36 and 37 
cannot on their own establish a prima facie case. Seventh, although not mentioned in Sec. 
35 (trial silence), the prosecution is now permitted to comment on the accused's failure to 
testify. Sec. 168(3) schedule 11 of CRIMPO repeals Sec 1 (b) of the Criminal Evidence Act 
1898. The prosecution may draw such inferences as appear proper from the accused's 
failure to give evidence or his refusal, without good cause, to answer any questions. Eighth, 
no inference of direct guilt may be drawn from the accused's failure to rebut a prima facie 
case established by the prosecution. An adverse inference from a failure to testify is only 
conclusive because the prosecutorial case· is already on the threshold of conclusive proof. 
The inference together with the other eXtraneous evidence cumulatively produces the weight 
of evidence necessary to convict. 
9.2 The Effect Of CRIMPO On The Common Law 
Without a doubt, CRIMPO has exerted a major influence on the common law right to silence. 
Some commentators8 are of the opinion that the impact has been limited, but others9 speak 
of a substantial attenuation of the common law silence principle. A reasonably objective view 
would be to adopt the middle ground. It is true that for certain evidentiary purposes the 
bundle of disjointed rules which make up the common law silence principle have been 
significantly limited. Yet, for other purposes, the changes have been minor. After all, 
CRIMPO does not formally abolish any of the common law rules of silence. It simply 
8 See Uglow Evidence Sweet and Maxwell (1997). 
9 See Andrew and Hirst Criminal Evidence (1997), Dennis ''The Criminal Justice And Public Order Act 
1994" Crim. L. Rev (1995) 4, 11; · Pattenden "Inferences From Silence" Grim. L. Rev (1995) 602; 
Keane The Modern Law of Evidence (2000), "CRIMPO is a major curtailment of the right to silence". 
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imposes certain restrictions 10 and makes it easier for the state to draw adverse inferences. 
(Note : the limitation on the drawing of adverse inferences is a modern and not a traditional 
historical application of the common law silence principle). In R v Cowan,11 Lord Taylor CJ 
specifically denies that the right to silence at trial has been abolished, "Sec. 35(4) clearly 
holds that the accused remains a non-compellable witness and that a mere failure to testify 
does not result in contempt or in any other legal sanction". Nevertheless CRIMPO does 
present the accused with certain active inducements to testify. The various changes to the 
common law brought about by CRIMPO are to be found in the following areas: 
The Caution : The old common law caution has been substantially modified by the CRIMPO 
provisions. The new caution must be administered once the investigating officer reasonably 
believes that the suspect is guilty of the offence (Code C para 1 0.1) and begins to direct his 
questioning with the deliberate intent of acquiring trial admissible evidence. The caution 
must be re-administered upon arrest (Code C para 1 0.3} and during all subsequent 
interrogations. The accused must, at regular intervals, be reminded of the caution. The 
caution is again repeated at the formal charge. The repetitive emphasis on the caution is 
crucial as Sec. 34 may only be triggered once the accused is charged and cautioned. The 
1995 caution as set out in Code C para 10.4 reads, "you do not have to say anything. But it 
may harm your defence if you do not mention when questioned something which you later 
rely on in court. Anything you do say may be given in evidence". The immediate problem 
with the new caution is that it is much too long (37 words) and much too complicated. By 
contrast, the American version, "you have a right to remain silent and anything you say may 
be taken down and used as evidence against you" [or words to that effect] is shorter (21 
words) and easier to understand. Research has shown that only about 50% of suspects 
understood the old caution which was only 22 words. How many will understand the more 
complex caution is anyone's guess.12 The arresting officer is not required to give a word for 
word formal recitation of the caution as long as the sense and meaning of the caution is 
communicated to the accused. The arresting officer may even, in certain circumstances, 
explain the caution in his own words. The caution administered in terms of the Sec. 36 and 
37 provisions differs substantially from the everyday Sec. 34 caution and is a rather unique 
10 In R v Birch (1999) Crim. L. R 651, it was stated, "the act does not formally abolish any one 
common law principle relating to the evidentiary effect of silence, it simply imposes restrictions". 
11 (1995) 4 ALLER 939 (1996) QB 373,378. 
12 Gudjonssen et al ''The Royal Commission On Criminal Justice, Persons At Risk During Interviews 
In Police Custody" Research Report No. 12 (1993), "Practice Direction, Crown Court : Evidence 
Advice To Defendanf' 1 W.L.R. 657 (1995), The Psychology Of Interrogations, Confessions And 
Testimony' Chichester Wiley (1992). Munday "Inferences From Silence And European Human Rights 
Law" Crim. L. Rev (1996) 370, 389, "the attempt to avoid making use of the exact statutory wording of 
the caution is a desire to make the caution more intelligible to the suspecf'. 
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specialisation.13 Code C para 10.58 does not set out a specific model caution in words and 
instead, substitutes a checklist of essential warnings which must be communicated to the 
suspect immediately on arrest. The arresting officer acting in terms of Sec. 36 or Sec. 37, 
must inform the accused in ordinary language of the following : (i) the nature of the offence 
being investigated, (ii) the incriminating fact(s) for which the suspect must make an account, 
(iii) the arresting officer's belief that the fact(s) may be due to the suspect's participation in 
the commission of the offence, (iv) if the suspect fails or refuses to account for the fact, a 
court may draw the appropriate inference, (v) a record is being made of the interview and 
may be given in evidence. The effect of CRIMPO is to make the English caution into a highly 
complex administrative warning, unlike any other in the Anglo-American criminal system. 
Pre-trial Silence : The common law did not permit either the judge or the prosecution to 
comment or to draw adverse inferences from the accused's invocation of silence during the 
pre-trial investigation (R v Ham.14 Silence during the pre-trial stage was inadmissible as 
evidence except in certain limited circumstances.15 The accused's silence was only 
admissible as an implied admission in reaction to an accusation made by the victim (R v 
Horne) 16 or a parent (R v Parkes), and only when the accused or the accuser were on even 
terms (R v Christie and R v Chandler') 17• CRIMPO has significantly altered some of the 
common law principles in this regard. Sec. 34(5) expressly preserves the common law 
Christie principle. Accordingly, Sec. 34(5)(a) does not "prejudice the admissibility in 
evidence of the silence or other reaction of the accused in the face of anything said in his 
presence relating to the conduct in respect of which he is charged .... ". The general 
common law silence principle continues to apply prior to the administration of the caution, as 
Sec. 34 is only triggered once the suspect has been cautioned. Case precedent such as R v 
Parkes will continue to be good law and the common law principles which fall outside of the 
scope of Sec. 34, 36 and 37 will remain unaltered. Indeed, Sec. 34(5)(b) specifically does 
not "preclude the drawing of any inference from any such silence or other reaction of the 
accused which could properly be drawn apart from this section". 
The common law doctrine of recent possession will also remain unaltered. In fact, Sec. 36 
and 37 merely add a new kind of inference to the other permissible common law 
circumstantial inferences that the court is entitled to draw. In terms of the possession 
13 The Sec. 36 and Sec. 37 special caution is set out in PACE Code 10.5B and E4.3D. See also R v 
McNamara (1998) Crim. L. R 278 and R v Sykes (1997) Crim. L. R 752. 
14 Supra chapter 8 note 128 and accompanying text. 
15 Suprra chapter 8 note 16-18 and accompanying text. 
16 Supra chapter 8 note 137 and accompanying text. 
17 Supra chapter 8 note 133-135 and accompanying text. 
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doctrine, the court is entitled to infer that the accused is guilty of stealing or dishonestly 
handling stolen goods found in his possession. The accused's failure to offer a credible 
explanation means that there is nothing to prevent a circumstantial inference from being 
drawn but an explanation belatedly given at a later stage, even at the trial itself, is as valid as 
one offered when the suspect is first questioned. Sec. 36 and Sec. 37 permit a different 
inference which enables the court to draw a direct (not a circumstantial) inference from the 
suspect's failure to offer an explanation when first questioned. A delayed explanation may in 
turn be open to attack as a fabrication in terms of Sec. 34. The general effect of Sec. 34, 36 
and 37 is to make it easier for the prosecution to draw adverse inferences, in certain 
circumstances, from the accused's use of pre-trial silence. A prosecutorial power which was 
not previously permitted in terms of the common law silence principle. 
Trial Silence: In terms of the common law, the judge (but not the prosecution) was entitled 
to comment on the accused's silence at trial (R v Rhodes, R v Sparrow and R v Martinez-
Tobon), 18 but only within certain limited parameters (R v Bathurst, Waugh v R and R v 
Martinez-Tobon). 19 The judge was directed to warn the jury that no inference of guilt could 
be drawn from the accused's silence (R v Gilbert). CRIMPO substantially reverses these 
common law precedents. In terms of Sec. 34, both the judge and the prosecution are now 
entitled to draw adverse inferences from the accused's silence. Sec. 35 permits the court 
and the jury to draw proper or reasonable inferences from the accused's failure to testify. 
Nevertheless, a trial inference drawn from the accused's silence is dependent on the 
establishment by the prosecution of a prima facie case. In this regard the common law has 
not been altered. 
Presumption Of Innocence : The silence principle is said to reinforce the presumption of 
innocence (the cardinal rule of an accusatorial legal system) by obliging the state to produce 
sufficient evidence to convict the accused. The state is obliged to shoulder the entire burden 
of proof. It has been argued by libertarian theorists that the statutory erosion of the silence 
principle weakens the presumption of innocence and incrementally shifts the burden of proof 
from the prosecution to the accused. Part I of the Criminal Procedure And Investigation Act 
1996 and Sec. 34 through to Sec. 37 seem to place an unfair burden of proof on the 
18 Supra chapter 8 note 139 and 162 and 163. 
19 See also Waugh v R (1950) A.C 203, 212, where it was held wrong for the judge to bolster a weak 
prosecution case by making repeated comments about the accused's failure to testify. Strong judicial 
comment is reserved for cases where the accused's silence is remarkable and the case against him 
strong (R v Martinez-Tobon). It is necessary for the judge to avoid any suggestion that silence by 
itself proves guilt (R v Sparrow and R v Gilbert). 
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accused, which is inconsistent with Woolmington's golden rule principle.20 (Note : This 
argument has been conclusively refuted in Chapter 4).21 It is also argued that CRIMPO is 
contrary to Article 6(1) "trial fairness" and Article 6(2) "presumption of innocence" of the 
European Convention Of Human Rights.22 By contrast, utilitarian theorists suggest that 
CRIMPO is merely a statutory reinforcement and a reasonable limitation of the common law 
silence principle. The CRIMPO adverse inferences are merely one type of circumstantial 
evidence which the prosecution may or may not use in evidence once it has otherwise 
established a prima facie case. This view is reinforced by Lord Taylor's comment in R v 
Cowan,23 "the effect of Sec. 35 is that the court or jury may regard the inference from a 
failure to testify as . . . a further evidential factor in support of the prosecution's case. It 
cannot be the only factor to justify a conviction and the totality of the evidence must prove 
guilt beyond a reasonable doubf'. Furthermore, the European Court Of Human Rights has 
rejected the argument that the Criminal Evidence (N.I) Order 1988 (an earlier Northern 
Ireland equivalent of CRIMP0)24 deprives the accused of a fair trial. In Murray v U.K, the 
European Court noted that the right to silence is not an absolute or unconditional guarantee. 
In certain appropriate circumstances common sense inferences may be drawn from the 
accused's silence, while in others no adverse inferences may be drawn.25 
9.3 Pre-Trial Silence 
9.3.1 Section 34 (Ambush Defences) 
Sec 34(1) reads : 
Where in a.ny proceedings against a person for an offence, evidence is given that the 
accused: 
20 The goiden rule, Woolmington v D.P.P (1935) A.C 462. 
21 Supra chapter 4 p.141-144. The nexus between the right to silence and the presumption of 
innocence is assumed as a sine qua non without explanation or proof of the exact relationship. This is 
another example of the blurred libertarian sentimentality which relies on emotion rather than logic for 
its arguments. 
22 Infra chapter 1 0. 
23 (1994) 4 ALL ER 939 at 943. 
24 CRIMPO is largely modelled on the Northern Ireland Order (1988) articles 3 to 6. The N.l Order 
(1988) has been used as a test case before the European Court of Human Rights. See in particular 
Murray v U.K (1996) 22 EHRR, 29. For an analysis of the Northern Ireland Act see Jackson 
"Curtailing The Right To Silence : Lessons From Northern Ireland" Crim. L. Rev (1991) 404, 
"Inferences From Silence : From Common Law To Common Sense" Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly 
(1993) 103, "Interpreting The Silence Provisions : The Northern Ireland Cases" Crim. L. Rev {1995) 
587. 
25 Infra chapter 10. 
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(a) at any time before he was charged with the offence, on being questioned under 
caution by a constable trying to discover whether or by whom the offence had been 
committed, failed to mention any fact relied on in his defence in those proceedings, or 
(b) on being charged with the offence or officially informed that he might be prosecuted 
for it, failed to mention any such fact, being a fact which in the circumstances existing 
at the time the accused could reasonably have been expected to mention when so 
questioned, charged or informed, as the case may be,26 
Sec 34(2) reads : 
(c) the court in determining whether there is a case to be answered, and 
(d) the court or jury in determining whether the accused is guilty of the offence charged 
may draw such inferences from the failure as appears proper. 
In terms of Sec. 34, the court may draw an adverse inference from the accused's failure to 
mention a defensive fact during the police investigatory stage and which the accused at his 
subsequent trial introduces as part of his defence.27 The intention behind Sec. 34 is to 
create an evidentiary balance between the prosecution and the accused, especially when the 
accused gains an evidentiary advantage at trial by adducing previously undisclosed and 
untested facts. The section specifically makes use of the word "may'', meaning that the 
drawing of an adverse inference is not automatic nor compulsory. The court may decline to 
draw an adverse inference. Silence at the police interview has no intrinsic evidentiary weight 
of itself and is dependent on what the accused was silent about and the statements expected 
from the accused based on the evidence called against him.28 The court may draw an 
adverse inference in the following circumstances : (a) when the accused fails to mention a 
26 Sec. 34, 36 and Sec. 37 have been amended as a result of the European Court of Human Rights 
decision in Murray v U.K (1996) 22 E.H.RR, "a denial of access to legal advice at the police station 
violates article 6 of the European Convention. Sec. 58(2) of the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence 
Act (1999) inserts a new section 2(A) which reads, "where the accused is at an authorised place of 
detention at the time of a failure to mention facts, no adverse inference is allowed where the accused 
has not been allowed an opportunity to consult a solicitor prior to being questioned or charged" 
!~araphrased]. 
Birch "Suffering In Silence : A Cost-Benefit Analysis Of Sec. 34" Grim. L. Rev (1999) 769, 772, 
argues that Sec. 34 is a radical departure 'from the common law and is an extremely expensive 
procedure which (a) consumes too much judicial time at trial and appeal, (b) it is a tool by which an 
unscrupulous jury may wreak injustice, and (c) its evidentiary cogency will mostly be outweighed by its 
~~~ . 
8 Sec. 38(3) which prevents the accused's conviction on an adverse inference drawn from Sec. 34 
alone, is a reaffirmation of the evidentiary unreliability of a Sec. 34 pre-trial inference. See R v 
Abdullah (1999) 3 Archbold News 3. 
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fact,29 (b) when the accused fails to mention a defensive fact later relied upon by his trial 
defence, and (c) when the accused is reasonably expected to mention a particular fact. The 
adverse inference must be a reasonable or "proper one" and may only be drawn once the 
accused has been cautioned. (Note : It is possible that Sec. 34 has been rendered 
superfluous, at least in theory, by the Criminal Procedure And Investigation Act 1996 which 
creates a complementary and parallel statutory framework for advance disclosure by both 
the prosecution and the defence. In particular, Sec. 11 enables adverse inferences to be 
made by the court, when the accused has failed to disclose his defence.30 However, the 
1996 Act does not specifically repeal Sec. 34). 
"Silence" : In Sec. 34 silence is simply defined as a failure to mention a fact.31 The 
definition is broad enough to encompass not only the silent accused, but also the verbose 
accused who says much during the police interview, but who fails to reveal relevant 
defensive facts which he will later rely upon in court. The police interrogator is expected to 
make a correct interpretation of the accused's language and answers. The accused who 
cannot articulate his answers clearly may be faced with the problem of proving that he did 
mention facts to the police but which the police failed to interpret correctly.32 
"The defensive action" : The concept of a defensive fact is central to an analysis of Sec. 
34. Where the accused does not rely on a defensive fact at this trial, then Sec. 34 cannot be 
triggered and no adverse inference may be drawn.33 What exactly is meant by the word 
"fact"? A fact may be defined in two ways. It may be defined empirically (in the technical 
sense) as an adducible fact of evidence or it may be simply defined as a mere suggestion. 
Some commentators are of the opinion that the mere suggestion of say an innocent 
29 Sec. 34(3) permits evidence of the accused's failure to mention facts to be given in trial, even 
before evidence of the fact itself. Early disclosure by the accused is therefore a strong feature of Sec. 
34. 
30 Part I of the Criminal Procedure And Evidence Act (1996) imposes a general obligation upon the 
accused to set out the general nature of his defence (Sec. 5(6)), and to disclose details of his alibi 
defence (Sec. 11 ), a failure to do so will result in an adverse comment at trial (Sec 11 (3)). Adverse 
inferences may be made where (a) the defence is made out of time, (b) the accused has laid out an 
inconsistent defence, (c) and has developed a trial defence which is inconsistent with this previous 
statement, and (d) has adduced an alibi defence during trial without making an advance disclosure. 
31 If the police uncover new evidence after the suspect has been interviewed and questioned, no 
groper or reasonable inference may be drawn. The time element is of crucial importance. 
2 A significant minority of English suspects suffer from a severe language problem. This type of 
suspect is unable to understand the caution, nor realize that certain information is exculpatory. 
Gudjonsson et ai"Persons At Risk During Interviews In Police Custody" RCC/ Research Study No. 12 p 993) 23-26. 
3 If no defensive fact is advanced at trial, Sec. 34 has no application, no matter how incriminating the 
accused's silence may have been during the police interview. R v Moshaid (1998) Crim L. R 420; R v 
Bansal (1999) Crim. L. R 484. 
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explanation by the accused is sufficient to trigger Sec. 34.34 The problem with defining a 
defensive fact as a mere suggestion is that it gives the prosecution an unfair advantage. The 
word "suggestion" is somewhat vague and obviously something less than a hard fact. If the 
prosecution could use the accused's trial suggestions to trigger a Sec. 34 adverse inference, 
it would make it very difficult for the defence to rebut in cross-examination. The better 
argument (R v Nickolson)35 is to define a fact not as a suggestion but as a ''fact in evidence". 
Sec. 34 is triggered once the evidentiary fact relied upon by the defence is adduced either by 
the accused himself or by a defence witness. This would also include fact(s) obtained from a 
prosecution witness which is of assistance to the accused's defence. 36 
"Reasonable expectation": There are many good reasons for remaining silent which are 
consistent with innocence.37 An inference may only be drawn from a defensive evidentiary 
fact which in the circumstance should reasonably have been mentioned by the accused. The 
test of "reasonableness" is partially objective and partially subjective. It is objective because 
it assesses the accused's silence in the particular circumstance against the standard of a 
reasonable person (would a reasonable person in the accused's shoes also have remained 
silent). It is partially subjective, because it involves an inquiry into the accused's state of 
mind.38 A measure of judicial control is also implicit in Sec. 34 as the judge is allowed to 
comment on the accused's silence and to determine the manner in which notice of the 
accused's silence should be brought to ttie jury's attention.39 The important factors in 
assessing reasonableness are the accused's actual quantum of knowledge and level of 
understanding.40 Knowledge of the alleged crime determines the extent of any disclosures 
the accused might make. The accused's disclosure of defensive facts is also dependent 
34 Jackson "Interpreting The Silence Provisions : The Northern Ireland Cases" Crim. L. Rev (1995) 
590-591 , notes "all that would seem to be necessary to bring Sec. 34 into play is for the defence to 
suggest a fact of assistance to the accused". In R v McLemon (1992) N.I.J.B. 41 it was held, "the 
accused can rely on a fact in his defence, even though neither he nor a defence witness has given 
evidence of the fact. A mere suggestion by defence counsel is sufficient". 
35 (1999) Crim. L. R 61, ''the comment advanced by the accused in evidence was more in the way of a 
theory or speculation than a fact, when Sec. 34 clearly required the latter". 
36 R v Bowers (1998) Crim. L. R. 817, "a fact relied upon may be established by the accused himself, 
a defence witness or by a prosecution witness. This includes any central and important fact relied on 
in examination-in-chief or cross-examination". 
37 
"Report Of The Working Group On The Right To Silence" London (1989) para 65, appendix D, sets 
out a list of factors consistent with an innocent explanation. 
38 Relevant factors are character, age, experience, sobriety, tiredness, fear, embarrassment, 
i~nor.ance, etc., R v Argent (1997) Crim. L. R 346. 
3 R v McGarry (1998) 3 ALL ER 805, "the judge is obliged to give an old style common law directive 
when the requirements of Sec. 34 are not met. The common law survives to the extent that it fills in 
the gaps left by Sec. 34". · 
40 R v Argent ibid "a deficiency of information is a factor the judge must take into account in making 
his commenf'. 
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upon the amount of information the police are willing to reveal during the interrogation.41 The 
accused's level of understanding is a critical factor as a confession is easily induced from 
vulnerable (including young and mentally handicapped) suspects. The accused is also 
invariably shocked, confused and intimidated by the harsh psychological environment of the 
police station. A Sec. 34 adverse inference should be avoided where the accused is unable 
to formulate cogent answers to interrogatory questions because of a physical or mental 
deterioration which results in a real inability to understand the legal consequence of a 
particular act or omission. The court has two options when the prosecution deliberately 
relies on evidence of the accused's silence obtained by the police in breach of PACE and the 
Practice Code. It may decline to draw a Sec. 34 adverse inference or it may decide to make 
use of its discretionary power to exclude the evidence in terms of Sec. 78(1) PACE.42 One of 
the primary problems with a Sec. 34 interpretation is the contentious issue of legal advice.43 
Should the accused be reasonably expected to disclose a defensive fact during the police 
interview when his legal advisor has instructed him to remain silent and the accused at trial 
relies upon such legal advice as a justification for his silence? On the one hand it may be 
unreasonable to expect the accused to disregard his legal advisor, but on the other hand, an 
acceptance by the court of such a justification would render Sec. 34 valueless.44 In R v 
Condron and Condron,45 R v Argent,46 and R v Roble,47 the Appeal Court has held that a pre-
trial legal instruction to remain silent is but one factor to be taken into account by the jury in 
assessing the accused's reliance on a defensive fact at trial. Legal advisors are well aware 
that they may be called upon at trial to justify the advice given to the accused during the pre-
trial stage. To protect themselves, legal advisors should take detailed notes of the police 
interview and ensure that the reasons given for advising the accused to remain silent are 
satisfactorily recorded as part of the police record.48 The legal advisor should also inform his 
41 Where the police undertake speculative questioning in the absence of real suspicion in the hope of 
triggering Sec. 34, then such evidence should be excluded. This also applies to persistent questioning 
which goes beyond what is necessary to achieve the required purpse. 
42 A judicial exclusionary discretion applies because (a) the positive use of evidence by Sec. 34 is 
subject to Sec. 78(1), PACE (b) although silence is logically the opposite of a confession, since the 
p.Josecution is using it to establish positive incriminating evidence, the PACE rules should apply. 
Cape "Sidelining Defence Lawyers : Police Station Advice After Condron" (1) International J. 
Evidence and Proof (1997) 386, "to permit an inference to be drawn from silence based upon legal 
advice invites the suspect to second guess his advisor who is now side-lined and ineffective". Dixon 
"Common Sense, Legal Advice And The Right To Silence" Public Law (1991) 233, ''the legal advisor's 
ability to use silence as a bargaining tool has been completely eroded". Fenwick "Curtailing The Right 
To Silence: Access To Legal Advice And Sec. 78" Crim. L. Rev (1995) 132; Wright "The Solicitor In 
The Witness Box" Crim. L. Rev (1998) 44. 
44 R v Kinsella (1992) N.I.J.B., 5 "it is not reasonable for a person being interviewed to fail to mention 
facts, simply because he had been advised by his solicitor to remain silent". 
45 (1997) 1 Cr. App. R 185. 
46 (1997) 2 Cr. App. R 27. 
47 (1997) Crim. L R 449. 
48 Provided the explanation is detailed and clear, the prosecution will find it difficult to motivate a 
request for the witness box appearance of the legal advisor. 
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client that the court may well waive professional-client privilege in this regard.49 In R v 
Condron and Condron, 50 it was held that a mere statement or recapitulation by the accused 
of his legal advisor's instructions on silence will not be sufficient to waive professional 
privilege. However, if the accused goes further and raises the legal advice as a reason for 
his silence, then he will have effectively waived professional privilege.51 A court ordered 
waiver of privilege is a tactical disadvantage for the defence, because it focuses the jury's 
attention on the cross-examination of the legal advisor in a way which may be out of 
proportion to the evidentiary value of such an examination. Nevertheless, in many 
circumstances it may well be reasonable for a legal advisor to give a silence instruction to his 
client, especially where the police have a weak or evidentiary insufficient case. Certainly in 
terms of the Human Rights Act 1998, the solicitor's advice to his client will greatly influence 
the type of inference which may be drawn against the accused. 52 
"A proper inference" : Sec. 34(2) permits the jury to draw "such inferences as appear 
proper from the accused's failure to mention a defensive fact during the pre-trial 
interrogation". The section does not specifically define the nature or the parameters of the 
word "inference". It obviously contemplates an "adverse inference" but this must be deduced 
from the meaning of the section. Since Sec. 34 is concerned with the credibility of a defence 
belatedly advanced, common sense suggests that the defensive fact when raised at trial is 
either a fabrication, 53 or is kept a secret in order to avoid police and prosecutorial scrutiny. In 
R vArgenf4 and R v Daniel, 55 the judicial guideline holds ''the jury may only draw an adverse 
inference if no other rational explanation for the accused's silence presents itself'. Judicial 
precedent is itself lacking in clarity as it does not expressly define the meaning of the words 
"adverse", "inference" or "rational". Apparently the stronger the prosecution case and the 
more implausible the accused's excuse for his pre-trial silence, the more likely that an 
adverse inference will be drawn. There are any number of plausible and rational 
explanations for the accused's silence. The accused may well remain silent because of a 
49 The legal advisor should inform his client (a) that professional privilege may be waived, and (b) it 
may be waived partially or fully". Once privilege is waived, the legal advisor may be cross-examined in 
order to explore the nature of the advice and the reasoning behind it", R v Bowen (1999) 1 W.L.R. 
823. 
50 (1997) 1 Cr. App R 185. 
51 R v Condron and Condron ibid at 197, when the accused goes into the reason for the advice, "it 
may amount to waiver of privilege, so the accused or his solicitor can be asked whether there are any 
other reasons for the advice". 
52 In terms of the European Convention of Human Rights as interpreted in Murray v U.K (1996) 22 
EHRR 29, it is likely that the nature of the advice given by the solicitor to his client will greatly influence 
the type of adverse inference which may be drawn. 
53 R v Taylor (1999) Crim. L. R 77, "the accused's defensive fact may be fabricated even if it is 
disclosed to a third party but not to the police or prosecution". 
54 (1997) 2 Cr. App. R 27. 
55 (1998) Crim. L. R 818. 
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guilty conscience, but other factors such as distrust of police, ignorance of the law, 
immaturity or mental inability also play a role. Even amongst legal theorists there is no 
consensus on the nature of the contemplated adverse inference. Some commentators 
favour a common law or limited force theory. An adverse inference may only be drawn if it 
goes to the credibility of the defensive explanation or one which supports the prosecution's 
prima facie case. Other commentators favour the extensive force theory in which an adverse 
inference amounting to a direct inference of guilt or which corroborates other evidence of 
guilty may be drawn. In theory, the interpretation which best fits the sense and meaning of 
Sec. 34(2) appears to be a circumscribed form of the extensive force argument. Implicit in 
the words of the section is the use of adverse inferences either as direct evidence of guilt or 
in support of other extraneous evidence adverse to the accused. Naturally, the prosecution 
case cannot be built up solely on the basis of the accused's pre-trial silence. Sec. 38(3) 
specifically prevents the prosecution from proving its case exclusively on the accused's 
silence. There must be other extraneous evidence which establishes a prosecutorial prima 
facie case. In R v Condron and Condron,56 the Appeal Court noted that a Sec. 35 
interpretation of an adverse inference (i.e. silence may amount to positive evidence of guilt in 
the appropriate circumstance) could by analogy also be applied to a Sec. 34 interpretation of 
an adverse inference. In theory, the extensive force argument works well when the 
prosecution case is a strong one. Once a strong prima facie case is established, an adverse 
inference drawn from a belated defence will logically and reasonably be one of guilt. 
However, the extensive force argument does not work well when the prosecution case is a 
weak one. If a Sec. 34 inference amounts to positive evidence of guilt, it will have the effect 
of altering a weak prosecution case into a strong one. The European Court in Murray v 
U.K,57 has clearly indicated that such an evidentiary use of the extensive force argument is 
an infringement of Sec. 6(1) of the European Convention on Human Rights. 
In practice, the nature of an adverse inference will depend on the factual circumstance, the 
court's notion of "common sense" and will entail a balanced appreciation of the weight of the 
prosecution's case versus the probative plausibility of the accused's defensive explanation. 
In his summation, the judge should draw the jury's attention to the following factors : 
(a) whether the accused's previous failure to mention a fact is capable of an innocent 
explanation; 
(b) whether the accused knew of the fact in question; 
56 (1997) 1 Cr. App. R 185, 197. 
57 (1996) 22 EHRR 29. 
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(c) whether it was reasonable to have expected him to disclose it, in the light of all the 
circumstances; 
(d) whether the Code of Practice requirements for detention and questioning by the 
police have been complied with. 
Case precedent often utilises the catch-all term "common sense" when describing an 
adverse inference. This is perhaps a dangerous symptom of the court's inability to give a 
simple and lucid explanation of the nature, use and ambit of an adverse inference. 
(Similarly, the American Supreme Court is also unable to provide reasonable guidelines as to 
the nature of an adverse inference). The jury is not necessarily endowed with common 
sense and the term becomes an excuse for unreliable and illogical speculation on the part of 
an undisciplined jury. Indeed, adverse inferences may well, in some circumstances, simply 
amount to an expost facto rationalisation of what the jury already knows. In its search for 
extraneous reasons upon which to base a common sense inference, the jury may sometimes 
render a Sec. 34 inference superfluous. "The jury is in a position to draw the proper 
inference only when it knows the reason for silence. Without these reasons the jury can only 
safely draw an inference when it is already expost facto convinced of guilf'.58 For example, X 
and Y are arrested together for the possession of drugs. During the pre-trial police interview 
X offers no defensive explanation. At trial X excuses himself by saying that he was merely 
buying drugs from Y for his personal use. He also belatedly explains that he remained silent 
during the police investigation because he did not want to get Y into trouble, until informed by 
his solicitor that Y intended to lay all the blame at his feet. If the jury accepts X's explanation, 
then logically Y is guilty. If the jury rejects X's explanation, then obviously Y is not guilty. 
Before the jury can use a Sec. 34 inference from X's initial silence, it must have already 
decided expost facto which of the two men is guilty. Sec. 34 then becomes redundant.59 
The probative value of an adverse inference is also dependent on the time when the accused 
exercises his right to silence. When there is a complete failure by the accused to mention 
defensive facts during the pre-trial interrogatory stage, the adverse inference may have a 
strong probative value. When the accused does not mention a defensive fact during the 
initial police interview and only raises it at a second or other subsequent interview, the 
adverse inference will be strong, but not as strong as when the fact is not mentioned at all. 
The degree of probative value attached to each adverse inference will depend on the time 
and the stage in the criminal process at which the accused's invocation of silence occurs.60 
58 Jackson "Interpreting The Silence Provision : The Northern Ireland Cases" Grim. L. Rev (1995) 600. 
59 R v Mountford (1999) Crim. L. Rev 575, "in these circumstances the jury may adopt a provisional 
inference of guilt, use such a provisional inference as part of the assessment of guilt and then ignore 
if'. 
60 R v Condron and Condron (1997) 1 Cr. App. R, 185, 197. 
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9.3.2 Sec. 36 (possession of incriminatory material) and Sec. 37 (presence at the 
crime scene) 
Possession of incriminating material : Sec. 36 concerns the failure or refusal of the 
accused to account for on arrest, the presence of objects, substances or marks on his body 
or in his possession. 51 Sec. 36(2) permits the drawing of adverse inferences in these narrow 
circumstances. The investigating officer must specify the offence and note his suspicion of a 
causal connection between the incriminating material, the specific offence, and the 
accused.62 A proper inference may only be drawn from the offence so specified by the 
investigating officer and no inferences may be drawn from other offences which have not 
been specified or made known to the accused.63 The adverse inference which the 
prosecution will usually seek to draw at trial will be one of a guilty knowledge. The accused's 
knowledge of the substances on his person or the articles in his possession and his failure to 
provide a reasonable explanation will constitute evidence of a guilty knowledge.64 
"Presence at the scene" : Sec. 37 has the same structure and intent as Sec. 36. An 
adverse inference may be drawn on the failure or the refusal of the accused to account for 
his presence on or about the crime scene. Sec. 37(2) permits the drawing of an adverse 
inference from mere presence at the crime scene, absent a reasonable explanation. Both 
Sec. 36 and Sec. 37 are only triggered once the accused is arrested. No adverse inferences 
may be drawn from any other offence not specified by the investigating officer and for which 
the accused is not arrested.65 A Sec. 37 adverse inference has a different probative value to 
that of a Sec. 36 adverse inference. A failure to provide an innocent explanation for 
presence at the crime scene is evidence capable of being incorporated into the prosecution's 
61 Sec. 36(1) refers to objects, substances and marks which are on the accused's person, on his 
clothing and footwear, in his possession and in his home at the time of arrest. 
62 An investigating officer is either a police officer or an officer of customs and excise. Note that Sec. 
34 gives a much wider definition of officer to include any person charged with an investigatory duty. 
63 The specificity requirement may present a problem. If the investigating officer specifies an offence 
of common assault and the prosecution proceeds with aggravated assault, Sec. 36 will not apply. The 
investigating officer would be wise to charge the suspect with a wide range of related and competent 
offences if he intends to rely on a Sec. 36 inference. 
64 Sec. 36 is somewhat arbitrary. If the suspect fails to explain why the jacket he is wearing on arrest 
is bloodstained, an adverse inference may be drawn. But if the suspect abandons his bloodstained 
jacket at the scene of the crime and is arrested on his way home, and fails to explain away the 
bloodstains on his jacket, no adverse inferences may be drawn. There is also nothing to prevent a 
belated innocent explanation by the suspect put forward at trial from being dismissed as fabrication in 
terms of Sec. 34. Thus Sec. 34 operates hand in hand with Sec. 36 (and Sec. 37). 
65 Specificity is a Sec. 37 problem. The investigating officer may arrest the accused for murder but 
the prosecutor may decide to proceed with culpable homicide. Since the accused was not arrested for 
culpable homicide, no Sec. 37 adverse inference may be drawn. Note, Sec. 34 requires no such 
specificity. 
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prima facie case, but can never, unlike a Sec. 36 inference, amount to a guilty knowledge. 
Sec. 36 and Sec. 37 adverse inferences depend on the particular facts of each case, the 
inferences may carry more weight in some cases and less in others. These types of 
inferences are usually used to support the building of a prosecution prima facie case. (Note : 
The use of a Sec. 34 inference is quite different. It cannot build a prosecution case and may 
only add value to an already established prima facie case). Sec. 36 and Sec 37 adverse 
inferences depend on the strength of the prosecution's circumstantial case against the 
accused. When the accused is arrested, while wearing bloodstained clothing holding a 
bloodstained knife and standing over the victim's body, his failure to offer an innocent 
explanation (and the adverse inferences to be drawn from such a failure) adds nothing to an 
already strong circumstantial case. On the other hand, when the accused is arrested at 
home, a few days after the murder and a bloodstained knife is found in his possession, a 
failure to offer an innocent explanation is highly incriminating and an adverse inference from 
such a failure may well bolster an initially weak circumstantial case. Sec. 36 and Sec. 37 
adverse inferences (like Sec. 34 inferences) are conditional on the accused's level of 
understanding, the amount of information at his disposal, his intelligence, experience and 
mental ability. 
A number of significant evidentiary differences exist between a Sec. 34 "inference" and a 
Sec. 36 or Sec. 37 "inference".66 First, a Sec. 34 inference may only be drawn upon the 
accused's failure to mention a defensive fact which is then relied upon at the trial. By 
contrast, it is the incriminating fact brought forward by the investigating officer and the 
subsequent failure of the accused to provide an innocent explanation which triggers a Sec. 
36 or Sec. 37 adverse inference. Sec. 36 and SeG. 37 exert a strong positive pressure upon 
the accused to specifically explain the suspicious circumstance, whereas the pressure 
exerted by Sec. 34 is more negative than positive. Second, Sec. 34 requires the accused to 
"reasonably mention a fact when questioned by the police". A reasonable response 
requirement is not written into either Sec. 36 or Sec. 37. Third, a Sec. 34 inference may only 
be triggered once the accused has been cautioned. By contrast, a Sec. 36 or Sec. 37 
inference is triggered on the accused's arrest (Code C para 1 0.5A) in tandem with the 
ordinary caution (para 10.4) and coupled to a special caution (para 10.58). Fourth, if either 
the special caution or the other requirements are infringed, Sec. 36 or Sec. 37 cannot be 
triggered and no adverse inferences may be drawn. As an alternative "backup", Sec. 36(6) 
and Sec. 37(5) expressly preserve the common law (particularly the doctrine of recent 
66 In terms of Sec. 36 and 37, the jury has to answer difficult questions because these sections seem 
to indirectly assume that it will always be reasonable to account for suspicious circumstances. Unlike 
Sec. 34, these sections do not directly concern themselves with the question of reasonableness. 
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possession) and where the statutory inferences are disallowed, common law inferences may 
be drawn. Sec. 34(5) also preserves the common law, but in more limited circumstances. 
Fifth, the investigating officer must have a reasonable belief that the Sec. 36 incriminating 
material is attributable to the accused's participation in the offence. Sec. 37 requires a 
similar reasonable belief based on the accused's presence at the crime scene. By contrast, 
Sec. 34 does not require the investigating officer to reasonably believe that the accused is 
withholding a defensive fact or that the accused intends to use the withheld fact at a later 
stage. Sixth, the same judicial directive to the jury applies to both Sec. 34 and Sec. 36 or 
Sec. 37 adverse inferences. The judicial study directive approved of by the Appeal Court in 
R v Condron and Condron67 reads, "the law is that you [the jury] may draw such inferences 
as appear proper from the accused's failure to mention it [the fact] at the time. You do not 
have to hold it against him. It is for y<:>u to decide whether it is proper to do so. Failure to 
mention such a fact at that time cannot, on its own, prove guilt, but depending on the 
circumstances, you may hold that failure against him when deciding whether he is guilty, that 
is, take it into account as some additional support for the prosecution's case. It is for you to 
decide whether it is fair to do so". Seventh, Sec. 36 and Sec. 37 treat the legal advisor's 
instructions to the accused in much the same way as Sec. 34. Tactically, the legal advisor 
should instruct his client to offer an immediate explanation for apparently incriminating 
material, unless the advisor is convinced that there is no innocent explanation, in which case 
silence is the better option and the accused· may take his chances on the adverse inferences 
to follow. Generally, the legal advisor's instructions is merely one of many factors which the 
jury must consider before drawing a proper inference. Professional privilege may sometimes 
be waived by the court when the accused relies on his legal advisor's instruction as a reason 
for failing to give an innocent explanation. The legal advisor may be obliged to take the 
stand and justify his instruction. 
9.4 Trial Silence (Sec. 35) 
Sec. 3568 applies at trial once the prosecution has established a prima facie case and the 
accused declines to testify in rebuttal. 69 When the accused chooses not to give evidence, or 
once having been sworn, decides without reasonable cause not to answer any questions, the 
court and the jury may draw such inferences as appear proper. Sec. 35 will apply to the 
accused who fails to support a positive defence from the witness box or the accused who 
67 (1997) 1 Cr. App. R 185. 
68 Sec. 35 expressly preserves the common law right to silence and the choice not to testify. R v 
Cowan (1996) QB 373, 378; Re B (1996) 1 FLR 239. 
69 R v Napper (1996) Crim. L. R 591; R v Price (1996) Grim. L. R 758. 
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puts the prosecution to proof by challenging the credibility of the state witnesses. However, 
the mere decision by the accused not to testify cannot by itself trigger Sec. 35. Sec. 35 
requires the court to determine whether the prosecution's case calls for an answer and 
whether the accused is the proper person to give it.70 Sec. 35(2) read together with Sec. 
35(3) and Sec. 38(3) clearly proposes that the prosecution must first establish a prima facie 
case before the question of the evidentiary value of the accused's silence can be decided.71 
Both the judge and the prosecutor may comment to the jury on the accused's silence. 
Schedule 11 of CRIMPO has repealed Sec. 1 (b) of the Criminal Evidence Act 1898 (which 
previously prevented prosecutorial commentary). The prosecution may positively invite the 
jury to draw the proper inference from the accused's trial silence. Indeed, the general 
presumption is that the jury is more likely to draw proper inferences from the accused's 
silence at trial than from the accused's silence at the pre-trial stage. Sec. 35 has adopted 
the common law reasoning in this regard. Since all the legal safeguards provided by the 
doctrine of natural justice are in place during the formal trial, the accused cushioned as he is 
by the doctrine, should be obliged to participate in the proceeding investigating his criminal 
liability. The wording of Sec. 35 suggests that the accused's silence is to be regarded as just 
another item of evidence amongst many other items of evidence adduced at trial. Sec. 35 
does not alter or shift the accused's primary burden of proof. The evidentiary question of 
whether or not the prosecution has discharged its burden will continue to be decided at the 
end of the trial once all the evidence (including the accused's silence) has been adduced, 
and cogently assessed. 
Sec. 35 may only be triggered once certain essential preconditions have been met. In terms 
of Sec. 35(1 )(a)(b) the accused must be fourteen years or older. The accused's physical and 
mental ability must be normal.72 No testimony will be expected from an accused whose 
defence is one of insanity or diminished responsibility.73 No testimony will be required from 
the accused who, following the correct evidentiary practice, has claimed a lawful privilege. 
The court is empowered to excuse the accused in certain circumstances from answering 
70 This point is carefully stressed in Murray v D.P.P (1994) 1 WLR 5, 11, in regard to the equivalent 
Northern Ireland articles. 
71 R v EI-Hannachi (1998) 2 Cr. App. R 226; R v Birchall (1999) Crim. L. R 311. 
72 The common law in this respect remains unaltered. R v Bathurst (1968) QB 99 in this respect 
remains good law. 
73 Exceptions may be made for physical and mental conditions, R v Friend (1997) 2 ALLER 1012, 
1020. A voire dire, R v A (1997) Crim. L. R 883, may be held to determine mental capacity. Sec. 35 
does not arise when the handicap is so great that the accused is unfit to plead. This is a judicial 
discretion dependent on the factual circumstance. 
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specific incriminating questions?4 The usual practice requires the defence counsel, at the 
end of the prosecution's case, to advise the court on whether or not the accused intends to 
testify75 (Sec. 35(1 )). If the accused chooses not to testify, the judge must satisfy himself 
that the accused is aware of the evidentiary consequences of his choice (Sec. 35(2)).76 The 
judge must ask the defence counsel in the presence of the jury, "have you advised your 
client that the stage has now been reached at which he may give evidence and, if he 
chooses not to do so, or, having been sworn, without good cause refuses to answer any 
questions, the jury may draw such inferences as appear proper from his failure to do so". 
"Proper inferences from trial silence" : The core provision Sec. 35(3) reads, "the court or 
jury in determining whether the accused is guilty of the offence charged, may draw such 
inferences as appear proper from the failure of the accused to give evidence, or his refusal 
without good cause to answer any question". Sec. 35(3) applies to most cases77 and is not 
limited only to exceptional cases (as were the original common law trial exceptions)?8 In 
essence, the prosecution must first establish a strong prima facie case before the possibility 
of an adverse inference from the accused's silence arises. 79 Lord Slynn, in Murray v D.P.pB0 
points out that there is an obligation only to respond to a clear prima facie case. The judge 
must inform the jury not to draw an adverse inference unless fully satisfied that the accused 
has a case to answer. The jury is obliged to draw an adverse inference only "where aspects 
of the prosecution's evidence taken alone or in conjunction with other facts, clearly calls for 
an explanation which the accused ought to be in a position to give, if an explanation exists, 
74 See Sec. 35(5). The accused must show good cause why he is not testifying. Good cause may be 
an abnormal medical condition, nervous disposition, duress, fear, desire to protect others, intimidation 
b/ a co-accused, but not fear of exposing a previous criminal record. R v Cowan (1996) QB 373. 
7 When the accused does testify, there is no need for the jury's attention to be drawn to the fact that 
the accused risked an adverse inference. 
76 At the close of the state case, the judge must warn the accused of the danger of an adverse 
inference from a failure to testify, R v Price (1996) Crim. L. R. 738; R v Ackinclose (1996) Crim. L. R 
74. 
77 R v Cowan ( 1996) QB 373 rejected the exceptional case argument because a plain reading of Sec. 
35 did not justify confining the operation of the section to exceptional cases only. Sec. 34 is also 
regarded as being of general application, although it is narrower in scope than Sec. 35 and contains 
the qualifying provision of reasonableness. 
78 If Sec. 35 was to apply exceptionally, it would then be a simple watered down codification of the 
common law. Common law inferences are only exceptionally allowed where there is no possible 
innocent explanation for the accused's silence. 
79 Where the prosecution's prima facie case is not a strong one, the accused is not obliged to answer. 
Jackson "The Right To Silence : Judicial Responses To Parliamentary Encroachment" (57) M.L.R. 
p994) 277. 
0 Murray v D.P.P (1993) 97 Cr. App. R 151. 
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then a failure to give an explanation may, as a matter of common sense, allow the drawing of 
an inference that there is no explanation and that the accused is guilty".81 
Judicial interpretations of Sec. 35 speak of a "common sense" inference, yet neither Sec. 35 
nor Sec. 34 give an adequate explanation, guideline or analysis as to the nature and 
meaning of "common sense". A proper inference is said to depend on the accused's ability 
to deny, explain or answer from within his own knowledge, the prosecution's case against 
him. It is also clear that in the appropriate combination of circumstances a Sec. 35(3) 
inference is capable of amounting to direct evidence of guilt. However, in the run of the mill 
cases, a Sec. 35(3) inference is normally used to bolster the prosecution's case or to 
undermine a specific defence relied upon by the accused. (Note : The Human Rights Act 
1998 will probably have the effect of abolishing adverse inferences which go directly to guilt). 
The essential elements of a Sec. 35 adverse inference may be summarised as follows82 : 
(a) Silence is adverse evidence against the accused. (Innocence cannot logically be 
inferred from silence).83 
(b) A proper inference depends on a clear or a strong prima facie case. 
(c) The inference to be drawn is not necessarily an inference from a specific fact, it may 
be a general inference from a combination of specific facts. 
(d) The inference to be drawn depends upon the nature of the issue(s), the weight of the 
evidence and the extent to which the accused is able to give his own account of the 
matter. 
(e) Following from above, a proper inference depends on whether the accused is in a 
position to deny, explain or answer from within his own knowledge the prosecution 
case against him. 
"The judicial direction": The judge possesses a broad discretion to advise the jury on the 
nature, extent or degree of the adverse inference to be drawn from the accused's failure to 
testify. In R v Cowan,84 the following judicial directive is proposed: 
81 The prosecution's case must be a clear one (Murray v D.P.P) or a strong one (R v Murphy). The 
reference in R v Byrne (1996) 2 WLR 24, to a bare prima facie case is incorrect. The European 
Convention on Human Rights precedent also calls for a clear or strong case. 
82 Per Lord Slynn and Lord Mustill in Murray v D.P.P (1993) 97 Cr. App. R 151 at 155, 160, 161. 
83 See in particular, Justice: Response to Home Office's Working Group Consultation Paper on the 
Right to Silence (1988) 3. 
84 (1995) 4 ALLER 942, per Lord Taylor CJ. 
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(a) The jury must be reminded that the burden of proof remains upon the prosecution 
throughout the trial. 
(b) It must be clearly explained to the jury that the accused is entitled to remain silent as 
a matter of law. Silence is the accused's right and his choice. The right to silence 
has not been statutorily abrogated and mere silence, by itself, does not attract 
contempt or other procedural sanctions. 
(c) An inference from a failure to give evidence cannot by itself prove guilt. 
(d) The jury must be satisfied that the prosecution has established a prima facie case 
before drawing an adverse inference from the accused's silence. 
(e) Where the jury finds the accused's exculpatory evidence satisfactory, it may not draw 
an inference. If the defence evidence presents no adequate or innocent explanation, 
the jury is properly empowered to hold the accused's silence against him. 
(f) The judge must also make known to the jury all the various circumstances in which 
the drawing of an adverse inference would be improper, i.e. where the accused is 
'unrepresented by counsel, where the accused fails to testify out of fear that his record 
or bad character may be exposed, or out of fear for his safety, etc. 
9.5 The Role of an Adverse Inference (Sec. 38) 
Sec. 38 explains the role of an adverse inference and is the evidentiary foundation of 
Sections 34 through to 37. The cardinal rule established by Sec. 38 is that no prima facie 
case may be established against the accused on the basis of silence alone. In principle an 
adverse inference may only be drawn against the accused once the prosecution has 
adduced sufficient evidence connecting the accused to the offence and upon which evidence 
a reasonable jury could convict. Sec. 38(3) reads, "a person shall not have the proceedings 
against him transferred to the Crown Court for trial, have a case to answer or be convicted of 
an offence solely on the inferences drawn from such a refusal or failure as is mentioned in 
Sec. 34(2), 35(3), 36(2) or 37(2)." In this sense, an adverse inference from silence operates 
in a supporting role and is only triggered once the accused fails to respond to other 
extraneous evidence of guilt. Sec. 35 is specific in this regard and an adverse inference may 
only be drawn once the state has established a sufficient case capable of discharging the 
prosecutorial burden of proof. Sec. 38(4) permits the accused to apply for discharge where 
the state case is based solely on adverse inferences. Sec. 38(5) ensures that the general 
evidentiary exclusionary rules (i.e. bad character rule, hearsay rule, etc) apply equally to the 
accused's silence testimony. The judge possesses a discretionary power in terms of Sec. 
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38(6) and may exclude state evidence which inhibits a fair trial process.85 The effect of Sec. 
38(3) is somewhat arbitrary. When the prosecution has a strong prima facie case based on 
non-silence evidence, an inference drawn from silence adds only an unnecessary additional 
probative value to the prosecution case. The prosecution is likely to proceed without 
evidence of silence, in which case Sec. 38(3) is largely superfluous. However, where the 
prosecution case is a weak one which requires shoring up by the addition of silence 
inferences, Sec. 38(3) comes into its own. In other words, there may be no case to answer 
without silence, but one to answer with silence. The crux of the debate between utilitarian 
proponents and libertarian opponents of CRIMPO is whether it is ''fair'' to permit an adverse 
inference from silence to alter a weak prima facie case into a strong prima facie case. An 
interpretation of Sec. 38(3) presents two immediate problems. First, the section gives no 
guideline on whether the prosecution is entitled to combine Sec. 34 to Sec. 37 inferences 
and. to use all four inferences cumulatively to establish a prima facie case without recourse to 
extraneous evidence. Must there always be some extraneous evidence (as most case 
precedent presumes) or is the prosecution entitled to mix and match Sec. 34, Sec. 35, Sec. 
36 and Sec. 37 inferences in order to build up a prima facie case capable of clearing the 
evidentiary hurdle?86 Second, in theory, Sec. 38(3) provides that the accused shall not be 
convicted solely on the basis of an adverse inference from silence. In practice, though, it is 
left to the jury to decide the effect of a proper inference. The practical problem is how to 
prevent a jury from ignoring judicial directives and convicting purely on the basis of the 
accused's silence. 
9.5.1 Problems, Criticisms and Solutions 
One of the immediate problems presented by CRIMPO is the highly technical nature of the 
flaws inherent in the wording of the various sections. Since 1995 the Court of Appeals has 
found itself preoccupied with the laying down of correct evidentiary directives, particularly in 
regard to Sec. 34. Parliament will also be occupied in future with the redefining of some of 
the CRIMPO sections in order to conform with the new Human Rights Act (1998). Other 
criticisms from within the English legal fraternity go to the philosophical nature of the 
CRIMPO limitations on the silence principle and offer no easy solutions. At a cursory glance, 
CRIMPO appears to be a radical departure from the common law. However, a measured 
85 There is no judicial discretion to exclude an adverse comment made by the co-accused against his 
gartner in crime. · 
6 In R v Mckinley (1993) 4 N.I.J.B 42 (Northern Ireland) presence at the scene of a crime coupled 
with a failure to explain away such presence (Sec. 37) combined with a refusal to testify at trial (Sec. 
35) was held to amount to an overwhelming case. Andrew and Hurst Criminal Evidence 3rd Ed (1997) 
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analysis of CRIMPO reveals no radical departure from the common law definitions. In many 
aspects, .CRIMPO merely codifies the existing common law and gives a new authority to a 
range of common law exceptions already in existence. CRIMPO does not abolish the right to 
silence (Sec. 35(4) specifically preserves it) and there is no directly enforceable duty on the 
accused to make an incriminating disclosure. Silence in the face of police or prosecutorial 
questioning has no formal procedural sanction attached to it. Most, but not all, of the 
common law limitations on the silence principle have been duplicated in the wording of the 
act. Sec. 34(5) expressly preserves the common law limitation on silence when the accused 
and the accuser are on even terms, which means that both the Christie and Chandler 
precedents will continue to apply unaltered. Sec. 36 and Sec. 37 have also not changed the 
common law doctrine of recent possession in any significant manner. In particular, the wide 
common law silence principle (including the privilege against self-incrimination) remains 
unchanged outside the narrow ambit of CRIMP0.87 CRIMPO has no effect on the traditional 
and core definitions of the silence principle and is entirely directed at the mid to late-twentieth 
century developments around the issue of adverse inferences. CRIMPO specifically deals 
with the nature of an adverse inference and provides a framework for the admissibility of the 
different types of permissible adverse inferences. A framework which the common law 
precedents were unable to provide with any sufficient degree of clarity. The most radical 
departure from the common law is found in three limited areas. First, the police caution 
(Code C para 1 0.4) has been revised to take into account the various adverse inference 
effects of CRIMPO. The new caution is a wordy paragraph and may not be easily 
understood by the average criminal. To allow for this, the new Practice Code permits the 
arresting officer a certain flexibility in explaining the caution in easily understood words. 
Second, Sec. 34 is deliberately designed with the intention of blocking the use of a surprise 
trial ambush defence by the accused. However, Sec. 34 is badly drafted, confusing and in its 
current format, presents more technical evidentiary problems that it will solve. Fortunately, 
Sec. 34 has been supplemented if not neutralized by the full disclosure regime established in 
the Criminal Procedure and Investigations act 1996. Third, Sec. 35 (trial inferencer is the 
most controversial section of CRIMPO and has aroused the most hostile criticism because it 
radically reverses the common law precedent as set out in R v Gilbert. 88 
suggest that it would be improper for a jury to convict on such a cumulative collection of adverse 
inferences, but advance no reasons for their opinion. 
87 Outside of the ambit of CRIMPO, the common law applies (as defined in R v Gilbert (1978) 66 Cr. 
App. R. 237 and R v Raviraj (1987) 85 Cr. App. R 93), and the judge must give a clear instruction to 
the jury not to draw an adverse inference (R v McGurry (1999) Crim. l. R. 316), but a failure to do so 
does not necessarily render the conviction appealable (R v Bowers (1998) Crim. l. R 817). 
88 Sec. 35 as supplemented by Sec. 34 (both sections may be applied independently of each other) 
allows a wide range of adverse inferences to be drawn at trial, thus reversing the narrow exception set 
out in R v Gilbert (1977) 66 Crim. App. R 237, a court cannot assume that a defence is untrue simply 
because it went unmentioned until the trial. 
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Many commentators have criticised the intention and direction of CRIMPO. The English Act 
was originally based on the Northern Ireland Order Act 1988. The Northern Ireland Act 
targets professional terrorist organizations such as the I.R.A. and Protestant militia groups. 
These organizations deliberately train their members in counter-interrogation techniques and 
in the cynical manipulation of the trial procedures, notably the right to silence, of the special 
Diplock court (a non-jury emergency tribunal established for the purpose of trying political 
terrorist cases).89 By contrast the English CRIMPO act applies not only to the professional 
terrorist, but targets all criminals in general. The most obvious effect of CRIMPO will be felt 
by those petty, badly educated criminals who through ignorance and the inability to secure 
legal advice, are the most vulnerable. Commentators have suggested that CRIMPO should 
be strictly construed to apply only to a narrow class of hardened professional criminals. 
Such a proposal has some theoretical merit, but it is practically and obtrusively much too 
discriminatory. It would be an infringement of the Human Rights Act (1998) to distinguish 
between different types of criminals solely on the basis of their professionalism or lack of it. 
It will also defeat the purpose of CRIMPO which is utilitarian in design and based on a crime 
control philosophy. The purpose of CRIMPO is to make the task of the police easier 
(CRIMPO is meant to counter-balance the procedural advantages awarded to the accused 
by the Police And Criminal Evidence Act 1984, PACE) and generally, to reduce crime levels 
across the whole spectrum of English criminality. 
Sec. 34 is described as being technically flawed and unnecessarily expensive, by consuming 
valuable time at trial and on appeal. It also presents the danger that an otherwise good 
prosecution case may be overturned on appeal because of a technical Sec. 34 
infringement. 90 The section has necessitated the development of a number of special judicial 
directives and represents a conceptual hurdle to the average lay person jury. A 
conscientious jury will find it difficult to grapple with the evidentiary challenges offered by 
Sec. 34, while the unconscientious jury may simply give up and use a Sec. 34 adverse 
inference without understanding its evidentiary purpose. Commentators have noted that a 
Sec. 34 analysis generates a high degree of collateral inconvenience91 which is contrary to 
the utilitarian spirit of CRIMPO. These commentators advance the Benthamite argument that 
89 A comprehensive analysis of the Dip lock courts is found in Jackson and Doran Judge Without Jury : 
Diplock Trials In The Adversary System, Sheldon (1995); Greer Abolishing The Diplock Courts 
(1986); Doran ''The Symbolic Function Of The Summing Up : Can The Diplock Judgement 
Compensate" (42) Northern Ireland. L. Q (1991) 385. 
90 See R v Bansal (1999) Crim. L. R 484, and R v Moshaid (1998) Crim. L. R 420, "although the 
evidence available to the Crown was powerful, [a misapplication of Sec. 34] renders the conviction 
unsafe". · 
91 Rejecting evidence on the grounds of collateral inconvenience is an established (if implicit) common 
law principle, R v Butler (1999) Crim. L. R 835. 
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evidence should be automatically excluded when receiving it would amount to unnecessary 
vexation, expense and delay. Adverse inferences from Sec. 34 certainly fall within this 
category. The probative value of a Sec. 34 inference is also open to question. The 
evidentiary relevance of a Sec. 34 inference is all too often outweighed by the prejudicial 
effect of its reception. Many prosecutors tend to ignore Sec. 34 inferences as it is an 
expensive and time-consuming exercise to establish the requisite threshold level of "logical 
relevancy". One of the more valid criticisms of Sec. 34 suggests that when it is coupled to 
Code C procedural safeguards (para 1 0.1, 1 0.3 and 11.3), it results in a procedural loophole 
which the police deliberately exploit. Sec. 34 is presently triggered only by the administration 
of the caution and not by arrest. Yet it is only upon arrest that the formal Code C and E 
safeguards become operative. The failure to include arrest as a triggering mechanism for 
Sec. 34 is a loophole which permits the police to question the suspect outside the police 
station, thus avoiding the tape-recording and other safeguard requirements of the formal 
police interview. A badly worded Sec. 34 is likely to result in the re-emergence of the old 
"verbal" problem which so bedevilled the common law. The courts may well become 
entangled in disputes between the accused and the police as to what was said or not said by 
whom and when.92 This problem is solvable by fine tuning the wording of Sec. 34 to include 
caution and arrest. 
One of the major problems with CRIMPO is the vague definition of the word "inference" and 
its qualification by the equally vague word "proper''. The court is empowered to draw a 
proper inference from the accused's silence, yet CRIMPO offers no guidelines on how a 
proper inference is to be interpreted. The English courts both at common law and in 
analysing CRIMPO, have defined a proper inference as one based on common sense 
reasoning. Common sense is not a legal term but a description with a rather wide and 
ambiguous meaning. The jury may well be encouraged to indulge in all kinds of speculation 
under the disguise of common sense.93 (In the words of Winston Churchill- common sense 
is really not so common). In answer to this criticism, it must be pointed out that the 
evaluation of all evidentiary material (admissibility, relevance, probative weight, prejudice, 
etc) is essentially based on a common sense reasoning. The glue of relevancy between 
evidentiary facts (facta probantia) and the principle facts-in-issue (facta probanda) is 
92 The court must now instruct the jury not to draw an adverse inference from the suspect's silence 
during an improper interview outside the police station, R v Pointer (1997) Crim. L. R 676. 
93 Easton "Legal Advice, Common Sense And The Right To Silence" Int. J. Evidence and Proof(1998) 
2 suggests "that a common sense inference from a jury is likely to be unreliable, impressionistic and 
unsystematic". 
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established by a blend of common sense logic and experience.94 As long as the rules of 
logic are adhered to, 95 there can be no objection to the drawing of common sense 
reasonable inferences from indirect circumstantial evidence, so why should the drawing of 
common sense adverse inferences from Sec. 34, 35, 36 and 37 be treated any differently?96 
Another criticism advanced is that the jury is likely to ignore these cardinal rules of inferential 
logic and to focus exclusively on the accused's pre-trial or trial silence. It is argued that 
CRIMPO has the unfortunate influence of immediately directing the jury's attention to the 
accused's silence thereby ignoring other probative evidence. The jury may well base a 
conviction solely on the accused's failure to speak. However, this essential problem is not of 
CRIMPO's making, but is a structural problem of the English jury trial system. As long as a 
trial conviction is dependent on the opinion of lay person juries, the judge will be unable to 
regulate the juror's state of mind. This is a structural problem and is not due to reasonable 
limitations on the silence principle. 
CRIMPO does not offer a guideline on the role of a cumulative combination of the various 
sectional adverse inferences. In theory, it may be possible in a particular circumstance, to 
admit Sec. 34 through to Sec. 37 adverse inferences either individually, but also 
cumulatively, as the facts warrant. The question is whether the prosecution may combine all 
the statutory inferences together and thereby establish a prima facie case. Is extraneous 
evidence always essential to the establishment of a prima facie case or may the prosecution 
mix and match the various sectional adverse inferences together, in order to build up a case 
capable of meeting the required evidentiary burden. Certainly, if Sec. 36 and Sec. 37 are 
part of the mixture, there will be a quantity of circumstantial evidence available to form a 
minimum threshold level of extraneous evidence (as required by Sec. 38(3)). Case law from 
Northern Ireland does suggest that it would not be unreasonable, in the right circumstance, 
to convict primarily on the cumulative weight of the accused's silence on arrest and a later 
failure to testify, as long as there is also a minimum amount of real evidence drawn from a 
Sec. 36 (possession of incriminating materials) or a Sec. 37 (presence at the crime scene) 
analysis. However, it may well be that the Human Rights Act (1998) will inhibit the 
94 R v Mathews 1960 (1) SA 752 (A) per Schreiner J at 758, "relevancy is based on a blend of logic 
and experience outside the law. The law starts with this practical or common sense relevancy and 
then adds material to it, or more commonly exclude material from it .... " See also Hollingham v Head p 858) 4 CB (NS) 388, 391. 
5 R v Blom 1939 AD 188, per Watermeyer JA at 202-3, "there are two cardinal rules of logic when 
reasoning by inference : (a) the inference must be consistent with all the proved facts, (b) the proven 
facts should be such that they exclude every reasonable inference save the one sought to be drawn". 
The same cardinal rules of logic may well be applied to statutory adverse inferences from silence. 
96 Hau Tau Tau v P.P (1982) A.C 136, 153, per Lord Diplock, ''what inferences are proper to be drawn 
from an accused's refusal to give evidence depends upon the circumstances of the particular case, 
and is a question to be decided by applying ordinary common sense'. 
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prosecution's ability to build a prima facie case solely on these sectional adverse inferences. 
Opponents of CRIMPO have also pointed out that statutory adverse inferences from the 
accused's silence may well become superfluous once the case reaches the trial stage. If the 
Director of Public Prosecutions is confident enough to allow a matter to proceed to trial, it 
means that the state case is strong enough, and subsequent statutory inferences will add 
very little evidentiary substance to the case.97 On the other hand, the director may be 
hesitant to allow a weak prosecution case to proceed to trial, especially when the case is 
dependent on the unpredictability of statutory adverse inferences to push it past the requisite 
evidentiary threshold hurdle. 
It is said that a statutory adverse inference disturbs the traditional adversarial trial balance by 
making the prosecution's task easier and a conviction more likely. The combined effect of 
Sec. 34 through to Sec. 37 is said to place an indirect and tacit pressure on the criminal 
defendant to co-operate during the police investigation, to disclose alibi defences at the 
earliest opportunity, to give reasonable explanations for the possession of incriminating facts, 
and to involuntarily respond to a prima facie case at trail by submitting to cross-examination. 
The effect of CRIMPO is to shift the primary evidential burden of proof away from the 
prosecution and on to the accused's shoulders. The shift in the primary burden causes a 
domino effect in which the presumption of innocence is eroded, the accused is forced to be 
an instrument in his own conviction and the fair trial nature of the adversarial procedure is 
compromised. There is a widely held assumption that somehow the burden of proof and the 
presumption of innocence are inextricably linked to a right to silence. The nexus is always 
assumed by both the English and American courts but is rarely if ever rationally explained. 98 
A careful analysis of CRIMPO does not suggest a shifting of the evidentiary burden of proof. 
On the contrary, CRIMPO treats the accused's silence as no more than an item of 
circumstantial evidence from which adverse inferences may be drawn according to the 
cardinal rules of logic. As a mere item of circumstantial evidence the adverse inference 
drawn from CRIMPO cannot as a matter of procedural logic have any effect on the 
presumption of innocence or the fairness of the trial. Indeed, the European court in Murray v 
U.K 99 did not find the jurisprudential reasoning for statutorily limiting the common law silence 
principle to be an infringement of the European Convention on Human Rights. The end 
result of the English reform process is the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act (1994) 
which gives a meaningful interpretation of the silence principle by taking into account both its 
97 In many of the appeal cases, the prosecution had a strong case without silence. See R v Argent · 
(1997) 2 Cr. App. R 27, R v Bowers (1998) Grim. L. R 817, R v Daniel (1998) Grim. L. R 818 and R v 
Tay/or(1999) Grim. L R 77. 
98 See supra chapter 4 p.141-144. 
99 (1996) 22 EHRR 29. See infra chapter 10. 
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practical and logical flaws. In contrast to the pragmatic Engli$h approach, the interpretation 
of the silence principle as an absolute constitutional right by the Supreme Court of the United 
States is a confusing and contradictory process. The English statute is a successful 
compromise between the need to protect the individual during the criminal process and the 
need to combat crime in the most efficient manner possible. The American model excludes 
a reasonable balance of interests analysis, but the pragmatic English model allows for the 
efficient and controlled limitation of the silence principle in the combating of crime. 
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CHAPTER 10 
THE ENGLISH PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION 
1 0.1 Statement of the Rule 
The English privilege is defined both in common and in statutory law. 1 "During a criminal or a 
civil proceeding an individual may refuse to answer any question or to produce any document, 
if the answer or the production has the tendency to expose the individual, directly or indirectly, 
to the risk of a criminal conviction, the imposition of a penalty or the forfeiture of an estate". 2 In 
this sense the privilege is sometimes said to be an obstacle in the search for legal truth and 
sometimes an aid or an inducement which encourages freedom of testation. As an inducement 
it shields the non-party witness from being forced to choose between lying on the witness stand 
(perjury}, refusing to answer questions (contempt) or exposure to a criminal charge. It is also 
presumed to increase the reliability factor of the non-party witness evidence. In the common law 
tradition the privilege generally applies to both oral and documentary evidence. No special 
distinction is drawn between the spoken or the written word. By contrast, American 
jurisprudence pays particular attention to written evidence and has developed an act of 
production and required records doctrine which curtails the privilege's application to documents. 3 
Unlike the accused's right to silence which is a fairly recent nineteenth and twentieth century 
development, the witness privilege against self-incrimination has a long history and an unbroken 
tradition going back to the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.4 
In this historical sense the privilege may be invoked whenever an individual (citizen, non-party 
witness or accused) is required to answer self-incriminatory questions under a legal compulsion 
or due process of law. 5 The common law privilege has been statutorily subsumed by sec 14 of 
the Civil Evidence Act (1968) as, 'the right of a person in any legal proceeding, other than a 
criminal proceeding, to refuse to answer any question or produce any document or thing, if to 
do so would tend to expose that person to proceedings for an offence or for the recovery of a 
1 Phipson On Evidence Sweet and Maxwell (2000); Keane The Modern Law of Evidence Butterworths 
(2000); Passmore Privilege C.L.T. (1998) Chp.11; Uglow Evidence Sweet and Maxwell (1997) 239; 
Andrew and Hirst Criminal Evidence Sweet and Maxwell (1997) para12.210; Cross and Tapper On 
Evidence Butterworths (1995) 453; Murphy on Evidence Blackstone (1995) 388; Ligertwood Australian 
Evidence Butterworths (1993) para 5.68; McNicol Law of Privilege (1992) 140. 
2 The seminal restatement of the common law rule is to be found in Blunt v Park Lane Hotel Ltd (1942) 
2K.B. 235, 257 per Goddard L.J. See also Redfern v Redfern (1891) Pp139, 147; Lamb v Munster(1882) 
10 Q.B. 100, 111 and Spokes v Grosvenor Hotel Co (1897) 2 Q.B. 124. 
3 See supra chapter 7 p.241-254. 
4 See supra chapter 2 
5 Rio Tinto Zinc Corp v Westinghouse Electric Corp (1978) AC 636 (1978) 1 ALLER 434, 464, per Diplock 
L.J. 
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penalty." The privilege applies only to the risk of a criminal proceeding6 and does not apply to 
questions which would tend to expose the witness to the risk of a civil proceeding.7 1n England, 
South Africa, Australia and New Zealand, the privilege applies not only in judicial (and quasi-
judicial) proceedings but may be extended to non-judicial proceedings including commissions 
and boards of inquiry.8 The Australian privilege is liberally defined as extending into "every 
circumstance where incriminating evidence is lawfully sought". 9 The same flexible criteria apply 
in most other Commonwealth jurisdictions. Traditionally the privilege has always been regarded 
as an ordinary procedural and evidentiary rule, but in line with the constitutional elevation of the 
right to silence, the privilege is currently regarded as a bastion of human rights. 
Jurisprudentially the privilege is now deemed to be a protection for the witness' personal 
freedom, dignity, privacy and the inviolability of human personality. 10 The twentieth century view 
that the privilege is not merely a procedural rule but a fundamental right is exemplified by the 
constitutional entrenchment of the privilege in the United States (the Fifth Amendment), Canada 
(sec 11, Charter of Rights and Freedoms) and South Africa (sec 35 of the 1996 Constitution). 
There is a recent tendency in both Australia and New Zealand (a statutory codification of the 
privilege in the Bill of Rights Act 1990) to translate the privilege into a first-class fundamental 
right. 11 The position in England is generally static and the privilege is sometimes regarded as 
an "archaic and unjustifiable survival from the past", 12 but the position is likely to change with 
the introduction of the Human Rights Act 1998. The modern privilege against self-incrimination 
is now much wider than the historical privilege and protects a wider range of legal persons over 
a greater spectrum of legal subject matters. The libertarian rationales advanced to justify the 
6 Lamb v Munster ibid, "[a person may refuse information] which may tend to bring him into the peril and 
possibility of being convicted as a criminal". 
7 There is no privilege in civil proceedings even when the state sues (Witness Act 1806), except in the rare 
instance of a civil penalty proceeding. The privilege may not be invoked in bankruptcy proceeding, per sec 
16(5) Civil Evidence Act 1968, or in professional disciplinary proceedings, Re XY, exp Haes (1902) 1 K.B. 
98. In A. T. and T. /stet Ltd v Tully (1993) A. C. 45, 55, the privilege's application in civil cases is limited to 
the extent that the state can use the discovered material against the witness in a future criminal 
proceeding. 
8 (Australia) Pyneboard Pty Ltd v Trade Practices Commission (1983) 57 A.L.J.R. 236; Sorby v 
Commonwealth (1983) 57 A.L.J.R. 248. (New Zealand) Taylor v New Zealand Poultry Board (1984) 
I.N.Z.L.R. 394. (Canada) R v Spyker (1990) 63 CCC (3d) 125. (South Africa) Waddel v Eyles NO and 
Welsh NO (1939) TPD 138 and R v Diedericks (1957) (3) SA 661 (E). 
9 Ligertwood Australian Evidence (1993) n 5, 66. 
10 See supra chapter 4 p.112 per Murphy J in Pyneboard Pty Ltd v Trade Practices Commission (1983) 
57 A.L.J.R. 236, 243. 
11 (Australia) Sorby v Commonwealth (1983) 152 CLR 281; E.P.A. v Caltex Refining Co. (1993) 178 
CLR 477. (New Zealand) Apple and Pear Marketing Board v Masters and Sons Ltd (1986) 1 NZLR 191. 
(Canada) Solonsky v R (1980) 1 SCR 821, 836. 
12 A. T. and T. /stet Ltd v Tully (1993) ibid at 53, per Lord Templeman. See also the Australian case 
Spedley Securities Ltd (in liq) v Bond Brewing Investments Pty Ltd (1991) 9 ACLC 522, per Cole J at 535-
6, "the privilege is a mere procedural rule from a time when defendants were less able to protect 
themselves: and Spratt v Hermes (1965) 114 CLR 226, per Barwick CJ at 244-245. 
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accused's right to silence have been uniformly extended to the witness privilege against self-
incrimination. This may be a mistake for a number of reasons. First, the accused's right to 
silence and the witness privilege against self-incrimination have historically taken different 
evolutionary paths. Second, the accused in a criminal proceeding is not legally or logically in the 
same position as the witness in a criminal or civil proceeding. Third, the liberal rationales 
developed to account for the accused's right to silence have been found to be without a moral 
or rational justification (see chapter 3 and chapter 4). Fourth, the jurisprudential foundations of 
these rationales have become even more confusing due to the large number of statutes which 
expressly or impliedly abrogate or modify the scope of the privilege. No consistency of purpose 
is exhibited by these sometimes arbitrary statutory modifications or abrogations. Fifth, the 
confusion is compounded by the traditional distinction drawn between communicative non-
physical evidence (to which the privilege attaches) and non-communicative physical evidence 
(to which the privilege does not attach). Sixth, following from the above, the confusion is 
multiplied by the unexplained ease in which passive body sample (blood, tissue and DNA) 
evidence is excluded from the scope of the privilege despite the proven communicative and 
incriminatory nature of some types of this form of evidence. Seventh, it is difficult to pinpoint a 
specific justification for the privilege when much the same reasoning is applied in some 
jurisdictions to deny the privilege to the corporation and in others to extend the privilege to the 
corporation. How can any consistent rationale be developed when, for example, the privilege 
is sometimes extended to the foreign forum and at other times denied to the foreign forum. 
10.2 The Application of the Privilege 
The privilege applies not only to self-incriminatory evidence during the trial stage but may be 
also claimed at the pre-trial stage during discovery, inspections of all kinds, interlocutory 
processes including Anton Pillar13 and Mareva injunction applications. The privilege may be 
claimed by any person whether a witness, party or ordinary citizen. 14 The claim must be 
13 (England) Rank Film Distributors Ltd v Video Information Centre (1982) AC 380. Anton Pillar orders 
and self incrimination is regulated by sec 72(1) Supreme Court Act 1981, "abrogating the privilege but 
substituting a limited use immunity". Garnham "Sec 72 of the Supreme Court Act 1981" (132) N.L.J. (1982) 
983. (New Zealand) The relationship between Anton Pillar orders and the privilege is regulated by 
common law, Thorn EM/ Video Ltd v Kitching and Busby (1984) FSR 342. (Australia) Warman 
International Ltd v Envirotech (Aust) Pty Ltd (1986) 67 A.L.R. 253, per Wilcox J at 264-5, Authors 
Workshop v Bileru Pty Ltd (1989) 88 A.L.R. 211, per Lockhart J at215-216. (South Africa) Universal City 
Studios Inc and Others v Network Video (Pty) Ltd 1986 (2) SA 734 (A), per Corbett JA at 754. In effect the 
privilege has destroyed the Anton Pillar Order at common law. 
14 In Rio Tinto Zinc Corp v Westinghouse Electronic Corp (1978) AC 547, Lord Denning at 573 
attempted to draw a distinction between a witness and a party to a civil suit, but the present position is that 
both a witness and a party are entitled to the privilege. 
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expressly invoked either by the individual or his legal representative. The privilege is invoked 
for each specific question asked or document requested. There is no blanket privilege which 
covers all possible questions or documents. The invocation must be timeous and may only be 
made at the point at which the risk of actual incrimination arises.15 (Note the accused's right to 
silence may be claimed at any stage of the criminal proceeding.) The privilege may not be 
invoked by a witness who has already been convicted of the offence, where the crime has 
prescribed or where the witness is no longer at risk of prosecution. The trial judge may, as a 
matter of choice (there is no legal obligation to do so), warn the ignorant witness of the 
privilege's existence. 16 (Note, the accused must be specifically warned of his right to silence.) 
Generally, in most Commonwealth jurisdictions, any evidence given in ignorance of the privilege 
may be utilised in a subsequent criminal proceeding. The ignorant witness must suffer the 
consequences as there is no retrospectivity of protection.17 If no invocation is made at the 
relevant time, the privilege is considered to be tacitly waived and the answers are deemed to 
have been made voluntarily. (Note, in contrast, the accused's waiver of his right to silence must 
be obvious and express.) The privilege does not prevent the question from being asked, it 
merely immunises the witness from answering. 18 (Note, the accused's trial right to silence is a 
blanket one which blocks both the question and the answer.) When the witness is wrongfully 
forced or tricked into giving incriminating evidence, such testimony will not be admissible against 
him. 19 The bona fide witness must establish from the circumstance and nature of the evidence 
that there is a reasonable expectation or risk of danger. An unsubstantiated claim of privilege, 
even under oath, is not sufficient. The court must be in a position to test the validity and 
substance of such a claim. R v Boyes'2° establishes the principle as follows, "a merely remote 
and naked possibility of legal peril to a witness is not sufficient to entitle him to the privilege of 
not answering". The court sets out the test as, "the danger to be apprehended must be real and 
appreciable with reference to the ordinary course of the law ... not a danger of an imaginary or 
15 AJ Bekhor and Co v Bilton (1981) 2 ALLER 565; reO (1992) 2 WLR 487, "the proper time for raising 
an objection and claim for privilege is not when a order for discovery is made but when it is answered". 
Spokes v Grosvenor Hotel Co (1897) 2 QB 124, "the privilege may be claimed only at the point at which 
the risk of actual incrimination arises". 
16 In South Africa there is an established practice at criminal proceedings to warn the witness of the 
privilege. A failure to do so may render the witness testimony inadmissable at a future criminal trial. S v 
Lwane 1966 (2) SA 433 (A) per Holmes JA at 4448. There is no reason why such an obligatory warning 
should not also apply in civil proceedings. See also Dunne v Connolly Ltd (1963) A.R. (N.S.W.) 873 and 
R v Bateman and Cooper (1989) Crim.L.R. 590. 
17 Riddick v Thames Board Mills (1977) Q.B. 881, "the incriminating answers may be admissible at 
criminal proceedings". 
18 Alhusen v La Boucher (1878) 3 Q.B. 654, 660; R v Ntshangela 1961 (4) SA 592(A). 
19 R v Garbett (1847) 1 Den 236. But see Sec 76 of PACE supra chapter 8 p.296. 
20 (1861) 121 E.R. 730, 738; Renworth v Stephansen (1996) 3 ALL ER 244, "a mere possibility is 
insufficient. It must be a reasonable likelihood of a charge being brought against the witness". 
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unsubstantial character, having reference to some extraordinary and barely possible 
contingency, so improbable that no reasonable man would suffer it to influence his conduct". 
(Note, although the United States Supreme Court uses much the same language and the same 
test, American precedent is more flexible in granting the privilege than is English precedent.)21 
Whether the claim of privilege should be allowed or not is usually a two step test. First, the 
presiding officer, in the absence of the jury, must determine if the witness's fear of a possible 
criminal prosecution is justified. Second, the real and appreciable danger test is applied taking 
into account the ordinary operation of the law. 22 The court will dismiss a claim based on fear of 
exposure to minor, trifling or petty crimes and where the risk is unlikely, remote or ridiculous. 
When the witness is aware of the unlikeliness of his claim, a rebuttable mala fide inference may 
well arise. 23 In Rank Film Ltd v Video Information Centre,24 the privilege was allowed on the 
ground that the defendants were exposed to a real and appreciable risk of conspiracy and fraud 
criminal charges. In Triplex Safety Glass Co v Lancegaye Safety Glass Lt&5 the court 
emphasised the idea of bona fides. A witness need not be compelled to answer a question 
which placed him at risk merely because it was unlikely to lead to a criminal prosecution. "If a 
claim is made in good faith, it should not be rejected outright simply because the chances of a 
prosecution is minor." The inquiry must make an obvious contrast between a real and 
appreciable risk and a remote or unsubstantial one. If the risk is real then there is a reasonable 
ground to apprehend danger and the privilege may be invoked. Nevertheless, even if the danger 
of prosecution is unlikely, a good faith claim should not be rejected out of hand. 
The privilege encompasses answers which directly incriminate the witness but it also applies to 
initially innocent answers which by a causal chain of reasoning may eventually lead to 
incriminating evidence and the risk of a criminal charge.26 The privilege will protect the witness 
from potentially incriminating disclosures which, through derivative use, may lead to direct and 
actual incriminating evidence. Derivative evidence of this type is defined as incriminating 
evidence obtained by the use of deceptively innocent answers based on a cause and effect 
21 See supra chapter 7 p.240. 
22 Rio Tinto Zinc Corp v Westinghouse Electronic Corp (1978) AC 547 per Lord Denning at 574. 
23 Adams v Lloyd (1858) 3 Hand N 351, 157 ER 506, "the judge should compel an answer if the witness 
is trifling with the court". 
24 (1982) AC 380. See also Sociedade Nacional De Combustiveis De Angola V.E.E. v Lundquist(1992) 
2 WLR 280; A. T. and T. /stet Ltd v Tully (1992) 2 WLR 112. 
25 (1939) 2 K.B. 395. 
26 Wigmore Evidence McNaughton Ed (1961) para 2260. See also the South African caseS v Heyman 
1966 (4) SA 598(A). 
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investigation. R v Slaney, 27 per Tenterden CJ, "[a party] would go from one question to another, 
and though no question might be asked the answer of which would directly incriminate the 
witness, yet they would get enough from him whereon to found a charge against him". The 
burden of proving a real, direct, indirect or derivative appreciable risk rests on the witness 
invoking the privilege. The burden of proof on the witness is a difficult one. There is no proper 
test of causation which distinguishes between derivative and non-derivative type evidence. 
Obviously the more remote the derivative evidence is from the initially innocent answer the less 
likely the possibility of the witness being at risk. Nevertheless the test is vague and 
unsubstantial. 28 To avoid the problem the court is well advised to adopt a reasonableness 
criterion which properly determines the limit between statements which directly incriminate and 
those which may only have a tendency to do so. Otherwise the definition of self-incriminatory 
statements is likely to be absurdly diluted as the court circularly explores the nature of a 
witness's answer which may or may not eventually lead to the danger of self-incrimination. 29 The 
privilege is not a general privilege against a// incriminatory questioning, it is a specific privilege 
directed at self-incrimination. The witness may not rely on the privilege to protect disclosures 
which tend to incriminate a third party. Neither may the privilege be claimed by a non-witness 
or stranger. 30 The privilege does not extend to disclosures which tend to incriminate the 
witness's spouse. 31 Rio Tinto Zinc Corp v Westinghouse Electrical Corp32 holds that no special 
privilege may be claimed in criminal proceedings. Similarly the Court of Appeal in R v Pitf3 
states, "the spouse of an accused who chooses to testify, should be treated no differently to any 
other witness and may also be treated as a hostile witness if the circumstance warrants it". The 
privilege is therefore a purely personal one, emphasising privacy, autonomy and presupposing 
that the evidence necessary to convict should not be forced from the individual's own lips.34 A 
privilege against self-incrimination based on a privacy rationale cannot support its extension to 
27 (1832) 5 C and P 213, 172 ER 944. See also R v Boyes (1861) 121 ER 730; Lamb v Munster(1882) 
10 QB 110, "the privilege covers answers which may tend to incriminate the witness". 
28 There are three problems with the extension of the privilege to derivative evidence. (i) a heavy onus 
is placed on the claimant to show that the answer may by derivative use lead to incrimination; (ii) it is 
difficult for the court to test the validity of the claim. Sorby v Commonwealth (1983) 57 ALJR 248 per 
Murphy J at 251-252 states, "where a witness claims that an answer might lead to investigations which in 
turn might provide evidence, which together with the evidence already available, would form a chain of 
evidence sufficient to support a criminal charge against the witness, is difficult to verify by the court"; (iii) 
such a wide extension of the privilege will rarely be invoked in practice. 
29 To extend the privilege to such an absurd length, means that it is no longer a fundamental principle 
of liberty or privacy and bears little resemblance to its original purpose. 
30 R v Minihane (1921) 16 Cr. App. R. 38. 
31 Although Sec 14(1)(b) of the Civil Evidence Act 1968 (U.K.) has extended the privilege to questions 
tending to incriminate a spouse at civil proceedings. 
32 (1978) AC 547. 
33 (1983) QB 25. 
34 Blackstones Commentaries Vol IV 293. 
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spouses or even other family members. 35 
One of the crucial questions in the Anglo-American legal system is whether the privilege applies 
to both the natural and the juristic person. The tendency in most Commonwealth jurisdictions 
is to give the privilege its widest possible meaning. In England, 36 New Zealand37 and in South 
Africa38 the privilege is extended to the corporation. The privilege is limited to the juristic 
corporation and does not cover its employees. The employee is of course entitled to claim an 
individual privilege in his own right. 39 The extension of the privilege to the corporation is not 
followed in Australia40 which has been heavily influenced by American jurisprudence. 
Environmental Protection Authority v Caltex Refining Co Pty Ltd 41 reverses lower court 
precedent and holds that the privilege does not extend to the corporation. In the United States42 
and Canada,43 the American fifth amendment and the Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms restrict the privilege to the natural person. The United States prohibition is rigid, while 
the Canadian approach is more flexible. In terms of sec 7, Charter of Rights and Freedoms, the 
privilege may be extended to the corporation, in the circumstance, where denying it may also 
have the consequential effect of preventing individual officers of the corporation from claiming 
the privilege. The privilege is denied to the corporation except where its denial may cause grave 
injustice to individual members of the corporation. The limited scope of the privilege in America, 
Australia and Canada is predicated on a human rights rationale, especially the right to dignity, 
freedom and privacy. Ironically the concept of a fair state-individual balance has been used by 
both Australian and English courts in justifying their mutually conflicting decisions.44 
35 See supra chapter 7 p.240-241. 
36 Triplex Safety Glass Co Ltd v Lancegaye Safety Glass Ltd (1934) 2 KB 395; Rio Tinto Zinc Corp v 
Westinghouse Electrical Corp ( 1978) AC 54 7. A corporation is subject to severe penalties and prosecution 
which could have a serious consequence for its, and its members reputations. 
37 New Zealand Apple and Pear Marketing Board v Master and Sons Pty Ltd (1986) 1 NZLR 191. 
38 There is no case precedent in South Africa, but the 1996 Constitution does include the juristic person 
and it is likely that a privilege will also be extended to the corporation. 
39 Sociedade Nacional De Combustiveis De Angola v Lundquist ibid; Tate Access Floors Inc v Boswell 
(1990) 2 WLR 280, "officers of a company cannot invoke the privilege so as to protect other officers". 
40 State Pollution Control Commission v Caltex Refining Co Pty Ltd (1991) 72 LGRA 212 per Stein J at 
219, "to my mind there is no satisfactory policy rationale to extend the privilege beyond the natural person 
to entities which are the invention of the state and cannot be punished by the deprivation of liberty". See 
also McDonald "No body to be kicked or soul to be damned: The corporate privilege" (5) Bond L.R. (1993) 
179. 
41 (1993) 178 CLR 477, "the privilege is a human right based on the protection of personal freedom and 
dignity. On the other hand the corporation is a creature of statute and state, limited by law". 
42 See supra chapter 7 p.229-230. 
43 In Canadian common law the privilege was available to the corporation, R v Bank of Montreal (1962) 
36 DLR (2d) 45 but as a result of the Charter the position has been reversed, R v Amway Corporation 
(1989) 65 DLR (41h) 309. 
44 Ansell "Self-Incrimination Privilege in Australia: The United State Influence" (24) Queensland S.L.J. 
(1994) 545; McNicol "The High Court Rules" (68) L./.J. (1994) 1058; Hill "Corporate Rights and 
Accountability" (2) Corporate Business L.J. (1994) 127; Santow "The Trial of Complex Corporate 
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On the one hand, the Australian courts argue that a corporation is usually in a strong position 
relative to the state, possesses greater resources than the private individual and the advantages 
of incorporation gives it a more than adequate compensation for the lack of a privilege. 45 On the 
other hand, the English courts argue that the vast majority of corporations are small and 
identical to their proprietors. The privilege is a natural advantage for the small family-run 
business. The extension of the privilege to the juristic person in most jurisdictions46 but not in 
others highlights the ambiguity of the privilege and its lack of a defining jurisprudential rationale. 
It may be said that the primary libertarian and human rights justification for the privilege has 
always rested on the respect and protection owed by the law to the natural and autonomous 
person. The privilege has always been regarded as an integral constitutional protection for the 
individual. The corporation has no need of such a protection, nor may it claim the respect due 
to an autonomous individual. Corporations are a mere creation of the law, endowed with an 
artificial personality which cannot be confused with a natural human personality. There is no 
logical reason to protect the corporation against a legal process which requires the disclosure 
of self-incriminatory evidence. In fact, legal entities should necessarily be subject to a proper 
state inquiry. 
10.3 The Range of the Privilege 
The privilege applies not only to the risk of a criminal prosecution, but as a rule, extends to the 
risk of a possible penalty, forfeiture or ecclesiastical sanction. The application of the privilege 
to a penalty developed in the common law through a judicial hostility against the public informer 
who sued for penalties in the common law courts. 47 Penalties and forfeitures survived the 
reforming Judicature Acts, although forfeitures are a somewhat anachronistic remnant of land 
protection.48 The modern English court has an extensive array of sophisticated procedural 
remedies against forfeitures, making a forfeiture privilege largely redundant. (For this reason 
Transgressions" (67) Australian L.J. (1993) 265; Ross "Corporations and the Privilege Against Self-
Incrimination" (15) Un. N.S.W.L.J. (1992) 297. 
45 Australian statutory law limits the privilege to the natural person. Sec 8, Sec 1316A, Corporations 
(Evidence) Amendment Act 1992 (Cth) "Corporations cannot claim the privilege in criminal proceedings". 
46 Case law of the European Convention on Human Rights and case law of the Court of Justice make 
no distinction between natural persons and juristic persons, Dombo Beheer B. V. v The Netherlands (1994) 
18 EHRR 213. There is no reason why the privilege cannot be extended to the European corporation. The 
only limitation on a juristic person is that it cannot invoke the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights. 
47 Earl ofMexborough v Whitwood Urban DistrictCounci/(1897) 2 Q.B. 111, 115, per Lord Esher, "rules 
of procedure to protect people in respect of their property against common informers". 
48 Pyneboard Pty Ltd v Trade Practices Commission (1983) 57 ALJR 236, per Murphy J at 242, "the 
privilege against a forfeiture arose [in England] out of special regard for land rights, originally secured by 
feudal tenures and later by entailing and other devices. It never had any justification in Australia".Nor does 
it have any justification in South Africa, Hoffman The SA Law of Evidence (1970) 180. 
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sec 16( 1 )(a) of the Civil Evidence Act 1968 abolishes the forfeiture privilege in civil cases.) 
Penalties, unlike forfeitures, have a potentially more important effect.49 A penalty in a civil 
proceeding is very similar to a punishment in a criminal proceeding, hence the need for a 
privilege. 50 A defendant may claim a penalty privilege in a civil proceeding if his answers tend 
to expose him to a civil penalty. 51 Where the civil proceeding does involve a penalty sanction, 
the court will usually award the privilege to the defendant in the form of an immunity against in 
limine discovery or the production of documents. The defendant must make a specific privilege 
claim to each interrogatory or to each document as the matter arises. 
The number of penalties to which the privilege applies has been increased by England's 
accession to the European Community and now includes breaches of E.C. treaty law and 
infringements of E.C. council regulations. 52 The penalty privilege is best summed up by the 
Australian case Refrigerated Express Lines (A/Asia) Pty Ltd v Australian Meat and Livestock 
Corp, 53 "it is a well established principle that a defendant in proceedings for the recovery of a 
pecuniary penalty should not be ordered to disclose information or produce documents which 
may assist in establishing his liability [but] where the proceedings are not for the recovery of a 
penalty, there is no general rule precluding the making of an order for discovery, or 
interrogatories and there will ordinarily be no proper ground for objecting to an order for 
production of documents or provision of information."54 Although the equity courts have held the 
penalty privilege to be distinct from the privilege against self-incrimination, both are in theory and 
practice indistinguishable. The only difference is the extent to which legislative acts abrogate 
or modify each privilege. (Note the ecclesiastical privilege which has its origins in English church 
practice is now obsolete in England, Australia, New Zealand and South Africa.)55 
49 The penalty privilege applies to discovery, interrogatories and is available in common law as well as 
in equity, Pyneboard Pty Ltd v Trade Practices Commission ibid at 239, "a penalty is a common law rule 
well established". 
50 Rv Associated Northern Collieries ( 191 0) 11 CLR 738, "a penalty is something which will penalise in 
a penal proceeding but does not fall under the heads of criminal law. 
51 Civil actions for penalties must be distinguished from criminal actions and also from other types of civil 
actions for compensation, damages or punitive damages. The purpose of a penalty proceeding is to punish 
the defendant for alleged wrongdoing, not to provide a means for civil compensation. For example, the 
privilege is excluded from actions for debt and other civil suits by the Witness Act 1806 (U.K.) Bhimmji v 
Chatwani (1992) 4 ALL ER 912; Garvin v Domus Publishing Ltd (1989) 2 ALL ER 344. The penalty 
privilege is obsolete in South Africa, Hoffman The SA Law of Evidence (1970) 179. 
52 Rio Tinto Zinc Corp v Westinghouse Electric Corp (1978) 1 ALL ER 434. 
53 (1979) 42 FLR 204, 207-8. See also Pyneboard Pty Ltd v Trade Practices Commission ibid at 242. 
54 Ecclesiastical censure and privilege was held to be restricted to divorce proceedings based on 
adultery, Blunt v Park Lane Hotel Pty Ltd ( 1942) 2 K. B. 253. Ecclesiastical privilege in adultery actions was 
abolished by sec 16(5) Civil Evidence Act (1968), Nast v Nast and Walker (1972) I ALLER 1171; Khan 
v Khan (1982) 2 ALLER 60. Ecclesiastical privilege has been abolished by statute in Australia, New 
Zealand and has fallen into disuse in South Africa, although never formally abolished. 
55 See supra chapter 2. 
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Whether the privilege against self-incrimination may be claimed by a witness who fears the risk 
of a criminal conviction in a foreign jurisdiction is uncertain in most Commonwealth jurisdictions. 
(Note in America, the constitutional privilege does not extend to fear of a foreign prosecution.}56 
Despite several nineteenth century cases which extended the privilege to fear of a foreign 
prosecution, the majority of recent precedent in England, Australia, 57 New Zealand and Canada 
is to deny the witness such a privilege. In the seminal cases King of the Two Sicilies v Willcox 
and Re Atherton58 it was held that the privilege does not extend to witness testimony which may 
incriminate under foreign law. The English courts have been influenced in their decision by the 
kind of reasoning so eloquently summarised by Wigmore, 59 "the privilege should not apply no 
matter how incriminating is the disclosure under foreign law and no matter how probable is a 
prosecution by a foreign sovereignty ... [a] rule which recognises incrimination under foreign law 
as a basis for privilege denies the forum sovereignty the power to grant immunity as broad as 
its privilege and thus denies it the power by any means to compel such testimony". 
However, it has been suggested in a minority of cases that where the risk is real, in the sense 
of being immediate and certain, it is common sense to allow the privilege. In USA v McRae60 it 
was held that where the possibility of incrimination under foreign law is proved as a fact and the 
content of the foreign law is clearly laid out by expert evidence, there should be no reason not 
to grant the privilege. In the worlds of Lord Chelmsford, "[the privilege should apply] where the 
presumed ignorance of the judge as to foreign law is completely removed by the admitted 
statements on the pleadings, in which the nature of the penalty incurred by the party objecting 
to answer is precisely stated". 61 In terms of a libertarian philosophy if the privilege is regarded 
as a fundamental human right and a right to privacy, then the place of the prosecution is 
irrelevant and a bona fide claim of privilege should apply equally in the domestic and the foreign 
jurisdiction. The fact that there is uncertainty in this aspect of privilege jurisprudence and that 
the U.S.A., England and Canada have rejected the extension of the privilege outside of the 
domestic forum, illustrates the ambiguity and confusion surrounding a libertarian interpretation 
of the silence principle. In England sec 14 (1)(a) Civil Evidence Act 1968 expressly confines the 
56 Recent decisions in Australia tend to leave the matter open, but the extension of the privilege to a 
foreign jurisdiction is only supported where the possible incrimination is a fact and the content of the 
foreign law is proved and uncontradicted, Medina v Copenhagen Handelsbank International S.A. (1989) 
ACLD 35, 314, and FF Seeley Nominees Pty Ltd vElAr Initiations (U.K.) Ltd (1990) 96 A.L.R. 468. 
57 (1851) 1 Sim N.S. 301, 61 ER 116, per Lord Cranworth. 
58 (1912) 2 K.B. 251, 255-256, "crimes committed abroad are not crimes committed at home ... l know 
of no principle which will enable a man to protect himself on the ground that he fears criminal proceedings 
in some other country". 
59 Wigmore Evidence McNaughton Ed (1961) para 2269 
60 (1868) L.R. 3 Ch. App. 79. See also Sharifv Azid (1967) 1 Q.B. 605,616. 
61 U.S.A. v McRae ibid at 85. 
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privilege to, "criminal offences under the law of any part of the United Kingdom and penalties 
provided for by such law (which also includes E.C. law)".62 Arab Monetary Fund v Hashim, 63 per 
Meritt J, is a flexible interpretation of sec 14(1)(a) and holds that there is no privilege in relation 
to a possible criminal offence under foreign law but the court does retain a discretion in respect 
to interlocutory injunctions and may well be influenced by a real possibility of incrimination under 
foreign law. 64 Canada has adopted a similar position and South Africa is also likely to follow the 
English approach. 55 The position is still uncertain in Australia but in F. F. Seeley Nominees Pty 
Ltd vELAr Initiations (U.K.),66 Zelling A.J. cast doubt on the existence of a foreign law privilege 
stating, "no amount of ad hoc tuition can put me in the position of [say] the Greek magistrate 
who tries the case, no one can predict with certainty the twists and turns of evidence, no one 
can judge who is not peritus in the law of Greece". However, in practice there is no reason to 
adopt a rigid or hard-and-fast rule. It is suggested that the question of extending the privilege 
to a foreign forum should be evaluated on a case-by-case basis, where the criminal 
consequence in the foreign law is clear and there is a real and appreciable risk that the 
witness's answer will lead to self-incrimination in the forum, then the privilege should be 
extended, but where the foreign law is unclear then the privilege should not be extended. 
1 0.4 Statutory Modification or Abrogation 
It is accepted legal practice in England, Australia and New Zealand that a legislative act may, 
on the basis of parliamentary sovereignty,67 limit the privilege against self-incrimination.68 
Parliament has made full use of its legislative power, largely under the influence of the judiciary 
which in recent years has called for a radical re-appraisal of the privilege. In one of the more 
important cases, AT and T. lstel Ltd v Tully and Another,69 Templeman LJ summarises the 
modern tendency, "Parliament has recognised in a piecemeal fashion that the privilege against 
self-incrimination is profoundly unsatisfactory when no question of ill-treatment or dubious 
62 In accordance with the European Communities Act 1972. 
63 (1989) I.W.L.R. 565. 
64 See also Levi Strauss and Co v Barclays Trading Corp lnc(1993) FSR 179. 
65 There is no South African case precedent in this regard. However, there is no reason why the 
privilege should not be extended to a foreign jurisdiction if the law is clear, proved and the crime is 
recognised in South Africa, Hoffmann and Zeffertt The SA Law of Evidence ( 1996) 242. For the Canadian 
position see Spenser v R (1985) 21 DLR (41h) 756. 
66 (1990) 96 ALR 468, 473. See also Jackson v Gamble (1983) VR 552; Comdr Australian Federal 
Poi/ice v Cox (1989) 87 ALR 163, 167. 
67 In the context of a parliamentary sovereignty (a Westminister system) the silence principle is viewed 
as just another common law rule. 
68 South Africa was previously a parliamentary sovereignty (the privilege was merely an evidentiary rule) 
but is now a constitutional state (the privilege is now elevated into a fundamental right as part of a supreme 
constitution). 
69 (1993) AC 45, 53. 
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confession is involved".70 In practice the number of statutes which amend the privilege has 
increased substantially over the last thirty years. In the words of Heydon/1 "the frequency and 
implication of such parliamentary interventions must be a matter of concern for those who still 
subscribe to the view that the privilege is a fundamental and firmly entrenched common law 
right". The English privilege has been subject to a varying degree of statutory modification or 
abrogation with the specific intent of reducing obstacles in the path of increased extra-curial 
investigatory efficiency. However, there has never been a consistent pattern or plan behind 
those statutes which abrogate the privilege and those which don't. Some statutes expressly 
ratify the privilege, 72 while others fail to mention the privilege at all. There are statutes which 
partially or totally abrogate the privilege.73 These partial and total abrogations are either directly 
expressed or must be indirectly deduced from the statutory meaning. 74 Statutes which abrogate 
the privilege usually operate in one of three ways. First, the statute abrogating the privilege may 
allow incriminating evidence to be admissible against the witness in a subsequent criminal 
proceeding. 75 Second, the statute may abrogate the privilege and remain silent about the use 
to be made of the incriminating material.76 Third, the statute may abrogate the privilege but as 
a substitute protection provide for various degrees of personal use immunity, including 
transactional or derivative use immunity. 77 These immunity provisions are sometimes co-
extensive with the abrogated privilege and sometimes the restored immunity protection may be 
less than the original privilege.78 The statutory immunity may cover only directly incriminating 
statements or indirect and derivative use testimony. England, Australia and South Africa favour 
70 Ibid at 7 4. The law Lords held that there was no reason to award the privilege to a defendant when 
the prosecuting authority has agreed not to make use of the material disclosed at a subsequent criminal 
proceeding. 
71 Heydon "Statutory Restrictions on the Privilege against Self-1 ncrimination" (87) L. Q. R. ( 1971) 214, 239. 
See also Passmore Privilege (1998) chp.11; Uglow; Tapper Cross on Evidence (1995) 453; and Phipson 
on Evidence (2000) 271. 
72 The Consumer Protection Act (1987) sec 47(2). Sec 110(7) Social Security Administrative Act (1992). 
73 Sec 31 Theft Act (1968); sec 98(1) Children's Act (1989); sec 72(1) Supreme Court Act (1981); sec 
2 Criminal Justice Act (1987). 
74 Sec 42 Banking Act (1987); sec 434 Companies Act (1985); sec 290 Insolvency Act (1986); sec 8 
Drug Trafficking Offence Act (1986); sec 71 Environmental Protection Act (1990). 
75 In particular sec 431, 432, 442, 446 of the Companies Act (1985). 
76 Sec 24(b) Purchase Tax Act (1963). The courts have generally interpreted these statutes as allowing 
the admissibility of incriminating evidence, George v Coombes (1978) Crim.L.R. 234; R v Savundra and 
Walker(1968) 52 Crim. App.R 637. 
77 Sec 9 Criminal Damages Act (1971); sec 72 Supreme Court Act (1981); sec 31 Theft Act (1968) 
expressly abrogate the privilege and any incriminatory evidence obtained is inadmissible in subsequent 
legal proceedings. 
78 Sec 2(2) Criminal Justice Act (1987) provides for the compulsory questioning and production of 
documents in fraud cases. The statements obtained are freely admissible in a subsequent criminal trial 
except where there is a defective compliance by investigators with the act. 
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the derivative-use form of immunity.79 In contrast, the American immunity statute which seeks 
to substitute the fifth amendment privilege must provide a protection which is co-extensive and 
an exact match with the abrogated privilege. 80 In Canada, sec 5 of the Canadian Evidence Act 
makes a specific provision for a use form of immunity. 81 
Most of the statutory abrogations of the privilege are concentrated in the field of corporate 
activity, banking, taxation, property protection, creditor rights, serious fraud, bankruptcy and 
insolvency. Statutory interference with the privilege is considered necessary for the efficient 
functioning of various extra-curial governmental bodies such as royal commissions, inquiry 
boards, police investigatory units, taxation and corporate fraud investigatory boards, company 
inspectors and other quasi-governmental and regulatory organs. The greatest erosion of the 
common law privilege has occurred in the commercial and financial arena. 82 Wigmore83 is of the 
opinion that the nature of a fiduciary duty and other public policy consideration make inroads 
into the privilege necessary. Brokers, trustees, company officers and other agents must be 
compelled to render self-incriminatory accounts to the persons (including the state) to whom the 
fiduciary duty is owed. The English do not hesitate in protecting fiduciary duties and other 
proprietary interests. With increasing commercial globalisation the modern trend is to sacrifice 
the p~ivilege on the altar of expediency, efficiency, practicality and competition-driven 
commercial self-interest. On a more fundamental level abrogating statues are essential if the 
state is to have a reasonable chance of successfully prosecuting white collar corporate crime. 84 
As a matter of common sense, the defendant's claim of privilege should be refused when it 
becomes an obstacle to the plaintiff's search and seizure of his own documents which are in the 
fiduciary possession of the defendant, especially where fraud is alleged.85 An example of this 
common sense approach to the privilege is the existence of a common law judicial discretion 
which permits the court to order discovery of incriminating material on the basis that a failure 
79 Rank Film Video Ltd v Video Information Centre (1982) A.C.380, 443 (U.K.) and E.P.A. v Caltex 
Refining Co Ltd (1994) 118 A.L.R., 392, 404 (Australia). See also Findlay "International Rights and 
Australian Adaptation" (2) Sydney L.R. (1995) 278; Aitken "Before the High Court" (16) SydneyL.R. (1994) 
394. In South Africa, sec 204(2) and (4) of the CPA allow for a transactional and use immunity, Net v Le 
Roux No 1996 (3) SA 562 (CC) and Dabelstein and others v Hildebrandt and Others 1996 (3) SA 42 (C). 
80 See supra chapter 7 p.258-259. In particular Kastigar v United States 406 U.S.441 (1972) 
81 See also Haywood Securities v Inter-Tech Resources (1987) 24 DLR (4th) 724 noting the decision 
in Kastigar v United States with approval. See infra note 98. 
82 Polonsky "Self-Incrimination in Insolvency Investigations". De Rebus Feb (1995) 112; Mercer "Right 
to Silence in Liquidations" J. Grim. L. (1992) 379; Tomkins and Bix "The Sounds of Silence: A Duty to 
Incriminate Oneself' Public Law ( 1992) 363; Porter "The Right to Silence in Serious Fraud" Cambridge L.J. 
(1992) 446. 
83 Wigmore Evidence McNaughton Ed (1961) par 2269. 
84 Corporate fraud operates behind a veil of secrecy (which is difficult to penetrate) and involves complex 
commercial technicalities (which are difficult to prove). By manipulating the privilege against self-
incrimination, the defendant makes it extremely difficult for the prosecutor to achieve a conviction. 
85 O'Rourke v Darbishire (1920) AC 581, 626-627. 
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to do so will place the plaintiff at a serious disadvantage while not placing the defendant at any 
real risk of a criminal charge. 86 
As a result of the weighty pressures of proprietary and fiduciary interests, public policy and 
fairness considerations, the privilege has never played more than a vestigial role in company 
fraud or investigations initiated in terms of the Companies Act 1985, the Financial Services Act 
1986, the Bank Act 1987 or the Insolvency Act 1986. Re JeffreyS. Levitt Ltc/7 states "the officer 
of an insolvent company may not claim the privilege against self-incrimination and is moreover 
under a statutory duty [sec 236 of the Insolvency Act] to assist in the insolvency investigation". 
The court is merely re-interpreting the declaratory rule of insolvency which goes back to at least 
the middle of the nineteenth century. The defendant under questioning by liquidation 
investigators cannot refuse to provide evidence which may turn out to be self-incriminatory. In 
re Arrows (4) v Naviede88 it is held that the Serious Fraud Office (S.F.O.) is entitled to the 
disclosure of all material obtained by liquidators in the course of their investigations.89 R v 
Kansaf0 unequivocally holds that self-incriminatory statements made by a bankrupt at his 
insolvency examination may be used in evidence in any other legal proceeding including a 
criminal proceeding. 91 By virtue of sec 2(2) of the Criminal Justice Act 1987, all persons under 
investigation for serious fraud are obliged to answer self-incriminatory questions. 92 According 
to R v Kansa/, parliament intended that the sec 2 investigatory powers should override the 
common law privilege. (Note the wide-ranging powers awarded to the Dfrector of the S.F.O. are 
likely to be curtailed by the introduction of the Human Rights Act 1998.) Although the privilege 
has been modified in many civil investigatory inquiries and civil trial proceedings, the privilege 
still exerts a substantial influence over criminal proceedings. A statutory discretion (in terms of 
sec 76 and 78 of PACE)93 permits the judge to exclude self-incriminatory material, the use of 
which may unfairly disadvantage the defence. The cumulative weight and effect of company, 
insurance, banking and insolvency legislation is to demand a duty of co-operation by the witness 
86 Blunt v Park Lane Hotel Ltd (1942) 2KB 253, 257. 
87 (1992) Ch 457 (1992) 2 ALLER 509. See also Bishopgate Investment Management Ltd v Maxwell 
(1993) Ch 1 (1992) 2 ALLER 856 and R v Harz (1967) 1 A.C. 760, 816. 
88 (1995) 2 AC 75. The combined effect of the Insolvency Act and the Criminal Justice Act is to abrogate 
the privilege. Cumulatively there is no express restriction on the disclosure of compulsory evidence nor 
any indemnity as to the evidentiary usage of testimony. 
89 Even when the defendant has been charged with a criminal offence, the S.F.O. may continue to 
undertake further investigations, R v Serious Fraud Office, ex parte Smith (1991) AC 1. In South Africa see 
Park-Ross v Director: Office for Serious Economic Offences (1995) (2) SA 148(C). 
90 (1993) QB 244 (1993) 3 ALLER 844. 
91 The express and strongly worded abrogation of the privilege in sec 433 and sec 290 of the Insolvency 
Act ( 1986) overrides the partial abrogation of the privilege in sec 31 of the Theft Act 1968. 
92 Sec 2(2) provides for a compulsory questioning. Sec 2(3) provides for a compulsory production of 
documents. Sec 2(8) for the admission of these transcripts at a subsequent trial. 
93 R v Seelig (1992) 94 Cr. App. R 17 and R v Saunders (1996) 1 Cr. App. R 463. 
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or defendant with the investigatory organ. The effect is to remove the privilege in private and 
public inquiries, to allow the admission of incriminating material in subsequent civil and criminal 
proceedings limited only by specific statutory immunity safeguards. The majority of state criminal 
prosecutions in the area of corporate and other serious fraud are dependant on the outcome 
of these civil investigatory processes, especially those which exclude the privilege against self-
incrimination. 
However, with the elevation of the silence principle into a fundamental human right, as a 
consequence of the European Court of Human Rights ruling in Funke v France94 read together 
with the Human Rights Act (1998), it is likely that all English statutes which abrogate the 
privilege will require a re-evaluation and a fundamentally different application. This change has 
already manifested itself in the partial reversal of the Court of Appeals decision in R v 
Saunders, 95 in which the court allowed the admission of a self-incriminatory transcript originally 
obtained from the defendant by a department of trade and industry investigation (i.e. in terms 
of sec 434(5) of the Companies Act 1985, any answer compulsorily obtained by a company 
investigation may be used in a subsequent criminal or civil proceeding). The Court of Appeal 
ruled that there was no unfairness in the trial use of such incriminating material as the 
Companies Act 1985 expressly abrogates the privilege without providing for a substitute use 
immunity. 96 The European Court of Human Rights in Saunders v U.K. 97 declared the 
government's use of the transcript to be an infringement of paunders' sec 6(1) right to a fair trial. 
The effect of the European Court's decision is to prevent the subsequent use of the defendant's 
self-incriminating statements in a criminal proceeding. Consequently, while a statute may 
abrogate the privilege in a pre-trial investigatory inquiry, no use may be made of the 
incriminating testimony in a criminal trial. Future English statutes which abrogate or modify the 
privilege are now obliged to provide specific use immunity guarantees. In contrast to the present 
English position, Australian statutes give wide investigatory powers to Federal, National and 
State Crime Commissions. In terms of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) and (NSW) the Australian 
courts will only uphold the witness' claim of privilege in non-curial investigations on reasonable 
grounds (sec 128(2)) and may in the interest of justice override such a claim (sec 128(5)). The 
courts have a statutory discretion to resolve the conflict between the witness interest and the 
state interest, and often do so in favour of crime control and law enforcement. Similarly in 
Canada, the Director of Investigation, Restrictive Trade Practices Commission may compel the 
94 (1993) 16 EHRR 297, 326. 
95 (1996) 1 Cr. App. R 463. 
96 Re London Investment PLC (1992) Ch 578. 
97 (1997) 23 EHRR 313, 340, "the public interest cannot be invoked to justify the use of answers 
compulsorily obtained in non-judicial investigations to incriminate the accused during the trial proceeding." 
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witness to give evidence at a non-curial investigation. Such compulsion does not violate the right 
to be protected against unreasonable searches (sec 8 of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms) 
nor the due process right (sec 7). The Canadian courts have a discretion to exclude the use of 
such witness evidence at a subsequent criminal proceeding.98 
10.5 Non-testimonial Physical Evidence 
Historically the silence principle has its origin in a limited testimonial privilege and was designed 
to protect oral and documentary disclosures. All other forms of incriminating evidence, such as 
physical and real evidence, were not covered by the privilege. A distinction has developed 
between testimonial evidence (communicative evidence sourced from the individual's own lips) 
and physical bodily evidence (evidence which does not have a communicative function). 
Wigmore lends his considerable authority to this traditional distinction. "Unless some attempt 
is made to secure a communication, written, oral or otherwise, upon which reliance is to be 
placed involving [the defendant's] consciousness of the facts and the operation of [the 
defendant's] mind in expressing it, the demand made upon him is not a testimonial one."99 
According to Wigmore it is not any and every compulsion which forms the core of the privilege, 
"the history of the privilege suggests that the privilege is limited to testimonial disclosures. It is 
directed at the employment of legal process to extract from the person's own lips an admission 
of his guilt which will take the place of other evidence. "100 In essence an incriminating statement 
forced from the defendant's own lips creates adverse evidence which has had no previous 
existence. Wigmore's reasoning is neatly summarised in R v McLellan, 101 "the making of an 
incriminating statement brings into being adverse evidence which previously did not exist. If 
forced from a prisoner it requires him to create evidence against himself, possibly in 
circumstances where he makes the statement not in accordance with the facts. On the other 
hand, a fingerprint or some physical feature is already in existence, it exists as a physical fact 
98 The Australian Evidence statutes provide the witness with a derivative-use immunity issued by the 
court at its discretion (sec 128(2) Evidence Act 1995). See Corns "The Big Four: Privileges and 
Immunities" A.N.Z. J. Criminology(1994) 133. The Canadian common law, Thompson Newspapers Ltd 
v Canada (1990) 54 CCC (3d) 417, and statute law, Combined Investigation Act 1970 RSC, sec 20, 
provide only a use immunity and not a derivative-use immunity, but the immunity provision, sec 13 of the 
Charter, has added a derivative-use immunity. See also R v S (R.J.) (1995) 1 SCR 451. For the position 
in South Africa see Bernstein and others v Bester and others NNO 1996 (2) SA 751 (CC) and Park-Ross 
v Director: Office for Serious Economic Offences 1995 (2) SA 148 (C). 
99 Wigmore Evidence McNaughton Ed (1961) para 2265. 
100 Wigmore ibid at para 2263. In the case of conventional body evidence, fingerprints, footprints, facial 
features, height, colouring, tattoo's, physical abnormalities and deformities, the defendant is not being 
asked to disclose his knowledge. The privilege may only be invoked when the state intends to compell 
testimony based on the accused's own knowledge (para 2265). 
101 (1974) VR 773, 777, per Gowans, Nelson and Anderson JJ. 
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and is not subject to misrepresentation. If it is to be excluded as evidence, it is only on the basis 
of accompanying circumstances of unfairness". 
Physical evidence is not manufactured from the witness, it is real evidence of a high probative 
value and a low level of prejudice. On the other hand, testimonial evidence is manufactured from 
the witness and may be rendered undesirable by a multitude of coercive influences. Physical 
sampling requires only a low level of intrusive co-operation from the witness, while a self-
incriminatory communication must be wrenched from the lips of a suitably manipulated and co-
operative witness. The privilege does not cover the human body as a passive, real source of 
identification evidence because the use of body samples as evidence cannot be equated with 
co-operative self-incriminatory testimonial evidence. Wigmore also classifies the pronunciation 
and spelling of words, the witness' submission to a medical examination, as non-testimonial 
sources of evidence falling outside the scope of the privilege. However, the traditional distinction 
becomes blurred when the question is one of advanced technology, the use of modern lie 
detector tests and a truth serum pharmacology. Lie detectors which test for a physiological 
reaction to emotionally-charged questions and truth serums, which reduce psychological barriers 
to suggestive questions lie in the grey area between non-testimonial and testimonial evidence. 
Evidence gathered from the use of these new methods may well be defined as an enforced 
disclosure of incriminating communicative knowledge. 102 For example, in Germany, court dicta 
has held that lie detector tests are inadmissible on the basis that the involuntary physiological 
responses of blood pressure and respiration are communicative testimonial forms of evidence, 
which fall within the scope of the privilege. Acknowledging that the physical-non-physical 
dichotomy is somewhat arbitrary, other rationales have been advanced to justify the exclusion 
or inclusion of evidence from the ambit of the privilege. The justifications for the extension of the 
privilege are based on evidence obtained as a result of a violation of lawful procedure, 
unreasonable search and seizures, violation of privacy, involuntariness, illegally obtained 
evidence and a general theory based on the violation of physical integrity in the form of 
assault. 103 A doctrine of implied waiver or implied consent is sometimes used to justify excluding 
the privilege from some type of evidence. For example, in all Commonwealth jurisdictions, the 
drunk driver in a traffic violation is deemed to have automatically consented to the taking of a 
102 Wigmore acknowledges that there may be problems at the boundary in regard to these types of 
evidence, "not only is the person's affirmative participation essential (at least in the form of physical 
responses) but his knowledge, despite his will to the contrary, is being extracted" (para 2265). 
103 In England objections to the taking of blood samples are sometimes based on unreasonable searches 
and seizures, violation of due process, etc., and not on the privilege against self-incrimination. For 
example, the statutory PACE consent requirement for the taking of an intimate sample is designed to avoid 
allegations of police assault and not to avoid the invocation of the privilege. See infra note 123 to 125. 
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blood sample.104 
Currently, two schools of interpretation may be distinguished. The majority school, exemplified 
by Wigmore and supported by case law from England, America, 105 Australia, New Zealand, 
Canada and South Africa, maintains an often inflexible distinction between testimonial 
communicative evidence (to which the privilege attaches) and physical non-communicative 
evidence (to which the privilege does not attach), 106 a distinction which is philosophically based 
on a Cartesian conception of the mind-body duality. 107 According to Cartesian reasoning the 
mind (a cognitive process) and the body (a conative process) are two unique functions which 
should be separated. An interaction between these two functions, which gives rise to a legal 
consequence, occurs only when the mind neurologically activates the body in a process which 
produces a verifiable communication of knowledge (for example, where the mind activates the 
musculature of the speech organ to produce an oral communication which has legal 
consequences}. 108 Only such a voluntarily-activated process is covered by the privilege against 
self-incrimination. A purely biological process which does not involve a neurological interaction 
between the mind and the body cannot fall within the ambit of the privilege. The minority view 
suggests that there can be no rigid dichotomy between a human mental and physical function. 
Even Wigmore recognised that all human conduct exists in a continuum in which every act is 
separated from another only by a matter of degree. On the one extreme of this continuum are 
to be found the passive forms of physical body evidence (real evidence), including· non-verbal 
gestures and body language, to which the privilege does not apply. In the middle of the 
continuum are polygraphs, lie detector tests, truth serums which induce evidence, to which it is 
unclear whether the privilege should apply. On the other extreme of the continuum are the 
traditional incriminating testimonial communications to which the privilege does apply. Where 
is the line to be drawn in this complex human interactive continuum? The artificiality of a rigid 
Cartesian dualism is illustrated by the modern day emphasis placed on the use of body 
language. Non-verbal gestures, whether voluntary or involuntary, can consciously or 
subconsciously communicate information. Visual signs from the body, such as demeanour, 
posture, shape and position, often give clues as to mental disposition. This kind of body 
104 In America the same position is held. South Dakota v Neville 459 US 533 (1983), "a refusal to take 
a blood test did not form part of the fifth amendment and the refusal could be used in evidence against the 
accused". The majority of American courts have construed a refusal to take a blood test as a physical act 
and not a communicative act. See supra chapter 7 p.237 -238. 
105 See supra chapter 7 p.234-239. In particular Schmerber v California 384 US 757, 764 (1965) 
106 (England) R v Smith (1985) 81 Cr. App. R 286, S v S (1972) AC 24. (Australia) Pyneboard Pty Ltd 
v Trade Practices Commission (1983) 57 ALJR 248. (Canada) R v Collins 1 SCR 265. (South Africa) 
Msomi v Attorney-General of Nata/1996 (8) BCLR 11 09 (N). 
107 Descartes Mediations and Passions of the Soul Philosophy Series 4 Ed, Cambridge (1992) 368-450. 
108 When the mind activates the musculature of the hand to produce a written document. 
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language often communicates vital information of a high probative value to the trained 
observer. 109 In criminal practice, knowledge of the accused's state of mind (intention) is derived 
from the accused's awareness of his conduct. Adverse inferences may be drawn by an implied 
admission from the accused's silence in the face of an accusation made by the accuser 
speaking on equal terms. In the law of evidence, the hearsay rule covers not only oral or written 
statements, but has been extended to include gestures and certain periods of silence. 110 The 
traditional distinction which excludes the privilege from physical body evidence because such 
evidence does not communicate knowledge is clearly incorrect. In Schmerber v California, 111 
Black J (dissenting) indicated that the taking of blood samples must have some communicative 
effect, "it is a strange hierarchy of values that allows the state to extract a human beings' blood 
to convict him of a crime because of the blood's content but proscribes compelled production 
of his lifeless papers" .112 The words "testimonial" and "communicative" are ambiguous and lack 
precision. For example, although a blood sample test is not comparable to oral testimony, it still 
serves to communicate to the jury the defendant's guilt. By analogy it constitutes the equivalent 
of testimony and is so regarded by the jury. Clearly the rigid and formalistic classification 
between testimonial and physical evidence is logically flawed. The arbitrary boundaries drawn 
between what types of evidence fall within or without the scope of the privilege demonstrates 
the absence of a fundamental jurisprudential justification for the privilege. 
In the Commonwealth and in America, therefore, at common law the privilege cannot be invoked 
by the witness to justify the withholding of a blood or other body sample. However, in England 
the taking of blood and fluid samples is based on a different type of reasoning, as an 
objectionable intrusion upon the witness' bodily integrity. The English common law permits the 
witness to refuse to provide body samples, not on the basis of a privilege against self-
incrimination, but as a protection of personal liberty. In the words of Tapper, "it involves what 
some regard as a peculiarly objectionable intrusion upon their bodily integrity" .113 The common 
law is now codified and governed by the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (PACE). The 
PACE provisions reaffirm the seminal decision in R v Smith114 in which the Court of Appeals 
109 Professional police investigators and prosecutors tend to keep a sharp lookout for this type of body 
language. 
110 A "pointing out" may also be highly communicative. S v Sheehama 1991 (2) SA 860(A) at 879, "a 
pointing out is essentially a communication by conduct". 
111 384 us 757, 775 (1965). 
112 Black J at 775 criticises the majority for its literal interpretation of the privilege and for moving away 
from the liberal interpretation in Boyd v United States 116 US 616 (1886), see supra chapter 7 p.242. The 
US Supreme Court has rejected Boyd in Fisher v United States 425 US 391 (1976), see supra chapter 7 
p.242-243. 
113 Tapper Cross on Evidence Butterworths (1995) 42. 
114 (1985) 81 Cr. App. R 286. See also R v Cooke (1995) 1 Cr. App. R 318. 
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declined to extend the privilege against self-incrimination to body samples115 and held that the 
right to co-operate with the police by supplying samples is not comparable to a refusal to speak. 
In Australia the common law position is also regulated by legislation. For example, the Victoria 
Crimes (Blood Samples) Act 1989116 permits the taking of a blood specimen either by the 
suspect's informed consent, or forcibly in terms of a magistrate's order. 117 The Victoria Act 
reaffirms the common law position that body samples do not fall within the ambit of the privilege. 
Canadian common law adopts the same position. In Marcoux v R, 118 the Supreme Court holds, 
"an accused cannot be forced to disclose any knowledge ... and thereby supply proof against 
himself but bodily conditions and bodily samples do not violate this principle". The European 
Court of Human Rights has also reaffirmed the Wigmore-Cartesian dichotomy between 
testimonial evidence and non-testimonial real body samples. In Saunders v U.1(1 19 the court 
states, "[the right not to incriminate oneself] does not extend to the use in criminal proceedings 
of material that may be obtained from the accused through the use of compulsory powers but 
which has an existence independent of the will of the suspect, such as samples and body 
tissues for the purpose of DNA testing". The common law in South Africa and New Zealand is 
also based on a Wigmore-Cartesian dichotomy in which the privilege against self-incrimination 
does not apply to non-testimonial physical evidence. (Note, in New Zealand, the refusal of a 
blood sample for DNA analysis has been held to be a basic human right and no adverse 
inferences may be drawn from it, R v Martin.) 120 The South African common law distinction is 
approved of inS v Binta121 and inS v Maphumulo122 it is held that the common law position has 
not been affected by sec 35 of the Constitution. 
115 The gathering of body samples does not attract the privilege, R v Apicella (185) 82 Cr. App. R 295, 
nor do other non-intimate samples such as speech, R v Deenik (1992) Crim. L.R 578. 
116 See also the Crimes (Fingerprinting) Act 1988 (Viet). 
117 These statutory powers are subject to the judge's discretion to exclude evidence improperly or unfairly 
obtained. 
118 Stillman v R (1987) 113 CCC (3d) 321; R v Le Clair (1989) 67 Cr (3d) 209; R v Therens ( 1985) 1 SCR 
613; R v Altseimer(1982) 38 OR (2d) 783 (CA); R v Dersch (1993) 3 SCR 768. 
119 (1992) 23 EHRR 313, 337-338 and Funke v France (1997) 23 EHRR 313, 338 (para 69). 
120 (1992) 1 NZLR 313. 
121 1993 (2) SACR 553(C), per Ackermann J at 562 D-E, "the common law principle nemo tenetur does 
not apply to the ascertaining of bodily features nor the taking of blood samples ... A distinction is drawn 
between being obliged to make a statement and furnishing real evidence". See also S v Duna 1984 (2) SA 
591 (C) at 595 G-H; Seetal v Pravitha 1983 (3) SA 827 (3), where Didcot J at 846 H-C cited Schmerber 
with approval. 
122 1996 (2) SACR 84 (N) and S v Huma 1995 (2) SACR 411 (W) 417E-419E. Note, sec 37 (body 
evidence) of the C.P.A. is generally interpreted in line with the common law and excludes the privilege from 
evidence of the accused's body and physical features or conditions (sec 37 is read together with sec 225 
(2)). 
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In England the extraction and evidentiary use of intimate and non-intimate body samples is 
regulated by sec 62 through to sec 65 of PACE (as amended).123 Sec 61 (4) and sec 63(4) give 
the police a wide range of powers in the taking of non-intimate samples (hair, nail scrapes, skin 
cell samples, fingerprints, etc.) from a suspect without consent. The investigating officer must 
have a reasonable cause for suspicion and the non-intimate sample must confirm or disprove 
the suspect's involvement in the alleged crime. Intimate sec 65 samples (internal soft tissue, 
blood, stomach, breath, sperm and other fluid samples) may only be taken with the suspect's 
consent. The doctrine of consent illustrates the importance of properly protecting the suspect's 
bodily integrity against unwarranted police intrusion or assault. Where the suspect refuses to 
give consent, sec 62(10) permits the court to draw an adverse inference from such a refusal. 
The adverse inference may not be construed as direct evidence of guilt, but it does add to the 
prosecution's prima facie case. Sec 62(10) has been amended by the Criminal Justice and 
Public Order Act (CRIMPO) 1994 so as to reflect the general import of sections 34 through to 
sec 37. Only a proper inference (as defined by CRIMPO) may be drawn at any of the relevant 
pre-trial or trial stages of the criminal process. A proper inference may be an adverse one if the 
suspect's refusal is made without good cause. No adverse inference may be drawn in the face 
of good cause shown, such as embarrassment, ignorance, fear, superstition or any other factor 
as may be appropriate in the individual circumstances. 124 In addition to the PACE provisions, 
other supplementary and ancillary legislation also exclude the privilege against self-incrimination 
from certain types of body evidence. The Road Traffic Act 1988 (sec6through to sec 9), obliges 
an alleged drunk motorist to produce blood or urine samples. A failure to do so will permit the 
court to draw the necessary adverse inference. 125 
At first glance DNA genetic profiling fits neatly into the traditional category distinction between 
testimonial and non-testimonial evidence. The scientific validity and high probative value of the 
DNA test makes it the ideal example of physical body evidence falling outside the scope of the 
privilege.126 Because of its high degree of specificity (a 99.9% indication of physical identity) and 
scientific verifiability (it cannot be faked and it is not dependant on the mental disposition of the 
123 Sec 62 of PACE 1984 has been amended by sec 54 of CRIMPO 1994, (i) by inserting a new 
subsection (1A) which permits the police to take non-intimate samples from a person not in police 
detention subject to the person's consent; (ii) sec 54 and sec 58 CRIMPO amend sec 62 and sec 65 PACE 
by removing dental impressions and saliva mouth swabs from the list of intimate samples and placing them 
in the list of non-intimate samples. See also R v Cooke (1995) 1 Cr. App. R 318 "DNA testing can now take 
place even on head hair without the suspects consent". 
124 Good cause may also be a refusal by members of a religious sect to give blood samples, Keane The 
Modern Law of Evidence 41h Ed (1996) 381. 
125 See also the Family Law Reform Act 1987, sec 23, permits the court to draw an adverse inference 
from the individual's refusal to submit a blood sample in a paternity suit, McVeigh v Beattie (1988) 2 ALL 
ER 500. 
126 See ReF (1993) 3 ALLER 596; JPD v MG (1991) IR 47. 
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suspect}, a refusal by the suspect to supply a DNA sample makes it easy for the court to draw 
a straight forward adverse inference of guilt. 127 Nevertheless, DNA testing does exhibit a number 
of flaws. First, a refusal to supply a DNA sample may be based on a variety of factors such as 
fear, anxiety, ignorance, etc. Similar factors to those which account for the suspect's genuine 
silence in the face of police interrogation. Second, although its scientific validity is unquestioned 
there is a practical problem about the standards of the various testing procedures. Different 
laboratories often apply widely varying techniques with differing standards of control. Expert 
evidence problems may arise from the way band sizes are calculated and the different sized 
data pools 128 against which the sample is randomly matched129 (the smaller the band size and 
the data pool, the more imprecise the identification match). Third, while DNA evidence is of 
obvious evidentiary use to the prosecution, its use by the defence is hindered by a limited 
access to expensive forensic services (in South Africa a semen DNA test can cost between 
R500 to R1,000 per sample); small sample sizes which prevent the defence from re-analysing 
the sample; inadequacy of quality controls to prevent sample contamination; and the necessity 
for expensive expert witnesses. Fourth, during the trial the popular appeal of DNA evidence may 
unfairly focus the jury's attention on a small part of the prosecution's evidentiary. material while 
the rest of a possibly weak prima facie case is ignored. The exclusion of DNA and other body 
evidence from the scope of the privilege against self-incrimination has made the erosion of the 
silence principle by the English courts much easier. In one sense it has given parliament the 
opportunity to legislate and regulate the infringement and limitation of the silence principle. In 
the words of Easton, 130 "the fact that the two category types of evidence [testimonial and non-
testimonial evidence] lie on a continuum and are closely related to each other (separated only 
by a matter of degree) means that once one grants concessions in the case of samples, one 
is on a slippery slope". Nevertheless, the ease by which DNA and other bodily evidence are 
excluded from the scope of the privilege in almost all Commonwealth jurisdictions, is perhaps 
indicative of the reality that the privilege is merely a utilitarian rule of evidence (one without a 
rational foundation) and not a libertarian fundamental human right. 
127 As per sec 62 (1 0) PACE, but note the New Zealand objection to DNA evidence in R v Martin ibid note 
120. 
128 Sec 63 (3A) PACE now gives the police the ability to build up a large and uniform DNA data base by 
taking representative non-intimate samples from arrested individuals. South African police do not possess 
this power. 
129 Other testing problems include: (i) band shifting, band distortion and strand mobility, all of which 
depend on the density of the protein gel used during testing; (ii) no uniform international statistics exist as 
to band concentrations in different nationalities and in small sub-populations; (iii) incorrect storage may 
also result in band distortion. See Evett, Foreman, Jackson and Lambert "DNA Profiling" Grim L.R. (2000) 
341. 
130 Easton "Body Samples and the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination" Grim. L.R (1991) 18. See also 
Walker and Cram "DNA Profiling and Police Science" Grim L.R (1990) 479; Joyce "High Profile: DNA in 
Court Again" New Scientist (July) 1990. 
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10.6 The European Convention on Human Rights 
The European Convention on Human Rights 131 was originally established with the aim of 
promoting greater unity amongst members of the European Community (EC) and other 
European states. Its purpose is to cultivate a European culture of human rights and a respect 
for European law. 132 The Convention is enforced by a European Court of Human Rights, which 
sits in Strasbourg and has jurisdiction over all the signatory states of the EC. The Human Rights 
Court should not be confused with the European Court of Justice, which sits in Luxembourg. 
The former court is narrowly concerned with the protection of basic European liberties, while the 
latter court is taxed with upholding the European legal administrative system in general. The 
European Convention on Human Rights does not expressly mention the terms "the right to 
silence", "the right not to give evidence against oneself' or the "privilege against self-
incrimination". Indeed, before 1993 it was thought that the Convention did not provide a 
protection against infringements of the silence principle. ln. its 1989 decision Orkem v 
Commission133 the European Court of Justice stated, "as far as article 6(1) of the European 
Convention is concerned ... neither the wording of the article nor the decisions of the Court of 
Human Rights indicate that it upholds the right not to give evidence against oneself'. It was only 
in the 1993 seminal decision Funke v France134 that the European Court suddenly discovered 
an implied privilege against self-incrimination in the wording and meaning of article 6(1 ), "a right 
to a fair hearing". 135 Article 6(1) of the European Convention should be read against the 
background of Article 14(3) of the United Nations International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (which specifically recognises a right not to give incriminatory evidence). According to 
Funke v France the European silence principle consists of two essential elements. First, the 
right of the individual to remain silent and not to assist the prosecution in obtaining evidence of 
a criminal offence. Second, neither the investigating authority nor the prosecution may compel 
131 The European Convention for the protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms ( 1953) in 
Cmnd 8969. See also Robertson and Merrills Human Rights in Europe (1993) Yd Ed 303-340. Jacobs and 
White The European Convention on Human Rights (1996) 2"d Ed. Munday "Inferences from Silence and 
European Human Rights Law" Grim. L. R(1996) 370; Frommel "The European Court of Human Rights and 
the Right of the Accused to Remain Silent" British Tax Review (1994) 598; Buxton "The Human Rights Act 
and the Substantive Criminal Law" Grim L. Rev (2000) 331 .. 
132 The European Convention is the indigenous counterpart of the UN's International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights (1968). 
133 (1989) ECR 3283. But see Otto B. V. v Postbank (1993) ECR 5683 in which the European Court 
refused to allow the Orkem rejection of a silence principle to be invoked by the prosecutorial services of 
its national signatories. 
134 (1993) 16 EHRR 297, 326, "[national law] cannot justify the infringement of the right of anyone 
'charged with a criminal offence' within the autonomous meaning of article 6, to remain silence and not to 
incriminate himself'. See also Bendenoun v France case 3/1993/338/476 (serie A) vol284, "taxpayers are 
entilted to invoke the right to silence". 
135 Article 6(1), "in the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against 
him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time, by an independent tribunal 
established by law". 
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the defendant to provide incriminating evidence. The European silence principle is a 
fundamental part of the European communis opinio which puts the burden of proof (charge de 
Ia preuve) on the prosecution as a specific and unvarying onus (onus probandi incumbit actor). 
In this sense, the European silence principle consists of a nexus between a right to a fair trial 
(art 6(1)) and the presumption of innocence (art 6(2)). 136 The silence principle is an extension 
of the fundamental notion that where the prosecution fails to meet its burden then the accused 
must be discharged (in dubio pro reo). Although the link between a privilege against self-
incrimination and the presumption of innocence was never alluded to in Funke v France, 137 it 
was found to be an essential relationship in Saunders v U.K. 138 
The surprise finding of the Human Rights Court in Funke v France was criticised as being 
unmotivated and without a rational basis in the ius commune of European law. Since the Funke 
decision the usual array of libertarian philosophical rationales have been advanced to justify a 
European silence principle.139 Murray v U.K. 140 vaguely refers to the principle as a "generally 
recognised international standard", "while the right to silence is not an absolute right, 141 it 
nevertheless lies at the heart of the notion of a fair trial". 142 The protection against an unfair 
conviction rationale is restated in Saunders v U.K. 143 which also draws support from the 
supposed historic origin of the silence principle. 144 In the dissent to Saunders v U.K., Martens 
J assumes that the majority judgement is based on the proposition "that respect for human 
dignity and autonomy requires that every suspect should be completely free to decide which 
attitude he will adopt with respect to the criminal charges against him", but it is doubtful whether 
the majority judgement does indeed embrace a human dignity rationale. Martens J also points 
out that the qualification of the right to silence by the Murray Court as "lying at the heart of a fair 
trial" gives the silence principle certain absolute overtones which may eventually make it an 
inflexible principle. In respect to the witness privilege against self-incrimination, case precedent 
from the Court of Justice and the Court of Human Rights seems to favour a rationale based on 
the prohibition against fishing expeditions. Case precedent suggests that it is the state's 
responsibility to collect evidence. The state may rely on the co-operation of the witness in 
136 Article 6(2), "everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proven guilty 
according to the law". 
137 Funke held it unnecessary to decide whether the national law also infringed article 6(2) the 
presumption of innocence. 
138 (1996) 23 EHRR 313. 
139 See Human Rights Cases A.N. Brown Edinburgh (2000) 92. 
140 (1996) 22 EHRR 29. 
141 Ibid para 29. 
142 Ibid para 56. 
143 Ibid para 67. This is an instrumental function of the right which excludes unreliable evidence and is 
restricted to the pre-trial poilce interrogation. 
144 See supra chapter 2. 
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gathering certain types of evidence, but it may not compel or "fish" for evidence. To do so, would 
undermine the fairness of the criminal process by undermining the burden of proof and the 
presumption of innocence. In its intent to establish a justification for the silence principle, the 
Court of Human Rights has canvassed the entire spectrum of libertarian rationales. (The 
philosophical nature of these personality and instrumental rationales has been analysed and 
found wanting in chapter 4.) The inclusion of a silence principle in the European Convention, 
where one did not previously exist, is the consequence of a prevailing and influential human 
rights culture, to which the judges of the European Court are obviously not immune. The 
creation of a European right to silence is one based more on libertarian sentimentality than on 
utilitarian reason. 
The European silence principle as it has developed over recent years may be identified as 
follows. First, the right to silence is protected by article 6(1) and may be claimed by both the 
natural and the juristic person. Second, it may be invoked by the suspect during the preliminary 
investigation or by the accused after being charged with a criminal offence. Third, the right to 
silence and the privilege against self-incrimination may be claimed during a criminal process or 
at any other proceeding which leads to the risk of a penalty or a fine. This would include 
competition and anti-trust investigations, tax, customs and company proceedings. Fourth, the 
privilege may be claimed by the witness personally in order to avoid self-incrimination but also 
to avoid the incrimination of a third party. In this respect the scope of the European privilege is 
far wider than its equivalent in America and the Commonwealth. The American and the English 
privilege cannot be claimed on behalf of a spouse, relative or friend. Fifth, the right applies to 
both oral testimony and the discovery or production of documents. Sixth, a distinction is drawn 
between non-testimonial evidence and physical (real) body evidence. Seventh, the right is 
extended to both the natural, as well as the juristic, person. Eighth, in a criminal proceeding the 
accused or the witness may voluntarily choose to remain silent or he may voluntarily and 
intentionally waive the right. Ninth, no presumption of guilt, nor an adverse inference of 
culpability, may arise from the accused's exercise of a right to silence. Tenth, the suspect or 
accused in a criminal process must be cautioned at the earliest possible opportunity and advised 
of his right to silence. Eleventh, the European Court has not yet ruled on whether the right to 
silence may be claimed by a defendant in the domestic forum who fears the risk of a foreign 
prosecution. 
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The jurisdictional relationship between the European Court of Human Rights and each signatory 
state is a rather sensitive one. 145 The function of the European Court is not to question the 
validity or the constitutionality of a signatory state's domestic legislative law. The European 
Court cannot dismiss or demand the redrafting of a national statute. In Klaus v Germany146 it 
was stressed that the Convention does not provide the aggrieved party with a kind of actio 
popularis. It does not permit the individual to complain about a national law in abstracto. The 
individual must first exhaust all possible domestic avenues of legal redress before approaching 
the European Court. The individual is obliged to show how the domestic law unreasonably and 
detrimentally infringes the human rights contained in the Convention. 147 The European Court 
emphasises that it confines its attention narrowly to the legal dispute by examining the domestic 
law against the aggrieved party's personal circumstance. When there is a degree of 
incompatibility about Convention rights between domestic case precedent and the case 
precedent of the European Court, the domestic court is obliged to seek its compromise solutions 
in the European Court's jurisprudence. 148 In particular, the English court is obliged to pay close 
attention to the spirit of flexibility inherent in European Convention jurisprudence (as imposed 
by sec 2( 1) of the Human Rights Act 1998) and it should not easily find that a provision of the 
English common law is necessarily incompatible with Convention law. 
Two popular and antagonistic visions of the silence principle have emerged in England and on 
the European continent. The English vision is of a silence principle analysed in pure utilitarian 
terms, as an instrumental procedural rule which gives the accused and the witness only a limited 
degree of protection during the criminal process. The crime control limitations placed on the 
silence principle by the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 (CRIMPO) are justified on 
the ground that an unlimited silence principle is an unnecessary obstruction to the efficient 
investigation and conviction of criminals (a rule-utilitarian reductionist vision). 149 Restrictions 
145 The Convention on Human Rights is part of the domestic law of the following EC countries: Australia, 
Belgium, Denmark, Greece, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and recently, in 
the United Kingdom, through the Human Rights Act 1998. Other non-EC members are: Cyprus, Finland, 
Switzerland, Malta and Turkey. The Convention is not part of the domestic law of Ireland, Iceland, Norway 
and Sweden. The status of the ex-Soviet bloc Eastern European countries who wish to join the Convention 
is as yet unclear. 
146 (1978) 2 EHRR 214, para 33. 
147 McCann v U.K. (1996) 21 EHRR 97, para 52, "it is not the role of the European Court to examine in 
abstracto the compatibility of the national legislation with the requirements of the Convention". 
148 The national judge when asked to apply a Convention right to a situation not specifically addressed 
by Convention law, should recognise that generality and flexibility is the nature of Convention 
jurisprudence. Z v Finland (1997) EHRLR 439, 442-443. R v D.P.P. ex p. Kebilene (1999) 3 WLR 972, 
993h, "in the hands of the national court the Convention is an expression of fundamental principles rather 
than a set of rules. The application of these principles involves questions of balance between competing 
interests and issues of proportionality". See also Van Dijk and Van Hoof Theory and Practice of the 
European Convention on Human Rights Boston 3rd Ed (1998). 
149 See supra chapter 3 p.1 06. 
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placed on the silence principle are sometimes justified on the basis that a silence procedural 
rule is only one amongst a number of possible alternative protective devices available to the 
accused. Once the costs associated with the silence principle become too high, these cost-
effective alternatives are preferable and the silence principle may be legitimately restricted (a 
substitution-abolitionist vision). In contrast to an English utilitarian and crime control 
jurisprudence, various European legal institutions view the silence principle as a due process 
human right, inherent in a fair criminal proceeding and founded on a fundamental presumption 
of innocence (a libertarian-retentionist vision). 150 The elevation of the silence principle to the 
status of a fundamental adjectival right in European Convention law calls into question the 
recent English developments. In particular, the statutory powers granted to the court permitting 
the drawing of adverse inferences from the accused's pre-trial and trial silence. The sharp edge 
of the clash between English and European Convention jurisprudence has been over the issue 
of "adverse silence inferences". May an adverse inference be drawn from the accused's silence, 
especially when he acts on the advice of his solicitor? The question of abrogating statutes which 
remove the witness' privilege against self-incrimination during non-curial inquiries and then 
permit the incriminating testimony to be used in a subsequent criminal trial, has also brought into 
focus the differences between the English and the European jurisprudential vision. The solution 
to these differences has become urgent since the incorporation of the European Convention of 
Human Rights into English domestic law by the Human Rights Act (1998) (effective from August 
2000). 151 
English case precedent must conform to Convention law and legislative acts must be re-
interpreted in a manner compatible with Convention rights, especially the procedural right to a 
fair trial. Two recent cases Saunders v U.K. 152 (concerning incriminating testimony gathered in 
terms of the Companies Act 1985) and Murray v U.K. 153 (concerning adverse inferences from 
the accused's silence) illustrates the differences between these two rival legal cultures and 
demonstrates the European Convention's strong commitment to a fundamental right of silence. 
The Influence of Saunders v U.K. upon English law: The Court of Human Rights' decision 
in Saunders v U.K. is the end result of a lengthy litigation process. The process begins with an 
inquiry by department of trade inspectors (acting in terms of a statutory power granted by part 
150 See supra chapter 3 p.1 07. 
151 The Human Rights Act (HRA) creates in domestic English law a system of convention rights. These 
are the rights and freedoms set out in the articles and protocols of the European Convention on Human 
Rights listed in sec 1 (1) and schedule 1 of the Human Rights Act. It is now unlawful for the English courts 
to act in a way which is contrary to a convention right (HRA, sec 6(1) and 3(a)). 
152 (1996) 23 EHRR 313, particularly para 61,67-69. 
153 (1996) 22 EHRR 29, particularly at para 45-47, 50-51 and 66-68. 
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XIV of the Companies Act 1985) into an illegal corporate conspiracy involving a share 
manipulation and hostile takeover of Distillers Co by Guinness PLC. The purpose of the inquiry 
was to analyse the mechanics of the conspiracy and not to apportion blame. In this type of 
inquiry inspectors have the statutory power to compel oral evi~ence and documents. Sec432(2) 
and 434(5) of the Companies Act 1985 permits the state to use evidence gathered by such an 
inquiry against an identified individual in a subsequent criminal or civil trial. In turn sec 2 of the 
Criminal Justice Act 1987 obliges the individual under investigation to answer all questions and 
to produce relevant documentation as required by the state investigation organ (in this case the 
Serious Fraud Squad). Evidence transcripts made during the department of trade inquiry were 
admitted in the criminal proceeding and the defendant was convicted of fraud largely on the 
basis of these compelled self-incriminatory transcripts. The defendant appealed his conviction 
to the European Court. The Court of Human Rights concluded that the prosecutorial use of self-
incriminating transcripts was an infringement of the defendant's privilege against self-
incrimination and a breach of article 6(1) "trial fairness" and article 6(2) "presumption of 
innocence". "The right not to incriminate oneself presupposes that the prosecution ... seek to 
prove their case ... without resort to evidence obtained through methods of coercion or 
oppression in defiance of the will of the accused."154 In this sense the right is closely linked to 
the presumption of innocence. Saunders re-establishes the supremacy of the silence principle 
in the face of statutory compelled state questioning. "The right not to incriminate oneself does 
not extend to the use in criminal proceedings of material obtained from the accused through the 
use of compulsory powers."155 However, the Court of Human Rights was careful in refraining 
from declaring the defendant's conviction before the English Court of Appeals to be wrongful. 
The judgement circumspectively condemns the use of self-incriminatory testimony in a criminal 
proceeding when such testimony is the fruit of a compulsory civil inquiry or investigation. The 
European Convention's privilege against self-incrimination does not operate to prevent the 
compulsory obtaining of evidence by inspectors, it merely prohibits the use of such evidence at 
a subsequent criminal proceeding. (In this sense the privilege is defined as a use-immunity.) 
Future English statutes which seek to abrogate the privilege in non-curial regulatory inquiries 
must now simultaneously provide a use (or use-derivative) immunity protection for the witness 
in any subsequent criminal proceeding. 156 
154 Saunders (1996) 23 EHRR 313 at 338, para 68. 
155 Ibid at 338 para 68, 69. 
156 The statutes in need of immediate revision are: the Companies Act 1986; Financial Services Act 1986; 
Banking Act 1987; Criminal Justice Act 1987. In particular sec 236 and 366 of the Insolvency Act 1986, 
sec 342 and 345 of the Companies Act 1985, and sec 2 of the Criminal Justice Act 1987. 
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The Influence of Murray v U.K. upon English law: The decision in Murray v U.K. 157 is 
important because it is regarded as being a test case for the validity of the Criminal Justice and 
Public Order Act 1994 (CRIMP0}.158 In this judgement it was held that adverse inferences drawn 
from the accused's failure to answer police questions and his failure to testify at trial was not an 
infringement of article 6 of the European Convention. As long as the inference drawn is 
reasonable in the circumstances there is no infringement of article 6(1) or article 6(2). Whether 
the drawing of an adverse inference breaches article 6 of the Convention is to be determined, 
"in the light of all the circumstances, having regard to the situations where inferences may be 
drawn, the weight attached to them by the national courts in their assessment of the evidence 
and the degree of compulsion inherent in the situation" .159 However, a failure to allow the 
accused access to a solicitor during the early stages of questioning (within 48 hours) is a 
violation of article 6(1) and 6(3}. 160 English commentators regard the European Court's decision 
as a vindication of CRIMPO. The major point made by the European Court is that a reasonable 
adverse inference may be drawn in the appropriate circumstance but the inference may not 
directly infer guilt. Silence in itself has no evidentiary value and may only serve to resolve doubt 
or add weight to a prosecution case which has already reached the threshold level of a sufficient 
prima facie case. 161 Silence cannot convert a weak prima facie case into a stronger one or lift 
it above the required threshold level. "The accused's silence, in situations which clearly calls for 
an explanation, may be taken into account in assessing the persuasiveness of the evidence 
adduced by the prosecution". 162 
A number of essential points may be distilled from the Court of Human Rights case precedent. 
First, a European silence principle is fundamentally conditioned upon the fairness of the pre-trial 
157 (1996) 22 EHRR 29. See also Quinn v U.K. (1997) 23 EHRR. CD 41. See Jennings, Ashworth, 
Emmerson "Silence and Safety: The Impact of Human Rights Law" Crim. L. Review (2000) 879. 
158 The Murray judgement is argued in the context of the anti-terrorist provisions of the Criminal Evidence 
(Northern Ireland) Order 1988 the precursor of CRIMPO particularly article 4 (the equivalent of sec 35 
CRIMPO) and article 6 (the equivalent of sec 37 CRIMPO). See Maloney "The Criminal Evidence (N.I.) 
Order 1988: A Radical Departure from the Common Law Right to Silence in the U.K." (16) Boston College 
Int. Comp. L. Rev (1993) 425. 
159 Ibid para 47. 
160 Sec 6(3) "a minimum requirement of access to legal advice". 
161 On the facts a strong direct and circumstantial case had been made against Murray (an alleged IRA 
terrorist). He had been caught in the same house as the kidnapped victim. The victim identified Murray as 
one of his captors and Murray was arrested while attempting to destroy a tape recording of the victim's 
coersed confession. In addition to its strong primafacie case, the prosecution had also relied on adverse 
inferences from Murray's silence at pre-trial and at trial. 
162 The European Court found it incompatible with the Convention for a prosecution "to base a conviction 
solely or mainly on the accused's silence", Murray ibid at para 47. It may be necessary to re-interpret 
CRIMPO in this regard, as sec 34 through to sec 37 does allow the construction of a prosecution case built 
mainly from silent inferences. The European Court's requirement is more strict than the test in sec 38(3) 
ofCRIMPO. 
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and trial process in which a presumption of innocence operates to place the burden of proof 
firmly upon the shoulders of the state. Second, one of the primary elements of a European 
silence principle is access to legal advice before being questioned, especially when there is a 
possibility of an adverse inference. Magee v U.K. 163 and Averill v U.K. 164 suggest that a failure 
to allow access to legal advice will amount to a breach of article 6(3). Sec 58 of the Youth and 
Criminal Evidence Act 1999 was hastily enacted to ensure that English law does not give rise 
to such a violation in future. An important question not yet answered by the European Court is 
whether an adverse inference may be drawn when the accused remains silent on the advice of 
his solicitor. The English courts permit reasonable adverse inferences to be drawn from this type 
of silence (to hold otherwise would negate the intent of sec 34 CRIMPO). Third, an adverse 
inference may not be drawn when the accused's silence is based on good cause shown. 
Although most innocent suspects will co-operate with the police, there may be good reasons for 
non co-operation. 165 However, a reasonable inference may be drawn when the accused's 
silence is based on a policy of non co-operation with the police instead of fear, ignorance or 
embarrassment. Fourth, the European Court has made it clear that an adverse inference may 
be drawn once the prosecution has established a prima facie case and where the circumstance 
clearly calls for an explanation. 166 Usually it will be easier to draw a sec 36 or sec 37 adverse 
inference and more difficult to do so from sec 34 or sec 35 (CRIMPO). For example, in Averill 
v U.K. 167 the European Court noted that the accused's failure to give an explanation of his 
presence near the scene (sec 37) and his failure to explain the presence of fibres from the 
victim on his clothing and his hair (sec 36) were factors easily justifying an adverse inference. 
A major criticism of the European Convention is its failure to include a written legal definition of 
the silence principle. It is instructive to note that article 6(1) makes no specific direct or indirect 
reference to silence or self-incrimination. The obvious assumption must be that the original 
authors of the European Convention thought the silence principle to be jurisprudentially 
insignificant. The Convention was drafted in the middle of the twentieth century, in a period 
163 (2000) Crim. L. R. 520. 
164 (2000) Crim. L.R 680. 
165 Murray ibid at para 47. Although the court does not provide any reasons, factors such as the desire 
to shield a friend or relative, R v Mountford (1999) Crim. L. R 575, or suspicion of police motives, R v 
Argent (1997) 2 Cr. App. R 27, 33, may play a role. 
166 See ibid note 162. A prosecution case built mainly on a combination of adverse inferences from sec 
34, 35, 36 and sec 37 is no longer permitted. This means that sec 38(3) of CRIMPO will have to be revised 
to bring it in line with the stricter test set out in the Murray judgement. The prosecution must establish a 
clear primafacie case. Also the judge is obliged to comment to the jury on the types of adverse inferences 
to be drawn and the weight to be attached to these inferences, Murray at para 62, 63 and 66. 
167 Averill ibid at 680. 
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before the ascendancy of an internationally pervaqsive culture of human rights. 168 It was left to 
the European Court of Human Rights in Funke v France, Saunders v U.K. and Murray v U.K. 
to extend and re-interpret the meaning of article 6 to include a right to silence and a privilege 
against self-incrimination. In 'magically' conjuring up a right to silence the European Court has 
failed to provide sufficient rationales for the jurisprudential existence of such a principle. 
European case precedent has not seen fit to explain the causal connection between a silence 
principle, the presumption of innocence and a fair trial. This is a recurring criticism and one 
which is noted throughout the thesis. The European Court, national courts (including the 
American Supreme Court) have simply assumed a causal nexus but the how and why of such 
causality has never been satisfactorily explained. 
10.7 The Corporate Privilege 
The corporation is described as an artificial association of individuals possessing the attributes 
of continuous existence, separate legal personae, limited liability and subject to the same rights 
and duties, where appropriate, as a natural person. 169 Historically the corporation was 
interpreted in terms of a concessional theory. The state exerted considerable influence over the 
corporation which was regarded as a mere extension of the state. As the use of corporations 
became common place in the nineteenth century business world, the corporate-state concession 
theory was discarded and replaced by a contractual theory in which the corporation was 
regarded as an independent entity owing its existence to the members who contractually created 
it and defined by the rights of the subscribers to the memorandum and articles of association. 
With the increasing sophistication of twentieth century business activity and the rise of a 
professional managerial class, who usurped control of the corporation from its members, the 
contractual theory gave way to a modern realism theory. The realism concept defines the 
corporation as a separate legal structure characterised by a juristic personality and based on 
a business ethic which includes the idea of continuous existence and limited liability. The 
corporation begins its original existence as a creation of the state but has evolved into an 
independent entity and in some cases the rival of government. The state has abandoned 
attempts to regulate the corporation through its charter and now seeks such regulation through 
168 The Convention was drafted in the 1950s before the rise of an international culture of human rights. 
In contrast, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights expressely provides for a right to silence 
and was drafted after the rise of a culture of human rights in the 1960s. A modern example of the "culture" 
is the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (1996) (rules and procedures) which 
expressely provides the suspect with a right to remain silent. 
169 Marks "The Personification of the Business Corporation on American Law" (54) Un. Ch. L. Rev(1987) 
1441; Bratton "The New Economic Theory of the Firm, Critical Perspectives from History" (41) Stanford 
L. Rev (1989) 1471; Note "Constitutional Rights of a Corporate Person" (91) Yale L. Rev (1982) 1641. 
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legislative and other curbs on corporate activity. One of the regulatory curbs employed by the 
United States and Australia is to refuse an extension of the silence principle to the corporate 
personality. 
In England a privilege against self-incrimination was extended to the corporation in Triplex 
Safety Glass Co v Lancegaye Safety Glass Co. 170 The court reasoned that although a 
corporation could not suffer physical or mental pain, it was capable of punishment and criminal 
conviction. The harm caused to its corporate reputation by a criminal conviction could ruin its 
trading ability. 171 Subsequent English courts have accepted the Triplex judgement without 
serious criticism. 172 The European Union has also developed a unique European-type corporate 
privilege in line with its interstate competition policy. 173 In terms of this policy a European 
Commission regulates competition between member states and has the power to prevent abuse 
of dominant market share position by European companies. Certain procedural defences have 
been awarded to the corporation as a result of the wide investigatory powers of the European 
Regulatory Commission. 174 These defences include the right to a fair trial, 175 the right to the 
discovery of all documents held by the Commission 176 and a privilege against self-incrimination 
recognised in Orkem SA v Commission. 177 Collectively these defensive rights apply to all 
administrative inquiries and criminal proceedings against corporations subpoenaed to appear 
before the Commission or the European Court of Justice. The applicability of the privilege is 
determined by a balance of interests test. 178 In deciding whether to extend the privilege to the 
corporation, the European Court must balance the regulatory interests of the Union against the 
corporation's fundamental right to defence. When the Union's legitimate goal of curbing 
corporate crime outweighs the corporation's defensive interests then a privilege against self-
incrimination will not be extended. 179 Case precedent suggests that there are few circumstances 
in which the privilege will be denied to the corporation. 
170 (1939) 2K.B. 395. 
171 Ibid at 409, "the corporation may be harassed, its existence threatened by the use of illegal state 
methods in acquiring information". 
172 Rio Tin to Zinc Corp v Westinghouse Electrical Corp (1978) AC 547. Although Lord Templeman in A. T. 
and T. /stet Ltd v Tully (1993) AC 45, at 53 suggests that the only justification for a silence principle is to 
limit police interrogation abuse and involuntary confessions, justifications which do not apply to the 
corporation. The question whether a South African corporation possesses the privilege was avoided in 
Seapoint Computer Bureau (Pty) Ltd v McLoughlin and Another NNO 1996 (8) BCLR 1071 (W). 
173 Treaty Convention establishing the European Community (1992), articles 85 and 86, CMLR 573. 
174 The European Commission, article 155, Council Regulation No.1?, 13 J.O, 204. 
175 Mustique Diffusion Francaise SA v Commission (1983) ECR 1825, 1880 (1993) 3 CMLR 221, 315. 
176 Hoffman-La Roche v Commission (1979) ECR 461, 512 (1979) 3 CMLR 21,268. 
177 (1991) 4 CMLR 502, 556. 
178 Ibid at 502 and 555-6. See also N. V. NederLansche Banden-lndustrie Michelin v Commission (1983) 
ECR 3461 (1983) ICMLR 282, 318. 
179 The European Commission allows the corporation a balanced right of defence against prosecutorial 
questioning deliberately designed to solicit incriminatory answers. 
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In contrast, the United States, Australia and Canada deny the privilege to the corporate entity.180 
American precedent181 has consistently emphasised the social and contractual nature of the 
state-corporate relationship. The state is empowered to enforce a certain degree of 
accountability on the corporation because the corporate entity exists for the public benefit. Its 
juristic existence is conditioned upon the employment and service benefits which it brings to 
society. The refusal to extend the privilege to the corporation is partially based on the historical 
antecedents and evolution of the silence principle. 182 According to the Supreme Court the 
silence principle evolved as a protection against abuse of personal liberty rights, including the 
prevention of torture and a respect for individual privacy.183 None of these founding rationales 
may be logically extended to the corporation. 184 ln turn, the Australian High Court in Environment 
Protection Authority v Caltex Refining Co185 has based its refusal of a corporate privilege on a 
fair state-corporation balance rationale. A fair balance between the state and the corporation 
excludes a corporate privilege on the following grounds. First, the complex nature of the 
corporate structure with its bureaucratic compartmentalisation inhibits access to information and 
provides a defensive shield against state investigations.186 Second, corporations conduct their 
business activities via the medium of written or electronic documentation. Granting a privilege 
to documentary evidence held by the corporation would effectively immunise it against a state 
investigation. 187 Third, corporate financial resources are considerably more than that of the 
individual. The ability to pay for legal services places the corporation on a more equitable footing 
with the state. 188 Fourth, the rules against unreasonable searches and seizures in American and 
Australian law provides the corporation with a substitute and efficient protection which renders 
the privilege unnecessary. In addition, American and Australian law provide adequate 
safeguards against unnecessary state probes, harassment or fishing expeditions. 189 Fifth, illegal 
corporate activity has the potential to harm large sections of the population. Illegal labour 
practices may endanger the health, safety and well-being of employees. Corporate crime places 
a burden on the national economy resulting in increased taxes and other social problems. In 
180 See supra note 36 to 46 and accompanying text. 
181 Hale v Henkel201 U.S. 43, 74 (1906); United States v White 322 U.S. 694, 700 (1944). See supra 
chapter 7 p.229-230. 
182 First National Bank v Bellotti 435 US 765, 779, n14 (1978), " ... purely personal guarantees such as the 
privilege ... are unavailable to the corporation ... because the historic function of that particular guarantee has 
been limited to the protection of individuals". 
183 Murphy v Waterfront Commission 378 US 52, 55 (1964). See also the Australian case Pyneboard 
(Pty) Ltd v Trade Practice Commission (1983) 152 CLR 328, 346. Supra chapter 4, p.112. 
184 The central premise of Henkel has been expanded into a collective entity doctrine which denies the 
privilege to corporations, unions, political organisations, etc. 
185 (1993) 178 CLR 477, 500-03. 
186 Ibid at 498-506. 
187 Ibid at 500. See also Wigmore Evidence McNaughton Ed (1961) sec 2259. 
188 Ibid at 500. 
189 Ibid Hale v Henkel at 71-72. 
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these circumstances the state should be free to hold the corporation accountable for illegal 
activities. Extending the privilege to the corporation will hinder civil claims for damages by former 
employees. A corporate privilege may make adequate discovery of documents more difficult 
resulting in a costly litigation process. 
An argument sometimes advanced by libertarians is that a failure to provide for a corporate 
privilege will undermine the accusational nature of the Anglo-American justice system. The 
American and the Australian courts have denied that such a fundamental erosion of the 
accusational system is possible. Quite the converse, the frequency by which legislation has 
interfered with and abrogated the corporate privilege indicates that such a privilege is not a 
fundamental aspect of the accusatorial system. 190 The purpose of many of these statutory 
abrogations of the corporate privilege is to ensure that the state has all the necessary 
information to function efficiently in today's complex world. For example, the United States 
Supreme Court has developed two unique doctrines to assist the government in the acquisition 
of documents and private business records. Fisher's "act of production"191 and Shapiro's 
"required records"192 doctrine are deliberately designed to give the state the ability to sidestep 
the privilege against self-incrimination. The Australian High Court and the European Court of 
Justice apply a balance of interest analysis to the corporate privilege and yet both courts arrive 
at opposite conclusions. The High Court denies the privilege to the corporation on the ground 
that the state interest supercedes the corporate interest and the European Court finds the 
privilege to be an important factor in the equitable distribution of power between the state and 
the corporation. 
Although the United States Supreme Court does not expressly recognise a balance of interest 
analysis, the act of production and the required records doctrines tacitly measure the public 
interest against the corporate interest. Similar tests!, similar factors!, yet differing conclusions! 
What is the nature and purpose of the silence privilege? Why is it subject to such conflicting 
variation? Is it perhaps only an evidentiary utilitarian rule and not a fundamental human right? 
190 Ibid Caltex Refining Co at 407-409, "indeed the extent to which statute has interfered with the privilege 
in relationship to corporations indicates that the privilege, at least in so far as it relates to the production 
of documents, is not a fundamental aspect of the accusational system". 
191 See supra chapter 7 p.241-247. 
192 See supra chapter 7 p.247-254. 
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CHAPTER 11 
A COMPARATIVE INTERNATIONAL REVIEW 
11.1 The South African Constitutional Divide 
The South African silence principle is delicately poised between the English and the American 
experience. 1 Its past is inseverably linked to English common law, but its future will be 
influenced by American constitutional jurisprudence. The South African right to silence and the 
privilege against self-incrimination, prior to the introduction of the 1993 Constitution, was a mere 
slavish imitation of English precedent devoid of sovereign judicial originality. Judicial 
interpretation of the accused's right to silence was a reaction to, and a repetition of prevailing 
English opinion. The statutory definitions of the witness privilege against self-incrimination (i.e. 
sec 203 C.P.A and sec 14 C.P.E.A) were influenced by, and indeed still are largely modelled 
on the English template originals. The primary break with the English tradition begins in 1993 
with the constitutional entrenchment of the silence principle. The wording and meaning of sec 
25(3) of the Interim Constitution (1993) is inspired by its American fifth amendment cousin. 2 The 
subsequent and further refinement of the accused's right to silence in sec 35 of the Final 
Constitution ( 1996) serves to reinforce the gradual rift from English precedent. The break with 
the English experience will widen as a result of the introduction in England of the Criminal 
Justice and Public Order Act 1994 (CRIMPO). The statutory limitations on the silence principle 
presently shaping English law are no longer possible in a South African jurisprudence dominated 
by a supreme constitution. South African jurisprudence is increasingly influenced by a human 
rights philosophy while the English law is pre-occupied with reforms based on utilitarian 
concerns. Future constitutional interpretations of the silence principle are likely to find a fresh 
inspiration in American precedent which already possesses a well-developed constitutional 
jurisprudence. These interpretations will be practical ones involving only the scope and breadth 
of the silence principle. Fundamental questions bearing on the nature and essence of the 
silence principle which continue to excite the English legal fraternity are now of mere academic 
interest to the South African commentator. The irony is that South Africa should have adopted 
the English approach of statutorily limiting the accused's right to silence in the interest of crime 
control and the efficient administration of justice. Instead, South Africa has chosen to follow an 
American type constitutional due process approach which elevates the silence principle into a 
1 See Venter Constitutional Comparison Juta and Co (2000); Licht et al South Africa's Crises of 
Constitutional Democracy Juta and Co (1994). 
2 Sec 251.C (1993), "every accused person shall have a right to a fair trial which shall include the right. .. to 
remain silent during the trial and not to testify during the trial (sec 25(3)(c)) and not to be a compellable 
witness against himself or herself (sec 25(3)(d)). 
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human right and places one more obstacle in the path of the prosecution. In my opinion this is 
a luxury which South Africa can ill afford. 
The formation of the South African Constitution has been influenced by Canadian precedent and 
the Constitutional Court has sometimes sought its definitions in Canadian constitutional law. 
However, Canadian constitutional law is unlikely to have any influence over the specific 
development of the South African silence principle as the Canadian principle is itself somewhat 
ambiguous. 3 Canada's silence principle is similarly caught in a cultural divide between its English 
common law heritage and the powerful influence of its American neighbour. The Charter of 
Rights and Freedoms (1982) illustrates the weakening of the English tradition and the increasing 
influence of American constitutional jurisprudence. For example, sec 11 (c), Sec 11 (d) and sec 
13 of the Charter entrench a privilege against self-incrimination but make no mention of the 
accused's right to silence. 4 The wording of sec 11 (c), "any person charged with an offence has 
the right not to be compelled to be a witness in proceedings against that person in respect of 
the offence [paraphrased]", 5 is remarkably similar to the fifth amendment. According to the 
Canadian Supreme Court, the common law English style right to silence is only indirectly 
guaranteed by sec 7. 6 Sec 7 contains the residual elements of a silence principle and 
supplements sec 11 (c) and sec 13.7 The Canadian silence principle is unclear and has very little 
to offer by way of a developed jurisprudence. 
3 The Canadian Charter does not contain an express right to silence. Sec 11(c) and sec 13 prevent self-
incrimination but only during formal proceedings, not at the pre-trial stage. Similarly, the Namibian 
Constitution contains a circumscribed silence principle which protects the accused against self-
incrimination at the trial stage only (article 12(1 )(f)). 
4 See Hogg Constitutional Law of Canada Caswell41h Ed (1998); Beaudoin and Mendes The Canadian 
Charter of Right and Freedoms Caswell 3'd Ed ( 1996). Before the enactment of the Charter there was no 
specific principle against self-incrimination in Canadian common law, Ratushny "Is There a Right Against 
Self-Incrimination in Canada" (19) McGill L.J. (1973) 1. 
5 Sec 11 (c) is declaratory of the pre-existing common law and prohibits only those common law rules 
which create a legal obligation to testify, R v Boss (1988) 46 CCC (3d) Ont (CA). Sec 11 (c) does not apply 
to rules of trial which merely create a tactical obligation to testify. Sec 11 (c) does not prevent the jury from 
drawing adverse inferences, R v Francois (1994) 2 SCR 872; R v Crawford (1995) 1 SCR 858; but see 
the opposite in R v Noble (1997) 43 CRR 233 (SC). 
6 R v Herbert (1990) 1 SCR 425, holds that the common law right to silence before trial is indirectly 
guaranteed by sec 7, despite the express failure to include such a right in sec 11 (c) and sec 13. See also 
R v Broyles (1991) 3 SCR 595 and R v Jones (1994) 2 SCR 229. 
7 Sec 11 (c) read with sec 7 makes the witness non-compellable at trial. Sec 13 read with sec7 prevents 
the use of a witness' incriminating evidence in other legal proceedings (Dubois v R (1985) 2 SCR 350, 360) 
as well as establishing a derivative use immunity, R v S (R.J.) (1995) 36 CR (41h) 1 (S.C.C.). Sec 11(d) 
protects the silence principle at trial in the form of a presumption of innocence. The silence principle is 
further supplemented by sec 4(b) of the Canada Evidence Act which prohibits judicial or prosecutorial 
comment on the accused's silence. The judge also cannot warn the jury against drawing an adverse 
inference, R v Noble ibid. 
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The South African silence principle will be strongly influenced and may in some aspects develop 
along the lines of the American fifth amendment. There are several reasons for suggesting such 
an influence. 8 First, the South African silence principle is no longer a utilitarian-based common 
law rule. It has been elevated into a libertarian constitutional human right. The American fifth 
amendment is the only well-developed jurisprudence which concerns itself with the nature and 
purpose of a constitutional right to silence. 9 Second, constitutional rights are interpreted against 
a unique set of rules which differ from the ordinary rules of common law and statutory 
interpretation. 10 Over time the common law interpretation of the silence principle will become 
less influential and utilitarian definitions are likely to give way to human rights-based meanings. 
The Constitutional Court has already indicated its reluctance to make use of the sec 361imitation 
clause. There is a real danger that the South African constitutional silence principle will take on 
the same absolute overtones which presently characterise the fifth amendment. In time the 
South African silence principle may well become inflexible and difficult to negotiate. Third, sec 
25 of the Interim Constitution (1993) and the American fifth amendment are similarly worded. 
Sec 35 of the Final Constitution (1996) also contains a number of semantic and conceptual 
similarities. 11 Fourth, it is possible to reconcile the American Constitution which is fundamentally 
based on a seventeenth century first generation liberty right with a South African Constitution 
based on a twentieth century third generation right of human dignity. Modern American 
interpretations of the fifth amendment are primarily predicated upon the protection of human 
dignity. The modern fifth amendment is equated with, "our high regard for human dignity", 12 "the 
inviolability of the human personality", 13 and is said to protect, "the conscience and dignity of 
man". 14 According to American precedent, the relationship between the silence principle, the 
presumption of innocence and a fair trial is best understood not only as a protection of the 
8 The influence of foreign law on a South African constitutional right must be read against the,following 
caution, "different constitutions are drafted in different contexts, different social structures and different 
historical backgrounds exist between those countries and South Africa", Park-Ross v Director, Office of 
Serious Economic Offences 1995 (2) SA 148 (C) 160 H; Qozeleni v Minister of Law and Order 1994 (3) 
SA 625 (E) 633 F-G. 
9 The jurisprudence of other constitutionalised silence principles are relatively underdeveloped. These 
constitutional rights have only come into existence in the last quarter of the twentieth century. The 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1968), the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms 
(1982) and the European Convention on Human Rights (1993). The American fifth amendment has been 
recognised since 1791. 
10 Sec 38(1) the interpretation of the Bill of Rights. "When interpreting the Bill of Rights, a court ... must 
promote the values that underlie an open, democratic society based on human dignity, equality and 
freedom (sec 39(1)(a))". See also S v Zuma 1995 (2) SA642 (CC) para 14 and 17; S v Makwanyane 1995 
(3) SA 391 (CC) para 9, 10, 15-18, 36-7 and para 88. 
11 Sec 39(1) "a court ... must consider international law (sec 39(1 )(b)) and may consider foreign law (sec 
39(1)(c))". See Sanderson v Attorney-General, Eastern Cape 1998 (2) SA 38 (CC) para 26. Dugard "The 
Role of International Law in Interpreting the Bill of Rights" (101) SAJHR (1994) 208. 
12 Cohen v Hurley 378 US 1 (1964). 
13 Murphy v Waterfront Commission 378 US 62 (1964). 
14 Miranda v Arizona 384 US 436 (1966). 
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individual's liberty within the criminal process, but also as a guarantee of human dignity. South 
African courts have sometimes described the silence principle and the presumption of 
innocence as a basket of protections based on a liberty principle. In the words of S v Zuma and 
Others, 15 the silence principle is part of a "seamless web" of criminal justice rights concerned 
with the individual's liberty in the criminal justice system. The link between liberty and a 
presumption of innocence is specifically referred to in Uncedo Taxi Service Association v 
Maninjwa and Others. 16 Finally, most South African text books on evidence and constitutional 
law make repeated reference to the conclusions reached in Miranda v Arizona (pre-trial silence) 
and Griffin v California (trial silence). 17 Recent case law about the silence principle tend to 
emphasise fifth amendment jurisprudence over English common law precedent. This tendency 
is the result of South Africa's apartheid legacy. A human rights philosophy presently dominates 
intellectual debate and overshadows alternative moral and legal doctrines. 
The South African Common Law Silence Principle: The South African common law silence 
principle is indistinguishable from those in other Commonwealth jurisdictions. 18 The silence 
principle is an essential element of an accusatorial-adversarial trial system and the bastion of 
a presumption of innocence. The prosecution bears the full burden of proof and cannot rely on 
the defendant for its inculpatory evidence. The prosecutorial prima facie case must be 
established from extrinsic evidentiary sources. The failure of a defendant to give evidence, 
either at the pre-trial or trial stage may have evidentiary value only in certain well-defined 
circumstances. 19 An adverse inference may be drawn from the suspect's silence in a 
circumstance where an innocent person would reasonably be expected to speak up and deny 
the charge. 20 Silence may also give rise to an adverse inference when the suspect is unable to 
explain a suspicious circumstance21 or to explain away the possession of stolen goods. 22 The 
court is obliged to take into account a surprise alibi-defence or any other fact which is first 
disclosed at trial. The failure to disclose an alibi-defence timeously may weaken the defence and 
15 1995 (2) SA 642 (CC), 1995 (4) 8CLR 401 (CC). 
16 1998 (3) SA 417 (E), 1998 (6) 8CLR 683 (E). 
17 See Schwikkard et al Principles of Evidence Juta (1997) 109, 112-115. Du Toit et al Commentary on 
the Criminal Procedure Act Juta (1997) 22-248. 
18 S v Lwane 1996 (2) SA 433 (A), "it is a [silence] principle firmly rooted in our common law and other 
Anglo-American jurisdictions". See also R v Camane 1925 AD 570 and S v Evans 1961 (4) SA 52 (K). 
19 R v Dube 1915 AD 557, S v Saaiman 1967 (4) SA 440 (A), S v VanWyk 1992 (1) SACR 147 (N). 
20 S v Mogotsi 1982 (1) SA 190(8), "whether an inference from silence may be drawn in the face of a 
direct accusation depends on: (i) did the suspect consider it worth replying to the accusation; (ii) was the 
suspect simply reserving his defence for later use; (iii) fear, intimidation, anxiety, shyness, ignorance, etc. 
are all factors which influence silence; (iv) was the accusation made by a person in authority (unequal 
situation) or by a private individual (even term principle). 
21 R v Barfin 1926 AD 459. 
22 S v Skweyiya 1984 (4) SA 712 (A), R v DuPlessis 1924 TPD 103, S v Parrow 1973 (1) SA 603 (A). 
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strengthen the prosecution's prima facie case. 23 Once a suspect has been arrested, a failure 
to deny a charge or to indicate a defence cannot amount to evidence and no adverse inference 
may be drawn. 24 At trial, silence has evidentiary relevance only once the state has established 
a prima facie case. 25 The accused's mere failure to testify cannot convert a weak prosecution 
case into a strong prima facie case. 26 But a failure to rebut an uncontroverted prima facie case 
may have an adverse consequence. The failure to rebut a prima facie case, "becomes a factor 
to be considered with other factors, and from that totality the court may draw the inference of 
guilt. The weight to be given to the factor in question depends upon the circumstance in each 
case. "27 Geldenhuys and Joubert give a more libertarian analysis of the silence principle. 28 While 
the accused's silence in the face of an uncontroverted state case may have certain damaging 
procedural consequences, it can never amount to evidence against the accused. A silence 
adverse inference by itself cannot add something positive to the state case. Silence is merely 
a reasonable observation that the accused has failed to rebut a prima facie state case which, 
by remaining uncontroverted, may eventually harden into conclusive proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt.29 
The South African silence principle at common law may be summarised by drawing the following 
conclusions: 
(a) The silence of the criminal defendant at the pre-trial or the trial stage may never amount to 
a direct inference or admission of guilt. 
(b) It is difficult to draw an adverse inference from the suspect's pre-trial silence and much 
easier to do so from the accused's trial silence because: 
(i) the suspect at the police station is in a vulnerable position in a hostile environment and 
may be ignorant of his procedural rights. There are any number of reasons why. the 
23 R v Mashelele 1944 AD 571. 
24 R v Patel1946 AD 903; S v Maritz 197 4 ( 1) SA 266 (NC); R v lnnes-Grant 1949 ( 1) SA 753 (A) at 764, 
"during the preparatory examination the accused need not reveal a defence and no adverse inference may 
be drawn from a failure to do so". 
25 A failure to rebut a prosecution case based on direct evidence will strengthen the prosecution case 
and result in conclusive proof, S v Mthetwa 1972 (3) SA 766 (A) 769 A-E, S v Francis 1991 (1) SACR 198 
(A). When the prosecution case is based on circumstantial evidence, an adverse inference from the 
accused's failure to testify may be added to all the other factors to be considered, S v Letsoko 1964 (4) 
SA 769 (A) at 776 A, S v Mtsweni 1985 (1) SA 590 (A) at 594 E-H. 
26 S v Miles 1978 (3) SA 407 (N); S v Pamensky 978 (3) SA 932 (E). 
27 S v Letsoko ibid at 776 C-E, made in reference to a prosecution prima facie case based on 
circumstantial evidence. 
28 Geldenhuys and Joubert Criminal Procedure Handbook (1994) 6-7. There are several reasons why 
silence cannot raise an adverse inference against the accused: (i) the nothingness of the accused's silence 
cannot logically fill in any gaps in the prosecution case; (ii) it is contrary to the principle of legality to punish 
the accused for the exercise of a right which he has been told he may exercise; (iii) a multitude of other 
reasons present themselves, the accused may think the prosecution case weak and not worth rebutting, 
he may not trust the court or be ignorant of strategy. 
29 Van der Merwe Obiter ( 1) 1994 at 21. 
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suspect refuses to co-operate with the police. 
(ii) the accused at trial is no longer vulnerable. He has been warned about his procedural 
rights and is usually represented by a legal adviser. 
(c) The evidentiary value of silence is dependent on the following considerations: 
(i) whether the defendant has been warned about his right to silence by the police at the 
interrogation stage; by a magistrate at the preliminary hearing; or by the judge at the 
trial proceeding.30 
(ii) whether the defendant has voluntarily waived his right to silence. 
(d) The suspect's pre-trial silence may give rise to adverse inferences only in certain limited 
circumstances (i.e., a reasonable or suspicious circumstance, an implied admission).31 
(e) The accused's silence only becomes a relevant evidentiary factor once the prosecution has 
established a prima facie case built on extrinsic sources of evidence. 
(f) The accused's failure to testify or to rebut the prosecution case may strengthen the 
prosecution case by leaving it uncontroverted in vital respects, but silence by itself cannot 
be used to remedy a deficiency in the prosecution case.32 
(g) The evidentiary weight to be attached to a failure to testify depends on the circumstances 
including: 
(i) whether the evidence against the accused is direct or circumstantial or a mixture of 
both; 33 
(ii) whether the essential elements of the crime are ascertainable by the prosecution or are 
peculiarly within the accused's personal knowledge; 
(iii) whether in the circumstance, a reasonable or unreasonable explanation for the 
accused's silence has been given. 
Finally, it must be borne in mind that South Africa possesses a non-jury trial system. The 
modern Anglo-American silence principle is largely directed at protecting the accused against 
the effect of unreasonable adverse inferences drawn by an inexperienced lay person jury. 
American and British trial jurisprudence is concerned with the practical need to give guidance 
to the inexperienced jury. It does so by imposing artificial limitations (i.e., a no-comment and no-
inference rule) on the judicial and prosecutorial ability to conduct a trial. South Africa has no 
need of such artificial limitations as the professional judge is unlikely to be unreasonably 
influenced by the accused's pre-trial or trial silence. Current South African jurisprudence 
30 R v Pate/1946 AD 903. 
31 See ibid note 19. 
32 S v Francis 1991 (1) SA 198 (A). 
33 S v Mthetwa 1972 (3) SA 766 (A), S v Theron 1968 (4) SA 61 (T) and S v Letsoko 1964 (4) SA 768 
(A). See ibid note 25. 
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requires the judge to warn himself against being influenced by the accused's failure to testify. 
An obviously absurd cautionary rule. The elevation of the silence principle into a constitutional 
right may be regarded as unnecessarily excessive. Does the South African accused need a 
constitutional protection against the judge who in reaching his judgement may want to draw an 
adverse inference from the accused's silence? 
The South African Constitutional Silence Principle: The criminal defendant's procedural right 
to silence is constitutionally entrenched within sec 35 (Chapter 2, Bill of Rights) of the South 
African Constitution 1996. Everyone arrested (sec 35(1)) has the right to remain silent (sec 
35(1 )(a)); to be informed promptly of the right (sec 35(1 )(b)(i)) and of the consequences of not 
remaining silent (sec 35(1 )(b)(ii). (At this stage the arrested person is not awarded a right 
against self-incrimination which is exclusively reserved for the accused person.) After arrest the 
accused person has the right to a fair trial (sec 35(3)), the right to be presumed innocent, not 
to testify (sec 35(3)(h)) and cannot be compelled to give self-incriminating evidence (sec 
35(3)0)). The position of a detained person is somewhat anomalous. He is afforded a right to 
consult with a legal practitioner (sec 35(2) (b) and (c)) but not the right to remain silent or the 
right against self-incrimination. The language of sec 35 therefore gives the criminal defendant 
different rights at different stages, depending on his criminal status. The question is whether the 
semantic distinction between an "arrested", "accused" or "detained" person has any significant 
legal effect. A generalist or fair trial approach suggests that these distinctions should have no 
practical legal effect at all. 34 The right to silence, the right against self-incrimination and the right 
to legal advice are triggered at the commencement of the criminal proceeding and apply 
uniformly to the arrested, detained or accused person. It has also been suggested that these 
rights should, as a matter of principle, be extended to the suspect who is not yet either an 
arrested, detained or accused person.35 
A contrary or specific-interpretative approach holds that sec 35 and its subsections should be 
given their literal meaning. Accordingly, the right to silence is triggered only once the person is 
arrested. 36 Suspects and other not yet arrested need not be warned nor may they invoke a right 
34 A generalist approach finds its support in the Judges Rules, the fair trial principle (sec 35(3}) and S 
v Zuma (2) SACR 568 (CC) where it was held that a right to a fair trial is broader than the specific list of 
rights set out in sec 25 IC (sec 35 F.C) and embraces a wide concept of substantive fairness. 
35 Authority for the view that the right to a fair trial does not begin in court but at the inception of the 
criminal process, S v Me/ani 1996 (1) SACR 335 (E); S v Agnew 1996 (2) SACR 120 (E); S v Mathebu/a 
1997 (1) SACR 10 (W); S v Sebejan 1997 (1) SACR 626 (W), per Satchwell J at 6350, "the right to a fair 
trial operates at the investigative stage of the criminal process" and at 6368, "the suspect is entitled to the 
same warning as the arrested person", but see the opposite view inS v Langa 1998 (1) SACR 21 (T) and 
S v Vander Merwe 1998 (1) SACR 194 (0). 
36 S v Agnew ibid and S v Nombewu 1996 (12) BCLR 1635 (E). 
390 
to silence. If incriminating admissions are made to the police at a stage when the individual is 
not detained or arrested there is no reason why the admissions may not be used at trial. 37 
Awarding the right to silence to a suspect not yet arrested is inappropriate for several reasons. 
The right to be brought before the court within 48 hours does not apply to the non-arrested 
suspect. The right to silence is designed to be triggered by detention, confinement or when the 
individual is under some kind of direct control by the state. A non-arrested suspect is not under 
the supervision of the state and at this stage a right to silence is superfluous. A suspect's 
voluntary statements, which have not been compelled by the state, may be admissible as 
evidence against the suspect at trial. (This kind of interpretation is similar to the American 
definition. The fifth amendment is only triggered once the defendant is under the coercive 
control of the state.) Extending sec 35 rights to the non-arrested suspect would make the 
investigation of crime difficult and irretrievably upset the fine balance between the defendant's 
procedural interests and the public interest in effective crime enforcement. Once the suspect 
has been arrested, the semantic difference between an arrested or a detained person has no 
practical consequence. Logically arrest is always followed by a period of detention and usually 
culminates in some form of accusation.38 Sec 35(1) is triggered together with sec 35(2) when 
detention follows upon arrest. Once the arrested person has been released from detention, only 
the sec 35( 1) rights continue to exist, while the sec 35(2) rights fall away. 39 
Access to legal advice at any stage of the criminal process is a central element of the 
defendant's criminal procedural rights. When the defendant is able to afford legal representation 
no problem arises, but legal representation for the indigent defendant is subject to an internal 
modifier. Sec 35(2)(c) and sec 35(3)(g) read, "every detained and accused person has the right 
to a legal practitioner, assigned by the state and at state expense, when substantial injustice 
would otherwise result". In theory, the right to silence and the right to a fair trial cannot be 
compromised by the defendant's indigence. If the state is unable to provide legal representation 
to the indigent defendant at the pre-trial state, the police must be circumspect and restrained 
in their interrogation and investigation methods. In practice, the state does not have the 
economic resources to provide every indigent defendant with legal representation. A substantive 
and absolute right to legal advice would paralyse law enforcement, hence the modifier 
37 S v Vander Merwe 1998 (1) SACR 194 (0). 
38 In a bail proceeding, if the accused fails to give evidence, he may be refused bail. Any evidence given 
at a bail proceeding may be used in a subsequent trial, S v Schietekat 1998 (2) SACR 707 (C) 714 G-H, 
S v Nomzaza 1996 (2) SACR 14 (A) 18 F-G. See the opposite view in S v Both a and Another (2) 1995 (2) 
SACR 605 (W). 
39 Not all detained persons are also arrested persons (an already sentenced person is detained but no 
longer arrested), therefore only sec 35(2) rights apply and sec 35(1) rights fall away. An accused person 
is not necessarily also an arrested or detained person, therefore only 35(3) rights apply and sec 35( 1) and 
(2) rights fall away. 
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qualification, "if substantial justice would otherwise result". A balance of interest analysis is 
applied in which the defendant's constitutional rights are weighed against the state's economic 
ability to provide an effective justice system. 40 The right to silence and the right to legal 
representation are integral elements of sec 35, especially at the pre-trial interrogation stage. 
(Similarly, the right to counsel during the interrogation process arises indirectly from the 
American fifth amendment. According to Miranda v Arizona, the right to have a legal advisor 
present is an indispensable adjunct of the fifth amendment.)41 Since the right to silence and the 
right to legal representation are constitutionally mandated, no adverse inferences from silence 
may be drawn once the arrested or accused defendant has been advised of his constitutional 
rights. A state infringement of the sec 35 constitutional rights (unless justified in terms of the 
limitation clause, sec 36) automatically triggers the sec 35(5) exclusionary clause and all 
evidence obtained as a result of the infringement is inadmissible at trial.42 
Sec 35(3) protects the accused's silence and right against self-incrimination during the trail 
proceeding. The accused's right to remain silent and not to testify, together with the right to be 
presumed innocent (sec 35(3)(b)) are integral elements of a fair trial principle. (The South 
African constitutional trial right, coupled with the right not to be compelled to give self-
incriminatory evidence (sec 35(3)0)) is similar in nature to the American trial fifth amendment.) 
The fundamental core concept of the constitutional right is that the court cannot draw an 
adverse inference from the accused's failure to testify at trial. Silence cannot make a case for 
the prosecution where none existed before. In this sense, silence at trial has no evidentiary 
value and is not indicative of guilt. (Sec 35 is similar to the interpretation of the fifth amendment 
in Griffin v California which reinforces the constitutional notion that the accused cannot be 
penalised for his refusal to testify). 43 The constitutional silence principle has not amended the 
common law in this respect. Nevertheless, a failure to testify may well have adverse 
consequences for the accused. The prosecution's prima facie case may ripen into conclusive 
proof if it remains uncontroverted by the defence. This kind of constitutional reasoning is based 
40 Balancing factors are: (i) the complexity of the legal issue; (ii) nature of the change and sentence; 
(iii) ignorance and poverty of the accused. Note, in theory, if the state is unable to provide legal 
representation to the indigent defendant then the police must immediately refrain from interrogation, S v 
Marx 1996 (2) SACR 140 (N), S v Agnew ibid at 542 D. In practice, the court tends to balance the state's 
limited economic ability to provide legal assistance against the indigent's interest and to proceed with the 
trial. 
41 See supra chapter 5 p.170. By contrast, the common law does not regard the right to legal 
representation as integral to a fair trial process, especially for those who could not afford a lawyer, S v 
Rudman 1992 (1) SA 343 (A). 
42 Sec 35(5) reads, "evidence obtained in a manner that violates any right in the Bill of Rights is excluded 
if the admission of that evidence would render the trial unfair or otherwise detrimental to the administration 
of justice". 
43 See supra chapter 6 p.217-227. The Griffin no-comment and no-inference rule is based on an 
impermissible burden test prohibiting all comment on the accused's failure to testify. 
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on a common sense evaluation of the ordinary procedural mechanisms of the trial process 
according to the Northern Cape Division in S v Brown and Anothel'4 and S v Scholtz and 
Another. 45 Scholtz refers with approval to the Canadian case R v Boss46 where it is suggested 
that no rule of law (constitutional or otherwise) may effectively curtail the drawing of tactical and 
common sense adverse inferences from the accused's failure to testify in the face of a strong 
prosecutorial prima facie case. 47 Also cited with approval is the dissenting judgement of Stewart 
J in Griffin v Califomia.48 Whenever the accused chooses to rely on the constitutional right to 
silence, adverse inferences are bound to be drawn by the jury, "no constitutional rule can 
prevent the operation of the human mind".49 The question whether adverse inferences are 
constitutionally permissible, the circumstances and extent of such adverse inferences has not 
authoritatively been decided by the Constitutional Court and was expressly left open in Osman 
and Another v Attorney-General Transvaal. 5° 
The South African constitutional right to silence may be summarised as follows: 51 
(a) The constitutional silence principle is primarily a shield against the coercive influences of 
the criminal justice system. It is meant to protect the arrested, detained or accused person 
during the pre-trial and the trial stage. 
(b) In conjunction with the silence principle, the arrested, detained or accused person has a 
right to legal advice and to be informed of that right. The voluntary waiver of either the right 
44 1996 (2) SACR 49 (NC) endorsed by S v Khomunala and Another 1998 ( 1) SACR 362(V) at 365E -
366A. 
45 1996 (2) SACR 40 (NC), "silence after the close of prima facie state case allows for the drawing of 
adverse inherences", S v Sidziya 1995 (12) BCLR 1626 (TK), "the drawing of an adverse inference from 
the accused's failure to testify does not amount to an unconstitutional compulsion to testify". See also S 
v Lavhengwa 1996 (2) SACR 453 (W). 
46 (1988) 46(3d) 523 C.C.C. See also R v Noble (1997) 146 DLR (41h) 385, "it is not permissible to use 
the accused's failure to testify as an adverse inference of guilt". 
47 A mere tactical pressure arising from the weight of the prosecution case cannot be described as a 
compulsion violating the accused's constitutional passive defence right. See Vander Merwe Obiter(1994) 
19. 
48 380 US 609 (1965) Steward J dissenting at621-623. 
49 The opinion expressed in S v Brown and Another, ibid, that a Griffin type no-inference rule should not 
apply outside the context of a jury trial, ignores the fact that a judge hardened by a continual exposure to 
guilty criminals, may find it difficult not to make adverse inferences. Doran et al "Rethinking Adversariness 
in Non-Jury Criminal Trials" (23) Am. J. Crim. L (1995) 1. 
50 Although the Constitutional Court refrained from making a direct ruling it did refer with approval to the 
judgement in Attorney-General v Moagi (1982) II BLR 124 (C.A.) at 131 and 175, "an adverse inference 
is permissible once a prima facie case has been established, and does not offend against the accused's 
constitutional rights". 
51 These constitutional conclusions are primarily drawn from S v Brown and Another ibid, S v Scholtz 
ibid, S v Disziya ibid and S v Lavhengwa ibid. Persuasive foreign judgements are R v Boss ibid, Griffin v 
California ibid, Miranda v Arizona ibid and Jenkins v Anderson 447 US 231 (1980). See also Van der 
Merwe Obiter ibid and Du Toit et al Commentary on the Criminal Procedure Act (1996) 22-4C. See also 
the contrary view in S v Langa 1998 (1) SACR 1 (SCA) 5G-H, "the accused's silence in the face of 
compelling evidence proves the case against him". 
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to silence or the right to legal advice must be based on the principal of an "informed 
consent". 52 
(c) No adverse inference may be drawn from the accused's post-arrest and pre-trial 
interrogation silence. However, the suspect's pre-arrest silence may have some evidential 
value. (It may be possible to apply a Jenkins v Anderson53 approach and to allow the 
impeachment of the accused's credibility during cross-examination through the use of his 
pre-arrest silence, subject to a sec 36 balance of interest analysis.) 
(d) All testimony gathered by the state in violation of the defendant's constitutional sec 35 rights 
is automatically inadmissible, unless the state can justify the infringement in terms of the 
limitation clause, sec 36. 
(e) During the trial proceeding, no adverse inferences may be drawn against the accused on 
the mere exercise of the constitutional right to silence or a refusal to testify. 54 The right to 
silence is also protected by a "passivity rule" and the accused need not disclose his defence 
in advance but may tactically and strategically await developments in the trial before. 
deciding whether to remain silent or to lead evidence. 
(f) Unless otherwise decided by the Constitutional Court, the constitution is presently 
interpreted as abolishing the common law rule that silence strengthens a prosecutorial 
prima facie case based on direct or strong circumstantial evidence. The common law rule 
which identifies silence as an evidentiary fact with some probative value no longer applies. 55 
(g) The only permissible inference to be drawn from silence depends on the accused's tactical 
use of the mechanics of the adversarial trial system. The state's prima facie case when left 
uncontroverted may well have adverse consequences for the accused. An unrebutted prima 
facie case may harden into conclusive proof at the trial's end. This may happen not because 
the accused's failure to testify has any evidential value, but simply because in the absence 
of contradictory evidence, the prosecutorial prima facie case is logically strong enough to 
become conclusive proof. 56 
(h) The evidentiary burden placed on the accused to rebut the prosecution's prima facie case 
and other evidentiary pressures which may arise during the course of the trial, which 
sometimes force the accused to testify, do not amount to compulsion and do not infringe 
52 S v Mphala and Another 1998 (4) BCLR 494 (W). 
53 447 US 231 (1980). See supra chapter 6 p.210-211. 
54 S v Brown and Another ibid at 60 F-G and 63 8-C, per Buys J. 
55 The common law interpretations developed in S v Mthetwa 1972 (3) SA 766 (A) at 769 A-E, in S v 
Snyman 1968 (2) SA 582 (A) at 588 F and S v Letsoko 1964 (4) SA 768 (A) at 776 A-F, appear to be in 
conflict with the present constitutional interpretations especially in S v Brown and Another ibid. 
56 Van der Merwe Obiter (1994) at 18, "the logical inferences which inevitably flow from uncontroverted 
prima facie proof cannot violate the constitutional passive defence right of the accused". This happens not 
because silence has any evidential value but simply because the accusatorial process follows its natural 
course, Geldenhuys and Joubert Criminal Procedure Handbook (1994) at 6-7. See supra note 28. 
394 
the accused's right to be a non-compellable witness. 57 
(i) In American constitutional law (the Griffin no-comment rule) and Canadian constitutional law 
(sec 11, Canadian Charter 1982)58 the prosecution is prohibited from making adverse 
comments on the accused's trial silence. Prosecutorial comment may influence the jury into 
drawing unconstitutional inferences. South Africa is a non-jury criminal system and the no-
comment rule prevalent in other constitutional jurisdictions has no relevance. 59 
According to Van der Merwe, prosecutorial comment on trial silence should not amount to 
a constitutional infringement. The prosecution should be free to identify and emphasise 
those logical inferences flowing from the available facts. The Constitution prohibits the 
prosecutorial use of compelled evidence, it does not prohibit argument. "Argument is mere 
persuasive comment on the interpretation of evidence. Argument is not evidence and in the 
South African system the trier-of-fact will not confuse the two."60 
0) The common law warning, "you have the right to remain silent but a failure to give evidence 
is a factor which may be taken into account and used against you", is unconstitutional in two 
respects. First, it gives silence an evidentiary value no longer permitted by sec 35. Second, 
the meaning indirectly compels the accused to take the stand and testify contrary to sec 
35(3)(h).61 The preferred constitutional warning should read , "[you] have a constitutional 
right to silence and no adverse inference can be drawn from the fact that [you] have opted 
for silence. 52 
(k) A number of ancillary points about the constitution need to be noted: 
(i) the proper constitutional interpretation of a bail proceeding is that incriminating evidence 
given during the bail hearing is inadmissible at a subsequent trial, especially when a 
failure to supply evidence will result in a refusal to grant bail. 63 
57 R v Boss 1988 46 (3d) 523 CCC (Canada), "constitutionally permissible evidentiary pressure is a 
natural consequence ofthe accusatorial trial system". But see supra chapter 6 p.220-222 and the criticism 
of the Griffin impermissible burden test. See also S v Brown and Another ibid at 641 - 65G. 
58 English statutory law, sec 1 (b) Criminal Evidence Act 1898, which prohibits commentary by the 
prosecution has been repealed by the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act ( 1994) (CRIMPO). In England 
both the judge and the prosecution are empowered to comment on the accused's silence. 
59 In the South African non-jury trial system, where the judge is both the controller and trier of fact, it is 
illogical to apply a strict Griffin no-comment rule. To do so would mean that in his capacity as the jury, the 
judge could draw conscious adverse inferences from the accused's silence, but in his capacity as judge-
controller he must refrain from commenting on the accused's silence. In Canada, the no-comment rule is 
confined to jury trials, Sopinka et al Law of Evidence in Canada (1992) 760, 764-765. 
60 Vander Merwe Obiter (1994) at 20. 
61 S v Hlongwane 1992 (2) SACR484 (N), 487 H-1, "the way in which the common law warning is worded 
virtually compels the accused to enter the witness stand". 
62 S v Brown and Another ibid at 65F; S v Makhubo 1990 (2) SACR 320 (0) at 322 G. The accused 
should be warned of the adverse consequences of leaving a prima facie case uncontrolled. 
63 See supra note 38. 
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(ii) the accused may exercise a right to silence during the plea proceeding (sec 112 to sec 
115 of the C.P.A.). The court must inform the accused of his constitutional right to 
silence during both the sec 112(1)(b)64 or sec 115 (1) and (2)(b)65 proceedings. 
The constitutional prohibition against adverse inferences from silence (as interpreted by S v 
Brown and Another)66 is significantly different to the common law principle (as illustrated by S 
v Mthetwa), 67 which permits certain adverse inferences in limited circumstances. This inflexible 
interpretation of the constitution is a natural consequence of a pervasive international human 
rights and-libertarian culture. In the light of South Africa's apartheid legacy, it is understandable 
why a human rights philosophy has so seductive an influence over the interpretation of the 
silence principle. 
Nevertheless, there are a number of pertinent reason for rejecting an absolute adverse 
inference prohibition. First, the historical silence principle was limited to a narrow testimonial 
immunity based on the necessity to preserve the truth-seeking function of the trial process. The 
traditional silence principle was intended to protect the defendant against coercive state 
practices and to prevent the admission of compelled and unreliable confessions. Neither of 
these two rationales justifies a modern constitutionally-imposed prohibition against adverse 
inferences. Second, the Constitutional Court has not yet issued a definitive opinion on the ability 
of the court to draw adverse inferences. Attention is drawn to the highly persuasive judgement 
in Attorney-General v Moagi, 68 a Botswana Appeal Court case in which Maisels J69 argues that 
an unfavourable inference is permissible and does not offend the constitutional right of the 
accused, "not to be compelled to give evidence". There is, "an evident distinction between the 
possession of a right and its exercise which may, in the appropriate circumstance, be highly 
questionable, and indeed warrant the drawing of inferences adverse to the possessor''.70 Third, 
on the ground of utilitarian common sense (and ignoring the sentimentality of libertarian human 
rights rhetoric), the drawing of an adverse inference in the appropriate circumstance is simply 
64 
"Plea of guilty", S v Maseko 1996 (2) SACR 91 (W) at 978-C, "sec 112(1)(b) is not in conflict with the 
constitution". But see the opposite inS v Damons 1997 (2) SACR 218 (W) at 224 H- 225 D. 
65 
"Plea of guilty", S v Evans 1981 (4) SA 52 (C), S v Daniels 1983 (3) SA275 (A) and S v Mabaso 1990 
(3) SA 185 (A), "no conflict between sec 115 and the constitution". 
66 See supra note 44, 49 and 51. 
67 See supra note 25, 26, 27 and 55. 
68 (1982) II BLR 124 (C.A.) per Maisels J, Dendy-Yong JA and Aguda JA, but see the dissenting 
judgement by Kentridge AJ at 189 who expresses a libertarian objection to the drawing of adverse 
inferences. Under the common law rule the accused takes the additional risk that his silence will be used 
as positive evidence against him which may have the effect of strengthening and completing an otherwise 
inadequate prosecution case. If the exercise of a [constitutional] privilege has these consequences, its 
value is diminished. Our [constitutional] right to remain silent is a no-right if silence can be construed as 
evidence, even slight evidence, of guilt. 
69 Maisels J at 131. 
70 lbidat131. 
396 
not contrary to legal logic. As a matter of logic an adverse inference is permissible when the 
accused fails to give evidence, when an innocent accused would have refuted the evidence 
against him, and there is no other explanation for the accused's failure to do so. Fourth, even 
if an adverse inference infringes upon the accused's constitutional right to silence, it may be a 
justifiable limitation in terms of the limitation clause sec 36: The South African constitutional 
silence principle is a relative and not an absolute right. As a relative right it is subject to a 
balance of interest and to a justifiable limitation. In certain circumstances, adverse inferences 
from silence amount to a justifiable limitation. Fifth, taking into account all the other procedural 
safeguards available to the accused in terms of sec 35(1) through to sec 35(5) and in the rest 
of Chapter 2, there is no reason why an adverse inference from the accused's silence would 
erode the accused's fair trail right nor risk the truth-seeking function of the accusatorial trial 
system. Finally, the primary problem with a constitutional right to silence is the inability to 
negotiate rational compromises. Once the silence principle is elevated into a constitutional right 
it becomes unnecessary to provide rational justifications for its existence. A constitutional right 
to silence becomes self-sustaining by virtue of its elevated status. This means that a criminal 
defendant may claim the right automatically, even in the absence of a state compulsion. The 
result is a legal system in which costs increase while the conviction rate decreases. 
The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination: The privilege against self-incrimination has 
developed through the common law,71 through statutory law,72 and partly by entrenchment within 
the constitution. Sec 35(3)0) refers to the accused's right, "not to be compelled to give self-
incriminatory evidence". The wording of sec 35 awards a right against self-incrimination to the 
accused but not to the non-party witness's. The non-party witness' right against self-
incrimination has not been constitutionally entrenched and it is arguable that a witness privilege 
against self-incrimination continues to be governed by common law rules. 73 The privilege is said 
to flow naturally from an accusatorial type system predicated upon a presumption of innocence 
and a fair trial principle. The nexus between the suspect's pre-trial right against self-incrimination 
and the accused's trial right against self-incrimination was established by the Constitutional 
Court in Ferriera v Levin N0/4 Bernstein v Bester N075 and Nel v Le Raux N0.76 The right 
71 S v Lwane 1996 (2) SA 433 (A); R v Comane 1925 AD 570, 575. 
72 Sec 200, 203-5, 217, 219A of the C.P.A. Sec 14 read with sec 42 of the C.P.E.A. 
73 If the non-party witness privilege against self-incrimination is still governed by the common law, it 
should be subject to statutory erosion. 
74 1996 (1) SA 984 (CC) (1) BCLR 1 (CC). 
75 1996 (2) SA 751 (CC) (4) BCLR 449 (CC). 
76 1996 (3) SA 562 (CC) (4) BCLR 592 (CC). 
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against self-incrimination is a use and derivative use immunity17 which operates at any legal 
proceeding wherein incrimination may occur. The defendant may be compelled to provide self-
incriminatory testimony at public inquiries or state investigations but no use or derivative use 
may be made of the incriminatory evidence at a subsequent criminal trial. The constitutional 
right against self-incrimination exists to protect the fair trial principle. When the right to a fair trial 
is not threatened the constitutional protection against self-incrimination does not apply.78 It's 
justification lies in a public revulsion against state compelled or coerced self-incrimination79 and 
the jurisprudential necessity to encourage the witness to testify freely. 80 This is essentially a 
personal privilege preventing the disclosure of relevant oral or written incriminating testimony. 81 
The privilege may only be claimed by the witness and does not extend to a co-defendant, 
spouse or relative. (By contrast, the inquisitorial system extends the privilege to spouses, family 
and relatives in certain circumstances.) A witness may refuse to answer a question which 
exposes him to a criminal charge (or penalty or forfeiture). 82 The privilege does not apply to the 
fear of a future civil claim. 83 The privilege may be claimed in a criminal, civil, administrative, 
quasi-judicial, coroner's and inquest proceedings, whenever there is a risk of a possible criminal 
charge. 84 The court is obliged to warn the witness of the privilege and a failure to do so may well 
render the incriminating testimony inadmissible in any future prosecution against the witness. 85 
The South African privilege closely mirrors the English, American, Australian, New Zealand and 
Canadian privilege. 86 The privilege is not a blanket immunity against all types of questioning, but 
77 In Ferreira v Levin NO ibid, Ackermann J at para 145, cited with approval the Canadian case R v S 
(RJ) (1995) 1 SCR 451, which holds, "while derivative evidence is not created by the accused per se, it 
is self-incriminating because it would not otherwise be part of the crown case". See also the use immunity 
provisions in sec 204 (2) and (4) of the C.P.A which also provides for a transactional immunity. 
78 Ferreira v Levin NO ibid at para 159, Davis v Tip NO 1996 (6) BCLR 807 (W); Seapoint Computer 
Bureau v McLoughlin NO 1996 (8) BCLR 1071 (W). 
79 In Davis v Tip ibid, and Seapoint Computer Bureau v McLoughlin ibid, it was held that only a positive 
state "coercive compulsion" as opposed to the exercise of free choice in answering questions amounted 
to a violation of the privilege. See also S v Mbolombo 1995 (5) BCLR 614 (C) (in the context of bail) and 
S v Zuma and Others 1995 (2) SA 642 (CC) (4) BCLR 401 (CC) at para 30, "the privilege is based on an 
abhorrence of coercive methods to extract confessions". But see Langbein's criticism of the supposed link 
between the privilege and torture, supra chapter 3. 
80 S v Botha (2) 1995 (2) SACR 605 (W) at 609 C-D; S v Lwane ibid per Ogilvie Thomson JA at 438G. 
81 Magmoed v Janse van Rensburg and Another 1993 (1) SACR 67 (A) at 104 B-C. 
82 A penalty or forfeiture privilege has an obsolete meaning inappropriate to South African procedure; 
Hoffmann and Zeffertt SA Law of Evidence (1966) 238. 
83 See sec 200 C.P.A read with sec 42 C.P.E.A. 
84 Waddell v Eyles NO and Welsh NO 1939 TPD 198; S v Ramalige/a 1983 (2) SA 424 (V); R v 
Diedericks 1957 (3) SA 661 (E). 
85 See sec 203 C. P.A, and Magmoed v Janse van Rensburg ibid, where it was held that the warning was 
not absolute but merely a general rule of practice dependant on the circumstances ( S v Lwane, ibid, at 440 
H - 441 A). Case precedent is inconsistent with the constitutional right and the better view is that a failure 
to warn the witness will render his subsequent testimony inadmissible. 
86 See supra chapter 7 p.228-240. Also chapter 10. 
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must be claimed on a question to question basis, 87 whenever there is a reasonable 
apprehension of danger to the witness. The risk of self-incrimination must be real, appreciable 
and not imaginary or unsubstantial. 88 Whether the risk is real is a matter of judicial discretion. 89 
The privilege applies to answers which directly incriminate but also to answers, though innocent 
in themselves, which may indirectly form a material link in the chain of causal proof resulting in 
a possible criminal charge against the witness. 90 The witness is obliged to answer frankly and 
honestly and will be discharged from future prosecutions. 91 A witness who has been immunized 
or statutorily indemnified against a future prosecution has no claim on the privilege.92 As in other 
Anglo-American jurisdictions, South African statutes which abrogate the privilege are 
concentrated in the area of taxation, corporate activities, banking, property, bankruptcy and 
insolvency. 93 Many of these abrogating statutes have been re-interpreted or amended in the light 
of a constitutionalised right against self-incrimination. The Constitutional Court in Ferreira v 
Levin N094 has invalidated a part of sec 417 (2) of the Companies Act 1973, whiCh permitted the 
criminal evidentiary use of incriminating testimony compelled during a liquidation inquiry. Sec 
417(2)(b) was found to be a violation of sec 35(3) and the constitutional right to a fair trial.95 
Consequently, while an abrogating statute may compel incriminating evidence from an 
examinee, such evidence is automatically inadmissible in future criminal proceedings.96 Taken 
together, the constitutional right against self-incrimination (sec 35(3)0)) and the right to silence 
(sec 35(1)(a)(b)) prohibit the admission of evidence induced under statutory compulsion. 
Similarly in Canada, sec 13 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms expressly prohibits 
the use of statutorily compelled testimony at a criminal trial. 
The question whether the constitutional right against self-incrimination ,as opposed to the 
common law privilege, is possessed by the corporation was avoided in Seapoint Computer 
87 R v Kuper 1915 TPD 308 at 316, Waddell v Eyles NO and Walsh NO, ibid. R v Ntshangela 1961 (4) 
SA 592 (A), "the choice to answer is not left to the witness". 
88 S v Cameson 1962 (3) SA 437 (T) at 439 H. 
89 Triplex Safety Glass Co Ltd v Lancegaye Safety Glass Ltd (1939) 2 ALLER 613. 
90 S v Heyman and Another 1966 (4) SA 598 (A) at 608 C. Rademeyerv Attomey-General1955 (1) SA 
444 (T), "the judge is not obliged to accept the witness' opinion that an answer will be incriminating. The 
witness may have to reveal some damaging evidence to support his claim". 
91 See sec 204 (1) (2) (3) (4) including sec 205(1) of the CPA. 
92 For example, the sec 204 "indemnity clause" C.P.A is intended to encourage accomplices to testify 
against their co-defendants. 
93 Sec651nsolvency Act24 (1936); sec415, 417 CompaniesAct61 (1973); sec66(1) Close Corporation 
Act 69 (1984); sec (4) (6) (8) (9) Inspection of Financial Institutions Act 38 (1984); sec (7) (9) (17) 
Competitions Act 96 (1979); sec 6 Bank Act 94 (1990); sec 5(8) Investigations of Serious Economic 
Offences Act 117 (1991). 
94 Ibid note 74 at para 153, 159. 
95 Parbhoo v Getz NO 1997 (4) SA 1095 (CC) invalidated sec415(5) of the Companies Acton the same 
constitutional ground. 
96 Park-Ross v Director Office for Serious Economic Offences 1995 ( 1) SACR 530 (C) at 546 J, 548 C-F. 
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Bureau (Pty) Ltd v McLoughlin and Others NNO. 97 A dichotomy exists between English common 
law which extends the privilege to the corporate person98 and American constitutional law which 
limits the privilege to the natural person.99 In America and Canada the constitutional elevation 
of the privilege into a human right precludes its extension to the corporation. 100 The limitation 
of the privilege to the natural person because of its human right status has also been recognised 
by the Australian High Court (despite the lack of an Australian Bill of Rights). 101 The better view 
is that the South African Constitutional Court will move to limit the privilege to the natural person 
in terms of an entrenched right against self-incrimination. There is some residual uncertainty in 
English, Australian and South African case precedent as to whether the privilege may be 
extended to the witness who fears the risk of incrimination under foreign law. The weight of 
English 102 and American 103 authority suggests that the privilege is limited to the domestic forum 
and does not extend to the foreign forum. The American Supreme Court in United States v 
Balsys 104 and sec14( 1) of the English Civil Evidence Act 1968 expressly limit the privilege to the 
domestic forum, and this is probably the better approach. 
In line with other Anglo-American jurisdictions, 105 South African courts make a careful distinction 
between testimonial communicative acts (to which the privilege attaches) and non-
communicative physical acts (to which the privilege does not attach). 106 A number of statutory 
provisions permit the compulsory taking of non-communicative passive forms of physical (real) 
evidence. Sec 37(1) of the Criminal Procedure Act 1977 permits the evidentiary use of 
fingerprints, palm prints, foot prints and other distinguishing body marks. Sec 37(1){c) permits 
the taking of blood samples. A refusal to give a blood sample raises a presumption against the 
accused at trial. 107 It is suggested that the compulsory taking of non-intimate and intimate body 
samples will survive a constitutional challenge. Although the taking of an intimate sample is an 
infringement of the individual's physical integrity, the state interest is likely to outweigh the 
97 1996 (8) BCLR 1071 (W). 
98 See supra chapter 10. 
99 See supra chapter 7 p.229-230. 
100 See supra chapter 10 note 181 to 189 and accompanying text. 
101 See supra chapter 10 note 40 to 41 and accompanying text. 
102 See supra chapter 10. 
103 See supra chapter 7. 
104 524 us 666 (1998). 
105 See supra chapter 10 note106, 121, 122 and 128. 
106 See R v Camane 1925 AD 570 at 575; Ex parte Minister of Justice In re R v Matemba 1941 AD 75 
at 82-3; S v Binta 1993 (2) SACR 553(C); S v Huma (2) 1995 (2) SACR 411 (W) per Classen J at 419 G, 
"the taking of a fingerprint does not constitute testimonial evidence against the accused and is not in 
conflict with the privilege". See also Seeta/v Pravitha 1983 (3) SA827 (D); S v Maphumulo 1996 (2) SACR 
84 (N) at 88 F - 89 B; Msomi v Attorney-General of Natal and Others 1996 (8) BCLR 1109 (N). 
107 S v Binta 1993 (2) SACR 553 (C); S v Kiti 1994 (1) SACR 14 (E); but in contrast see the American 
case South Dakota v Neville 459 US 553 (1983). 
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individual's right to dignity and privacy. 108 Compulsory physical sampling, even in the face of a 
refusal, may well be justifiable in terms of the limitation clause (sec 36). For example, DNA 
sampling is an indispensable forensic investigatory tool and is unlikely to be constitutionally 
challenged, as long as reliable DNA data banks and proper test protocols are maintained. State 
medical personnel are now permitted to take compulsory fluid samples from a suspected rapist 
at the request of the victim in order to determine HIV status. The evidentiary use of external 
body samples (fingerprints, hair, nails, breath) and internal body samples (blood, fluids, semen, 
DNA) are essential tools in the investigation of crime. The neutralisation of these tools in the 
interest of the accused would adversely affect the administration of justice. 
The English common law witness privilege generally covers both incriminatory oral and 
documentary forms of evidence. No special distinction is made between the written or the 
spoken word. On the other hand, the United States Supreme Court draws a fine line between 
oral testimony and documents. Several unique doctrines (the act of production and required 
records doctrine) have been developed, under the influence of fifth amendment constitutional 
requirements, to account for the state compulsion of documentary evidence. According to the 
United States Supreme Court it is critical to distinguish between the seizure of documents and 
their compelled production by the state. The reason for such a distinction is that documentary 
evidence falls into the grey area between a communication (to which the privilege attaches) and 
real evidence (to which the privilege does not attach). The privilege does not apply to the seizure 
of documents which exist independently of their maker. Although documents contain the written 
communications of their maker, they do not become compulsory produced communicative 
evidence on seizure. Seizure may violate the constitutional right to privacy but it does not violate 
the constitutional right against self-incrimination (per United States v Fisher and United States 
v Doe). 109 In Bernstein v Bester N0110 Ackermann J distinguishes questions of privacy 
infringement from questions of compelled self-incrimination. By contrast, the production and 
disclosure of the existence of documents creates self-incrimination problems. The compelled 
disclosure may be used by the state as an admission against the accused (United States v 
Fisher)111 or the disclosure may lead, through derivative use, to other evidence incriminating the 
accused (Dabelstein v Hildebrandt and Others). 112 The order to produce documents, the 
existence of which is unknown to the state or in dispute, will also lead to self-incrimination 
108 See Ou Toit et al Commentary on the Criminal Procedure Act ( 1997), at 3 - 1. 
109 See supra chapter 7 p.241. 
110 Ibid note 75 at para 64. 
111 425 US 391 (1976) at 410. 
112 1996 (3) SA 42 (C) at 66-7. 
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(United States v Hubbe~. 113 The suggestion is made that these versatile American doctrines (the 
act of production and the required records doctrine) may be of use in the South African context 
and may guide the future development of the South African constitutional law on document 
admissibility and the state compulsion of private or public documents. 
11.2 The Scottish Philosophical Divide 
Historically, Scotland has had a close relationship with continental Europe and that strong 
influence is illustrated in the unique Scottish legal system. The Scottish legal system is a hybrid 
system and like all other common and civil law jurisdictions recognises that the accused should 
not be compelled to convict himself from his own mouth. The Scottish criminal process is 
essentially accusatorial in nature but with certain unique inquisitorial elements. While the trial 
procedure is adversarial, there is an inquisitorial emphasis on the pre-trial investigatory stage. 
Once arrested114 a suspect may be detained. The suspect must be informed of the offence and 
the reasons for detention. 115 A caution on the right to silence and the right to legal· advice is 
issued. 116 After the caution the suspect's reliance on silence during interrogation may not give 
rise to adverse inferences at trial. 117 A failure to caution the suspect at reasonable intervals 
during the police inquiry will render any confession inadmissible at trial. The unique inquisitorial 
feature of the Scottish criminal process is the re-introduction of a pre-trial judicial examination. 
A feature similar to the continental preparatory investigation before ajuge d'instruction. In terms 
of the Criminal Justice (Scotland) Act 1980,118 the procurator fiscaf 19 or prosecutor may cause 
the accused to be brought before the sheriff for judicial examination, 120 either before or after bail. 
This judicial examination is a formal public procedure in which the accused is not put under oath. 
The sheriff begins by notifying the accused of his right to silence and right to legal advice. The 
sheriff conducts the examination by directing his questioning towards the elicitation of a denial, 
explanation, comment or justification of the criminal charge. Strict limitations are placed on 
113 120 S.Ct 2037 (2000). See supra chapter 7 p.246-247. 
114 In terms of sec 1 and sec 2 of the Criminal Justice Act (1980), "the constable must inform the 
individual of the nature of the offence and that a failure to comply with the arrest is an offence". 
115 Ibid sec 2(4). 
116 Ibid sec 2(7). The Scottish statutory warning is only a partial one by comparison to the English 
warning. It does not require the police to warn the suspect that any answers given will be taken down and 
used in evidence. See Tonge v H.M. Advocate 1982 SLT 506, (1982) SCCR 313 
117 The right to silence at the police investigation is entirely judge made and it arises only as an indirect 
consequence of the primary silence right at trial. Chalmers v H.M. Advocate 1954 JC 66 at 79 and 
Twycross v H.M. Advocate 1973 SLT 85, "at common law there is no duty on the individual to answer 
police questions." 
118 See in particular sec 20 A(5) of the Criminal Procedure Act (Scotland} 1975. The judicial examination 
is similar to the arraignment process in the United States. 
119 The procurator fiscal is the principal prosecuting crown officer in the sheriffs court. 
120 Scotland is divided into a number of sheriff court districts. The role of the sheriff in a district court is 
similar to that of a judge in the Scottish High Court, except his legal status is inferior. 
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prosecutorial questioning which may only be directed at clarifying the accused's defence and 
no attempt may be made to incriminate him. The prosecutor may not cross-examine or ask 
leading questions and the accused's solicitor is limited to questions which resolve ambiguity and 
clarify the nature of the change. One of the important differences with English law is that Scots 
law prevents the state from being ambushed by unexpected lines of defence which were not 
made at the judicial examination. If the accused raises a defence at trial which could have been 
given at the judicial examination this failure may be commented upon by the judge and the 
prosecutor. 121 The same applies to questions at trial which could have been answered at the 
judicial examination but were not. 
The accused who consistently says nothing at the judicial examination and refuses to testify at 
trial does not expose himself to adverse commentary. 122 Significantly, the judicial examination 
prevents the accused from recanting voluntary confessions made either to the police or the 
sheriff. It also bars ambush defences 123 and prevents the prosecution from being taken by 
surprise, by new witnesses or unexpected lines of defence, at trial. 124 Adverse inferences may 
be drawn and commented upon by the court, but the adverse inference may not amount to a 
corroboration of guilt. The examination is tape recorded, reduced to shorthand, and made 
available at any subsequent trial. The unique nature of the Scottish pre-trial investigatory 
process allows it to escape the recent and major statutory amendments to the English silence 
principle. The Scots have managed to avoid the rigid technicalities of the exclusionary 
confessional rules statutorily developed in the English Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 
(PACE). 125 Scottish confessional law is still primarily based on common law voluntariness 
principles and a common law judicial discretion. The nature of the Scottish pre-trail judicial 
examination precludes the English necessity to enact special legislation to curb ambush 
121 An adverse inference may be drawn in the appropriate circumstance even when the accused has 
remained silent on legal advice. McEwan v H.M. Advocate 1990 SCCR 401 and McGee v H.M. Advocate 
1991 SCCR 510. This kind of judicial precedent may be in conflict with the European Convention on 
Human Rights. A similar problem with the English CRIMPO Act and the European Convention remains as 
yet unresolved. 
122 Walker v H.M Advocate 1985 SCCR 150, "adverse commentary can only be invoked where the 
accused gives or leads evidence, and if he does neither, no comment may be made on the failure to 
answer at judicial examination". 
123 See supra chapter 9 p.327 -334. 
124 See in particular sec 20, 20A, 208 of the Criminal Procedure Act. In practice the judicial examination 
has not had a major effect on the Scottish criminal process, as it is entirely at the discretion of the 
procurator fiscal whether an examination is held at all, McPhaii"Safeguards in the Scottish Criminal Justice 
System" Grim. L. Rev (1992) 144, 147. 
125 See supra chapter 8. 
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defences. 126 There is no procedural need for an English type Criminal Justice and Public Order 
Act 1994.127 Scotland has therefore avoided the jurisdictional and procedural conflict between 
English domestic law and the European Convention on Human Rights. 128 
The accused's competency to stand trial is defined in sec 141 through to sec 346 of the Criminal 
Procedure Act (Scotland) (1975). 129 Specific provision is made prohibiting the prosecution from 
commenting on the accused's failure to give evidence. 130 However, the trial judge is empowered 
to comment in the appropriate circumstances and even to direct the jury's attention to the 
accused's failure to testify. Scott v H.M. Advocate131 holds, "although a comment of the Uudicial 
kind] is ... competent, it should be made with restraint and only where there are special 
circumstances which require it". More recently, McClean and Canning v H.M Advocate132 
suggests that judicial comment may be directed to the nature of the unanswered or unrebutted 
crown case, "what they [the jury] were being invited to do was to see what inferences could be 
drawn from the basic facts, taking account. .. of the absence of an innocent explanation". When 
the accused has been warned about his rights, no adverse inference may be drawn from his 
silence in the face of police questioning. Robertson v Maxwelf 33 clearly states, "no legitimate 
inference in favour of a prosecutor can be drawn from the fact that a person when charged with 
a crime says nothing ... He is entitled to reserve his defence."134 
The Scottish non-party witness privilege against self-incrimination is largely drawn from the 
English privilege and there are no significant differences. For example, the Scottish courts draw 
the familiar bright line distinction between communicative non-physical evidence and physical 
non-communicative forms of evidence. Consequently blood, semen and DNA body samples are 
126 Scottish procedural law avoids ambush defences by requiring all special defences (i.e., alibi, insanity, 
self-defence) to be lodged with the court at least ten days before the trial date. A list of witnesses and 
exhibits must be lodged at least three days before trial. In addition, the prosecutor may ask for an 
adjournment to examine the new evidence. 
127 See supra chapter 9. 
128 See supra chapter 10. 
129 These sections are direct descendants of the English sec 1 Criminal Evidence Act 1898 and the 
emphasis is on competence rather than compellability. 
130 Despite the prohibition on prosecutorial comment, if such a comment is made in court, the conviction 
is unlikely to be set aside, McHugh v H.M. Advocate 1978 JC 12 and Upton v H.M. Advocate 1986 SCCR 
188. 
131 1946SLT140. 
132 1993 SCCR 605. 
133 1951 SLT 46, per Coope JC. See also Whightman v H.M. Advocate 1959 JC 44 and White v H.M. 
Advocate 1991 SCCR 555. 
134 The accused is not entitled to reserve a defence when faced with a presumption of the possession 
of stolen property (Fox v Patterson 1948 JC 104). The implied confession rule also allows a limited 
inference from silence (Glover v Tudhope 1986 SCCR 49; Buchan v H. M. Advocate 1993 SCCR 1 076). 
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admissible evidence which do not attract the privilege against self-incrimination. 135 Other 
standard admissible types of physical evidence are fingerprints, identification of external 
features, handwriting specimens, evidence of body smell or odour, 136 rubbings from the 
suspect's hands, and impressions of the suspects teeth. The Scottish witness privilege is a 
personal one and may only be claimed on a question to question basis. It is subject to statutory 
abrogation although provision is made for a derivative use immunity. The privilege extends to 
the corporation and is limited to the greater domestic jurisdiction of the United Kingdom. Scottish 
jurisprudence on the silence principle, as in other Anglo-American systems, reflects a dynamic 
compromise and need to balance the protective interests of the individual against the public 
interest in law enforcement. The Scottish compromise is exactly the same as those reached in 
other Commonwealth jurisdictions. 
11.3 The Accusatorial-Inquisitorial Divide 
Apart from the common law, a number of other legal systems, civil, religious and customary 
have evolved a silence principle. The universality of a right to silence and a privilege against 
self-incrimination is illustrated by the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (United 
Nations General Assembly Resolution 2200 (A)XXI, 1996) article 14(2)(g), which gives the 
individual the right, "not to be compelled to testify against himself or to confess guilt". The 
essential notion of a protection against "compelled testimony" and a protection against 
"involuntary confessions" is also fundamental to the civil-inquisitorial legal systems of continental 
Europe. The civil-inquisitorial silence principle has its ancient roots in the ius commune of 
Roman-canonical jurisprudence particularly the legal maxim, "nemo debet prodere seipsum" (no 
one may be compelled to be his own betrayer). 137 It should be noted that the strong common 
law distinction between the accused's right to silence and the non-party witness' privilege 
against self-incrimination is blurred in the civil-inquisitorial system. Civil jurisprudence has no 
separate or defining set of rules for a witness privilege. Where a witness privilege does exist it 
135 Sec 50(1) of the Criminal Justice (Scotland) Act 1987; sec 28(4) of the Prisoners and Criminal 
Proceedings (Scotland) Act 1993. 
136 Patterson v Nixon 1960 JC 42, "a tracker dog's identification of the suspect by odour and by barking 
is admissible evidence. In contrast the South African court rejects this kind of evidence as prejudicial, R 
v Trupedo 1920 AD 58 and S v Shabalala 1986 (4) SA 734 (A). 
137 Note, the civil-inquisitorial system will for convenience henceforth be referred to as the "civilian" 
system. The "civilian" silence principle evolved from a bundle of Roman-canonical rules (ius commune) 
which were basic to all criminal procedure manuals of the 15th, 16th and 17th centuries. For example, 
Panormitanus (1453) Commentaria in Libros Decretalium ad X 2.18.2 no 16 (1555); Videtur enim quod 
non tenebur respondere interrogationi seu positioni criminosae quia non debet seipsum prod ere. Mysinger 
(1588) Singalurium observationum judicii imperalis Cent VI, Obs 92 (1599); quia nemo se ipsum prodere 
tenetur. Other jurists who refer to the silence principle are Damhouder (1581) Praxis rerum civilium, ch 
154, no 22 (1646); Mascardus (1588) De probationisbus, vol3, Concl1177, no 59-60 (1593). De Oriano 
(1536) Practica aurea de responsionibus, no 17 (1541); and many more. 
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is an indirect and weak extension of the accused's right to silence. One of the intrinsic features 
of the civilian criminal procedure is that the defendant is not obliged to give evidence against 
himself (a protection against compelled testimony) nor may a confession be extracted by the 
use of torture, violence, trickery, deception or any other stratagem inconsistent with a fair trial 
(a protection against an involuntary confession). Modern inquisitorial criminal law is the result 
of fundamental reforms carried out in post-revolutionary (1791) and Napoleonic (1808) France. 
The outstanding features of the 1808 reforms were the abolition of torture, increased procedural 
protections for the accused (including a reorganised silence principle) and an independent 
judiciary. 
There are a number of essential differences in the modus operandi between the modern civilian 
and the modern common law silence principle. The civilian principle is fundamentally designed 
to protect the defendant against physical and psychological abuse by the state. In contrast, the 
common law principle is primarily orientated at producing trustworthy testimony and only 
secondarily directed against state compulsion. The historical reason for this difference in 
emphasis is to be found in the institutional use of torture. Torture was never a systematic tool 
of the English criminal investigation. It was limited to major political crimes, treason, heresy, 
sedition and was abolished entirely by 1640. 138 Judicial torture was an integral part of the 
European criminal investigation and was only abolished in 1789 (France), 1801 (Russia), 
surviving in some German and Eastern European states until1831. Although the English silence 
principle was designed throughout the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries as a protection 
against state compulsion, with the early abolition of torture, the emphasis shifted to a protection 
against the admissibility of an involuntary confession. The modern common law silence principle 
is co~cerned with securing the truth-finding integrity of the trial by excluding the confession 
altogether. The accused is not a central, but only an incidental, feature of the adversarial trial. 
(Note the emphasis of the American Miranda safeguards and the English statutory PACE 
safeguards is on a protection against the involuntary confession.) 
The inquisitorial trial process works differently, its purpose is to secure the inclusion, rather than 
the exclusion, of the confession. The accused is a central feature of the inquisitorial trail 
138 Before 1640 torture was mainly used to extract confessions from religious heretics who committed 
treason by refusing to accept the state religion. Between 1550 and 1640 some eighty warrants for torture 
were issued despite the acknowledgement by the twelfth century that coerced confession was prima facie 
unreliable. See Stephens History of the Criminal Law (1883) 446, 44 7; Heath Torture and the English Law 
(1982) 31, 74-166; Langbein Torture and the Law of Proof(1977) 9, 66-69, 134-5. By early 1628 the use 
of torture to extract confessions was abhorrent to the legal fraternity. The Chief Justice in 1628 advised 
King Charles I that the law did not permit political prisoners being put to the "rack" [tortured]. "Proceedings 
against J. Felton for the murder of the Duke of Buckingham", 3 How St. tr 367 (1628). 
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process, which means that a civilian silence principle is purposefully designed as a guarantee 
against state coercion and only secondarily as a protection against the involuntariness of a 
confession. Until the middle of the twentieth century the involuntary, but otherwise reliable, 
confession was readily admissible at trial. The striking difference lies in the centralisation of an 
inquisition philosophy in the civilian trial system and its prohibition in the common law system. 
The civilian focus is on the gathering of evidence through the interrogation of the accused. The 
common law focus is on extrinsic evidence and witnesses. 139 As a result, the common law trial 
is based on a neutral trier-of-fact who relies largely on extrinsic sources of evidence presented 
to the court by adversarial parties. Jones v N.C. B. 140 notes, "in the system of trial which we have 
evolved in this country, the judge sits to hear and determine the issues, not to conduct an 
investigation or examination on behalf of society at large". In the civilian trial process the judge 
is not neutral and relies on a dossier, prepared before trial by an investigatory judge assessor. 
The civilian accused usually has no choice but to testify. Once on the witness stand he has the 
right to refuse to answer some or all of the questions put to him. The inquisitorial trial 
mechanism places a strong psychological pressure on the accused to testify and immediate 
adverse inferences may be drawn from his refusal to do so. The civilian silence principle is 
limited to verbal testimony only and does not protect against the production of written 
documents or records. The common law distinction between a testimonial communicative act 
and a non-communicative physical act does not exist in civilian law. The witness immunity grant 
which acts as a substitute for the privilege against self-incrimination in the common law finds 
no parallel in most civilian jurisdictions (except Germany and Italy), though the non-party witness 
privilege may be extended to spouses and other close relatives. The result is that the standards 
of a coerced testimony are much looser and wider in civilian jurisdictions than the American 
Miranda and the English PACE standards. 141 
The common law accused, if he chooses to testify, must do so under oath thereby exposing 
himself to the dilemma of self-incrimination or perjury. (Note, this type of dilemma argument is 
one of the rationales advanced to justify the silence principle but the argument falls away in an 
inquisitorial trial system which routinely permits the accused to testify without swearing an 
oath.)142 The civilian law is more pragmatic. There is the realisation that untruthful statements 
are often part and parcel of the accused's attempt to exculpate himself. Accordingly civilian 
139 Damaska 'Evidentiary Barriers to Conviction and Two Models of Criminal Procedure; A Comparative 
Study" (121) Un. Penn. L. Rev (1973) 506, 578-587; Goldstein "Reflection on Two Models, Inquisitorial 
Themes in American Criminal Procedure" (26) Stan. L. Rev (1974) 1015-25. 
140 (1957) 2 WLR 760. 
141 Damanska ibid at 527-530. 
142 See supra chapter 4 p.114-116. 
407 
jurisdictions do not insist on the oath as it places unrealistic expectations on the accused. The 
civilian accused is examined before all other witnesses. The mechanism of a civilian-inquisitorial 
trial is based squarely on the accused as the best evidentiary source. Consequently, civilian 
commentators regard the technical rules protecting the common law accused in an adversarial 
system as historically and logically antiquated. The adversarial system is said to be mired in a 
morass of exclusionary rules which detracts from the pursuit of truth as the primary purpose of 
the trial. Continental jurists are surprised at the depth and complexity of evidentiary rules with 
which the accusatorial criminal court surrounds itself. In contrast, virtually all probative evidence 
is admissible in the civilian-inquisitorial criminal trial. Civilians regard the artificial exclusionary 
rules of the accusatorial system as ideal for keeping facts out of the courtroom, thereby limiting 
the trier-of-fact's ability to arrive at the truth. 
The inquisitorial system provides a number of safeguards not found in the accusatorial system. 
For example, there is no similar fact rule and evidence of other crimes, however relevant, is 
always inadmissible. There is no legal sanction for false testimony. 143 The central aim of the 
inquisitorial procedure is to ensure that all the facts-in-issue (facta probanda) are placed before 
the trial court. To achieve this aim the inquisitorial system places a premium on an exhaustive 
pre-trial inquiry and the gathering of evidence by a properly designated investigatory judge. The 
common law system has nothing comparable to the inquisitorial pre-trial judicial preparatory 
investigation process. (Note, in this regard the Scottish pre-trial judicial examination takes the 
best from both the common law and civilian worlds.) The common law accused's first opportunity 
to present his version to an independent judge occurs only at the trial stage. The common law 
accused therefore has no real opportunity to avail himself of the substantial investigatory 
resources of the state. (Note, one of the important justifications for a silence principle is based 
on levelling the material inequality between the resources available to the accused and the 
resources available to the state. This argument is weakened in an inquisitorial type process 
because the accused has access to the investigatory resources of the state.)144 The problem 
with the judicial pre-trial examination is that the issues are determined before the trial and the 
actual trial becomes a mere formality in which a presumption of innocence and a right to silence 
may become a mere fiction. The advantage of the pre-trial examination is that all evidence, both 
for and against the accused, is revealed. The issues between the parties are clearly defined and 
the risk of evidence manipulation is reduced. The accusatorial trial process, by placing the 
presentation of evidence in the hands of interested parties, allows for the suppression of 
143 By contrast, in the accusatorial system the accused must be sworn in before taking the stand and the 
untruthful witness is faced with either a perjury or an obstruction of justice charge. 
144 See supra chapter 3 p.1 02 (Bentham's fox hunting rationale) and chapter 4 p.139. 
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evidence (each party will emphasise only those facts in its favour) and the surprise production 
of new evidence (ambush alibi defences, etc.) and may sometimes lead to the distortion of the 
truth-finding integrity of the trial. In the inquisitorial trial this type of manipulation is impossible 
because the judge is actively involved in the trial process and may positively balance the state 
and defence views. Unlike the neutral common law judge, the inquisitorial judge actively guides 
the unfolding development of the trial process. 
The principal problem with the inquisitorial system is that by focusing on the accused as the 
primary source of evidence, certain individual legal rights are necessarily weakened. In an 
accusatorial system which focuses on extrinsic sources of evidence, individual procedural rights 
are correspondingly better protected. In theory a silence principle should logically be stronger 
in a pure accusatorial system and weaker in a pure inquisitorial system. Similarly, the 
confessional standard should enjoy stronger procedural safeguards in an accusatorial system 
and weaker safeguards in an inquisitorial system. It is ironic therefore that England, an 
accusatorial system, has statutorily moved to limit the right to silence and Germany, an 
inquisitorial system, has moved to strengthen the right to silence in line with the spirit of the 
European Convention. The irony is strengthened by the United States Supreme Court's 
attempts over the past thirty years to limit the interrogatory and confessional safeguards 
enunciated in Miranda v Arizona. 
Despite these theoretically significant procedural differences, both the common law and the 
civilian systems, in practice, rely heavily on the confession as the primary source of criminal 
convictions. However, the civilian procedure is more honest, and is openly designed around the 
interrogation of the accused and the elicitation of a confession. In the civilian system almost 
95% of all convictions are confessionally based. The common law maintains a rather 
unbalanced subterfuge, over 80% of all convictions arise from either a pre-trial confession or 
a plea-bargain and a guilty plea. What the civil system does honestly and with the proper 
safeguards in place, the common law does hypocritically via the backroom negotiated plea-
bargain. In practice the common law accusatorial system is purchasing cost-effective 
confessions through the use of the plea-bargain and guilty plea. 145 Frankel, an American 
commentator, aptly remarks, "the [common law] court has already cut off almost totally the 
opportunity to question an accused in a civilised fashion or even to comment upon his silence 
145 Kasimar "Equal Justice in the Gatehouse and Mansions of American Criminal Procedure" Police 
Interrogation and Confessions (1980) 27, "contrasting the few rights of the suspect in the police station 
(gatehouse) with the full array of protections at trial (mansion)". The prosecutor will concentrate his efforts 
at the gatehouse (police station) where the suspect is vulnerable in order to lessen his workload in the 
mansion (at trial). 
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at trial. So it [is] driven to stultify itself by leaving an opening which predictably means that the 
defendant who is naive, confused, unintelligent or careless will [confess] to the police while 
others will not."146 
Proposals to reform the common law procedural system along the lines of a civil-inquisitorial 
process are dismissed as attempts to undermine the accused's protection, to increase the 
likelihood of humiliation and abuse at the hands of the state. 147 The attempt to re-organise and 
limit the silence principle is often criticised as the threat to impose inquisitorial practices and to 
undermine fundamental values of the accusatorial system. In Murphy v Waterfront Commission 
the United States Supreme Court, per Goldberg J, speaks of "our preference for an accusatorial 
rather than an inquisitorial system of criminal justice", which is associated with "our fear that self-
incrimination statements will be elicited by inhumane treatment and abuses". 148 Miranda v 
Arizona also uses the familiar language of an inquisitorial-accusatorial dichotomy. The fifth 
amendment is the "essential mainstay of our adversarial system" and "our accusatory 
system ... demands that the government in seeking to punish an individual, produce the evidence 
against him by its own independent labours, rather than by the cruel simple expedient of 
compelling it from their own mouths". 149 The United States Supreme Court regards the 
procedural protections given to the suspect during the police custodial interrogation as unique 
to an accusatory system, "it is at this point that our adversary system commences, distinguishing 
itself from the inquisitorial system recognised in some countries" .150 Griffin v California is harsh 
in its condemnation, "comment on the refusal to testify is a remnant of the inquisitorial system 
of criminal justice which the fifth amendment outlaws" .151 The accusatorial-adversarial criminal 
system is somehow regarded as being innately superior to the inquisitorial system although no 
logical reasons are advanced for this notion. It is also argued that a presumption of innocence, 
the burden of proof and the right to a fair trial is a golden thread of English jurisprudence solidly 
entrenched within the accusatorial system and likely to be unravelled within the inquisitorial. This 
common law English prejudice is patently untrue. A knowledgeable analysis of the inquisitorial 
system reveals a strong attachment to the principle of innocence and a fair trial. For example, 
the principle of indubio pro reo is strongly adhered to. Doubt over a relevant admissible fact is 
146 Frankei"From Private Fights Towards Public Justice" (51) N.Y. Un. L. Rev(1975) 516, 530. See also 
Kasimar"Judicial Examination of the Accused; Forty Years Later" (73) Mich. L. Rev(1974) 15; Mendelson 
"Self-Incrimination in American and French Law" (19) Grim. L. Bulletin (1983) 34-36, 42-43. 
147 O'Reilly "England Limits the Right to Silence and Moves Towards an Inquisitorial System of Justice" 
(85) J. Grim. L. Criminology (1994) 402, 444-451. But see Ingraham "The Right to Silence, A Reply to 
O'Reilly" (86) J. Grim. L. Criminology (1996) 559, 588-95. 
148 Murphy 378 US 52, 55 (1964) 
149 Miranda 384 US 436, 460, 477 (1996). 
150 Miranda ibid at 477. 
151 Griffin 380 US 609, 614 (1965). 
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always resolved in the accused's favour. Cases built on insufficient evidence, or where the 
accused is factually innocent, are weeded out during the judicial investigatory stage. The 
accused is not exposed to a public trial unless the state possesses a prima facie case against 
him. At all stages in the inquisitorial criminal process the burden of proof remains on the 
prosecution. Proponents of a silence principle who point to the inquisitorial system and argue 
that a limitation of a right to silence shifts the burden of proof away from the prosecution and 
infringes the presumption of innocence are truly ignorant of the nature of an inquisitorial trial 
process. The inquisitorial criminal system is a living example that a limited silence principle may 
safely cohabit with a strong presumption of innocence and without diluting the prosecutorial 
burden. 
In truth, there is no such thing as a pure accusatorial or inquisitorial system. A cross-fertilization 
of legal ideas between England and the Continent has been a constant over the last 200 
years. 152 Indeed, according to the Helmholz-McNair theories, the silence principle does not 
originate in common law, but was incorporated through a process of absorption from the ius 
commune of Roman-canonical and English ecclesiastical law. 153 Furthermore, the absorption 
of inquisitorial procedures into English law is likely to intensify with the incorporation of the 
European Convention on Human Rights (Human Rights Act 1998) into domestic law. As 
England moves closer to the European Union so to does the inquisitorial system. In other 
respects Anglo-American criminal procedure has become less accusatorial in form than is 
generally admitted. For example, it is inquisitorial to require the defendant to stand in an 
identification line-up, to yield blood samples and to provide a pre-trial discovery of an intended 
trial defence. The common law has developed strong inquisitorial tendencies which are rarely 
acknowledged because of the irrational sentimentality of equating an inquisitorial system with 
an excessive crime control philosophy. 154 Such an excess is no more integral to the inquisitorial 
system than it is to other criminal systems, including an accusatorial one. It is perhaps 
worthwhile noticing that the English adversarial trial, in which the main protagonists are the 
defence counsel and the prosecution, is only some 150 years old. The inquisitorial trial, in which 
the main protagonists are the judge and the accused, is at least 1,000 years old. 
152 Ingraham The Structure of Criminal Procedure (1987) 30-32, "adversarial and inquisitorial systems 
no longer stand in sharp contrast. They are now mixed systems, in the sense that they contain elements 
of both in different proportions". 
153 See supra chapter 2. 
154 Packer "Two Models of Criminal Process" (113) Un. Penn. L. Rev (1964) 1, 9-23. The inquisitorial 
system does tend towards a crime control model. The civilian system exerts a subtle pressure on the 
accused to testify. It does so because of its inherent focus on the confession and is preference for a free 
evaluation of evidence. In contrast, the accusatorial system tends to emphasise the interests of the 
accused. It is a due process model because of the elaborate artificial rules (hearsay, privilege, etc.) which 
place obstacles between the state, the suspect and the successful completion of the criminal process. 
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The French Civil System: Modern French criminal procedure is the descendent of the Code 
d'lnstruction Criminelle of 1808, itself a revolutionary reform of the older Ordonnance Criminelle 
1670. 155 At the pre-trial stage the police or the prosecutor (procurer) may question the suspect 
without notification of his rights or a "caution" so fundamental to the accusatory system. 
Although the suspect does not posses a right to silence during interrogation, the police 
interrogator has no legal ability to compel an answer. 156 The French police have broad powers 
of seizure and interrogation without the need to show probable cause. The suspect may be held 
in detention for up to 48 hours (garde avue) without charge. 157 In the United States suspects 
may not be held this long unless police have probable cause to arrest. If the police investigation 
justifies a charge against the suspect, he is brought before an examining judge (juge 
d'instruction) at a formal preparatory examination (instruction judicaire). 158 The preparatory 
examination is the rough equivalent of the common law preliminary inquiry before a magistrate, 
but is not open to the public and the judge takes a controlling role in the examination of the 
accused. Article 114 of the modern Code de Procedere Penale states, "at [the accused's] first 
appearance, the examining magistrate shall advise him that he may freely decline to make a 
statement. Mention of the warning shall also be included in the official dossier". Article 114 and 
the associated right to legal counsel are only triggered once the accused is formally arraigned 
before the juge d'instruction. 159 The accused may not be charged unless there is a prima facie 
case against him. The purpose of the preparatory examination is to actively involve the accused 
in the criminal investigation and the judge may question in such a way as to solicit a confession. 
At this stage, the accused's legal representative has only a limited authority. His primary 
function is to prevent a procedural abuse of his client's rights. 160 The French "silence warning" 
155 The Code d'lnstruction Criminelle (1808) represents an inquisitorial system with an overlay of English 
adversarial procedures. The modern Code de Procedere Pen ale is also partly based on a recognised 1897 
code DP IV 119. The silence principle is generally contained in articles 105, 114, 118(3), 279 and 406 of 
the Code de Procedere Penale. 
156 Pieck "The Accused's Privilege Against Self-Incrimination in Civil Law" Am. J. Com.L (1962) 588-89; 
Sheehan Criminal Procedure in Scotland and France Edinburgh (1975); Frase "Comparative Criminal 
Justice as a Guide to Law Reform, How Do the French Do It?" (78) CalL. Rev (1990) 581-582; Weston 
An English Readers Guide to the French Legal System New York (1991 ). 
157 Code de Procedere Penale article 63, 64, 64(2), 65 and article 77. See also Ingraham The Structure 
of Criminal Procedure New York ( 1987) 62. 
158 The victim or injured party may initiate a preparatory examination. The victim (parte civile) may 
participate in the examination and is entitled to press for damages. The preparatory examination has a 
dual function of both a criminal and civil-damages hearing. A separate claim for damages need not be 
lodged and the juge d'instruction will assess the victim's claim for compensation along with all the other 
evidence, thereby sparing the victim additional legal expenses. 
159 The article 114 silence principle is a weak one as it is triggered only at the judicial examination. The 
warning comes too late as the suspect has already been questioned by police who are under no obligation 
to issue a warning. 
160 The suspect does not have an automatic right to counsel at the garde avue (article 63, 77). The right 
to counsel only becomes a part of the process at the preparatory examination stage (article 114(3), 116). 
Counsel has a right to be present at the examination and to examine the dossier (article 118(3)). 
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differs from the United States Miranda and the English PACE warning in several respects. First, 
the warning need not be administered to a suspect during the preliminary interrogation. Second, 
even during the preparatory examination the juge d'instruction or the judicial police need not 
administer a silence warning unless there is a prima facie case against the suspect. 161 Third, 
once the warning is administered it constitutes a decisive break and statements following the 
warning cannot be admitted into evidence. 
The juge d'instruction compiles an unbiased record (dossier) of the available evidence. The 
dossier must reflect an impartial balance without favour either to the accused or to the state. 
(During the preparatory examination the accused is entitled to harness state resources in 
making his case. This type of process sidesteps the accusatorial problem of unequal access to 
resources.) There is a complete evidentiary disclosure between the accused and the 
prosecution. (The accused cannot surprise the prosecution with a tactical last minute evidentiary 
disclosure.) The juge d'instruction has the power to call witnesses, to order searches and 
seizures and to request a further police investigation. The accused is encouraged to participate 
in the process by giving evidence or by submitting to questioning, but cannot be compelled to 
do so. A refusal to answer questions has evidentiary weight and will be noted in the official 
dossier. The accused is usually advised to remain silent when no prima facie case emerges 
from the examination. When it appears that a clear prima facie case is emerging the pressure 
to speak becomes stronger. Demeanour, attitude and credibility are commented upon and noted 
in the dossier. The accused is not expected to make sworn statements under oath and he is not 
subject to a legal sanction for lying. 162 This courtesy is extended to spouses, parents and 
relatives to the fourth degree. The completed dossier forms the substantial basis for all further 
judicial proceedings. 163 The dossier is handed over to a court of arraignment (Court d'Assise) 
which makes the decision whether to continue with the prosecution. 164 The Assise decision is 
subject to appeal (Chambre d'Accusation). According to French jurists, the pre-trial judicial 
examination is one of the noblest provisions of civil criminal law, designed to protect the accused 
and to familiarise the judge with the evidence against the accused. 
161 Article 105, "the judge in charge of the preliminary investigation, as well as magistrate and judicial 
police, may not with the intention of frustrating defence rights, hear as witnesses, persons against whom 
there exists serious evidence indicating guilt". 
162 Article 105 and article 361 (suspect commits no perjury). 
163 The completed dossier contains all relevant evidence including physical evidence such as fingerprints, 
identification line-up evidence, and body samples (DNA, saliva, blood, fluid, breath, etc.). 
164 Article 177 to 181. 
413 
Before the main trial begins the Assise juge-president is obliged to conduct an interview with the 
accused in order to familiarise himself with the preparatory dossier. 165 The juge-president may 
even attempt to extract a confession from the accused or, if unsatisfied by the dossier, order a 
further police investigation. The main trial consists of the juge-president, two assessory judges 
and a jury (a procedural idea adopted in 1808 from the English accusatorial system). The 
dominant characteristic of the main trial is judicial control rather than party control. The 
inquisitorial trial, unlike the accusatorial, places little emphasis on oral presentation of evidence 
or on cross-examination by counsel. The trial is generally a recapitulation, with variations, of the 
written dossier compiled by the preparatory juge d'instruction. The French civil trial process is 
unique in that a combination of both judge and jury is responsible for the end verdict. The juge-
president may add to the dossier by direct questioning. He may examine differences between 
the accused's testimony in court and at the preparatory examination. The accessory judges, the 
defence counsel and even the jury are free to direct questions to the accused with the juge-
president's permission. 166 The accused gives unsworn testimony and is warned about his right 
to silence (Art 114). He cannot be compelled to answer and does not waive his right if he 
chooses to answer some questions but not others. His selectiveness in answering questions, 
his evasiveness, demeanour and credibility may be commented upon and may form the basis 
of adverse inferences. Traditionally, silence in the face of an accusation [j'accuse] could 
exceptionally amount to an inference of guilt. However, article 6( 1) of the European Convention 
on Human Rights prohibits the drawing of a direct guilty adverse inference from silence alone. 
Silence by itself does not amount to a tacit confession. In the civil system, unlike the 
accusatorial system, a voluntary confession of guilt does not amount to conclusive proof against 
the accused. The inquisitorial confession amounts only to additional evidence and is added to 
the state prima facie case. It must be evaluated together with all the other evidence. The 
adverse inferences drawn from the accused's silence may strengthen the state prima facie case. 
The cumulative result of the inquisitorial criminal process is that the majority of defendants 
confess, either at the preparatory examination or at the assise trial before the juge-president. 
By far the majority of guilty convictions are based on the confession extracted from the accused 
in a carefully designed and controlled legal environment subject to stringent procedural 
safeguards. 
165 The juge-president interviews the accused privately, without counsel present. He must assure himself 
that the evidence has not been tampered with, that the accused understands the nature of the procedure 
and is properly represented. 
166 Defence counsel is prevented from cross-examining a witness directly. Questioning occurs through 
the medium of the judge. In practice only the presiding judge can cross-examine directly (article 312). 
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The French civil-inquisitorial system contains a number of unique factors. First, the right to 
silence and the right to legal advice are not triggered upon arrest and have no place in the police 
interrogation. The civil system has not developed an American type Miranda caution, nor an 
English type PACE caution. This gives the police a window of opportunity before the preparatory 
examination in which to solicit a confession. These rights are only triggered during the 
preparatory examination before the juge d'instruction. (Note, there is no procedural reason why 
these rights should not be extended to the police interrogation and the European Convention 
on Human Rights (article 6) will probably be a catalyst in this regard.) The police are obliged to 
maintain a written record of arrest date, interrogation times and duration, periods of rest, release 
times, medical examinations and sleep periods. The record must be signed by the accused. The 
accused also has the right, in theory, to withdraw any pre-trial confession made to the police or 
examining juge d'instruction before the main trial. 
Second, the distinctive character of the civil trial process is the central and controlling role 
played by the juge d'instruction at the preparatory examination and the juge-president at the 
assise trial. The juge-president in particular directs the trial and draws evidence from the 
accused and other witnesses by personal questioning. In order to carry out this central role, the 
French judge must possess a complete knowledge of all the evidence for and against the 
accused. In contrast, the common law judge is a neutral umpire and the less he knows about 
the evidence the better prepared and the more free he is of potential prejudice. 
Third, the civil criminal process is specifically designed to elicit admissions (preferably in the 
form of a confession) from the accused. The accused is regarded as the best source of 
evidence. As a result the silence principle is somewhat weaker in the typical inquisitorial system 
and stronger in the accusatorial system. In many European criminal systems the right to silence 
and the privilege against self-incrimination amount to no more than simple positive safeguards 
against abuse by state authorities or an absence of administrative and legal powers to compel 
an answer. The adoption into French domestic law of the European Convention of Human 
Rights is likely to substantially increase the accused's ability to resist the compulsion of answers 
at the police interrogation as well as fleshing out his right to silence at the preparatory 
examination and the assise trial. For example, the German criminal code largely modelled on 
the French code, has recently prohibited the drawing of adverse inferences and the evidentiary 
use of the accused's trial silence. 
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The German Civil System: German criminal procedure has been strongly influenced by the 
French Code d'lnstruction Crimenelle of 1808167 and the German criminal process is remarkably 
similar to the French model. 168 As a reaction to the distorted legal policies of the Nazi era, the 
Anglo-American system of criminal procedure has had a profound effect on German post-war 
jurisprudence. German definitions of the silence principle have also looked for inspiration to the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, article 14(g) and the European Convention 
on Human Rights, article 6(1). The German criminal code has also been shaped by the 
constitutional concepts of human dignity and the individual's right to privacy. 169 These influences 
are reflected in sec 136 of the Criminal Procedure Code which reads, "the accused in a trial is 
not bound to incriminate himself and has the right [at his discretion] to either answer or refuse 
to answer the charge brought against him". 170 Sec 136(1) holds, "at the beginning of the first 
Uudicial] hearing, the accused is to be informed of the charge. He must be warned that he is free 
to respond or to remain silent. At any time during and even before the initial hearing he may 
consult with defence counsel of his choice." A right to silence which was previously only 
available at the judicial stage of the criminal process, has been extended to the police 
interrogation stage. 171 (Note, in extending the silence principle to the police interrogation phase, 
the Germans have shown a greater flexibility than their French counterparts.) The suspect, once 
detained, must be warned of his right to silence and the right to legal advice. 172 Generally no 
adverse inferences may be drawn from the accused's exercise of silence at the pre-trial or the 
trial stage. In essence, the accused's silence, after notification, has no evidentiary value at other 
subsequent proceedings. 173 A refusal to speak or a refusal to testify has no substantive 
167 French procedures were adopted in Bavaria (1848), Prussia (1849), Saxony (1868). The modern 
German Criminal Code is based on the Strafprozessordnung of 1879 and the Judicature Act of 1877. 
168 The French model is followed closely. First stage, an investigation by police and the public prosecutor. 
Second stage, a preparatory examination by a special investigating judge. Third stage, the actual trial 
before a judge and judicial assessors. 
169 The German constitutional principle of Rechtsstaat is an important influence on the right to silence. 
To achieve a fair procedure, a right to silence must be compulsory although subject to certain exclusions 
and exceptions. The result is that the accused is no longer obliged to make a confession, which must now 
be voluntary and cannot be induced contrary to the accused's free will (STPO sec 136(a)(3)). 
170 German criminal code STPO sec 136(1) (modified Dec 19, 1964, BGBII1067). 
171 STPO sec 163(a) IV(1), also BGHSt Wes Ger 325, 327 (1975) and BGHSt 38, 214 (1992). These 
rules are based on the notion of a rechsstaatlichen fairen verfahrens. Restricting the silence warning to 
the trial stage is unfair, because once the police ignore their duty to warn the suspect of his right to silence, 
a subsequent judicial warning comes too late and is a meaningless formality. 
172 The accused may consult with counsel, but counsel may not be present during interrogation. 
173 Germany, like France, allows for the free evaluation of all relevant evidence (beweiswurdignung). This 
means that all evidence, including adverse inferences from silence are admissible. Previously the 
accused's silence could be used against him at trial and adverse inferences could amount to a direct 
inference of guilt. This now no longer permissible both in terms of the constitution and the criminal code. 
However, as in France, the majority of accused tend to confess because the criminal inquisitorial process 
is subtly biased in favour of the confession as the best evidentiary source. A confession (unlike the 
accusatory confession) is not conclusive proof and does not relieve the German court of the duty to 
continue. 
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evidentiary value and no adverse inferences may be drawn. 174 When the accused waives his 
right to silence or has implicitly consented to the admission of his statement, adverse inferences 
may be drawn. The German Court (as is the Anglo-American practice) makes a distinction 
between physical and communicative evidence. Sec 81 (a) of the criminal code allows for the 
taking of blood samples, particularly in the case of drunk driving. Sec 81 (e) permits the 
evidentiary use of DNA blood and semen samples. The silence principle applies not only to the 
accused but also to the non-party witness. 175 The parameters of the German silence principle 
are dependant on a balance of interest analysis. The state interest in obtaining evidence to be 
used against the accused must be balanced against the accused's constitutional rights to 
physical integrity, dignity and privacy. 
11.4 The Eastern Japanese Divide 
The Silence principle is entrenched within the modern Japanese constitution (Kenpo) and the 
criminal procedure code (Keiji Soshoho) law No.131 of 1948. Despite these constitutional and 
statutory provisions, the silence principle is often a theoretical right rather than a practical 
protection for the defendant. Japan has no historical precedent or cultural affinity to what is 
essentially an artificially imposed Western-style privilege against self-incrimination. 176 Japanese 
law enforcement officials (in common with law enforcement authorities in other legal systems) 
have developed an unswerving hostility to the right of silence. To many Japanese prosecutors 
the silence principle is an obstacle which requires a degree of perseverance in order to 
overcome. Police and public prosecutors possess wide-ranging powers of arrest, detention and 
interrogation (to a degree which is unacceptable in both the Anglo-American and the European 
systems). The Japanese legal system is a melting pot of both Western and Eastern moral and 
ethical-legal rules sometimes in conflict with each other. On the one hand, the Japanese 
criminal process, as modified by the American Occupational Administration after World War II, 
contains recognisable Western legal principles including interrogation safeguards, a right to 
silence and legal counsel, and confession rules based on the notion of voluntariness and 
reliability. On the other hand, honour-based cultural mores require the defendant to co-operate 
fully with public authorities. The confession is regarded as the best source of proof and as the 
174 No adverse inference may be drawn, even in the circumstance where the innocent person would have 
spoken up if confronted by an accusation; BGH StrV (1983) 321, BGH StrV (1988) 239 and 383. 
175 Criminal code sec 55, there is no blanket right of the witness to decline to answer. As in the Anglo-
American system, the witness may refuse to answer individual questions as they arise. 
176 See Walker "A Comparative Discussion of the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination" (14) N. Y.L. Sch. 
J. Int. L. Comp. L (1993) 25-27. For a history of the early Japanese criminal code see Dando Japanese 
Criminal Procedure B. George Translation 1965; Gadsby "Some Notes on th History of the Japanese Code 
of Criminal Procedure" (30) L. Q. Rev (1914); Abe "Self-Incrimination; Japan and the US" (46) J. Grim. L. 
Criminology Pol. Sci. (1960) 613. 
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only honourable path by which the defendant may redeem and rehabilitate himself. It would be 
misleading to believe that the silence principle is alien to Japanese jurisprudence. As in other 
legal systems, the Japanese criminal process is motivated by a' truth-seeking rationale. 
However, the Japanese truth rationale is fundamentally and inextricably linked to the concept 
of the confession as a primary evidentiary source of a conviction. The Japanese principle must 
be viewed against the extra-ordinary importance placed on the confession. The Japanese 
silence principle is shaped by the dynamic interaction and balance between the legal and ethical 
need to extract truthful confessions and the need to protect individual rights. (Unlike modern 
Western jurisprudence which places the individual interest above the state interest, traditional 
balance of interests in Japanese society tends to favour the state over the individual.) 
There are three major periods in the development of the Japanese legal system. An organised 
state criminal procedure has its origin in the Takugawa Shogunate (1600-1868) and was heavily 
influenced by contemporary Chinese criminal codes. The confession, usually coerced through 
torture and other physical and psychological pressures, was central to the criminal prosecution. 
A formal and ritual confession, drafted according to traditional Chinese abstract and stereotype 
norms, was a requirement before conviction and punishment. Authoritative texts on confessional 
law included an instructional manual on the methodology and degree of torture to be applied for 
each designated criminal offence. The Meiji Restoration (1868-1944) swept away all but the 
fundamental core values of the old procedure and replaced it with a Western-style criminal 
jurisprudence. 177 However, the traditional confession principle and associated standards of 
torture survived and were incorporated in all subsequent criminal codes. 178 It was only in 1879 
that the old confession by torture standard was replaced by a confession by evidence standard. 
The influential criminal codes of 1890 (law no.96) and 1922 (law no. 75) were largely based on 
French and German models. Japanese criminal procedure was modelled on inquisitorial 
procedure because of the central role placed on the confession by both the civilian and 
traditional Japanese legal systems. The modern Japanese criminal process is inquisitorial in 
nature and provides for an initial investigation by police (with much greater powers than their 
European counterparts), followed by a secret (non-public) judicial examination before an 
investigatory judge (yoshin hanj1) and ending in a public trial. At all these stages the police, 
prosecutors and judges have wide discretionary powers to question and to induce confessions, 
although the accused is legally empowered to refuse to answer, and may not be punished for 
177 Chen "The Formation of the Early Meiji Legal Order" (35) London Oriental Series (1981) 31, 65, 79. 
178 The Meiji regime continued the use of torture as a confessional tool but placed restrictions on its use. 
No one under the age of 15 or over the age of 70 could be tortured. Torture as an officially-sanctioned 
criminal tool was only abandoned on the advice of the respected French jurist B. de Fontarabie (1879). 
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lying or perjury. 179 Each stage of the criminal process is purposely designed to elicit a confession 
and the public trial is often no more than a narrow examination of the admissibility and reliability 
of the accused's confession. 
In the legal environment prevalent before the Second World War, the silence principle was 
practically non-existent. Defeat and a forcibly imposed post-war Constitution ( 1945-1948) 
resulted in the restructuring of the Japanese legal system. A legal system primary based on 
traditional and inquisitorial elements, now acquired an overlay of American-style accusatorial 
and adversarial influences. The present day Japanese criminal process is therefore a hybrid 
mixture of indigenous rules (Chinese influenced), inquisitorial rules (German influenced) and 
accusatorial rules (American influenced). Elaborate protective safeguards (modelled on 
American constitutional principles) were entrenched within the post-war Constitution and the 
Criminal Procedure Code of 1948. Article 36 of the Constitution forbids, "the infliction of torture 
by any public or state authority". Article 38 simply incorporates the wording of the American fifth 
amendment in verbatim, "no person shall be compelled to testify against himself', and "a 
confession made under torture or threat or after prolonged arrest or detention shall not be 
admitted into evidence". The Criminal Procedure Code, article 198(2) holds, "in the case of 
questioning, the suspect shall be notified that he need not answer any question against his will". 
Article 291 read with article 311 notes, "after the indictment has been read, the presiding judge 
must notify the accused that he may remain silent at all times and refuse to answer any 
questions". These legal provisions were an attempt by the American Occupational 
Administration to reshape the Japanese legal system from one focused narrowly on the 
confession, to one which included elaborate safeguards against state abuse of individual rights. 
Although moderately successful, the reforms of 1948 have failed to establish a meaningful right 
to silence. In an extra-ordinary conformist society, Japanese jurisprudence is still locked into the 
confession as the central medium of conviction. The present Criminal Procedure Code 
(amended six times since 1948) grants police and prosecutors astonishingly wide powers of 
arrest and interrogation. Although the right to silence is constitutionally mandated it is often 
ignored, sidestepped or phrased in ambiguous language. The Japanese public, by contrast to 
the American public, are still largely ignorant of their right to silence. 
179 George "The Right to Silence in Japanese Law" (43) Wash. L. Rev(1968) 1148; Abe "Japan Criminal 
Procedure" in Police Power and Individual Freedom Claude, R Soule Ed ( 1962) 269. 
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Police may arrest, 180 detain and interrogate the suspect for up to 48 hours without probable 
cause. 181 Upon the showing of probable cause before a magistrate the suspect may be detained 
for a further 10 days. 182 Additional periods of detention may be requested. 183 In total the police 
and prosecutorial service may detain a suspect for a period of 22 days before filing a formal 
charge. 184 The suspect is given only the most tenuous contact with legal counsel and is subject 
to continuous and arbitrary periods of interrogation. Although the suspect is informed of his right 
to silence and his ability not to answer questions, this protection may be illusionary, as the police 
question at any time and for indefinite lengths during the 22 day detention period. At the arrest 
stage the police are expected to inform the suspect of his right to counsel, 185 but state-assisted 
legal representation is only obligatory at trial. 186 The suspect's ability to meet with counsel is 
limited and entirely at the whim of the prosecution. 187 Counsel is not permitted to be present 
during the actual interrogation session and the refusal of access to legal representation will not 
render the confession inadmissible at trial. 188 The right to silence warning, although 
constitutionally mandated, is only administered once after arrest and before questioning. It is 
often issued in an ambiguous manner and the warning need not be repeated during subsequent 
interviews. 189 The interrogator is entitled to continue questioning even in the face of repeated 
invocations of the right to silence. (Note in the accusatorial American and English interrogation, 
the invocation of silence immediately terminates the interview.) In practice the Japanese 
interrogator may continue to question until the suspect breaks down and answers. A failure to 
180 The police may use a number of procedural powers on arrest and detention. For example, the Bekken 
Taiho, which allows the police to arrest the suspect on a minor charge and to detain him for 24 hours, even 
though there is insufficient evidence to proceed on the main charge. The Nin'i D6k6, a request by the 
police for the suspect to voluntarily accompany them to the police station for questioning. 
181 See criminal code article 199(1) and (2). Rule 143 of the rules to the criminal code and Superior Court 
rules no.32. 
182 See criminal code article 205(1 ). See also George "Rights of the Criminally Accused" (53) Law and 
Contemporary Problems (1990) 88-89. 
183 Criminal code sec 207(2). Although a judge may deny such a request, almost 99% of such requests 
are granted. 
184 During this period the suspect is held in a temporary substitute prison (Daiyo Kangoku), where he may 
be readily available for interrogation. 
185 Constitution article 34, clause (1). Criminal code article 203. 
186 Criminal code article 272. Indigents are forced to wait until after the indictment before receiving state-
assisted legal aid. 
187 Criminal code article 39(3). The prosecution at its own discretion determines a time, date and place 
for such meetings. Despite the Supreme Court's instruction to use such a power sparingly, prosecutors 
continue to limit access to counsel. Note, a judge may also limit access by family to the accused, article 
81. 
188 The Supreme Court has issued a set of discretionary guidelines to the prosecution on access to the 
accused by counsel, Sugiyama v Osaka Prefecture 32 Minshu 820 (Saikosai) Sp Crt (1978). 
189 Criminal code article 198(2) obliges the police to inform the accused of his right to silence, but sec 
203(1) also obliges the police to ask the accused for an explanation of the facts. These two provisions 
cancel each other out and police often merge the two provisions into one sentence, further confusing the 
suspect. In effect the police say, "you don't have to say anything" and then immediately demand, "now 
talk". 
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notify the suspect of his right to silence does not necessarily render the confession involuntary 
and therefore inadmissible at trial. 190 (Note, a failure to administer the Miranda safeguards to 
the American accused is a material breach. A confession obtained as a result of a material 
breach of due process is inadmissible in the Anglo-American trial.) The evidentiary admissibility 
of a confession is determined by the usual standards of voluntariness and reliability. The 
Japanese standard of voluntariness is somewhat looser and broader than the equivalent 
Western standard. 191 
Japanese statutory definitions of a threat, inducement, compulsion, trickery and deception are 
much broader than the Western definitions. 192 Questioning during a procedurally illegal detention 
or a failure to warn the suspect of his right to silence do not necessarily affect the voluntariness 
of a confession. 193 As long as the confession adheres to the wide statutory-defined standard of 
voluntariness, it will be automatically admissible at trial. The Japanese court may sometimes 
admit an involuntary confession when it is coupled with other extraneous evidence suggesting 
guilt, but it will always exclude a confession which has little evidentiary weight. Reliability is a 
more likely ground on which to base the inadmissibility of a confession. The Japanese court 
traditionally pays more attention to the contents of the confession rather than the circumstances 
in which it was obtained. The reliability standard requires an analysis of the inconsistencies 
between the confession and known objective facts. A confession is unreliable and inadmissible 
when it fails to reconcile or explain facts revealed by extraneous evidence. (Note, the Japanese 
confession standard is an unusual mix of both pre-Miranda type voluntary requirements as well 
as Miranda-like safeguards. The importance attached to the reliability rather than the 
voluntariness of a confession parallels the emphasis placed by the English court on the reliability 
standard of sec 76(2)A of PACE (1984)). 
The Japanese court is no different to its English and American counterparts when it tends to 
interpret procedural rules and the violation of these rules in a manner which is favourable to the 
interests of law enforcement. However, the Japanese court takes this favourable bias one step 
further by incorporating the cultural principle of torshirabe junin gimu, "the duty of an arrestee 
or detainee to submit to questioning throughout the period of detention". Prevailing standards 
in the courtroom reflects the widely held cultural belief of Japanese society that it is natural and 
expected for the accused to testify. The accused's silence at trial heightens suspicion and 
190 Shirogane v Japan 4 Keishu 2359 (Saikosai) Sp Crt (1988). 
191 Criminal code article 198(4), the confession is read to the accused who must verify its truthfulness by 
signing and sealing the document, although he has no duty to do so. See also article 233. 
192 Constitution article 38(2). Criminal code article 319(1 ). 
193 Tsukahara v Japan Keishu 1245 (Saikosai) (Sp Crt) (1990). 
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justifies an intensification of prosecutorial and judicial commentary. 194 At the commencement 
of the trial the judge is obliged to warn the accused of his right to silence. 195 The effect of this 
warning is usually neutralised because it is immediately followed by a judicial request for an 
explanation from the accused. The judge may also intervene during the course of the trial and 
directly question the accused. 196 Silence in the face of judicial questioning may be used against · 
the accused. The psychology of a Japanese trial demands a confession as the first step on the 
process of redemption and rehabilitation. A failure to confess and an insistence on silence is 
often perceived by the court as a sign of guilty stubbornness and the accused who refuses to 
testify runs the risk of a disproportionately higher punishment. As a result, very few Japanese 
defendants assert the right to silence or refuse to testify. Some 98% of all criminal convictions 
are confession-based. The Western notion of a silence principle as a protection of individual 
self-worth, dignity and privacy is not one shared by Japanese jurisprudence. Neither is the idea 
that the silence principle guarantees the presumption of innocence and a state-shouldered 
burden of proof. On the contrary, there is a strong emphasis on the individual's duty to co-
operate with the state even to the detriment of self. The Japanese silence principle serves 
primarily to give the accused some measure of protection from abuse at the hands of state 
interrogators. Even here the Japanese understanding of the degree of compulsion required to 
infringe the accused's right to silence is significantly higher and different to Western standards. 
(Note, the Griffin impermissible burden standard would find no place in a Japanese court room.) 
In essence the Japanese silence principle must be understood against the background of a 
culture in which the defendant's co-operation with the state is expected and where the 
confession plays a central evidentiary role. 
There are a number of significant differences between the Japanese and the Western 
perception of a silence principle which also serves to illustrate the cultural-legal divide between 
East and West. First, Japanese society has no strong expectation of autonomy and personal 
privacy. A substantial state intrusion into personal autonomy is not necessarily regarded by the 
Japanese legal system as a constitutionally impermissible infringement of human rights. In the 
West the protection of personal privacy is regarded as a fundamental justification for the silence 
principle. The importance of a silence principle is diminished in a society which places a lesser 
value on personal autonomy. Second, Japanese society exerts a strong pressure on the 
individual to conform and to co-operate with the state. A high level of trust exists between the 
individual and the authorities. Japanese society cultivates the duty of co-operation as a moral 
194 Sakai v Japan 32 Keishu 670 (Saikosai) Sp Crt (1978). 
195 Constitutional article 38(1 ). Criminal code article 311 (1 ). 
196 Criminal code article 311 (2) expressly provides for a judicial power of intervention. 
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value. The silence principle become irrelevant when co-operation with the state is regarded as 
a moral value. No such high level of co-operation between individual and state is expected or 
demanded in a Western legal system. On the contrary, the Western criminal justice system is 
often regarded with suspicion and one of the purposes of a silence principle is to curb 
government overreach. 
Third, the Japanese understanding of "compulsion" and "voluntariness" is different to Western 
definitions. The Japanese interrogator is allowed a latitude and freedom to question which does 
not exist in the West. Intrusive questioning, prolonged periods of detention, high levels of 
psychological intimidation, limited access to legal counsel and the cultural pressure to co-
operate gives the Japanese prosecutor an edge which is not available to the Western law 
enforcer. In the West extended custodial interrogation over several days or even several hours 
will render a confession inadmissible. In Japan interrogation over several days is the norm and 
condoned by the courts. The Japanese silence principle is regarded as a protection only against 
excessively high levels of psychological or physical compulsion, levels much higher than would 
be considered reasonable in the West. 
Fourth, the exclusive focus on the confession as the principal Japanese tool for conviction 
means that the silence principle is correspondingly diminished. For this reason academic 
commentary on, and public knowledge of, the silence principle is limited. The central focus on 
the confession also means that law enforcement officials rarely examine or weigh independent 
extrinsic sources of evidence. There is no Western style distinction between communicative 
evidence and real physical evidence. All relevant evidence is admissible. Intrusive forms of 
physical evidence (blood, fluid, semen, DNA)197 are as easily admissible as non-intrusive 
physical evidence (fingerprints, identification features, foot prints, etc.).198 There is also no 
prohibition on the admissibility of documentary evidence, even when the contents are private 
or incriminatory. 
Fifth, an extreme illustration of the Western-Eastern cultural-legal divide is the example set by 
the People's Republic of China. There is a complete absence of a constructive silence principle 
in the Chinese criminal procedure code. The Chinese legal system is based primarily on the 
confession and there is nothing in Chinese jurisprudence remotely resembling a presumption 
of innocence or the burden of proof as developed in Western procedural law. To avoid obvious 
physical coercion of confessions, the Chinese code (article 32) reads, "the use of torture to 
197 Criminal code article 167. 
198 Criminal code article 128, 218(2). 
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coerce statements and the gathering of evidence by threat, enticement, deceit or other unlawful 
methods is strictly prohibited". 199 However, the code (article 64) also states that, "the defendant 
shall answer the questions put by the investigation personnel, according to the facts". 200 The 
defendant may refuse to answer irrelevant facts and the prosecutor must allow the defendant 
the opportunity and time to explain the facts at his own pace, without demanding or pressurising 
an explanation. At best the defendant finds some protection in the refusal to answer at 
interrogation or in a refusal to testify at trial. This type of refusal does not attract a legal 
sanction. But if the defendant chooses silence, an adverse inference amounting to a silent 
confession of guilt may be drawn against him. A recent reform movement in China is urging the 
government to introduce a limited Western-style silence principle. The reform movement is 
based in Hong Kong, which has an English-style accusatorial legal system. 
In summary, the Japanese right to silence is constitutionally entrenched and statutorily codified. 
On paper it is the legal equivalent of the American fifth amendment, but in practice the 
Japanese silence principle is a mere shadow of its American cousin. It is an emasculated 
foreign importation trapped in a legal system designed by history, tradition and culture, not for 
the protection of the individual, but for the efficient compulsion of a confession. The Japanese 
silence principle is a second class constitutional right. 201 It has escaped the influence of an 
international libertarian philosophy and the post-World War II elevation of the silence principle 
into a fundamental and absolute human right. 
11.5 Other Legal Systems 
Eastern Europe: Countries previously part of the Soviet bloc recognise varying degrees of a 
silence principle in their criminal codes. Historically all Eastern European countries possessed 
some form of an inquisitorial legal system. Now that the veneer of socialist-ideologicallaws have 
been stripped from the traditional indigenous criminal codes of these countries, the silence 
principle is beginning to emerge as an important procedural protection for the defendant. 
A good example is Russia, which statutorily recognises both the suspect's pre-trial and the 
accused's trial right to silence. The suspect's refusal to answer questions and the accused's 
refusal to testify cannot amount to a corroboration of guilt. Article 76 read with article 77 of the 
Russian criminal code reads, "an acknowledgement of guilt by the accused may become the 
199 See Ingraham The Structure of Criminal Procedure (1987) 81. 
200 Ibid at 81. 
201 The modern Japanese silence principle resembles the pre-World War II American silence principle 
which was also defined as a second class constitutional right in Palkov v Connecticut 302 US 319, 325-326 
(1937) per Cardoso J. See supra chapter 5 note 19 and accompanying text. 
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basis for an accusation only if the acknowledgement is confirmed by the totality of the evidence 
in the case". Silence may in some circumstances be evaluated together with all other extraneous 
evidence and be added to the state case-in-chief. The Russian silence principle is a narrow 
construction and applies only to the criminal defendant. The silence principle does not extend 
to the non-party witness who is obliged to give evidence from the stand even at the risk of self-
incrimination. The Russian silence principle, as in many other inquisitorial systems, recognises 
only an accused's right to silence and not a non-party witness privilege against self-
incrimination. The developing silence principle in Eastern Europe reflects the dynamic tension 
common to all inquisitorial-based legal systems. A balance of interests must be found between 
state law enforcement interests and the protection interests of the individual. How the balance 
of interests will be struck and what the scope of the silence principle will be depends on the 
differing socio-cultural nuances of each country. 
South Asia: Criminal procedure statutes in India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Singapore, Hong Kong 
and Malaysia are generally imprinted with a Western-style silence principle. 202 The legal systems 
in these jurisdictions are a legacy of British colonial rule. The various definitions of the silence 
principle reflect values similar to those of the English common law. For example, in de Mel v 
Haniffa (Sri Lanka), 203 Gratiaen J states, "to my mind ... here as in England once proceedings 
have been initiated against an accused person, he is placed in a special category. The 
precarious position in which he stands entitles him [to certain protections]. .. He cannot be 
compelled or legally required to contribute to the proof of his alleged guilt by giving or providing 
even indirectly, evidence against himself." The silence principle has been statutorily codified in 
all South Asian jurisdictions and there is a remarkable uniformity between these codifications 
and the English silence principle. The only major difference is that most Asian jurisdictions 
abrogate or limit the silence principle at the pre-trial interrogatory stage of the criminal process. 
The Asian suspect (except in Hong Kong, India and Singapore) is usually under a statutory 
obligation to answer all relevant police questions. Police enforcement officials in Asian 
jurisdictions have wide statutory powers of investigation and detention and are sometimes not 
obliged to administer the silence warning or caution. The obligation to notify the suspect of his 
right to silence and right to legal advice upon arrest are based on internal administrative policy 
rules which are often flouted in practice. 
202 The very first South Asian Evidence and Criminal Code was prepared in 1872 for India. The Indian 
Evidence Act (1872) incorporated all of the English common law principles on evidence. The Indian 
Evidence Act also served as a model for the subsequent criminal codes of all other South Asian 
jurisdictions under British colonial control. 
203 (1952) 53 NLR 433, 438. 
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The silence principle at trial is a strong protection and does not differ appreciably from the 
English trial right to silence. The accused's silence may never amount to a direct inference of 
guilt. Prosecutorial comment on the accused's failure to testify is prohibited but judicial comment 
is allowed within the recognised parameters set by the English common law. The accused's 
silence by itself cannot convert a weak prosecution case into a strong one or raise it above the 
threshold of proof or beyond a reasonable doubt. Silence may be evaluated together with other 
evidence and is generally added to an already established prima facie case. The accused's 
silence may only give rise to an adverse inference once the prosecution has established a prima 
facie case and the accused through his silence has failed to rebut it. There must be no other 
extraneous reason for the accused's silence except his obvious reluctance to answer the case 
against him. Asian jurisdictions regard the presumption of innocence and the prosecutorial 
burden of proof as fundamental elements of a fair trial process. The silence principle is generally 
regarded as a reinforcement and justification of these due process elements. The witness 
privilege against self-incrimination in all the South Asian jurisdictions is a carbon copy of the 
English privilege. The Asian witness may invoke the privilege of self-incrimination on a question 
by question basis whenever there is a reasonable risk of self-incrimination and exposure to a 
possible criminal charge. In all other ancillary aspects (admissibility of physical evidence, 
documents, immunity statutes, etc.) the Asian silence principle does not differ from those in 
Western jurisdictions. 
The Republic of Singapore serves as an example of the continuing and pervasive influence of 
English jurisprudence. 204 In 1976 Singapore became the only Commonwealth jurisdiction to 
codify mutatis mutandis the draft proposals of the controversial U.K. Criminal Law Revision 
Committee's Eleventh Report on Evidence. 205 The Criminal Law and Procedure Code 
(Amendment) Act 10 (1977) contains similar limitations on the accused's right to silence as are 
presently found in the English Criminal Justice and Public Order Act (1994) (CRIMPO). Sec 121 
read with sec 122(6) of the Singapore Criminal Code provides for an obligatory police caution 
(one of the few South Asian jurisdictions to do so). The suspect is warned that he is obliged to 
mention all facts which will assist him in his defence. The court may draw adverse inferences 
from the suspect's failure to mention facts which should have reasonably been mentioned during 
the pre-trial police interview. 206 Sec 123(3) expressly preserves the common law right to silence. 
204 See Khee-Jin Tan "Adverse Inferences and the Right to Silence; Re-examining the Singapore 
Experience" Crim. L. Rev (1997) 471; Hor "Privilege Against Self-Incrimination and Fairness to the 
Accused" Singapore J.L. Studies (1993) 35; Yeo "Diminishing the Right to Silence; The Singapore 
Experience" Crim. L. Rev (1983) 89. 
205 HMSQ Commd 4991 (1972) 
206 (Pre-trial silence): Ng Chong Teck v PP (1992) 1 SLR 664 HC and Thongbai Naklangdon v P.P. 
(1996) 1 SLR 497 CA. (Trial silence): Nathan Tse v P.P. (1992) 1 SLR 870 HC. 
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A constitutional challenge to the Criminal Law and Procedure Act 10 (1977) was rejected in 
Jaykuma/ v P.P. 207 on the grounds that the statute allows only for the drawing of adverse 
inferences as appear "proper" in the circumstances. The statute is not an infringement of the 
defendant's constitutional rights nor does it unreasonably limit or alter the common law, 
according to Mazlan Maidun v P.P. 208 Sec 189 warns the accused of the consequences of not 
testifying at trial particularly once a prima facie case has been established against him. 
According to sec 196(2) if the accused refuses to testify or refuses to answer any question 
without good cause shown, reasonable adverse inferences may be drawn. The tendency in 
Singapore, as it is in all other South Asian jurisdictions, is to favour a jurisprudence based on 
crime prevention values rather than one based on due process values. Mazlan Maidun v P.P. 
is thought to mirror public opinion in South Asia which favours the maintenance of law and social 
order, a tough stance on crime and the continued emphasis on deterrence as the basis of 
punishment. In the words of Yong Pung How, Chief Justice (Singapore), 209 "in English doctrine, 
the rights of the individual are of paramount consideration. We shook ourselves free from the 
confines of English norms which do not accord with the customs and values of Singapore 
society. Our priority is the security of law-abiding citizens rather than the rights of the criminals 
to be protected from incriminating evidence." 
Middle East: All the legal systems of the Middle East are to some extent the legacies of 
previous French (inquisitorial) and British (accusatorial) colonial administrations. These 
Western-style criminal codes exist in an uneasy symbiotic relationship with religious law which 
often takes precedence over them. In Israel (an English-style acclfSatorial system) the 
accused's English style right to silence exists in parallel with a religious law right to silence. 
Although the religious silence principle is not constitutionally or statutorily entrenched, it forms 
part of a fundamental Judaic religious code and has been traced back to the fourth century 
before Christ. The body of Jewish religious law is set out in the Five Books of Moses (Torah) 
and subsequent traditional rules in the Mishnah (219 AD) and the Talmud (500 AD).210 
207 (1981) 3 WLR 408, following on Haw Tua Tau v P.P. (1981) 2 MLJ 49; (1981) 3 ALLER 14. 
208 The seminal case Mazlan Maidun v P.P. (1993) 1 SLR 512 CAper Yang Pung How C.J, denies that 
the silence "privilege" has any constitutional significance. 
209 Keynote address before the Conference on Review of Judicial and Legal Reforms, Buttersworth 
(1996) p.VI. 
210 Horowitz "The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, How Did It Originate" (31) Temp. L.Q (1958) 121; 
Lamm "The Fifth Amendment and its Equivalent in Jewish Law" (17) Decalogue J (1967) 1; Rosenberg 
"In the Beginning; The Talmudic Rule Against Self-Incrimination" (63) N.Y. Uni. L. Rev (1988) 955. See 
also Mazabow "The Origin of the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination; Jewish Law" (1 04) SALJ ( 1987) 710. 
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In the Babylonian Talmud, Bava Kamma 74b, a commentary by Rashi reads, "upon his own 
testimony he may not be condemned, for indeed, the Torah disqualifies a relative as a witness, 
and a man is a relative unto himself. Just as a relative is an incompetent witness because of his 
presumed bias in favour of the accused, so the accused himself is deemed biased in his own 
favour." The great Jewish philosopher Maimonides in his masterly restatement of the Torah 
(Book Fourteen, Judges)211 summarises the Talmudic principle against self-incrimination as, "no 
man is to be declared guilty on his own admission. This is a divine decree." 
An Islamic religious code (Sharia)212 is entrenched within the criminal codes of Saudi Arabia, 
Afghanistan, Iran, Sudan, Oman, Yemen and Northern Nigeria. The Sharia code has a 
significant influence on the criminal law of Egypt, Iraq, Libya, Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco, 
Lebanon, Malaysia, Indonesia, Pakistan, Niger, Chad and Mali. Islamic criminal law is derived 
from the Quran, the acts and words of the prophet Mohammed (Hadith), traditional pre-Islamic 
law and a kind of common law, specific to each country, composed of scholarly interpretations 
and commentaries. The Sharia code is similar to Judaic religious law and provides the criminal 
defendant with an absolute right to silence. Both Judaic and Sharia law exclude confessions 
induced by coercion, deception or torture. A confession is only admissible in a court if the 
accused is able to exercise his free will. "Free will" is the accused's unequivocal 
acknowledgement of all the elements of the crime. A confession may only be made to a judicial 
forum. Police-induced confessions are automatically inadmissible. The confession must also be 
corroborated by extrinsic sources of evidence. In its pure form a Sharia-based criminal process 
must maintain an absolute right to silence, permit the complete exclusion of all non-judicially 
obtained confessions, apply stringent controls to the accused's waiver of silence and allow for 
the voluntary withdrawal of a confession at any stage of the criminal proceeding. 
211 Code of Maimonides, Book of Judges 141h, 52-53, Penguin Ed (1984). 
212 Walker "The Rights of the Accused in Saudi Criminal Procedure" (15) Loy. L.A. tnt and Comp. L.J 
(1993) 863; Souryal "The Role of Sharia Law in Determining Criminality in Saudi Arabia" (12) Int. J. Comp 
and Ap Grim Justice (1985) 1, 5. 
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CHAPTER12 
THE SO-CALLED RIGHT TO SILENCE 
"the so-called right to silence... is contrary to common sense. It runs counter to our 
realisation of how we ourselves would behave if we were faced with a criminal charge. '11 
Proponents have sought to justify the silence principle by elevating it into a fundamental 2 and 
sometimes absolute right. 3 They have done so not on the basis of reason but by an appeal to 
the emotional and sentimental language of a human rights doctrine. There are, however, a 
number of rational and practical arguments which mitigate against amending and elevating an 
ordinary rule of evidence to the rank of a fundamental human right. It is axiomatic that a legal 
rule if it is to be elevated above other rules of evidence must be both morally and rationally 
coherent. It is illogical to qualify a fundamental right, especially one which seeks to exclude 
rather than include relevant evidence, with generous praise which cannot be translated into 
consistent applications of a clearly understood moral and rational purpose. 4 American fifth 
amendment jurisprudence is a good example of this confusion and the South African 
constitutional right is in danger of following the same inconstant path. When a legal rule fails to 
satisfy the test of reason it must be revised or abandoned, otherwise it serves only to distort the 
adjectival procedures by which the criminal process seeks to arrive at legal truth. 
A fundamental right has the power to intrude across the whole spectrum of statutory and 
common law. If a fundamental right is not reinforced by moral principles, sustained by reason 
and susceptible to logical analysis it becomes inflexible and difficult to negotiate. A typical 
illustration of this inflexibility is the American fifth amendment which, despite its noble origin, has 
been allowed to distort the criminal process because it is justifiable only in terms of 
1 Williams "The Tactic of Silence" (137) N.L.J (1987) 1107. 
2 R v Be/jajev (1984) V.R. 657 per Starke J at 662, "silence is a fundamental principle of the criminal law 
and is not to be overridden by any other so-called doctrine or other principle". In contrast see Cross "The 
Right to Silence and the Presumption of Innocence: Sacred Cows or Safeguards of Liberty" ( 11) J. Society 
Public Teachers of Law (1970) 66 at 75 " ... let us stop mouthing platitudes about a non-existent 
fundamental right to silence ... ", and at 72, " ... the right to silence is a sacred cow obstructing the operation 
of common sense". See also Twinning v New Jersey 211 US 78, 79 (1908) "[ ... ]it has been the opinion of 
constitution makers that the privilege [of silence], if fundamental in any sense, is not fundamental in the 
due process of law, nor an essential part of it." "There is no reason for straining the meaning of due 
process to include this privilege within it." 
3 Berger "Burdening the Fifth Amendment: Towards a Presumptive Barrier Theory" (70) J. Grim. L. 
Criminology (1979) 27, 31, "the compulsion requirement of the privilege and its interpretation by the court, 
provides some support for the view that the fifth amendment is an absolute barrier to state imposed 
burdens on the right to remain silent". 
4 Mewitt "Law Enforcement and the Conflict of Values" (16) McGill L.J (1970) 1, 6-7, "like all legal cliches, 
the [silence principle] tends to be highly misleading ... perhaps no phrase has been bandied about with more 
imprecision and with more unawareness of its legal and social significance ... ". 
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sentimentality and not in terms of reason. On the one extreme, by limiting the government's 
ability to use the suspect as a testimonial source, the fifth amendment has driven interrogation 
techniques underground. Substitute methods such as trickery, deception, wiretaps, sting 
operations and an over-reliance on informers have now become commonplace in law 
enforcement organs. On the other extreme, the majority of convictions are obtained by means 
of a plea-bargaining process and not by the normal trial process. The trial process, hedged in 
by sophisticated defence safeguards, has simply become too expensive, while the plea-bargain 
is user-friendly and cost-effective. The legitimacy of the justice system becomes compromised 
when convictions are negotiated privately in the state attorney's office instead of being debated 
publically in open court. The silence principle as an inflexible constitutional safeguard for the 
defendant contributes to this distortion of the criminal process. 
The Historical Dilemma: Proponents of a modern right of silence seek to justify it by reference 
to the pivotal historical role it has played in the struggle between state and citizen for first 
generation rights. However, the modern rights-based silence principle is very different from its 
immediate utilitarian ancestor. The historical silence principle was a limited evidentiary rule 
based on the utilitarian necessity to preserve the truth-seeking function of the criminal justice 
system. The traditional silence principle was narrowly intended to protect the defendant against 
coercive state practices and to prevent the admission of compelled and unreliable confessions. 
Neither of these two rationales justifies the elevation of the twentieth century silence principle 
into a fundamental human right, nor its extension to include a prohibition against the drawing 
of adverse inferences. The original silence principle was never intended to be an entitlement to 
conceal or exclude relevant evidence. Silence was meant to be an immunity awarded to both 
the innocent and guilty alike, in order to preserve the integrity of proof and the person within the 
criminal system. The traditional silence principle was not jeopardised when adverse inferences 
were drawn from the accused's silence and until the early 1930s Anglo-American courts 
unhesitantly drew such adverse inferences from the defendant's pre-trial and trial silence. 
However, once the silence principle is elevated into a constitutional right and is construed to 
include a prohibition against adverse inferences, then the principle is severed from its historical 
roots and becomes nothing more than an active inducement to conceal guilt. When there is no 
risk that the truth-seeking function of the criminal process is being compromised there can be 
no legitimate reason for prohibiting the drawing of an adverse inference. 
The traditional utilitarian common law silence principle has been redesigned in the twentieth 
century as a constitutional right and widened into an immunity not to answer interrogatory 
questions (a pre-trial right) or to give evidence (a right not to testify). The difference between 
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the traditional silence "rule" and the modern silence "right" is significant. It would be absurd to 
speak of waiving the historical immunity against state compulsion. No person would logically 
waive such an immunity, but it is sensible to speak of waiving a right to silence. Once the silence 
principle is elevated into a constitutional right it becomes sensible to prohibit the drawing of 
adverse inferences, otherwise the right to silence is diminished. It also becomes unnecessary 
to refer to rational justifications for the right. A right to silence becomes self-sustaining by virtue 
of its elevated status. This means that the criminal defendant may claim the right automatically 
even in the absence of a state compulsion. The inability to distinguish between the original 
evidentiary common law immunity from compulsion and the modern constitutional immunity to 
withhold testimony has become a source of much confusion for the proponents of the silence 
principle. 
On the ground of utilitarian common sense, and ignoring the sentimentality of libertarian human 
rights rhetoric, the drawing of an adverse inference in the appropriate circumstance is simply 
not contrary to legal logic. The cogency of this argument finds support in the opinions of leading 
English jurists. According to Lord Mansfield, 5 "all evidence is to be weighed according to the 
proof which it is in the power of one side to have produced and in the power of the other to have 
contradicted". In the words of Lord Goddard CJ,6 "everybody knows that absence from the 
witness box requires a very considerable amount of explanation from the defence". Lord Abbott 
CJ is quite specific, 7 " •.• if the conclusion to which the prima facie case tends to be true, and the 
accused offers no explanation or contradiction, can human reason do otherwise than adopt the 
conclusion to which the proof tends". Lord Devlin, a prominent supporter of the silence principle, 
makes the comment, 8 "when the prisoner, who is given the right to answer the question chooses 
not to do so, the court must not be deterred by the incompleteness of the tale from drawing 
inferences that properly flow from the evidence it has got nor dissuaded from reaching a firm 
conclusion by speculation upon what the accused might have said if he had testified". Perhaps 
the most telling opinion is that of Lamar CJ in the Canadian case R v Noble, 9 "why has this court 
commented so frequently on the effect of the accused's silence? Why has it arisen so often as 
an issue before this court? The reason is simple, silence can be very probative ... under the right 
circumstances ... silence can form the basis for natural, reasonable and fair inferences." The 
influential commentator Me Cormick succinctly notes, "[the courts] as they become conversant 
with the history of the privilege [of silence] will see that it is a survival that has outlived the 
5 8/atch v Archer (1774) 1 Cowp 64 at 65. 
6 R v Jackson (1953) 37 Cr. App. R 43 at 50. 
7 R v Burdett (1820) 4 Band Aid 95 at 161. 
8 R v Sharmpal Singh (1962) A.C 188 at 244-45. 
9 (1997) 1 SCR 874, per Lamar CJ at 887-88. 
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context that gave it meaning and that its application today is not to be extended under the 
influence of a vague sentimentality but is to be kept within the limits of realism and common 
sense."10 
The Confusion between a "Right" and a "Privilege": Proponents of a libertarian silence 
principle make indiscriminate and interchangeable use of the words "right" and "privilege" 
without regard to the conceptual differences between the two. Invariably the right to silence is 
confused with the privilege against self-incrimination and this confusion is symptomatic of the 
vague sentimentality of a human rights philosophy. This is particularly true of American fifth 
amendment jurisprudence. 11 The fifth amendment refers only to a compulsion which must not 
induce the individual to be a witness against himself. Within this witness compulsion paradigm 
there is no mention of silence. Fifth amendment jurisprudence focuses entirely on the meaning 
of "compulsion", "coercion" or the "burden" which induces self-incrimination from the witness. 
The concept of silence within this paradigm is subsumed by an analysis of compulsion 12 and 
self-incrimination. As the right to silence has no independent existence of its own, it is easy to 
blur the philosophical distinction between a right and a privilege. The first ten amendments of 
the United States Constitution (1791) are collectively referred to as the Bill of Rights. Yet of all 
these rights only the silence principle of the fifth amendment has been labelled a "privilege". In 
fifth amendment jurisprudence there appears to be a semantical and conceptual confusion 
between the use of the word "right" and the word "privilege". By contrast, utilitarian jurisprudence 
is meticulous in maintaining a proper semantic and conceptual distinction between the various 
terms it employs to define the silence principle. 
English jurisprudence draws a sharp distinction between the privilege against self-incrimination 
(usually claimed by a witness to the criminal proceeding) and a right to silence (usually claimed 
by the accused in a criminal proceeding). English jurisprudence suggests that it is conceptually 
mistaken to describe the compellable witness as possessing a right to silence, for the witness 
is obliged to take the stand and may only refuse to answer on a question-to-question basis. 
Once immunised against a future criminal charge the witness is forced to give evidence. On the 
10 
"Some Problems and Developments in the Admissibility of Confessions" (24) Texas L. Rev (1946) 
277. 
11 The fifth amendment has proved to be a difficult provision to interpret. The language used by its 
authors is both ambiguous and misleading, thereby making textual analysis unconvincing. Similarly the 
historical background and intentions of the authors are unclear. The policies that the fifth amendment is 
designed to further are seriously disputed, leaving the fifth amendment without an agreed upon rationale. 
12 Just how heavily the state may burden the fifth amendment is unclear. The Supreme Court has until 
now failed to establish a standard. The court decisions from the Warren era suggest that all burdens on 
the fifth amendment are forbidden; while more recent decisions have barred only those burdens 
automatically imposed by the state on the exercise of the fifth amendment. 
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other hand, the right to silence, as a right to speak, belongs only to the accused who is under 
no obligation to take the stand or to give evidence. A "right" is an expression of a fundamental 
human value which, by its very nature, demands an almost absolute degree of legal protection. 
A "privilege", however, is considerably less valuable than a "right". A "privilege" has no essential 
human value and is merely a concession or special treatment awarded by the state as a favour. 
While an intrinsic human right is inalienable and irrevocable, a privilege may be revoked or 
withdrawn by the state at any time. The state cannot arbitrarily create a right in the way it can 
create, amend or abrogate a privilege. A right is the creation of a higher natural law, above state 
law, and an unalterable consensus which imposes limitations upon the exercise of government 
power. A privilege is created by the state as a voluntary and unilateral limitation upon its own 
powers, but the privilege may be withdrawn whenever it conflicts with other more important state 
interests. 
There is a certain degree of illogicality in the way Anglo-American jurisprudence defines the right 
to silence in theory and the way the courts treat the right in practice. The silence principle is 
invariably referred to as a near absolute right in theory. The fifth amendment has always been 
defined as an absolute "liberty" type right, imposing limitations on the exercise of government 
powers. It is set forth in absolute terms, neither conditioned nor qualified and therefore not 
subject to judicial inventiveness (New Jersey v Portash). The fifth amendment is also absolute 
because it protects the substantive dignity and integrity of the individual. It makes the procedural 
demand that the state, in seeking to punish the accused, must do so through its own 
independent labours (Miranda v Arizona). However, in practice the courts treat the silence 
principle as a privilege by seeking to limit it or to balance it against other law enforcement 
interests. The result is a confusion about the exact nature and purpose of the silence principle. 
This contradiction becomes obvious when the silence principle is elevated into a constitutional 
right but it is less obvious when the silence principle is simply defined in traditional terms as a 
mere utilitarian evidentiary rule. The American fifth amendment makes no conceptual distinction 
between the "right" and the "privilege" and both are constitutionally entrenched. The logical 
confusion in fifth amendment jurisprudence becomes apparent when the Supreme Court, on the 
one hand, reinforces the absolute nature of a trial right to silence (the Griffin no-inference rule)13, 
and on the other, reduces the pre-trial silence safeguards to a prophylactic protection riddled 
13 In selected cases the US Supreme Court has used absolutist language to reject a state burden 
imposed upon the accused's exercise of his fifth amendment trial right to silence. Griffin v California 380 
US 609 ( 1965), "the fifth amendment absolutely bars comment upon a defendant's failure to testify". United 
States v Jackson 390 US 570, 583 (1968), "Congress cannot impose a penalty in a manner that needlessly 
penalises the assertion of a constitutional right". Brooks v Tennessee 406 US 605 (1972), "the defendant 
is entitled to the unfettered exercise of his own will, and to suffer no penalty for such silence". See also 
Malloy v Hogan 378 US 1, 8 (1964). 
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with artificial exceptions (the erosion of the Miranda standard). 14 The accused's trial silence is 
treated as a near absolute "right" (at a stage when the accused is least vulnerable), but his pre-
trial silence is treated as a "privilege" (at a stage when the accused is at his most vulnerable). 
Similarly, the non-party witness "privilege" while defined as near absolute in theory, is in practice 
limited by numerous exceptions. 
The Canadian silence principle, under the influence of American fifth amendment jurisprudence, 
also exhibits the same kind of logical inconsistency. The Charter of Rights and Freedoms 
elevates the accused's and the witness' privilege against self-incrimination into a constitutional 
right (sec 11 and sec 13) but does not specifically mention a right to silence. The assumption 
made by the Canadian Federal Constitution is that the "right" and the "privilege" are one and the 
same thing. In the South African Constitution the accused's right to silence (sec 35(1)(a)) and 
his right against self-incrimination (sec 35(3)U)) are specifically entrenched but no mention is 
made of the witness privilege against self-incrimination. Is the non-party witness privilege still 
defined in terms of the common law (in which case it remains an ordinary evidentiary rule) or 
has it, by association, also been elevated to the status of a constitutional right? The American 
fifth amendment is sometimes construed as an absolute right and at other times as a relative 
right. The same right in the Canadian and the South African Constitutions is always a relative 
right subject to reasonable limitation. The danger exists that a relative and flexible South African 
right to silence may in time become an American-style inflexible and absolute right. The 
Constitutional Court has, in recent decisions, exhibited a strange reluctance to make use of its 
powers in terms of the $ec 361imitation clause. In contrast to the American, Canadian and South 
African approach, English jurisprudence has never deviated from the traditional utilitarian 
definition of the silence principle as an ordinary common law rule. Neither the accused's "right" 
to silence or the "privilege" against self-incrimination are constitutionally defined. The English 
common law silence principle is subject to severe statutory limitation and in some circumstances 
may be totally abrogated. 
Both the Australian and the New Zealand silence principle are closely modelled on the traditional 
English common law approach. Similarly the Singapore High Court has demonstrated, in a 
number of cases, that the silence principle is not a constitutional right but remains an ordinary 
evidentiary rule subject to statutory limitation. The Singapore High Court goes further by stating 
that the silence principle is not even a fundamental element of Singapore legal culture. The 
Anglo-American silence principle is inconsistent and incoherent. It has been variously defined 
14 Michigan v Tucker 417 US 433, 444 (1974) has declared the Miranda safeguards to be mere 
prophylactic measures without constitutional authority. 
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as a "right", a "privilege" or as an ordinary evidentiary "rule". Depending on the circumstance it 
is sometimes an "absolute" right and at other times a "relative" right. It is said to be immutable 
and unalienable in some jurisdictions but in others it is subject to limitation or abrogation. In 
some circumstances it permits the drawing of adverse inferences, but in other circumstances 
it does not. Yet, when it should count the most it is unable to prevent the juror from drawing 
whatever proper or improper inferences the juror deems personally appropriate. 
The Moral Dilemma: The central question is whether the silence principle should be defined 
in terms of a human rights or a utilitarian morality. A human rights morality is founded upon 
natural exhortatory law. A supernatural source of law which imposes conditions on human 
existence that cannot be transgressed or amended by a human law maker. A silence principle 
becomes a divinely inspired human right and an immutable protection for the human personality. 
Within this kind of morality all other legal rules would have to give way before the silence 
principle, and the balance of interests would always weigh in favour of the individual and never 
in favour of the state. According to Dworkins' reasoning, a right to silence would always "trump" 
mere state interests. The alternative is a utilitarian morality founded upon positivist law which 
seeks to increase the net well-being of society. A silence principle is simply a legal rule sourced 
from an accountable sovereign and susceptible to a balance of interests. A "utilitarian-positivist" 
morality is the great opponent of a "human rights-naturalist" morality and would reduce the 
silence principle to a flexible evidentiary rule. An evidentiary rule which usually protects the 
defendant in the criminal process, but which may well allow the state interest to supercede the 
individual interest in some circumstances. 
A human rights-based silence principle cannot be justified in terms of reason and is forced to 
rely on the sentimentality of a "natural" morality. In the words of Lord Salmon, 15 "the right to 
silence is a sense of instinct for what is just and is innate in our people" and "our law has never 
been built on logic alone, still less on abstract theory". The American commentator Horowitz16 
glibly lays claim to a Judea-Christian religious justification, "the [fifth amendment] privilege is not 
good legal logic, but it is a religious principle of humaneness and mercy grafted upon the 
common law". These types of sentimental statements make no legal sense and it may also be 
argued that their appeal to morality is just as misguided. 17 The silence principle is normally 
15 House of Lord's debate on the Criminal Law Revision Committee 111h Report, Cmnd, 4991 (1972) 
1608-1609. 
16 Horowitz "The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination: How Did It Originate" (31) Temp. L.Q. (1958) 121, 
143. 
17 Zuckerman "The Right Against Self-Incrimination: An Obstacle to the Supervision of Interrogation" 
(102) L.Q. Rev (1986) 68, "hardly any of the justifications of the privilege seem to rest on a moral 
argument. While it is sometimes said that it is wrong to ask a man to dig his own grave, we have seen that 
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invoked in circumstances which create the impression that it is not a protection for the innocent 
but rather a protection for the guilty and a safe sanctuary for those who break society's rules. 
The silence principle is of importance only to the arrested person, someone who has broken the 
law or is suspected of doing so. Where is the morality in such a protection? The moral value of 
the silence principle in the criminal process defies ordinary common sense notions of decent 
conduct. In the words of Judge Friendly, 18 "no parent would teach such a doctrine to his children. 
The lesson parents teach is that while a misdeed will generally be forgiven, a failure to make 
a clean breast of it will not be." 
The silence principle is psychologically and morally unacceptable as a social principle in human 
relationships. Hook regards the privilege against self-incrimination as an insult to the average 
person's intelligence, 19 "let any sensible person ask himself whether he would hire a babysitter 
for his children if she refused to reply to a question bearing upon the proper execution of her 
duty with a response equivalent to the privilege against self-incrimination". A human rights-
based silence principle cannot appeal to morality when it helps the defendant avoid personal 
responsibility for his wrongdoing, stands in the way of a conviction, impedes the state in 
providing fully for the security of society and sometimes prevents the giving of restitution to the 
victims of crime. A silence principle may well erode the social and moral legitimacy of the 
criminal justice system. In South Africa there is a widely held belief that the criminal justice 
system fosters a culture of criminal rights while ignoring victim rights. The South African silence 
principle is regarded as being part and parcel of criminal rights, a procedure which operates to 
the advantage of the alleged wrongdoer. In the real world personal accountability is the societal 
norm. The wrongdoer is expected to personally account for his transgression of social rules and 
is under intense social pressure to make an honest and revealing disclosure. For example, in 
Christian ideology the healing process only begins once the "sinner" confesses and takes 
personal responsibility for his actions. 
Certainly in the interrogation room the police questioner will attempt to manipulate these social 
pressures in order to extract an admission from the suspect. Yet in the artificial environment of 
the courtroom the very opposite prevails. There is no legal duty to co-operate with the court. 
Instead America, Canada and South Africa have chosen to entrench the non co-operative 
the hardship involved is not morally objectionable. Nor do we intuitively feel that there is something wrong 
in having to offer an explanation for wrongs we have committed. Given this weak moral support it is not 
surprising that the privilege should give way to the interests of combating crime." 
18 Friendly "The Fifth Amendment Tomorrow: The Case for Constitutional Change" (37) Uni. Cinn. L. Rev 
(1968) 671,680. 
19 Hook Common Sense and the Fifth Amendment (1957) 121. 
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aspect of the silence principle as a constitutional right. The non co-operative, non-accountable 
nature of the silence principle, coupled with the adversarial combativeness of the accusatorial 
trial process, stimulates a defensive resistance. The criminal comes to believe that true guilt or 
innocence is determined not by the facts, but by the prosecution's ability to prove guilt in 
accordance with the rules of adversarial procedure, which favour the defence and not the 
prosecution. The guilty criminal is thus able to excuse his wrongdoing and to justify his 
immorality simply because the prosecution is unable to prove his guilt beyond a reasonable 
doubt. A whole generation of South African criminals have used this kind of reasoning to justify 
their criminality both to themselves and to their peer group. An accusatorial trial system which 
incorporates a human rights-based silence principle emphasises the negative elements of 
nonco-operation and the refusal by the defence to accept responsibility or accountability. In 
contrast, the civil-inquisitorial trial system seeks the active co-operation of the accused and 
places importance on personal accountability. 
The Rational Dilemma: The main obstacle to a rational analysis of the silence principle has 
been the acceptance of a certain lyricism and eloquent phraseology as a justifiable substitute 
for critical thought. Proponents frequently invoke the silence principle as a "fundamental tenent 
of the constitutional fabric", a reflection of "fundamental values" and most "notable aspirations". 
These ringing, but vacuous, pronouncements common across the entire Anglo-American world 
explain everything except "why"! In the words of a leading Canadian scholar,20 "there is the 
suggestion that great consequences flow from the [silence principle], yet its precise significance 
is not explained. Rather, the significance is assumed. Such assumptions seem to have been 
made so often that the references take on the character of generalities spoken without 
understanding, but without fear of contradiction, because of the absence of any clearer 
understanding on the part of the [true believer]. 21 With every reference and tacit concurrence 
the difficulty of challenging the assumptions increases." Bentham22 some 200 years ago 
characterised the main obstacle to a rational discussion of the silence principle as the 
"assumption of the proprietry of the rule as a proposition too plainly true to admit of dispute. By 
assuming it to be true, you represent all reasonable men as joining in the opinion. By this 
means ... you present. .. the fear of incurring the indignation ... of all reasonable men, by presuming 
to disbelieve or doubt what all such reasonable men are assured of." 




Ratushny "Is There a Right Against Self-Incrimination in Canada" (19) McGill L.J (1973) 1, 2. 
The thesis author's addition and emphasis. 
Bentham Rationale of Judicial Evidence Bowring Ed (1843) 446 and 451. 
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rights-based rationales, derived from Packer's due process model23 have been advanced to 
justify the principle. Personality rationales are said to safeguard human dignity (the core element 
of the South African Constitution), liberty (the core element of the American Constitution), 
privacy and personal autonomy.24 The silence principle, by guarding against organised state 
compulsions, prevents the trauma of psychologically cruel choices, blocks the infringement of 
human dignity and the invasion of individual privacy. The instrumental rationales provide the 
defendant with a number of procedural safeguards. The silence principle prohibits the 
authoritarian temptation to employ investigative shortcuts, prevents the coercion of testimony 
and encourages the search for extraneous sources of evidence. It is said to be an essential 
guarantee of a fair trial process by turning the criminal forum into a fair playing field, in which 
the prosecution has no procedural or material advantages over the accused. Within the 
courtroom the silence principle is a bulwark of the presumption of innocence and ensures that 
the state shoulders the entire burden of proof. 
This libertarian vision of the silence principle as a protection of personal human values, and as 
a guarantee of a fair relationship between state and citizen has great symbolic value. 
Unfortunately it is a symbol without valid substance. As has been amply demonstrated in the 
course of this thesis, all the rationales advanced to justify a human rights-based silence principle 
have been refuted or found to contain rational and practical flaws. The irrationality of the 
American fifth amendment is illustrated by the influential academic Dolinko, who suggests, 25 
"although possessing no rational justification the silence principle is nevertheless functionally 
important; and its repeal would do violence to the legal system as a whole". An argument which 
is testimony to the omnipotence of the constitution in American jurisprudence. There is nothing 
morally or rationally intrinsic about the personality rationales which would logically explain why 
dignity or privacy should always "trump" the retributive and deterrence functions of a well-
balanced criminal justice system. Why should a right to silence protect the accused's privacy 
when other constitutional rights allow reasonable privacy infringements? Why is a prosecutorial 
intrusive questioning at trial considered to be an unreasonable infringement of the accused's 
human dignity when conviction and incarceration are far worse indignities? 
23 Packer "Two Models of the Criminal Process" (113) Un. Penn. L. Rev (1964) 1-68. 
24 Gerstein "Privacy and Self-Incrimination" (80) Ethics (1970) 87, 89-96, argues that the individual 
should have absolute control over his personal autonomy (another justification of the silence principle using 
absolutist language) including the ability to exclude all state-compelled self-incrimination. However, in order 
to secure the core of personal autonomy, one must secure the peripheral areas as well. Personal 
autonomy becomes absolutist and inflexible. 
25 Dolinko "Is There a Rationale for the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination" (33) U. C.L.A. L. Rev (1986) 
1063-1148. 
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It is a common sense observation that silence is an effective shield for the knowledgeable and 
guilty accused, but not for the innocent accused. When faced by an accusation the natural 
instinct of the guilty person is to remain silent or to obfuscate the facts whereas the innocent 
person is more likely to speak up in an attempt to explain the facts. The guilty accused, but not 
the innocent accused, is faced with a dilemma between disclosing evidence of guilt or suffering 
an adverse inference through saying nothing. The silence principle calls upon the criminal 
justice system to dispense with the dilemma and to allow the accused to conceal knowledge of 
guilt. Undoubtedly the choice forced upon the guilty accused is psychologically unenviable, but 
why should it be a function of the law to shield the guilty accused from making it? Furthermore, 
silence is not a strong shield against the psychological pressures of the police station. It does 
not offer an adequate protection against physical or psychological abuse at the hands of the 
police interrogator. Silence does not reduce the risk of a false confession nor does it enhance 
the truth-seeking ability of the trial process. Instead it serves to inhibit the criminal process which 
should be better designed to expose, rather than suppress, relevant evidence in the pursuit of 
legal certainty. The silence principle, unlike professional, marital or public privilege, is unable 
to provide a pressing social, moral or legal reason for its exclusion of relevant evidence. 
Why should the courtroom be reduced to a level playing field? There is no logic to the argument 
that the state should be curtailed from using all its resources in the investigation and conviction 
of criminals. 26 Why should the prosecution be prevented from adducing relevant evidence simply 
because it enjoys an "unfair'' advantage? Proponents of the silence principle are once again 
forced to resort to vaguely articulated feelings. Ellis exemplifies the libertarian blind faith in the 
silence principle. In his own words, 27 "[silence] is not an issue which is amenable to empirical 
investigation nor can answers be derived by reasoning" and "we are ... dealing with value 
judgements, with an issue of conscience, with a 'feeling' of justice which is [not] rationally 
explicable". These sentiments may have great rhetorical force, but as an explanation for an 
important legal principle they are without logical substance. 
Reform of the criminal justice system demands, not an extension of the silence principle, but its 
limitation. A limited and narrowly interpreted silence principle (defined in utilitarian terms as an 
26 
"Why is it automatically assumed that men as government are less logical than men as men? Why 
when the state is the actor, do we tip the scales in favour of values other than accuracy in fact 
ascertainment? Does the silence principle practically protect the individual against the power of the state 
and its capacity for tyranny or cruelty? Perhaps the silence principle illustrates society's deep scepticism 
of the value of criminal law enforcement." Louisell "Criminal Discovery and Self-Incrimination: Roger 
Traynor Confronts the Dilemma" (53) Cal. L. Rev (1965) 89, 96. 
27 Ellis "A Comment on the Testimonial Privilege of the Fifth Amendment" (55) Iowa L. Rev (1970) 838-
39, 843, " ... irrational feelings play a valid role in justifying the privilege". 
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ordinary evidentiary rule) would make the criminal process practically more efficient and excuse 
the court from having to draw absurdly fine distinctions about the effect and scope of silence. 
Rationally the silence principle is not an essential component of a fair trial system. The recent 
statutory amendments to the silence principle in England amply demonstrates that the silence 
principle may be safely modified without damaging the relationship between the presumption 
of innocence and the prosecutorial duty of shouldering the entire burden of proof. In fact, there 
is no logical connection between the silence principle and the prosecution's primary onus of 
proof. The primary burden of proof concerns itself with the total sufficiency of evidence and not 
with the way in which evidence is gathered. Logically a silence principle designed to exclude 
self-incriminating evidence (a source of evidence) cannot conceptually influence the fixed 
burden of proof which is designed only to account for the cogency and quantum of evidence and 
is not designed to acknowledge the various sources of evidence. Limiting the silence principle 
cannot logically shift the burden of proof away from the prosecution and onto the accused's 
shoulders. A fair trial process is not fundamentally impaired when the silence principle is 
abrogated. The civil-inquisitorial trial system, as an alternative to the accusatorial trial system, 
provides for a fair trial despite its fundamental concentration on the accused and a system of 
proof which emphasises the confession above other sources of evidence. 
A Right in Theory But Not One in Practice: The right to silence is a legal principle much talked 
about in theory, but not observed in practice. The nature of the accusatorial-adversarial trial 
process makes a strong theoretical commitment to the silence principle unrealistic in practice. 
The average suspect, unlike the hardened professional criminal, feels a strong social pressure 
to co-operate with the investigating authority. The suspect's natural anxiety to explain his 
innocence coupled with the intimidating atmosphere of the interview room and the well-honed 
interrogation skills of the police weakens the suspect's willpower and the psychological ability 
to invoke the right to silence. The accusatorial system is designed to exert the strongest 
possible pressure on the accused during the police interrogation when he is at his most 
vulnerable, but once in the courtroom when the accused is least vulnerable, the reverse 
happens and every effort is made to insure that the accused does not co-operate with the 
prosecution. In the hostile police environment the right to silence is an ineffective protection, 
more likely to be manipulated as a shield by the experienced criminal than be the intimidated 
average suspect. South African prisons are filled, not with professional criminals, but by the 
naive and the ignorant, who are easily persuaded to waive their procedural rights. English 
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empirical studies28 confirm that the average suspect does not exercise his right to silence when 
questioned by the police. If the right to silence was invoked more regularly, the conviction rate 
would drop drastically and the costs of the criminal justice system would increase substantially. 
(If the South African courts were to apply in practice what they so easily uphold in theory, the 
South African justice system would simply collapse.) 
In practice the criminal justice system is specifically organised around the interrogation of the 
accused, the extraction of an admission or confession and the inducement of a guilty plea. An 
effective and consistently exercised right to silence would seriously disrupt this well-oiled 
process. For this reason the caution, which upon arrest is supposed to warn the defendant of 
his procedural rights, is often administered in a perfunctory manner and is always submerged 
or overwhelmed by the hostile environment of the police station. The duty of administering the 
caution falls to the investigating officer who is placed in an unenviable moral dilemma. One the 
one hand, it is the training and instinct of a good policeman to break down the unco-operative 
suspect in order to obtain relevant evidence (the suspect is usually the best source of evidence). 
On the other hand, the policeman is also charged with the duty of informing the suspect of his 
right to silence, the aim of which is to ensure that the suspect des not co-operate with the police. 
The policeman is placed in a moral and practical dilemma, caught between his profession 
responsibility as a law enforcer and the artificial duty imposed upon him by the right to silence. 
The result is that the police officer stretches and breaks the law in order to carry out his duty 
efficiently. The courts collude in this process by ignoring police trickery or deception which 
induce admissions and impose weak sanctions against obvious infringements of the accused's 
procedural rights. For example, as a result of Miranda v Arizona the focus of the American pre-
trial confession safeguard has shifted from a common law voluntariness standard to an analysis 
of an effective and knowing waiver of a right. In practice it is now easier for the unscrupulous 
police officer to fabricate a simple waiver of rights rather than to counterfeit convincing 
indications of voluntariness. Miranda has made it easier for police to obtain a waiver of rights 
and consequently an admissible confession. 
It cannot be said that the silence principle is applied by the Anglo-American courts as befits a 
fundamental right. The noble pre-trial safeguards institutionalised by the Warren Court in 
28 Moston et ai"The Incidence, Antecedents and Consequences of the Use of the Right to Silence during 
Police Questioning" (3) Criminal Behaviour and Mental Health (1993) 30-47; Maston et ai"The Effects of 
Case Characteristics on Suspect Behaviour during Questioning" (32) British J. Criminology (1992) 23-40; 
Mitcheii"Confessions and Police Interrogation of Suspects" Grim. L. Rev (1983) 596, 598; McConville et 
ai"The Role of Interrogation in Crime Discovery and Conviction" (22) British J. Criminology (1982) 165, 
166; Zander "The Investigation of Crime: A Study of Cases Tried at the Old Bailey" Grim L. Rev (1979) 
203, 213. 
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Miranda v Arizona have been consistently eroded over the past thirty years. What was supposed 
to be a constitutional safeguard is now no more than a prophylactic protection riddled with 
technical exceptions. Even in a culture dominated by a human rights philosophy, the American 
courts have been reluctant in practice to give the suspect's pre-trial right to silence its full 
constitutional meaning. In the course of this thesis it has been demonstrated that there is quite 
a difference in what American courts say in theory and do in practice. In England there is an 
equal reluctance to unconditionally protect the silence principle. Admissions obtained in breach 
of the Police Criminal and Evidence Act (1984) (PACE) are often admitted by a judge in the 
exercise of his discretionary power. In practice the exercise of the judicial discretion tends to 
favour the police officer more than it does the criminal defendant. The difference in theory and 
practice is the result of an influential but fallacious libertarian assumption that crime is capable 
of being solved by the independent labour of the state unassisted by the accused. A regularly 
voiced libertarian criticism is that it is easier to sit in the shade and coerce admissions from a 
suspect instead of going out into the sun and hunting down clues. 29 In theory this may sound 
very well, but in practice a criminal act is often carried out outside the public eye and with the 
deliberate intention to avoid leaving clues. Quite often only the perpetrator has relevant 
knowledge of the crime. The silence principle which so effectively excludes reliable evidence 
may markedly impair the truth-seeking function of the trial, forcing the police and courts to 
scramble around in finding alternative ways of admitting evidence extracted from the accused. 
In theory the silence principle is part of the adversarial process in which the prosecution and the 
defence square up against each other and fight over the body of the accused before a neutral 
judge-umpire. The accused's conviction is supposedly obtained in a public trial in which justice 
is seen to be done. In practice the majority of criminal convictions are obtained either by the 
plea-bargain, the voluntary confession or through an arraigned guilty plea. For example, the 
Americans have made plea-bargaining into a fine art of negotiated compromise completely 
removed from the notion of justice. These kind of convictions by-pass the trial process 
altogether and are mediated in the prosecutor's office. Ironically, the accusatorial trial process 
elaborately protects the accused through his right to silence in an open and public court where 
the danger of state abuse is minimal. But behind the scenes where the accused's right to silence 
is weak, police interrogators psychologically induce confessions and prosecutors negotiate 
these confessions into guilty pleas. 
29 Stephen History of the Criminal Law of England London (1883) Vol1, 42. 
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As a result of these extra-curial methods, the noble "due process" protections of the accusatorial 
trial, including the right to silence, become practically irrelevant. To a degree the accusatorial 
criminal process has been cynically redesigned to exploit cost-efficient guilty pleas without the 
need for recourse to a time-consuming and expensive trial. Kasimar0 criticises the excessive 
and unbalanced "due process" protections of the American trial system by noting the contrast 
between the weak procedural rights of the suspect in the police station (the gatehouse) and the 
strong array of protections for the accused at trial (the mansion). As a matter of practical 
strategy, the prosecutor will concentrate his efforts at the gatehouse (the police station) where 
the suspect is vulnerable, in order to lessen his workload at the mansion (in the trial), where the 
accused is strong. The attempt to obtain a trial conviction in which the accused is elaborately 
shielded by a sophisticated right to silence, is now so difficult that state prosecutors are 
practically forced to rely on extra-curial devices for a significant number of their convictions. 
Recognising this problem there is a movement in South Africa to introduce a formal plea-
bargaining system. Parliament's Justice Committee has endorsed a plea-bargaining system 
which closely resembles the American system. 31 
This solution may be criticised on the ground that it address the symptoms, without curing the 
disease. Rather than adding one more extra-curial administrative layer to an already 
overburdened criminal process, 32 it would have been more logical to reform the actual trial 
procedures. By streamlining the accused's procedural protections at trial (for example, by 
limiting the right to silence) a trial conviction can be made as cost-effective as a plea-bargain 
conviction. The subterfuge employed by the accusatorial system must be compared to the 
inquisitorial system which is openly designed around the interrogation of the accused and the 
inducement of a confession. Both the accusatorial and the inquisitorial systems rely heavily on 
the cost-effective confession. But what the inquisitorial system does publically and with the 
proper safeguards in place, the accusatorial system does furtively via the backroom and often 
in the absence of proper procedural safeguards. South Africa is a good illustration of the 
difference between a theoretical right to silence and the diminished role it plays in practice. The 
South African criminal justice system is distorted by a theoretical adherence to First World 
procedural standards and frustrated by a Third World's practical lack of resources. In order to 
cope with the gradual breakdown of the criminal justice system, the South African courts must 
be prepared to adopt a less aggressive adversarial trial process in which elaborately technical 
3° Kasimar "Equal Justice in the Gatehouse and Mansions of the American Criminal Procedure" Police 
Interrogations and Confessions (1980) 27. 
31 Criminal Procedure Amendment Bill, Justice Committee Report, 2 November 2001. 
32 The problem with plea-bargaining is that it creates a new opportunity for the bribery and corruption 
of badly paid state prosecutors. 
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and artificial safeguards (including the right to silence) are reformed or abolished altogether. 
In theory the silence principle is also purposely designed to protect the accused against 
mistakes by the lay person jury. The silence principle is meant to be a guideline and instruction 
to the jury on how to prevent the drawing of unreasonable or improper inferences from the 
accused's failure to testify. In practice the silence principle has no such effect and there is no 
practical manner by which to control the working of a juror's mind. Surely a judge should be 
saved from having to perform linguistic acrobats in defence of a right which is not real. In the 
words of the late Professor Cross,33 "spare the judge from talking gibberish to the jury, the 
conscientious magistrate from directing himself in imbecilic terms and the writer of the law of 
evidence from drawing distinctions absurd enough to bring a blush to the most hardened 
academic face". It has been argued that the absolute no-comment rule established by Griffin v 
California is a perfect illustration of the theoretical and practical dichotomy of the silence 
principle. On the one hand, the Griffin rule necessitates an almost automatic reversal when 
there is an improper prosecutorial comment on the accused's trial silence, irrespective of the 
strength of the prosecution's prima facie case. On the one hand, the no-comment rule fails to 
counteract the natural inference of guilt which arises in the minds of a layperson jury when 
confronted by a non-testifying accused. 
The South African trial system also illustrates the practical absurdity of the silence principle. It 
could be argued that a silence principle is redundant in a non-jury type criminal trial. Does the 
South African accused really need a constitutionally entrenched right to silence as a protection 
against the professional judge, who in the course of evaluating the probative evidence may want 
to draw an adverse inference from the accused's silence? Surely in this regard the elevation of 
the silence principle into a constitutional right is an unnecessary and excessive protection. Is it 
not another example of the sentimentality of a libertarian philosophy out of touch with practical 
reality. An absurd introduction of one more obstacle in the South African justice system already 
teetering on the brink of collapse. 
A Balance of Interests: Unlike other common law principles, the silence principle by placing 
an artificial constraint on the state's ability to collect evidence, creates an obvious conflict 
between the policy of combating crime and the policy of protecting individual procedural rights. 
Each Anglo-American jurisdiction, within its respective legal-cultural nuances, must adopt some 
kind of balance of interest analysis. The accusatorial criminal process provides two possible 
33 Cross "The Evidence Report: Sense or Nonsense" Grim L. Rev ( 1973) 329 at 333. 
'-
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methods of solving this' inherent tension. It may adopt a crime control model in which the 
balance of interests weighs heavily in favour of the cost-efficient combating of crime or a due 
process model in which the balance of interest swings in favour of the individual and a 
procedural protection against intrusive state infringements. The American and the South African 
constitutional silence principles are the result of a due process philosophy whereas the modern 
English statutory silence principle is the consequence of a crime control philosophy. The crime 
control model is utilitarian in nature and necessitates the curtailment of the silence principle in 
the interest of increased managerial efficiency. The due process model is based on a human 
rights philosophy which emphasises human value over managerial efficiency and is prepared 
to sacrifice a degree of efficiency in the interests of increasing individual procedural protections. 
The English Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 and to some extent the Police and 
Criminal Evidence Act 1984, are affirmative utilitarian statutes which place limitations on the 
accused's right to silence. America and South Africa have chosen a due process model which 
elevates the silence principle into a constitutional right and which places procedural limitations 
on the state's investigatory and trial powers. Within a due process philosophy the Americans 
have interpreted the fifth amendment right to silence in near absolute terms. 34 The critical point 
according to Douglas J (dissenting) in Ullmann v United States35 is that the constitution places, 
"the right to silence beyond the reach of government". The fifth amendment stands between the 
citizen and his government. The American balance of interest standard is an unsophisticated 
test which applies only on the periphery of fifth amendment jurisprudence. 36 By contrast the 
South African right to silence is a relative right subject to a complex balancing test incorporated 
in sec 36 of the Constitution. The South African limitation clause is probably the most 
sophisticated balance of interest test in the entire Anglo-American world. 
34 According to New Jersey v Portash 440 US 450, 459 (1979) and Fisher v United States 425 US 391, 
400 ( 1976), when the constitutional privilege arises in its most pristine form, interest balancing is 
unnecessary and impermissible. The fifth amendment, unlike the fourth, does not give way before 
"reasonableness". Lushing "Testimonial Immunity and the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination: A Study in 
Isomorphism" (73) J. Grim L and Criminology (1982) 1690, 1697, "no language in the Court's self-
incrimination opinions ... indicates that the privilege ever bends under the weight of competing interests". 
35 350 us 422, 454 (1956). 
36 The Supreme Court holds fast to a single defining standard. Whenever the state seeks to induce self-
incrimination in order to secure a criminal conviction, the privilege is absolute, but on the periphery in non-
criminal regulatory practices a balance of interest is permissible. California v Byers 402 US 424 (1971), 
"this balancing inevitably results in the dilution of constitutional guarantees". Crampton v Ohio 402 US 183, 
213 (1971}, "the balance will only be judged once the penalty has impaired fifth amendment interests to 
an appreciable extent". Simmons v United States 390 US 377 ( 1968) "it is intolerable that one constitutional 
right should be surrendered in order to assert another (a constitutional tension theory)". Nevertheless, 
because of the untouchable status of the fifth amendment, the balancing test is weak and permits only a 
superficial assessment of the effect of a penalty on self-incriminatory interests. 
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Unfortunately the silence principle, by its nature, does not lend itself easily to a balance of 
interest analysis. The right to silence, unlike other constitutional rights, has a certain element 
of absoluteness about it. Silence cannot be upheld in halves, nor granted for some offences and 
denied to others. It is essentially an "all" or "nothing" kind of right. This makes it conceptually 
difficult for the courts to apply a reasonable balance of interest analysis. The American courts 
are particularly prone to treating the right to silence in an unbalanced manner. On the one hand, 
the accused's "right" against self-incrimination and a refusal to testify at trial is protected as a 
near-absolute right against all possible state infringements and from which no adverse 
inferences may be drawn. On the other hand, the non-party witness "privilege" against self-
incrimination may be circumvented whenever the public or government interest so demands. 
Although never directly approving of a balance of interests, except in periphery non-criminal 
matters, the US Supreme Court has nevertheless applied a tacit balancing of interests standard 
in most of the seminal cases dealing with the self-incrimination clause. The balancing is done 
on an ad-hoc basis, because of the pervasive influence of the fifth amendment, and varies from 
case to case depending on the circumstance and the urgency of the government interest. 
One of the idiosyncrasies of the American and the English experience as highlighted in this 
thesis, is to honour the silence principle in theory, but to limit its practical application. In the 
battle between the individual's procedural interests and the need for efficient investigatory 
processes the silence principle is a clear loser. For example, in the many instances in which the 
witness silence privilege has been limited by the US Supreme Court the government interest has 
always dominated over the witness' constitutional right. The inconsistent, uneven and 
unbalanced treatment of the silence principle by both the American and English courts serves 
to illustrate that perhaps the silence principle is not a fundamental right but merely a sentimental 
legal device shrouded in bombastic rhetoric and shrugged aside whenever practical 
convenience demands it. 
The Ideal Silence Principle Model: Rule-utilitarianism offers a rational and practical 
methodology by which to define the silence principle without disturbing key elements of the 
accusatorial criminal process. The silence principle does have a place in adjectival law, not as 
a constitutional right (the American, Canadian and South African model), but as an ordinary 
evidentiary rule capable of rational judicial evaluation (the English statutory model). The 
defendant who refuses to respond to police questioning in a properly constituted interview or to 
testify in court, must do so in the full knowledge, quid pro quo, that his defensive use of silence 
may draw a reasonable adverse inference. A "reasonable" inference depends largely on the 
strength of the prosecution's case and will usually amount to no more than additional 
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circumstantial evidence against the accused. However, logic suggests that in certain limited 
situations it may be possible to draw a reasonable adverse inference from the defendant's 
silence which amounts to a direct inference of guilt. What reasonable inferences are to be drawn 
from the defendant's pre-trial or trial silence depends on the circumstances and is a question 
of utilitarian common sense. Generally, if there is no prima facie case to answer to, then no 
logical adverse inference may be drawn from the accused's silence. If the evidence against the 
defendant taken as a whole calls for an explanation and no such explanation is forthcoming, a 
reasonable adverse inference may be drawn. 
Such a utilitarian construction inspires confidence in the criminal justice system because it 
allows the defendant to be convicted on the basis of all the relevant evidence. The ideal silence 
principle is modelled on the example set by the English Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 
(CRIMPO) 1994, an excellently crafted statutory compromise which awards the accused a 
limited, but well-defined, procedural immunity without unnecessarily inhibiting effective law 
enforcement. The defensive use of silence by the defendant offers certain pre-trial and trial 
advantages, but is also entails certain disadvantages. The defendant and his legal adviser must 
strategically balance the defensive evidentiary use made of the defendant's silence against the 
known adverse inferences which the prosecution is entitled to draw from such a defensive 
strategy. 
The nature and purpose of a silence principle lends itself to the following ideal model: 
(a) The silence principle is awarded to the arrested suspect during the pre-trial police 
investigation and interrogation stage and consists of a specific immunity against being 
compelled to answer questions by a duly appointed authority. It is also a specific immunity 
for the accused at the trial stage and protects against being compelled to give evidence or 
to answer questions from the witness stand. 
(b) The silence principle must be invoked unequivocally and personally by the criminal 
defendant. The principle may also be waived voluntarily. 
(c) Three kinds of reasonable adverse inferences may be drawn from the defendant's 
evidentiary use of silence during the criminal process: 
(i) Silence may be reasonably construed as an implied admission of all or part of a 
statement made to the face of the defendant. 
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(ii) Silence alone or together with other evidence may reasonably amount to a general 
consciousness of guilt (note, adverse inference (i) is an implied acknowledgement of 
a specific statement, whereas adverse inference (ii) is an unintended acknowledgement 
of the value of all the probative evidence against the defendant). 
(iii) Silence may be reasonably used to evaluate other extraneous evidence by permitting 
inferences from such extraneous evidence to be more easily drawn. 
(iv) Adverse inferences (i), (ii) and (iii) may be properly drawn from the arrested suspect's 
pre-trial silence. Adverse inferences (ii) and (iii) may be properly drawn from the 
accused's failure to testify at trial. 
(d) The evidentiary use of silence will depend on whether or not a cautionary warning has been 
administered to the criminal defendant: 
(i) A cautionary warning must be administered to the suspect immediately upon arrest and 
at each subsequent police interrogation or interview. The warning should include the 
key words, "a failure to answer an accusation or question which an innocent person 
would be reasonably expected to deny, explain or answer, may result in an adverse 
inference against you at trial". 
(ii) At the end of the prosecution's case, the judge must warn the accused that a failure to 
deny, explain or answer the evidence given against him may result in an adverse 
inference being drawn. 
(e) What constitutes a "reasonable" adverse inference in the "appropriate circumstance" 
depends on the following factors: 
(i) An adverse inference may not be drawn unless a denial, explanation or answer is 
reasonably expected, taking into account the nature of the question, evidence or 
accusation. 
(ii) A reasonable inference will depend on: 
• the evidentiary strength of the prosecution's case; 
• the extent to which the evidentiary facts are within the defendant's personal 
knowledge; 
• whether the evidentiary facts are capable of amounting to an innocent explanation; 
• whether the defendant has already given an explanation on some other occasion. 
(iii) Other factors which may influence the drawing of adverse inferences from the suspect's 
pre-trial silence are: 
• whether the interrogation was written down or electronically recorded by the 
interviewer. If not, why not? 
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• the extent to which the suspect was given the opportunity to deny, explain or answer 
the interrogatory questions; 
• the extent of the knowledge and understanding possessed by the suspect enabling 
an informed denial, explanation or answer; 
• was the suspect given access to legal advice. To what extent does the suspect's 
failure to deny, explain or answer flow from the nature of the legal advice given? 
The jurisprudence surrounding the silence principle exhibits a disturbing degree of 
ambivalence. 37 None of the proponents of the silence principle are able to provide a sufficiently 
persuasive raison d'etre to justify a principle which has proved to be both theoretically and 
practically inconsistent. The large number of statutory and other exceptions to the non-party 
witness privilege against self-incrimination is a pragmatic indication that silence, far from being 
a fundamental right, is in reality merely an ordinary legal rule amongst other legal rules. It does 
not possess a particularly unique auctoritas. In the Anglo-American legal tradition two major 
trends may be identified. Amongst American theorists, the silence principle enshrined within the 
fifth amendment as a sort of "holy grail", has been safe from radical attack. Debate has centred 
more on an analysis of the periodic waxing and waning of its protective sphere without touching 
on the sensitive issue of its abolition. Amongst English theorists the common law silence 
principle (unburdened by a written constitution) has been the subject of a number of plausible 
attacks against its very nature and existence. 
It has been argued that the trend towards the constitutional entrenchment of a silence principle 
is conceptually misguided. The term "right" to silence is a misnomer. A right must contain the 
crucial elements of morality and rationality. As has been amply demonstrated in the course of 
this thesis the silence principle contains neither of these exacting criteria. The practical 
consequence of elevating a silence principle devoid of rational meaning into a constitutional right 
serves only to inhibit the efficient administration of justice and to undermine the legitimacy of the 
criminal justice system. The ideal model for a silence principle suggested above would sweep 
away all current restrictions on adverse inferences and allow logical inferences, determined by 
the particular circumstance, to be drawn from the defendant's silence. The judge (especially in 
a non-jury type trial system) should be given the freedom to draw any reasonable inference from 
the evidentiary material. These revisions parallel the modern English approach and are heavily 
influenced by a utilitarian philosophy. After all, Bentham's forceful maxim, "evidence is the basis 
37 Louisell supra note 25 at 94, "Why this ambivalence, this schizophrenia about the fifth amendment? 
If the principle is so solid, valuable and significant, why so many accepted encroachments? If the fifth 
amendment is such an old friend, why do we depart its company so readily?" 
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of justice, exclude evidence and you exclude justice" is persuasive common sense and should 
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